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When you build something, you have to pick some design goals and priorities. Ideally you do so explicitly, but even if you don't, you're still implicitly doing so based on your design choices. These choices are trade-offs. If you want to write a quiet song, it won't be loud. If you are writing a software tool and you want to prioritize speed over simplicity, then it won't be as simple as if you'd prioritized simplicity over speed. There are two main signs that you've succeeded at your goals. The first, and more pleasant, is that you get compliments about how your thing is like you wanted it to be. "I love that song, it's so quiet!" "Your tool is so fast!" Why thank you, that's exactly what I was going for. The second sign, though, is that you will get complaints. Specifically, people will complain that your thing does not achieve the things you didn't set out to achieve. "I wish this song was louder", "this tool is so hard to use". That you are receiving complaints at all means that people are aware of your creation; that they are complaining about what you specifically set out to make a non-goal is a side-effect of the fact that you made that trade-off. The worst thing to do, when you receive such complaints, is take them to heart and try to fix them. This is because by definition you wanted these complaints. They are a sign that the thing you built is built as you wanted to build it. The people complaining want something different, they don't want your thing. It's just that your thing is so good that it's the thing they're compelled towards even though it doesn't prioritize the things they care about most. If you try to fix these complaints, you will, again by definition, be compromising on your goals. If you make the song have a loud part, then it's no longer a quiet song. You wanted a quiet song. Now it's a song that's quiet in parts and loud in parts. It probably still doesn't satisfy the needs of the people who want a loud song, and now it also doesn't satisfy the needs of the people who wanted your original quiet song. If you make your tool easier to use by compromising on the speed, then now you have a tool that's both not as fast as it could be and not as usable as it could have been if you'd started with that as a goal. It's important, therefore, to separate out complaints into those that are complaints you expect based on your design goals (which you should acknowledge but not fix), vs complaints that are either orthogonal to your goals (which you can fix without compromising your goals), or that are in line with your goals (which you should prioritize, since that's what you said to yourself was most important in the first place).
My involvement in web standards started with the CSS working group. One of the things that we struggled with as a working group was that we would specify how the technology should work, but the browser vendors' implementations weren't exactly what we intended, and web authors would then write web pages that worked with those browsers, even though that meant the web pages themselves were also not doing things like the specifications said they should. The folks I worked with at the W3C (especially the academics and people working for organizations that did not themselves implement browsers) would frequently bemoan this state of affairs, expressing surprise at how they, the people in charge of the standards, were not being respected by the people implementing the standards. One of the key insights I had very early on in my work, before working on HTML5, which really influenced the WHATWG and its work, is the realization that the power dynamics at work were not at all the power dynamics that the folks at the W3C described. The reality of the situation was that the power lay entirely in the hands of the users. The users chose browsers. A browser vendor that ignored what the users wanted would lose market share. Market share is everything in this space. Browser vendors want users because they can convert users into dollars (in various ways, but they typically boil down to someone showing them ads and paying the browser vendors for the privilege). In turn, the browser vendors had more power than the specifications. What they implement is, by definition, what the technology is. The specification can say in absolute clarity that the keyword "marigold" should look yellow, but if a browser vendor makes it look red, then no web author is going to use it to mean yellow, and many will use it to mean red. There is a feedback loop here: if one browser implements "marigold" to mean red, and some important web site (or many unimportant web sites) rely on it, and say something like "best viewed in ThisOrThat browser!" because that's the one they use and in that browser it looks red and red is what looks best, then the other browser vendors are incentivised to make sure that the web page looks good in their browser too. Regardless of what the specification says, therefore, they are going to make "marigold" look red and not yellow. When I realized this, I also realized a corollary: if you have two competing specifications that both claim to define the same technology, but one matches what the browsers already do while the other one does not, the browser vendors are going to find it more useful to follow the one that matches what they do. This is because they can trust that implementing that specification will get them more market share. It means they won't have to stop and think at every step, "will following this specification cause me to lose users?". It is easier for them to use a specification that takes into account their needs in this way. We actually tried to explain this to the W3C membership. There was a big meeting in 2004 at Adobe in San Jose, the "W3C Workshop on Web Applications and Compound Documents". We tried to convey the above (I didn't quite understand it in the stark "power dynamic" terms yet, or at least, I didn't really express it in those terms, but if you read our position paper you can see this insight starting to crystalize). At this meeting, we made a pitch for the W3C to continue to maintain HTML and to care about what the browser vendors wanted. Representatives from Microsoft and Sun (in many ways arch enemies at the time) supported us. I seem to recall Apple being more quiet about it at the meeting but also essentially supporting the principles. The W3C membership resoundly rejected this whole concept. One of the W3C staff even explicitly said something along the lines of "if you want to do this you should do it elsewhere". That's what led to the WHATWG being founded a few weeks later. The WHATWG was founded on this core principle — the specifications need to actually specify reality. When the browsers disagree with the spec, the spec is by definition incorrect and needs to change, regardless of how much technically superior the design in the spec is. Naturally, when you provide browser vendors with something that valuable, they will follow. You end up with a weird inverted power dynamic. The spec writer (when they follow this principle) has all the power, but only within the space that the browser vendors are themselves willing to play; and the browser vendors have all the power, but only within the space that the users are willing to put up with. It's very easy to appear to be in control when you tell people to do the thing they were going to do anyway (or at least, one of the things they were willing to do if they were to think about it). There is a (probably apocryphal) quote supposedly by Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin that is often cited in mockery of bad leadership, but that perfectly matches the power dynamic here: "There go my people; I must find out where they are going so I can lead them". (Thanks to Leonard Damhorst for prompting me to write this post.)
I often get asked how many people contribute to Flutter. It's a hard question to answer because "contribute" is a very vague concept. There's tens of thousands of packages on pub.dev, all of which are written by contributors to the community. There's over 100,000 of issues filed in our issue database, filed by more than 35,000 people over the years (the exact number is hard to pin down because people sometimes delete their GitHub accounts; about 700 issues have been filed by people who have since deleted their account). Many more people still have used the "thumbs-up" reaction to indicate that an issue matters to them, with almost 165,000 thumbs up from about 45,000 people. All of these people are valuable contributors to Flutter. Usually, when pressed, people try to clarify by asking about "the core team". Again though it's hard to say exactly what that means, but let's assume they mean "people with commit access". That is, people we trust enough to have added to the GitHub repo as collaborators. This includes people who work on Flutter for companies like Google, Canonical, or Nevercode, and it includes people like me who are self-employed and/or contribute to Flutter on a volunteer basis. Currently that's about 280 people. So is that the answer? Well, no, not really. Some people have commit access but aren't active (maybe they got access because of their employer, but were then reassigned to work on another project, and the bureaucracy hasn't caught up with them yet — we only audit the membership occasionally because it's rather tedious to do). Some people have been very active recently but don't have commit access (e.g. because they were just laid off and a bot automatically removed their access; they might even resume working on Flutter in the future, as a volunteer or funded by another company). So what's the answer? I recently drilled down through our data to see if I could answer this. I will caveat the following numbers by saying that this changes all the time. We added a new team member just today (hi Nate!) who is not counted as a team member in the following numbers because we collected the data a few weeks ago (it takes literally days to scrape all the data from GitHub, and then hours to explore the resulting very large and very slow spreadsheet). Also, some of my definitions are a bit arbitrary, and slightly tweaking the limits would probably change the numbers noticeably. First, I collected a list of everyone who has ever created an issue, commented on an issue, put an emoji reaction on the first comment of an issue, or submitted a PR, excluding bots and people who deleted their GitHub account. (Actually Piinks did the actual data collection. Thanks!) I limited this to a subset of the GitHub repos of the flutter org that is relatively inclusive but does not count everything (we have a lot of historical repositories and so forth). This finds about 94,357 people. (So there you go. The Flutter team is about a hundred thousand people!) To avoid padding the numbers with people who left the project long ago, and to avoid counting "drive-by" contributors who came, did a bunch of work, and then left, I then limited the data set to people who contributed over a period of more than 180 days, and who last contributed sometime in 2024. Because of the definition of "contributed" described above, that means that someone who added a thumbs-up to an issue in December 2020 and then filed an issue in January 2024, and did nothing else, is included, but someone who submitted two PRs in March 2024 is not. Like I said, this is a bit arbitrary. Anyway, that leaves 3,839 people, of which 182 currently have commit access, 27 once had commit access but don't currently (these are mainly people who either got laid off recently and had their commit access revoked by an automated process, or people who were once team members, left, lost access from inactivity long ago, and then later came to comment on issues or file new issues — it's surprisingly common for people who once worked on Flutter full time to stick around even when their employment changes), and about 3,627 people who have never had commit access. Of those who have never had commit access, 2,407 have filed at least one issue or submitted at least one PR (accounting for a total of 12,383 issues and 2,613 PRs). Of those, 341 have filed 5 to 9 issues (2,242 issues total), and 296 have filed 10 or more issues in their lifetime (7,021 total issues). Similarly, of the "never had commit access" cohort, 73 people have sent 5 to 9 pull requests in their lifetime (458 total PRs) and 47 have sent 10 or more (1,321 PRs total). (For context, 4,663 people have ever submitted a pull request, and 429 have ever submitted more than 10 PRs.) Of the people who currently have commit access, 98 people have submitted more than one PR every 3 weeks on average since they first got involved (accounting for 49,173 PRs), 75 people have closed at least one issue every 3 weeks (accounting for 48,490 total issue closures), of which 10 are not in the first group (mostly that's our triage team), and 150 people have commented at least once every 3 weeks. A follow-up question a lot of people ask is "do they all work for Google?". This is a surprisingly hard question to answer. There are a lot of weird edge cases. For example, one person worked on Flutter for a company that Google hired to work on Flutter, but then quit that company, asked for their commit privileges to be removed, but continued to be active in the community. Several people who have quit Google (such as myself), or been laid off by Google, have continued to be active in one sense or another (I think I submit more code to Flutter now than I did in my last year at Google). It's also hard to answer because a lot more people at Google contribute to Flutter than just those on Google's Flutter team, and a lot of people on Google's Flutter team contribute in ways that don't show up on GitHub (e.g. product management, marketing, developer relations, internal tooling). Of the 98 people who have commit access, have been active for more than 180 days, have contributed at least once this year, and have submitted more than one PR every 3 weeks on average for the entire time they've been contributing, I estimate (based on what I know of people's employment and so forth) that about 85% are Googlers or somehow get their funding from Google, and about 15% are currently independent of Google. (This is by no means the entirety of the Google team contributing to Flutter; as I mentioned earlier, many folks at Google working on Flutter don't appear in these statistics.) I'm not sure what conclusion to draw from this; it's both more people than I expected to see funded by Google, which is great, and fewer people that aren't funded by Google, which is less great. On the other hand, it's still a significant number of non-Google-funded people. Is it enough? I think that really depends on what your goals are. I think if your goal is for Flutter to be an order of magnitude better than other UI frameworks, then frankly no, it's not enough. There is a ton of work to be done to get there. We know what it would take, but we don't have the people to do it today. On the other hand if your goal is to be a great framework, on par with others, then it's probably adequate. It would certainly be difficult to continue to be great with fewer people today. Of course, that may change as we complete big efforts, or as we take on new ones, or as the landscape changes, it's all hard to predict. That said, I would love to see more direct contributions from non-Google sources, if for no other reason but to end this silly "will Google cancel Flutter" line of questioning that has followed the project since its inception. It's a dumb question. Flutter's an open source UI framework. It will never die. It will become old and something else will shine brighter one day, just as happens with literally every other UI framework ever. That's just how our industry works. There's no reason to believe that'll happen any time soon though, and certainly no reason for it to happen earlier for Flutter than any other modern UI framework.
Despite my departure from Google, I am not leaving Flutter — the great thing about open source and open standards is that the product and the employer are orthogonal. I've had three employers in my career, and in all three cases when I left my employer I continued my job. With Netscape I was a member of the team before my internship, during my internship, and after my internship. With Opera Software, I joined while working on standards, kept working on standards, and left while working on the same standard that I then continued to work on at Google. So this is not a new thing for me. Flutter is amazingly successful. It's already the leading mobile app development framework, and I think we're close to having the table stakes required to make it the obvious default choice for desktop development as well (it's already there for some use cases). It's increasingly used in embedded scenarios. And Flutter is extremely well positioned to be the first truly usable Wasm framework as the web transitions to the more powerful, lower-level Wasm-based model over the next few years. In the coming month I will prepare our roadmap for 2024 (in consultation with the rest of the team). For me personally, however, my focus will probably be on fixing fun bugs, and on making progress on blankcanvas, my library for making it easy to build custom widget sets. I also expect I will be continuing to work on package:rfw, the UI-push library, as there has been increasing interest from teams using Flutter and wanting ways to present custom interfaces determined by the server at runtime without requiring the user to download an updated app.
I joined Google in October 2005, and handed in my resignation 18 years later. Last week was my last week at Google. I feel very lucky to have experienced the early post-IPO Google; unlike most companies, and contrary to the popular narrative, Googlers, from the junior engineer all the way to the C-suite, were genuinely good people who cared very much about doing the right thing. The oft-mocked "don't be evil" truly was the guiding principle of the company at the time (largely a reaction to contemporaries like Microsoft whose operating procedures put profits far above the best interests of customers and humanity as a whole). Many times I saw Google criticised for actions that were sincerely intended to be good for society. Google Books, for example. Much of the criticism Google received around Chrome and Search, especially around supposed conflicts of interest with Ads, was way off base (it's surprising how often coincidences and mistakes can appear malicious). I often saw privacy advocates argue against Google proposals in ways that were net harmful to users. Some of these fights have had lasting effects on the world at large; one of the most annoying is the prevalence of pointless cookie warnings we have to wade through today. I found it quite frustrating how teams would be legitimately actively pursuing ideas that would be good for the world, without prioritising short-term Google interests, only to be met with cynicism in the court of public opinion. Charlie's patio at Google, 2011. Image has been manipulated to remove individuals. Early Google was also an excellent place to work. Executives gave frank answers on a weekly basis, or were candid about their inability to do so (e.g. for legal reasons or because some topic was too sensitive to discuss broadly). Eric Schmidt regularly walked the whole company through the discussions of the board. The successes and failures of various products were presented more or less objectively, with successes celebrated and failures examined critically with an eye to learning lessons rather than assigning blame. The company had a vision, and deviations from that vision were explained. Having experienced Dilbert-level management during my internship at Netscape five years earlier, the uniform competence of people at Google was very refreshing. For my first nine years at Google I worked on HTML and related standards. My mandate was to do the best thing for the web, as whatever was good for the web would be good for Google (I was explicitly told to ignore Google's interests). This was a continuation of the work I started while at Opera Software. Google was an excellent host for this effort. My team was nominally the open source team at Google, but I was entirely autonomous (for which I owe thanks to Chris DiBona). Most of my work was done on a laptop from random buildings on Google's campus; entire years went by where I didn't use my assigned desk. In time, exceptions to Google's cultural strengths developed. For example, as much as I enjoyed Vic Gundotra's enthusiasm (and his initial vision for Google+, which again was quite well defined and, if not necessarily uniformly appreciated, at least unambiguous), I felt less confident in his ability to give clear answers when things were not going as well as hoped. He also started introducing silos to Google (e.g. locking down certain buildings to just the Google+ team), a distinct departure from the complete internal transparency of early Google. Another example is the Android team (originally an acquisition), who never really fully acclimated to Google's culture. Android's work/life balance was unhealthy, the team was not as transparent as older parts of Google, and the team focused on chasing the competition more than solving real problems for users. My last nine years were spent on Flutter. Some of my fondest memories of my time at Google are of the early days of this effort. Flutter was one of the last projects to come out of the old Google, part of a stable of ambitious experiments started by Larry Page shortly before the creation of Alphabet. We essentially operated like a startup, discovering what we were building more than designing it. The Flutter team was very much built out of the culture of young Google; for example we prioritised internal transparency, work/life balance, and data-driven decision making (greatly helped by Tao Dong and his UXR team). We were radically open from the beginning, which made it easy for us to build a healthy open source project around the effort as well. Flutter was also very lucky to have excellent leadership throughout the years, such as Adam Barth as founding tech lead, Tim Sneath as PM, and Todd Volkert as engineering manager. We also didn't follow engineering best practices for the first few years. For example we wrote no tests and had precious little documentation. This whiteboard is what passed for a design doc for the core Widget, RenderObject, and dart:ui layers. This allowed us to move fast at first, but we paid for it later. Flutter grew in a bubble, largely insulated from the changes Google was experiencing at the same time. Google's culture eroded. Decisions went from being made for the benefit of users, to the benefit of Google, to the benefit of whoever was making the decision. Transparency evaporated. Where previously I would eagerly attend every company-wide meeting to learn what was happening, I found myself now able to predict the answers executives would give word for word. Today, I don't know anyone at Google who could explain what Google's vision is. Morale is at an all-time low. If you talk to therapists in the bay area, they will tell you all their Google clients are unhappy with Google. Then Google had layoffs. The layoffs were an unforced error driven by a short-sighted drive to ensure the stock price would keep growing quarter-to-quarter, instead of following Google's erstwhile strategy of prioritising long-term success even if that led to short-term losses (the very essence of "don't be evil"). The effects of layoffs are insidious. Whereas before people might focus on the user, or at least their company, trusting that doing the right thing will eventually be rewarded even if it's not strictly part of their assigned duties, after a layoff people can no longer trust that their company has their back, and they dramatically dial back any risk-taking. Responsibilities are guarded jealously. Knowledge is hoarded, because making oneself irreplaceable is the only lever one has to protect oneself from future layoffs. I see all of this at Google now. The lack of trust in management is reflected by management no longer showing trust in the employees either, in the form of inane corporate policies. In 2004, Google's founders famously told Wall Street "Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one." but that Google is no more. Much of these problems with Google today stem from a lack of visionary leadership from Sundar Pichai, and his clear lack of interest in maintaining the cultural norms of early Google. A symptom of this is the spreading contingent of inept middle management. Take Jeanine Banks, for example, who manages the department that somewhat arbitrarily contains (among other things) Flutter, Dart, Go, and Firebase. Her department nominally has a strategy, but I couldn't leak it if I wanted to; I literally could never figure out what any part of it meant, even after years of hearing her describe it. Her understanding of what her teams are doing is minimal at best; she frequently makes requests that are completely incoherent and inapplicable. She treats engineers as commodities in a way that is dehumanising, reassigning people against their will in ways that have no relationship to their skill set. She is completely unable to receive constructive feedback (as in, she literally doesn't even acknowledge it). I hear other teams (who have leaders more politically savvy than I) have learned how to "handle" her to keep her off their backs, feeding her just the right information at the right time. Having seen Google at its best, I find this new reality depressing. There are still great people at Google. I've had the privilege to work with amazing people on the Flutter team such as JaYoung Lee, Kate Lovett, Kevin Chisholm, Zoey Fan, Dan Field, and dozens more (sorry folks, I know I should just name all of you but there's too many!). In recent years I started offering career advice to anyone at Google and through that met many great folks from around the company. It's definitely not too late to heal Google. It would require some shake-up at the top of the company, moving the centre of power from the CFO's office back to someone with a clear long-term vision for how to use Google's extensive resources to deliver value to users. I still believe there's lots of mileage to be had from Google's mission statement (to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful). Someone who wanted to lead Google into the next twenty years, maximising the good to humanity and disregarding the short-term fluctuations in stock price, could channel the skills and passion of Google into truly great achievements. I do think the clock is ticking, though. The deterioration of Google's culture will eventually become irreversible, because the kinds of people whom you need to act as moral compass are the same kinds of people who don't join an organisation without a moral compass.
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Hold my hand, grow my skin Erica Western Geiger Counter Do you have any addictions? You may not register them as such, perhaps because they don’t lead to anything you consider harmful consequences. But you have them. In some ways, all your behavior is compulsive. What would the alternative be? A point is, if we have something that we can predict this video Free will comes from the “veil of computability”, things look random until you find the pattern. I was at a bar last night and this girl told me you can’t predict humans, and the exact example she used was that it’s not like y = mx + b Oh, if only she knew. The dreams of my childhood have come true, studying machine learning has shown me how I work. I tried to explain that instead of 2 parameters it’s 100 trillion parameters, and it’s the slightly different y = relu(w@x) + b a bunch of times, you have to put some nonlinearities in there cause linear systems can only approximate a small class of functions. But this explanation was not heard at a bar. She was so confident she was right, and like I don’t even know where to start. Reader of this blog, do you know? AI is coming and we are so unbelievably unprepared. What is this garbage and this garbage. It’s nerd shit and political propaganda. The amount of power over nature that the Silicon Valley death cult is stumbling into is horrifying, and these high priests don’t have a basic grasp of people. No humanities education (perhaps the programs were gutted on purpose). Are we ready for the hypnodrones? How the fuck is targeted advertising legal and culturally okay? This will not stop until they take our free will from us. There’s a fire that burns today Better Nukes don’t end humanity. Current path AI doesn’t end humanity. It just ends all the machines and hands the world over to the street people. Now I see how the dark ages happened. If all the humans died today, all the machines would shortly follow. If all the machines died today, humanity would keep on going. Pay attention to this milestone. To date, machines are not robust, and evolution may be efficient at robust search. If it is, we get dark ages. If it’s not and we find a shortcut, God only knows.
This is re-post of How to Permanently Increase Your Sales by 50% or More in Only One Day article by Steve Pavlina Of all the things you can do to increase your sales, one of the highest leverage activities is attempting to increase your products’ registration rate. Increasing your registration rate from 1.0% to 1.5% means that you simply convince one more downloader out of every 200 to make the decision to buy. Yet that same tiny increase will literally increase your sales by a full 50%. If you’re one of those developers who simply slapped the ubiquitous 30-day trial incentive on your shareware products without going any further than that, then I think a 50% increase in your registration rate is a very attainable goal you can achieve if you spend just one full day of concentrated effort on improving your product’s ability to sell. My hope is that this article will get you off to a good start and get you thinking more creatively. And even if you fail, your result might be that you achieve only a 25% or a 10% increase. How much additional money would that represent to you over the next five years of sales? What influence, if any, did the title of this article have on your decision to read it? If I had titled this article, “Registration Incentives,” would you have been more or less likely to read it now? Note that the title expresses a specific and clear benefit to you. It tells you exactly what you can expect to gain by reading it. Effective registration incentives work the same way. They offer clear, specific benefits to the user if a purchase is made. In order to improve your registration incentives, the first thing you need to do is to adopt some new beliefs that will change your perspective. I’m going to introduce you to what I call the “lies of success” in the shareware industry. These are statements that are not true at all, but if you accept them as true anyway, you’ll achieve far better results than if you don’t. Rule 1: What you are selling is merely the difference between the shareware and the registered versions, not the registered version itself. Note that this is not a true statement, but if you accept it as true, you’ll immediately begin to see the weaknesses in your registration incentives. If there are few additional benefits for buying the full version vs. using the shareware version, then you aren’t offering the user strong enough incentives to make the full purchase. Rule 2: The sole purpose of the shareware version is to close the sale. This is our second lie of success. Note the emphasis on the word “close.” Your shareware version needs to act as a direct sales vehicle. It must be able to take the user all the way to the point of purchase, i.e. your online order form, ideally with nothing more than a few mouse clicks. Anything that detracts from achieving a quick sale is likely to hurt sales. Rule 3: The customer’s perspective is the only one that matters. Defy this rule at your peril. Customers don’t care that you spent 2000 hours creating your product. Customers don’t care that you deserve the money for your hard work. Customers don’t care that you need to do certain things to prevent piracy. All that matters to them are their own personal wants and needs. Yes, these are lies of success. Some customers will care, but if you design your registration incentives assuming they only care about their own self-interests, your motivation to buy will be much stronger than if you merely appeal to their sense of honesty, loyalty, or honor. Assume your customers are all asking, “What’s in it for me if I choose to buy? What will I get? How will this help me?” I don’t care if you’re selling to Fortune 500 companies. At some point there will be an individual responsible for causing the purchase to happen, and that individual is going to consider how the purchase will affect him/her personally: “Will this purchase get me fired? Will it make me look good in front of my peers? Will this make my job easier or harder?” Many shareware developers get caught in the trap of discriminating between honest and dishonest users, believing that honest users will register and dishonest ones won’t. This line of thinking will ultimately get you nowhere, and it violates the third lie of success. When you make a purchase decision, how often do you use honesty as the deciding factor? Do you ever say, “I will buy this because I’m honest?” Or do you consider other more selfish factors first, such as how it will make you feel to purchase the software? The truth is that every user believes s/he is honest, so no user applies the honesty criterion when making a purchase decision. Thinking of your users in terms of honest ones vs. dishonest ones is a complete waste of time because that’s not how users primarily view themselves. Rule 4: Customers buy on emotion and justify with fact. If you’re honest with yourself, you’ll see that this is how you make most purchase decisions. Remember the last time you bought a computer. Is it fair to say that you first became emotionally attached to the idea of owning a new machine? For me, it’s the feeling of working faster, owning the latest technology, and being more productive that motivates me to go computer shopping. Once I’ve become emotionally committed, the justifications follow: “It’s been two years since I’ve upgraded, it will pay for itself with the productivity boost I gain, I can easily afford it, I’ve worked hard and I deserve a new machine, etc.” You use facts to justify the purchase. Once you understand how purchase decisions are made, you can see that your shareware products need to first get the user emotionally invested in the purchase, and then you give them all the facts they need to justify it. Now that we’ve gotten these four lies of success out of the way, let’s see how we might apply them to create some compelling registration incentives. Let’s start with Rule 1. What incentives can be spawned from this rule? The common 30-day trial is one obvious derivative. If you are only selling the difference between the shareware and registered versions, then a 30-day trial implies that you are selling unlimited future days of usage of the program after the trial period expires. This is a powerful incentive, and it’s been proven effective for products that users will continue to use month after month. 30-day trials are easy for users to understand, and they’re also easy to implement. You could also experiment with other time periods such as 10 days, 14 days, or 90 days. The only way of truly knowing which will work best for your products is to experiment. But let’s see if we can move a bit beyond the basic 30-day trial here by mixing in a little of Rule 3. How would the customer perceive a 30-day trial? In most cases 30 days is plenty of time to evaluate a product. But in what situations would a 30-day trial have a negative effect? A good example is when the user downloads, installs, and briefly checks out a product s/he may not have time to evaluate right away. By the time the user gets around to fully evaluating it, the shareware version has already expired, and a sale may be lost as a result. To get around this limitation, many shareware developers have started offering 30 days of actual program usage instead of 30 consecutive days. This allows the user plenty of time to try out the program at his/her convenience. Another possibility would be to limit the number of times the program can be run. The basic idea is that you are giving away limited usage and selling unlimited usage of the program. This incentive definitely works if your product is one that will be used frequently over a long period of time (much longer than the trial period). The flip side of usage limitation is to offer an additional bonus for buying within a certain period of time. For instance, in my game Dweep, I offer an extra 5 free bonus levels to everyone who buys within the first 10 days. In truth I give the bonus levels to everyone who buys, but the incentive is real from the customer’s point of view. Remember Rule 3 - it doesn’t matter what happens on my end; it only matters what the customer perceives. Any customer that buys after the first 10 days will be delighted anyway to receive a bonus they thought they missed. So if your product has no time-based incentives at all, this is the first place to start. When would you pay your bills if they were never due, and no interest was charged on late payments? Use time pressure to your advantage, either by disabling features in the shareware version after a certain time or by offering additional bonuses for buying sooner rather than later. If nothing else and if it’s legal in your area, offer a free entry in a random monthly drawing for a small prize, such as one of your other products, for anyone who buys within the first X days. Another logical derivative of Rule 1 is the concept of feature limitation. On the crippling side, you can start with the registered version and begin disabling functionality to create the shareware version. Disabling printing in a shareware text editor is a common strategy. So is corrupting your program’s output with a simple watermark. For instance, your shareware editor could print every page with your logo in the background. Years ago the Association of Shareware Professionals had a strict policy against crippling, but that policy was abandoned, and crippling has been recognized as an effective registration incentive. It is certainly possible to apply feature limitation without having it perceived as crippling. This is especially easy for games, which commonly offer a limited number of playable levels in the shareware version with many more levels available only in the registered version. In this situation you offer the user a seemingly complete experience of your product in the shareware version, and you provide additional features on top of that for the registered version. Time-based incentives and feature-based incentives are perhaps the two most common strategies used by shareware developers for enticing users to buy. Which will work best for you? You will probably see the best results if you use both at the same time. Imagine you’re the end user for a moment. Would you be more likely to buy if you were promised additional features and given a deadline to make the decision? I’ve seen several developers who were using only one of these two strategies increase their registration rates dramatically by applying the second strategy on top of the first. If you only use time-based limitations, how could you apply feature limitation as well? Giving the user more reasons to buy will translate to more sales per download. One you have both time-based and feature-based incentives to buy, the next step is to address the user’s perceived risk by applying a risk-reversal strategy. Fortunately, the shareware model already reduces the perceived risk of purchasing significantly, since the user is able to try before buying. But let’s go a little further, keeping Rule 3 in mind. What else might be a perceived risk to the user? What if the user reaches the end of the trial period and still isn’t certain the product will do what s/he needs? What if the additional features in the registered version don’t work as the user expects? What can we do to make the decision to purchase safer for the user? One approach is to offer a money-back guarantee. I’ve been offering a 60-day unconditional money-back guarantee on all my products since January 2000. If someone asks for their money back for any reason, I give them a full refund right away. So what is my return rate? Well, it’s about 8%. Just kidding! Would it surprise you to learn that my return rate at the time of this writing is less than 0.2%? Could you handle two returns out of every 1000 sales? My best estimate is that this one technique increased my sales by 5-10%, and it only took a few minutes to implement. When I suggest this strategy to other shareware developers, the usual reaction is fear. “But everyone would rip me off,” is a common response. I suggest trying it for yourself on an experimental basis; a few brave souls have already tried it and are now offering money-back guarantees prominently. Try putting it up on your web site for a while just to convince yourself it works. You can take it down at any time. After a few months, if you’re happy with the results, add the guarantee to your shareware products as well. I haven’t heard of one bad outcome yet from those who’ve tried it. If you use feature limitation in your shareware products, another important component of risk reversal is to show the user exactly what s/he will get in the full version. In Dweep I give away the first five levels in the demo version, and purchasing the full version gets you 147 more levels. When I thought about this from the customer’s perspective (Rule 3), I realized that a perceived risk is that s/he doesn’t know if the registered version levels will be as fun as the demo levels. So I released a new demo where you can see every level but only play the first five. This lets the customer see all the fun that awaits them. So if you have a feature-limited product, show the customer how the feature will work. For instance, if your shareware version has printing disabled, the customer could be worried that the full version’s print capability won’t work with his/her printer or that the output quality will be poor. A better strategy is to allow printing, but to watermark the output. This way the customer can still test and verify the feature, and it doesn’t take much imagination to realize what the output will look like without the watermark. Our next step is to consider Rule 2 and include the ability close the sale. It is imperative that you include an “instant gratification” button in your shareware products, so the customer can click to launch their default web browser and go directly to your online order form. If you already have a “buy now” button in your products, go a step further. A small group of us have been finding that the more liberally these buttons are used, the better. If you only have one or two of these buttons in your shareware program, you should increase the count by at least an order of magnitude. The current Dweep demo now has over 100 of these buttons scattered throughout the menus and dialogs. This makes it extremely easy for the customer to buy, since s/he never has to hunt around for the ordering link. What should you label these buttons? “Buy now” or “Register now” are popular, so feel free to use one of those. I took a slightly different approach by trying to think like a customer (Rule 3 again). As a customer the word “buy” has a slightly negative association for me. It makes me think of parting with my cash, and it brings up feelings of sacrifice and pressure. The words “buy now” imply that I have to give away something. So instead, I use the words, “Get now.” As a customer I feel much better about getting something than buying something, since “getting” brings up only positive associations. This is the psychology I use, but at present, I don’t know of any hard data showing which is better. Unless you have a strong preference, trust your intuition. Make it as easy as possible for the willing customer to buy. The more methods of payment you accept, the better your sales will be. Allow the customer to click a button to print an order form directly from your program and mail it with a check or money order. On your web order form, include a link to a printable text order form for those who are afraid to use their credit cards online. If you only accept two or three major credit cards, sign up with a registration service to handle orders for those you don’t accept. So far we’ve given the customer some good incentives to buy, minimized perceived risk, and made it easy to make the purchase. But we haven’t yet gotten the customer emotionally invested in making the purchase decision. That’s where Rule 4 comes in. First, we must recognize the difference between benefits and features. We need to sell the sizzle, not the steak. Features describe your product, while benefits describe what the user will get by using your product. For instance, a personal information manager (PIM) program may have features such as daily, weekly, and monthly views; task and event timers; and a contact database. However, the benefits of the program might be that it helps the user be more organized, earn more money, and enjoy more free time. For a game, the main benefit might be fun. For a nature screensaver, it could be relaxation, beauty appreciation, or peace. Features are logical; benefits are emotional. Logical features are an important part of the sale, but only after we’ve engaged the customer’s emotions. Many products do a fair job of getting the customer emotionally invested during the trial period. If you have an addictive program or one that’s fun to use, such as a game, you may have an easy time getting the customer emotionally attached to using it because the experience is already emotional in nature. But whatever your product is, you can increase your sales by clearly illustrating the benefits of making the purchase. A good place to do this is in your nag screens. I use nag screens both before and after the program runs to remind the user of the benefits of buying the full version. At the very least, include a nag screen when the customer exits the program, so the last thing s/he sees will be a reminder of the product’s benefits. Take this opportunity to sell the user on the product. Don’t expect features like “customizable colors” to motivate anyone to buy. Paint a picture of what benefits the user will obtain with the full version. Will I save time? Will I have more fun? Will I live longer, save money, or feel better? The simple change from feature-oriented selling to benefit-oriented selling can easily double or triple your sales. Be sure to use this approach on your web site as well if you don’t already. Developers who’ve recently made the switch have been reporting some amazing results. If you’re drawing a blank when trying to come up with benefits for your products, the best thing you can do is to email some of your old customers and ask them why they bought your program. What did it do for them? I’ve done this and was amazed at the answers I got back. People were buying my games for reasons I’d never anticipated, and that told me which benefits I needed to emphasize in my sales pitch. The next key is to make your offer irresistible to potential customers. Find ways to offer the customer so much value that it would be harder to say no than to say yes. Take a look at your shareware product as if you were a potential customer who’d never seen it before. Being totally honest with yourself, would you buy this program if someone else had written it? If not, don’t stop here. As a potential customer, what additional benefits or features would put you over the top and convince you to buy? More is always better than less. In the original version of Dweep, I offered ten levels in the demo and thirty in the registered version. Now I offer only five demo levels and 152 in the full version, plus a built-in level editor. Originally, I offered the player twice the value of the demo; now I’m offering over thirty times the value. I also offer free hints and solutions to every level; the benefit here is that it minimizes player frustration. As I keep adding bonuses for purchasing, the offer becomes harder and harder to resist. What clever bonuses can you throw in for registering? Take the time to watch an infomercial. Notice that there is always at least one “FREE” bonus thrown in. Consider offering a few extra filters for an image editor, ten extra images for a screensaver, or extra levels for a game. What else might appeal to your customers? Be creative. Your bonus doesn’t even have to be software-based. Offer a free report about building site traffic with your HTML editor, include an essay on effective time management with your scheduling program, or throw in a small business success guide with your billing program. If you make such programs, you shouldn’t have too much trouble coming up with a few pages of text that would benefit your customers. Keep working at it until your offer even looks irresistible to you. If all the bonuses you offer can be delivered electronically, how many can you afford to include? If each one only gains one more customer in a thousand (0.1%), would it be worth the effort over the lifetime of your sales? So how do you know if your registration incentives are strong enough? And how do you know if your product is over-crippled? Where do you draw the line? These are tough issues, but there is a good way to handle them if your product is likely to be used over a long period of time, particularly if it’s used on a daily basis. Simply make your program gradually increase its registration incentives over time. One easy way to do this is with a delay timer on your nag screens that increases each time the program is run. Another approach is to disable certain features at set intervals. You begin by disabling non-critical features and gradually move up to disabling key functionality. The program becomes harder and harder to continue using for free, so the benefits of registering become more and more compelling. Instead of having your program completely disable itself after your trial period, you gradually degrade its usability with additional usage. This approach can be superior to a strict 30-day trial, since it allows your program to still be used for a while, but after prolonged usage it becomes effectively unusable. However, you don’t simply shock the user by taking away all the benefits s/he has become accustomed to on a particular day. Instead, you begin with a gentle reminder that becomes harder and harder to ignore. There may be times when your 30-day trial shuts off at an inconvenient time for the user, and you may lose a sale as a result. For instance, the user may not have the money at the time, or s/he may be busy at the trial’s end and forget to register. In that case s/he may quickly replace what was lost with a competitor’s trial version. The gradual degradation approach allows the user to continue using your product, but with increasing difficulty over time. Eventually, there is a breaking point where the user either decides to buy or to stop using the program completely, but this can be done within a window of time at the user’s convenience. Hopefully this article has gotten you thinking creatively about all the overlooked ways you can entice people to buy your shareware products. The most important thing you can do is to begin seeing your products through your customers’ eyes. What additional motivation would convince you to buy? What would represent an irresistible offer to you? There is no limit to how many incentives you can add. Don’t stop at just one or two; instead, give the customer a half dozen or more reasons to buy, and you’ll see your registration rate soar. Is it worth spending a day to do this? I think so.
I'm a big (neo)vim buff. My config is over 1500 lines and I regularly write new scripts. I recently ported my neovim config to a new laptop. Before then, I was using VSCode to write, and when I switched back I immediately saw a big gain in productivity. People often pooh-pooh vim (and other assistive writing technologies) by saying that writing code isn't the bottleneck in software development. Reading, understanding, and thinking through code is! Now I don't know how true this actually is in practice, because empirical studies of time spent coding are all over the place. Most of them, like this study, track time spent in the editor but don't distinguish between time spent reading code and time spent writing code. The only one I found that separates them was this study. It finds that developers spend only 5% of their time editing. It also finds they spend 14% of their time moving or resizing editor windows, so I don't know how clean their data is. But I have a bigger problem with "writing is not the bottleneck": when I think of a bottleneck, I imagine that no amount of improvement will lead to productivity gains. Like if a program is bottlenecked on the network, it isn't going to get noticeably faster with 100x more ram or compute. But being able to type code 100x faster, even with without corresponding improvements to reading and imagining code, would be huge. We'll assume the average developer writes at 80 words per minute, at five characters a word, for 400 characters a minute.What could we do if we instead wrote at 8,000 words/40k characters a minute? Writing fast Boilerplate is trivial Why do people like type inference? Because writing all of the types manually is annoying. Why don't people like boilerplate? Because it's annoying to write every damn time. Programmers like features that help them write less! That's not a problem if you can write all of the boilerplate in 0.1 seconds. You still have the problem of reading boilerplate heavy code, but you can use the remaining 0.9 seconds to churn out an extension that parses the file and presents the boilerplate in a more legible fashion. We can write more tooling This is something I've noticed with LLMs: when I can churn out crappy code as a free action, I use that to write lots of tools that assist me in writing good code. Even if I'm bottlenecked on a large program, I can still quickly write a script that helps me with something. Most of these aren't things I would have written because they'd take too long to write! Again, not the best comparison, because LLMs also shortcut learning the relevant APIs, so also optimize the "understanding code" part. Then again, if I could type real fast I could more quickly whip up experiments on new apis to learn them faster. We can do practices that slow us down in the short-term Something like test-driven development significantly slows down how fast you write production code, because you have to spend a lot more time writing test code. Pair programming trades speed of writing code for speed of understanding code. A two-order-of-magnitude writing speedup makes both of them effectively free. Or, if you're not an eXtreme Programming fan, you can more easily follow the The Power of Ten Rules and blanket your code with contracts and assertions. We could do more speculative editing This is probably the biggest difference in how we'd work if we could write 100x faster: it'd be much easier to try changes to the code to see if they're good ideas in the first place. How often have I tried optimizing something, only to find out it didn't make a difference? How often have I done a refactoring only to end up with lower-quality code overall? Too often. Over time it makes me prefer to try things that I know will work, and only "speculatively edit" when I think it be a fast change. If I could code 100x faster it would absolutely lead to me trying more speculative edits. This is especially big because I believe that lots of speculative edits are high-risk, high-reward: given 50 things we could do to the code, 49 won't make a difference and one will be a major improvement. If I only have time to try five things, I have a 10% chance of hitting the jackpot. If I can try 500 things I will get that reward every single time. Processes are built off constraints There are just a few ideas I came up with; there are probably others. Most of them, I suspect, will share the same property in common: they change the process of writing code to leverage the speedup. I can totally believe that a large speedup would not remove a bottleneck in the processes we currently use to write code. But that's because those processes are developed work within our existing constraints. Remove a constraint and new processes become possible. The way I see it, if our current process produces 1 Utils of Software / day, a 100x writing speedup might lead to only 1.5 UoS/day. But there are other processes that produce only 0.5 UoS/d because they are bottlenecked on writing speed. A 100x speedup would lead to 10 UoS/day. The problem with all of this that 100x speedup isn't realistic, and it's not obvious whether a 2x improvement would lead to better processes. Then again, one of the first custom vim function scripts I wrote was an aid to writing unit tests in a particular codebase, and it lead to me writing a lot more tests. So maybe even a 2x speedup is going to be speed things up, too. Patreon Stuff I wrote a couple of TLA+ specs to show how to model fork-join algorithms. I'm planning on eventually writing them up for my blog/learntla but it'll be a while, so if you want to see them in the meantime I put them up on Patreon.
Here’s Jony Ive in his Stripe interview: What we make stands testament to who we are. What we make describes our values. It describes our preoccupations. It describes beautiful succinctly our preoccupation. I’d never really noticed the connection between these two words: occupation and preoccupation. What comes before occupation? Pre-occupation. What comes before what you do for a living? What you think about. What you’re preoccupied with. What you think about will drive you towards what you work on. So when you’re asking yourself, “What comes next? What should I work on?” Another way of asking that question is, “What occupies my thinking right now?” And if what you’re occupied with doesn’t align with what you’re preoccupied with, perhaps it's time for a change. Email · Mastodon · Bluesky
There's no country on earth that does hype better than America. It's one of the most appealing aspects about being here. People are genuinely excited about the future and never stop searching for better ways to work, live, entertain, and profit. There's a unique critical mass in the US accelerating and celebrating tomorrow. The contrast to Europe couldn't be greater. Most Europeans are allergic to anything that even smells like a commercial promise of a better tomorrow. "Hype" is universally used as a term to ridicule anyone who dares to be excited about something new, something different. Only a fool would believe that real progress is possible! This is cultural bedrock. The fault lines have been settling for generations. It'll take an earthquake to move them. You see this in AI, you saw it in the Internet. Europeans are just as smart, just as inventive as their American brethren, but they don't do hype, so they're rarely the ones able to sell the sizzle that public opinion requires to shift its vision for tomorrow. To say I have a complicated relationship with venture capital is putting it mildly. I've spent a career proving the counter narrative. Proving that you can build and bootstrap an incredible business without investor money, still leave a dent in the universe, while enjoying the spoils of capitalism. And yet... I must admit that the excesses of venture capital are integral to this uniquely American advantage on hype. The lavish overspending during the dot-com boom led directly to a spectacular bust, but it also built the foundation of the internet we all enjoy today. Pets.com and Webvan flamed out such that Amazon and Shopify could transform ecommerce out of the ashes. We're in the thick of peak hype on AI right now. Fantastical sums are chasing AGI along with every dumb derivative mirage along the way. The most outrageous claims are being put forth on the daily. It's easy to look at that spectacle with European eyes and roll them. Some of it is pretty cringe! But I think that would be a mistake. You don't have to throw away your critical reasoning to accept that in the face of unknown potential, optimism beats pessimism. We all have to believe in something, and you're much better off believing that things can get better than not. Americans fundamentally believe this. They believe the hype, so they make it come to fruition. Not every time, not all of them, but more of them, more of the time than any other country in the world. That really is exceptional.
