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a year ago

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More from Molson Hart's Blog - Molson Hart

America Underestimates the Difficulty of Bringing Manufacturing Back

On April 2nd, 2025, our president announced major new taxes on imports from foreign countries (“tariffs”), ranging from 10% to 49%. The stated goal is to bring manufacturing back to the United States and to “make America wealthy again”. These tariffs will not work. In fact, they may even do the opposite, fail to bring manufacturing back and make America poorer in the process. This article gives the 14 reasons why this is the case, how the United States could bring manufacturing back if it were serious about doing so, and what will ultimately happen with this wrongheaded policy I’ve been in the manufacturing industry for 15 years. I’ve manufactured in the USA and in China. I worked in a factory in China. I speak and read Chinese. I’ve purchased millions of dollars worth of goods from the US and China, but also Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Cambodia. I’ve also visited many factories in Mexico and consider myself a student of how countries rise and fall. In other words, unlike many who have voiced an opinion on this topic, I know what I am talking about. And that’s why I felt compelled to write this article. I had to do it. I’m a first generation American and I love my country and it pains me to see it hurtling at high speed towards an economic brick wall. This article is an attempt to hit the brakes. The 14 Reasons Why these Tariffs Will Not Bring Manufacturing Back They’re not high enough A tariff is a tax on an imported product. For example, when Apple imports an iPhone that was made in China it declares to the United States government what it paid to make that product overseas. Let’s say it’s $100. When there is a 54% tariff, Apple pays $100 to the manufacturer in China and $54 to the US government when importing. In this simplified example, an iPhone used to cost Apple $100, but it now costs $154. For every dollar Apple spends, Apple needs to make profit. So Apple sells iPhones to stores for double what it pays for them. And stores sell iPhones to consumers like you and me for double what it pays for them, as well. Before the tariffs, prices looked like this: Apple bought iPhones it designed for $100 Apple sold iPhones for $200 to stores Stores sold iPhones to you and me for $400 After the tariffs, prices look like this: Apple bought iPhones for $154 ($100 + $54 in import taxes) Apple sells those iPhones for $308 (double what it paid) Stores sell those iPhones to you and me for $616 (double what they paid) Now that you know what a tariff is, let me tell to you why they aren’t high enough to bring manufacturing back to the United States. In short, manufacturing in the United States is so expensive and our supply chain (we’ll explain that next) is so bad that making that iPhone in the United States without that 54% tariff, would still cost more than in China with 54% tariff. Since it still costs less to make the iPhone in China, both Apple and consumers would prefer it be made there, so it will, and not in the USA. America’s industrial supply chain for many products is weak. Think of a supply chain as a company’s ability to get the components it needs to build a finished product. Suppose you wanted to build and sell wooden furniture. You’re going to need wood, nails, glue, etc. Otherwise you can’t do it. If you want to build an iPhone you need to procure a glass screen, shaped metal, and numerous internal electronic components. Now you might be thinking, “what do you mean America has a weak supply chain?” I’ve built furniture, I’ve assembled a computer. I can get everything I want at Home Depot and at Amazon. That’s because America has an amazing consumer supply chain, one of the best, if not the best in the world, but this is totally different from having an industrial supply chain. When you’re operating a furniture factory, you need an industrial quantity of wood, more wood than any Home Depot near you has in store. And you need it fast and cheap. It turns out that the United States has a good supply chain for wood, which is why, despite higher wages, we export chopsticks to China. We have abundant cheap wood in the forests of the Northern United States. But if you decided to move that chopstick factory to desert Saudi Arabia, you would not succeed, because their supply chain for wood is poor; there simply aren’t any trees for 1,000s of miles. When it comes to the iPhone, all the factories which make the needed components are in Asia, which is one reason why, even with a 54% tariff, it’s cheaper to assemble that iPhone in China than in the United States. It’s cheaper and faster to get those components from nearby factories in Asia than it is to get them from the US, which, because said factories no longer exist here, has to buy these components from Asia anyways. Supply chains sound complicated, but aren’t. If you can’t get the components you need at a reasonable price and timeline to build a finished product, it doesn’t matter what the tariffs are, you have to import it, because you can’t build it locally. We don’t know how to make it Apple knows how to build an iPhone, but may not know how to make the individual components. It may seem trivial to make that glass that separates your finger from the electronic engineering that powers your ability to access the internet, but it’s difficult. The world buys semiconductors from Taiwan, not just because its relatively expensive (but more expensive than China) labor and excellent supply chain, but because they know how to make the best semiconductors in the world. Even with infinite money, we cannot duplicate that, because we lack the knowhow. A 54% tariff does not solve that problem. We still need to buy semiconductors from Taiwan, which is perhaps why the administration put in an exception for semiconductors, because we need them and because we can’t make them without their help. This is a problem which applies to more than just semiconductors. We have forgotten how to make products people wrongly consider to be basic, too. My company makes educational toys from plastic called Brain Flakes. To make Brain Flakes, you melt plastic and force it into shaped metal molds. Were we to import the machines and molds needed to do this, it would work for a little while, but as soon as one of those molds broke, we’d be in trouble, because there are almost no moldmakers left in the United States. The people who knew how to build and repair molds have either passed away or are long retired. In the event of a problem, we’d have to order a new mold from China or send ours back, shutting down production for months. People trivialize the complexity and difficulty of manufacturing when it’s really hard. And if we don’t know how to make something, it doesn’t matter what the tariff is. It won’t get made in America. The effective cost of labor in the United States is higher than it looks Most people think that the reason why we make products in China instead of the United States is cheaper labor. That’s true, but it’s not the whole story. Frankly, the whole story is hard to read. People are not machines, they are not numbers on a spreadsheet or inputs into a manufacturing cost formula. I respect everyone who works hard and the people I have worked with over the years, and I want Americans to live better, happier lives. Chinese manufacturing labor isn’t just cheaper. It’s better. In China, there are no people who are too fat to work. The workers don’t storm off midshift, never to return to their job. You don’t have people who insist on being paid in cash so that they can keep their disability payments, while they do acrobatics on the factory floor that the non-disabled workers cannot do. Chinese workers much less likely to physically attack each other and their manager. They don’t take 30 minute bathroom breaks on company time. They don’t often quit because their out-of-state mother of their children discovered their new job and now receives 60% of their wages as child support. They don’t disappear because they’ve gone on meth benders. And they don’t fall asleep on a box midshift because their pay from yesterday got converted into pills. And they can do their times tables. To manufacture, you need to be able to consistently and accurately multiply 7 times 9 and read in English, and a disturbingly large portion of the American workforce cannot do that. Chinese workers work longer hours more happily and they’re physically faster with their hands; they can do things that American labor can’t. It’s years of accumulated skill, but it’s also a culture that is oriented around hard work and education that the United States no longer has. Sadly, what I describe above are not theoretical situations. These are things that I have experienced or seen with my own eyes. It’s fixable, but the American workforce needs great improvement in order to compete with the world’s, even with tariffs. So yes, Chinese wages are lower, but there many countries with wages lower than China’s. It’s the work ethic, knowhow, commitment, combined with top notch infrastructure, that makes China the most powerful manufacturing country in the world today. We don’t have the infrastructure to manufacture The inputs to manufacturing are not just materials, labor, and knowhow. You need infrastructure like electricity and good roads for transportation, too. Since the year 2000, US electricity generation per person has been flat. In China, over the same time period, it has increased 400%. China generates over twice as much electricity person today as the United States. Why? Manufacturing. To run the machines which make the products we use, you need electricity, a lot of it. We already have electricity instability in this country. Without the construction of huge amounts of new energy infrastructure, like nuclear power plants, we cannot meaningfully increase our manufacturing output. And it would put huge stress on our roads and create lots more dangerous traffic. When we import finished goods from foreign countries, a truck delivers them from the port or the airport to distribution centers, stores, and where we live and work. When you start manufacturing, every single component, from factory to factory, needs to be moved, increasing the number of trucks on the road many times. Paving more roads, modernizing our seaports, improving our airports, speeding up our train terminals, and building power plants in the costliest nation in the world to build is a huge undertaking that people are not appreciating when they say “well, we’ll just make it in America”. Made in America will take time. We placed a $50,000 order with our supplier overseas before the election in November 2024. At the time of ordering, there were no import taxes on the goods. By the time it arrived, a 20% tariff had been applied and we had a surprise bill for $10,000. It can easily take 180 days for many products to go from order, to on your doorstep and this tariff policy seems not to understand that. It takes at least, in the most favorable of jurisdictions, 2 years (if you can get the permits) to build a factory in the United States. I know because I’ve done it. From there, it can take 6 months to a year for it to become efficient. It can take months for products to come off the assembly lines. All this ignores all the infrastructure that will need to be built (new roads, new power plants, etc.) to service the new factory. By the time “made in America” has begun, we will be electing a new president. Uncertainty and complexity around the tariffs To start manufacturing in the United States, a company needs to make a large investment. They will need to buy new machinery and if no existing building is suitable, they will need to construct a new building. These things cost money, a lot, in fact. And significantly more in the USA, than they do in other countries. In exchange for this risk, there must be some reward. If that reward is uncertain, no one will do it. Within the past month, the president put a 25% tariff on Mexico, and then got rid of it, only to apply it again, and then get rid of it a second time. Then, last week, he was expected to apply new tariffs to Mexico, but didn’t. If you’re building a new factory in the United States, your investment will alternate between maybe it will work, and catastrophic loss according to which way the tariffs and the wind blows. No one is building factories right now, and no one is renting them, because there is no certainty that any of these tariffs will last. How do I know? I built a factory in Austin, Texas in an industrial area. I cut its rent 40% two weeks ago and I can’t get a lick of interest from industrial renters. The tariffs have frozen business activity because no one wants to take a big risk dependent on a policy that may change next week. Even further, the tariffs are confusing, poorly communicated, and complex. Today, if you want to import something from China, you need to add the original import duty, plus a 20% “fentanyl tariff”, plus a 34% “reciprocal tariff”, and an additional 25% “Venezuelan oil” tariff, should it be determined that China is buying Venezualan oil. The problem is there is no list of countries which are importing Venezuelan oil provided by the White House, so you don’t know if you do or don’t need to add that 25% and you also don’t know when any of these tariffs will go into effect because of unclear language. As such, you can’t calculate your costs, either with certainty or accuracy, therefore, not only do you not build a factory in the United States, you cease all business activity, the type of thing that can cause a recession, if not worse. For the past month, as someone who runs a business in this industry, I have spent a huge portion of my time just trying to keep up with the constant changes, instead of running my business. Most Americans are going to hate manufacturing Americans want less crime, good schools for their kids, and inexpensive healthcare. They don’t want to be sewing shirts. The people most excited about this new tariff policy tend to be those who’ve never actually made anything, because if you have, you’d know how hard the work is. When I first went to China as a naive 24 year old, I told my supplier I was going to “work a day in his factory!” I lasted 4 hours. It was freezing cold, middle of winter, I had to crouch on a small stool, hunched over, assembling little parts with my fingers at 1/4 the speed of the women next to me. My back hurt, my fingers hurt. It was horrible. That’s a lot of manufacturing. And enjoy the blackouts, the dangerous trucks on the road, the additional pollution, etc. Be careful what you wish for America. Doing office work and selling ideas and assets is a lot easier than making actual things. The labor does not exist to make good products There are over a billion people in China making stuff. As of right now there are 12 million people looking for work in the United States (4% unemployment). Ignoring for a moment the comparative inefficiency of labor and the billions of people making products outside of China, where are the people that are going to do these jobs? Do you simply say “make America great again” 3 times and they will appear with the skills needed to do the work? And where are the managers to manage these people? One of the reasons why manufacturing has declined in the United States is a brain drain towards sectors that make more money. Are people who make money on the stock market, in real estate, in venture capital, and in startups going to start sewing shirts? It’s completely and totally unrealistic to assume that people will move from superficially high productivity sectors driven by US Dollar strength to products that are low on the value chain. The United States is trying to bring back the jobs that China doesn’t even want. They have policies to reduce low value manufacturing, yet we are applying tariffs to bring it back. It’s incomprehensible. Automation will not save us. Most people think that the reason why American manufacturing is not competitive is labor costs. Most people think this can be solved by automation. They’re wrong. First, China, on a yearly basis installs 7x as many industrial robots as we do in the United States. Second, Chinese robots are cheaper. Third, most of today’s manufacturing done by people cannot be automated. If it could, it would have already been done so, by China, which, again, has increasingly high labor costs relative to the rest of the world. The robots you see on social media doing backflips are, today, mostly for show and unreliable off camera. They are not useful in industrial environments where, if a humanoid robot can do it, an industrial machine which is specialized in the task can do it even better. For example, instead of having a humanoid robot doing a repetitive task such as carrying a boxes from one station to another, you can simply set up a cheaper, faster conveyor belt. Said another way, the printer in your office, is cheaper and more efficient than both a human and a humanoid robot with a pen, hand drawing each letter. It’s unlikely that American ingenuity will be able to counter the flood of Chinese industrial robots which is coming. The first commercially electrical vehicle was designed and built in the United States, but today China is dominating electric vehicle manufacturing across the world. Industrial robots will likely be the same story. Robots and overseas factory workers don’t file lawsuits, but Americans do I probably should not have written this article. Not only will I be attacked for being unpatriotic, but what I have written here makes me susceptible to employment lawsuits. For the record, I don’t use a person’s origin to determine whether or not they will do good work. I just look at the person and what they’re capable of. Doing otherwise is bad business because there are talented people everywhere. America has an extremely litigious business environment, both in terms of regulation and employment lawsuits. Excessive regulation and an inefficient court system will stifle those with the courage to make in this country. Enforcement of the tariffs will be uneven and manipulated Imagine two companies which import goods into the United States. One is based in China, while the other is based in the United States. They both lie about the value of their goods so that they have to pay less tariffs. What happens to the China company? Perhaps they lose a shipment when it’s seized by the US government for cheating, but they won’t pay additional fines because they’re in China, where they’re impervious to the US legal system. What happens to the USA company? Owners go to prison. Who do you think is going to cheat more on tariffs, the China or the US company? Exactly. So, in other words, paradoxically, the policies which are designed to help Americans, will hurt them more than the competition these policies are designed to punish. The tariff policies are structured in the wrong way Why didn’t the jobs come back in 2018 when we initiated our last trade war? We applied tariffs, why didn’t it work? Instead of making America great, we made Vietnam great. When the United States applied tariffs to China, it shifted huge amounts of manufacturing to Vietnam, which did not have tariffs applied to it. Vietnam, which has a labor force that is a lot more like China’s than the United States’, was able to use its proximity to China for its supply chain and over the past 7 or so years, slowly developed its own. With Vietnamese wages even lower than Chinese wages, instead of the jobs coming to the United States, they just went to Vietnam instead. We’re about to make the same mistake again, in a different way. Let’s go back to that last example, the China based and the US based companies which were importing goods into the United States. That US based importer could’ve been a manufacturer. Instead of finished iPhones, perhaps they were importing the glass screens because those could not be found in the USA, for final assembly. Our government applied tariffs to finished goods and components equally. I’ll say that again. They applied the same tax to the components that you need to make things in America that they did to finished goods that were made outside of America. Manufacturing works on a lag. To make and sell in America, first you must get the raw materials and components. These tariffs will bankrupt manufacturers before it multiplies them because they need to pay tariffs on the import components that they assemble into finished products. And it gets worse. They put tariffs on machines. So if you want to start a factory in the United States, all the machinery you need which is not made here, is now significantly more expensive. You may have heard that there is a chronic shortage of transformers needed for power transmission in the United States. Tariffed that too. It gets even worse. There is no duty drawback for exporting. In the past, even in the United States, if you imported something and then exported it, the tariff you paid on the import would be refunded to you. They got rid of that so we’re not even incentivizing exports to the countries that we are trying to achieve trade parity with. Tariffs are applied to the costs of the goods. The way we’ve structured these tariffs, factories in China which import into the United States will pay lower tariffs than American importers, because the Chinese factory will be able to declare the value of the goods at their cost, while the American importer will pay the cost the factory charges them, which is of course higher than the factory’s cost. Worse still. With a few exceptions like steel and semiconductors, the tariffs were applied to all products, ranging from things that we will never realistically make like our high labor Tigerhart stuffed animals to things that don’t even grow in the continental USA, like coffee. Call me crazy, but if we’re going to make products in America, we could use some really cheap coffee, but no, they tariffed it! Our educational engineering toy Brain Flakes, also got tariffed. How is the next generation supposed to build a manufacturing powerhouse if it cannot afford products that will develop its engineering ability? It’s like our goal was to make education and raising children more expensive. Not only did we put tariffs on the things that would help us make this transformation, we didn’t put higher tariffs on things that hurt us like processed food which makes us tired and fat or fentanyl precursors which kill us. The stated goal of many of our tariffs was to stop the import of fentanyl. 2 milligrams of fentanyl will kill an adult. A grain of rice is 65 milligrams. How do you stop that stuff from coming in? It’s basically microscopic. Maybe we could do what every other country has done and focus on the demand, instead of the supply, ideally starting with the fentanyl den near my house which keeps my children indoors or in our backyard instead of playing in the neighborhood. It’s frustrating to see our great country take on an unrealistic goal like transforming our economy, when so many basic problems should be fixed first. Michael Jordan sucked at baseball America is the greatest economic power of all time. We’ve got the most talented people in the world and we have a multi-century legacy of achieving what so many other countries could not. Michael Jordan is arguably the greatest basketball player of all time, perhaps even the greatest athlete of all time. He played baseball in his youth. What happened when he switched from basketball to baseball? He went from being an MVP champion to being a middling player in the minor leagues. 2 years later, he was back to playing basketball. And that’s exactly what’s going to happen to us. My prediction for what will happen with the tariffs This is probably the worst economic policy I’ve ever seen. Maybe it’s just an opening negotiating position. Maybe it’s designed to crash the economy, lower interest rates, and then refinance the debt. I don’t know. But if you take it at face value, there is no way that this policy will bring manufacturing back to the United States and “make America wealthy again”. Again, if anything, it’ll do the opposite; it’ll make us much poorer. Many are saying that this tariff policy is the “end of globalization”. I don’t think so. Unless this policy is quickly changed, this is the end of America’s participation in globalization. If we had enacted these policies in 2017 or 2018, they stood a much stronger chance of being successful. That was before Covid. China was much weaker economically and militarily then. They’ve been preparing 8 years for this moment and they are ready. China trades much less with the United States as a percent of its total exports today than it did 8 years ago, and as such is much less susceptible to punishing tariffs from the United States today than it was back then. Chinese made cars, particularly electric vehicles, are taking the world by storm, without the United States. Go to Mexico to Thailand to Germany and you will see Chinese made electric vehicles on the streets. And they’re good, sometimes even better than US made cars, and not just on a per dollar basis, but simply better quality. That is what is going to happen to the United States. Globalization will continue without us if these policies continue unchanged. That said, I think the tariffs will be changed. There’s no way we continue to place a 46% tariff on Vietnam when 8 years ago we nudged American companies to put all their production there. Most likely, this policy will continue another round of the same type of investment; rather than replacing made in China with made in the USA, we’ll replace it with made in Vietnam, Mexico, etc. Finally, in the process of doing this, regardless of whether or not we reverse the policies, we will have a recession. There isn’t time to build US factories, nor is it realistic or likely to occur, and American importers don’t have the money to pay for the goods they import. People are predicting inflation in the cost of goods, but we can just as easily have deflation from economic turmoil. The policy is a disaster, how could it be done better? And what’s the point of this anyways? The 3 reasons why we want to actually bring manufacturing back 1. It makes our country stronger. If a foreign country can cut off your supply of essentials such as food, semiconductors, or antibiotics you’re beholden to that country. The United States must have large flexible capacity in these areas. 2. It makes it easier to innovate. When the factory floor is down the hall, instead of 30 hours of travel away, it’s easier to make improvements and invent. We need to have manufacturing of high value goods, like drones, robots, and military equipment that are necessary for our economic future and safety. It will be difficult for us to apply artificial intelligence to manufacturing if we’re not doing it here. 3. People can simplistically be divided into three buckets: those of verbal intelligence, those of mathematical intelligence, and those of spatial intelligence. Without a vibrant manufacturing industry, those with the latter type of intelligence cannot fulfill their potential. This is one reason why so many men drop out, smoke weed, and play video games; they aren’t built for office jobs and would excel at manufacturing, but those jobs either don’t exist or pay poorly. How to actually bring manufacturing back Every country that has gone on a brilliant run of manufacturing first established the right conditions and then proceeded slowly. We’re doing the opposite right now, proceeding fast with the wrong conditions. First, the United States must fix basic problems which reduce the effectiveness of our labor. For example, everyone needs to be able to graduate with the ability to do basic mathematics. American healthcare is way too expensive and it needs to be fixed if the United States wants to be competitive with global labor. I’m not saying healthcare should be socialized or switched to a completely private system, but whatever we’re doing now clearly is not working, and it needs to be fixed. We need to make Americans healthy again. Many people are too obese to work. Crime and drugs. It needs to stop. And to sew, we must first repair the social fabric. From Covid lockdowns to the millions of people who streamed over our border, efforts must be made to repair society. Manufacturing and economic transformations are hard, particularly the way in which we’re doing it. Patriotism and unity are required to tolerate hardship, and we seem to be at all-time lows for those right now. Let’s focus on America’s strengths in high end manufacturing, agriculture, and innovation instead of applying tariffs to all countries and products blindly. We should be taxing automated drones for agriculture at 300% to encourage their manufacture here, instead of applying the same blanket tariff of 54% to that that we apply to t-shirts. The changes in the policies needed are obvious. Tax finished products higher than components. Let exporters refund their import duties. Enforce the tariffs against foreign companies more strenuously than we do against US importers. If American companies want to sell in China, they must incorporate their, register capital, and name a person to be a legal representative. To sell in Europe, we must register for their tax system and nominate a legal representative. For Europeans and Chinese to sell in the United States, none of this is needed, nor do federal taxes need to be paid. We can level the playing field without causing massive harm to our economy by adopting policies like these which cause foreign companies to pay the taxes domestic ones pay. And if we want to apply tariffs, do it slowly. Instead of saying that products will be tariffed at 100% tomorrow, say they’ll be 25% next year, 50% after that, 75% after that, and 100% in year four. And then make it a law instead of a presidential decree so that there is certainty so people feel comfortable taking the risks necessary to make in America. Sadly, a lot of the knowhow to make products is outside of this country. Grant manufacturing visas, not for labor, but for knowhow. Make it easy for foreign countries to teach us how they do waht they do best. Conclusion and final thoughts I care about this country and the people in it. I hope we change our mind on this policy before it’s too late. Because if we don’t, it might break the country. And, really, this country needs to be fixed.

a month ago 64 votes
The DECIDE Algorithm — A Simple Step-by-Step Method for Converting Idle Time into Productive Action

DECIDE D - Determine the Bottleneck E - Engage with the subject matter C - Clear distractions I - Implement mental models D - Decide how to proceed E - Execute next steps When you’re traveling or waiting for something to happen, instead of listening to a podcast or scrolling on your phone, you can use the DECIDE algorithm to convert that otherwise wasted time into a realization, a useful plan, or action. Here’s how: D - Determine the Bottleneck You can skip this step if you already know what you want to think about. If you don’t, cycle through the important things in your life (family, employees/coworkers, yourself, goals, your calendar) to seek out the single biggest problem in your life so you can solve it for a maximal increase in happiness. E - Engage with the subject matter Once you have determined what to think about, announce it to yourself using your inner monologue. “I will now think about how to solve X.” This will help you stay focussed and by verbalizing the problem succinctly, the problem will become easier to solve. C - Clear distractions The speed and quality of your thought processes improve if you can remove distractions. Go to a quiet room. Put away your phone. Go for a walk. You’re on a mission and it is not complete until you solve the problem and if you get distracted and switch to another task, you will have failed. I - Implement mental models To make good decisions you must have a repertoire of mental tools which you can apply. My favorite are thinking from first principles (something that applies to more than just problems of physics) and thinking about a problem in the context of my life’s greatest purpose. There many other useful mental models such as inversion (how would I NOT solve this problem), two way doors (can I undo this decision, if so, why overanalyze it?), the premortem (I made this decision, it failed, why?), or even asking an expert/AI. D - Decide how to proceed You’ve considered the options and have made a decision. Verbalize it to at least yourself, if not others. “I have decided to do Y to solve X because…”. If verbalizing your decision triggers a new important thought return to the previous step and reconsider. E - Execute next steps It is insufficient to reach a conclusion. What are the first steps that follow from this conclusion? Execute them. If you can’t in the moment, make a note to do so “to solve my lack of time, I will hire a cleaner, and I will write a job description on Monday to do so.” This technique will reduce analysis paralysis and ensure that you act on your hard fought realizations. Conclusion: Your standing in life is a function of the quality and quantity of decisions you make. Improving and speeding up your decision making will allow you to live a better life. Mnemonics such as the DECIDE algorithm allow you to practice your skills while reducing the chance that you forget critical considerations in deciding important matters.

2 months ago 24 votes
When People Outperform Data

People who succeed via analysis of numbers and facts need to learn that understanding of people can make that analysis unnecessary and can even outperform it. Examples: 1. Amazon did not make money between its 1994 founding through 2002. There was no financial or business fundamentals analysis that could’ve led you to buying the stock, which would launch AWS and FBA in 2006. The only way you could’ve profited from the 4000x share price growth between Dec 31 2002 and today was to figure out that Bezos was one of the greatest of all time and was pouring his best years into the company. 2. I was once doing a reference check for a new employee. You can make a quantifiable prediction of employee quality by creating a points system for traits correlated with future work quality. On paper this employee did not appear to be so great, however his reference, who was an accomplished businessman in his own right without an agenda stopped me and said “Hire this guy. Just do it. Trust me.” He was right. 3. Careers and health are complex systems. We can come up with rules of thumb like “work hard” or “exercise”, but, generally we know a lot less about what leads to good outcomes in these fields than we do in chemistry and mathematics where there are higher degrees of predictable certainty. When an older businessperson who has survived and thrived through multiple recessions tells you, someone much younger, less experienced, and successful, to do something like “call them” or “go to this event”, you just need to do it. When your grandmother tells you to stay slim, exercise, and spend time with friends, you just need to do it. There is no fact or data based analysis to support these recommendations, but decades of experience, of seeing people fail in business or die early and those who didn’t, inform these powerful inexplicable recommendations. Yes, facts and numbers are great, but they will only take you so far. Master the understanding of people and know when their recommendations outperform what we call rational analysis to go even father. And note that these two methods are even more powerful when combined. Trust me.

6 months ago 19 votes
What Do Brontosauruses Know about Uncoordinated Conspiracies?

Brontosaurus skeleton at the Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History (allegedly) Let’s pretend for a moment that brontosauruses are made up, despite them being accepted by the public and scientific community, having ample evidence for their existence, and appearing in museums all over the world. Let me show you how this could come to be: Smart, but young, naive, and generally conformist people enter academia to study paleontology (the study of fossils) They learn about brontosauruses: They were up to 7 stories tall They weighed up to 70 tons They have no back teeth and swallowed all their food whole They would eat rocks to help with their digestion Their long necks were to "reach marshy vegetation some distance away or to reach leaves higher up in trees" (Encyclopedia Britannica) No skull has ever been found The bones you see in museums are mostly not real. They're casted. They get a PhD about how their poop is the size of a 737 Then one day they have a thought “you know…there’s a lot of stuff about brontosauruses which is pretty unbelievable” and they make a list They write a paper and submit it to a paleontology journal. If the paper is right, the journal must disband and all the people who work for it will lose their life’s work, so it gets turned down. The skeptical paleontologist turns to the press, but all the more senior paleontologists say that the skeptical guy is crazy, so now our skeptic’s reputation is ruined The skeptic can’t attract funding because they can’t get published and they’re a kook according respected paleontologists No museum will air the possibility that brontosauruses are fake because it’s one of the main reasons why people go to museums If the skeptical paleontologist is smart at all, they will see all this and they won’t say anything. They want to keep their PhD, their role in the group, and their prestige. It takes a unique and rare person to go against the flow and call something out like this and even if they do, their views mostly won’t be heard. Of course, I’m just joking around. Brontosauruses are real. But if they weren’t, the brontosaurus would be an uncoordinated conspiracy.

9 months ago 16 votes
The Fiacracy; A Mental Model for Modern Government

This article will explain the following: 1. What is a Fiacracy 2. How do Fiacracies NOT work 3. How Fiacracies work 4. Are Fiacracies sustainable 5. Why Fiacracies matter 1. What is a fiacracy? It’s government by fiat (money). The driving mechanism by which it works is not voting (democracy), a royal family (monarchy), or even a stable ruling elite (aristocracy, oligarchy). It’s a government driven mainly by the creation and movement of currency, fiat. 2. How do fiacracies NOT work? In school you were probably taught that your government works like this: A. People vote for politicians B. The politicians use tax revenue to provide services for voters C. If taxes get too high or services too bad, voters substitute the politicians responsible for new ones who will be better Fiacracies have voting, politicians, and taxes, but this is NOT how they work. 3. How do fiacracies work? A. People vote for politicians B. Politicians allocate money for services C. A central bank creates new money to pay for these services D. If voters do not like the politicians or what they are doing, they change them out for new ones What’s different between between this system and the last one? This system has only one check on government action, voting, whereas the other has two, voting and taxes. A concrete example: It’s much easier for fiacracies to go to war because taxpayers don’t need to pay for it, they just need to vote for it. And it’s also much easier for fiacracies to do handouts, whether it be for the rich, the poor, or the companies’ shareholders which benefit from war. Why is it so much easier? Because no one has to pay for it. All it requires is votes. An uncoordinated consensus exists between politicians, the central bank, and voters to keep the system going. If politicians don’t spend they don’t have political support and they get voted out. If the central banks don’t finance the spending they know the system collapses resulting in chaos. The voters are subjected to propaganda (oftentimes paid for by the government itself), don’t know what is happening, and if they do, why end the system and face chaos? Uncoordinated consensus. 4. Are fiacracies sustainable? Let’s answer the question in reverse: What would make a fiacracy unsustainable? A. People must be willing accept the newly created money, otherwise government cannot provide services nor effective handouts. B. People must believe in the system and its fairness or they will revolt C. It cannot be too easy to convert the newly created money into other currencies that are perceived to be more stable D. If money is created too fast, handouts will overtake the creation of value as peoples’ focus and people will stop working causing system collapse E. Handouts must be allocated fairly to system participants or the system will face instability from groups who feel shortchanged F. Greed. If a powerful group makes too much money for itself without acknowledging the delicate balance between the participants in the fiacracy, the system will destabilize and die. G. Immigration/emigration. Countries mostly are not closed systems and the arrival of new voters or their departure can cause violent swings how new money is allocated, which is the main determinant whether people continue to support the fiacracy system. We can see from how many different ways they can go wrong that individual fiacracies are generally unstable, but with proper management and the right general conditions they can last for a long time, particularly if culture, education, or propaganda (which can be paid for with fiat) are conducive to the maintenance of the fiacracy. 5. Why Fiacracies matter? They matter because of how ubiquitous they are and how increasingly large government spending is relative to the overall economy. Politics in a fiacracy is, at its core, a fight over access to the newly created money enabled by achieving a voter majority. Once you understand that and how fiacracies work at large, you can both benefit yourself, but also predict and maintain your country’s stability. The fiacracy is a useful mental model that explains better how things actually work than what we were taught in school and told by media.

9 months ago 19 votes

More in finance

Sovereign Ratings, Default Risk and Markets: The Moody's Downgrade Aftermath!

I was on a family vacation in August 2011 when I received an email from a journalist asking me what I thought about the S&P ratings downgrade for the US. Since I stay blissfully unaware of most news stories and things related to markets when I am on the beach, I had to look up what he was talking about, and it was S&P's decision to downgrade the United States, which had always enjoyed AAA, the highest sovereign rating  that can be granted to a country, to AA+, reflecting their concerns about both the fiscal challenges faced by the country, with mounting trade and budget deficits, as well as the willingness of its political institutions to flirt with the possibility of default. For more than a decade, S&P remained the outlier, but in 2023, Fitch joined it by also downgrading the US from AAA to AA+, citing the same reasons. That left Moody's, the third of the major sovereign ratings agencies, as the only one that persisted with a Aaa (Moody's equivalent of AAA) for the US, but that changed on May 16, 2025, when it too downgraded the US from Aaa (negative) to Aa1 (stable). Since the ratings downgrade happened after close of trading on a Friday, there was concern that markets would wake up on the following  Monday (May 19) to a wave of selling, and while that did not materialize, the rest of the week was a down week for both stocks and US treasury bonds, especially at the longest end of the maturity spectrum. Rather than rehash the arguments about US debt and political dysfunction, which I am sure that you had read elsewhere, I thought I would take this moment to talk about sovereign default risk, how ratings agencies rate sovereigns, the biases and errors in sovereign ratings and their predictive power, and use that discussion as a launching pad to talk about how the US ratings downgrade will affect equity and bond valuations not just in the US, but around the world. Sovereign Defaults: A History     Through time, governments have often been dependent on debt to finance themselves, some in the local currency and much in a foreign currency. A large proportion of sovereign defaults have occurred with foreign currency sovereign borrowing, as the borrowing country finds itself short of the foreign currency to meet its obligations. However, those defaults, and especially so in recent years, have been supplemented by countries that have chosen to default on local currency borrowings. I use the word "chosen" because most countries  have the capacity to avoid default on local currency debt, being able to print money in that currency to pay off debt, but chose not to do so, because they feared the consequences of the inflation that would follow more than the consequences of default. BoC/BoE Sovereign Default Database While the number of sovereign defaults has ebbed and flowed over time, there are two points worth making about the data. The first is that, over time, sovereign defaults, especially on foreign currency debt, have shifted from bank debt to sovereign bonds, with three times as many sovereign defaults on bonds than on bank loans in 2023. The second is that local currency defaults are persistent over time, and while less frequent than foreign currency defaults, remain a significant proportion of total defaults.     The consequences of sovereign default have been both economic and political. Besides the obvious implication that lenders to that government lose some or a great deal of what is owed to them, there are other consequences. Researchers who have examined the aftermath of default have come to the following conclusions about the short-term and long-term effects of defaulting on debt: Default has a negative impact on the economy, with real GDP dropping between 0.5% and 2%, but the bulk of the decline is in the first year after the default and seems to be short lived. Default does affect a country’s long-term sovereign rating and borrowing costs. One study of credit ratings in 1995 found that the ratings for countries that had defaulted at least once since 1970 were one to two notches lower than otherwise similar countries that had not defaulted. In the same vein, defaulting countries have borrowing costs that are about 0.5 to 1% higher than countries that have not defaulted. Here again, though, the effects of default dissipate over time. Sovereign default can cause trade retaliation. One study indicates a drop of 8% in bilateral trade after default, with the effects lasting for up to 15 years, and another one that uses industry level data finds that export-oriented industries are particularly hurt by sovereign default. Sovereign default can make banking systems more fragile. A study of 149 countries between 1975 and 2000 indicates that the probability of a banking crisis is 14% in countries that have defaulted, an eleven percentage-point increase over non-defaulting countries. Sovereign default also increases the likelihood of political change. While none of the studies focus on defaults per se, there are several that have examined the after-effects of sharp devaluations, which often accompany default. A study of devaluations between 1971 and 2003 finds a 45% increase in the probability of change in the top leader (prime minister or president) in the country and a 64% increase in the probability of change in the finance executive (minister of finance or head of central bank). In summary, default is costly, and countries do not (and should not) take the possibility of default lightly. Default is particularly expensive when it leads to banking crises and currency devaluations; the former has a longstanding impact on the capacity of firms to fund their investments whereas the latter create political and institutional instability that lasts for long periods. Sovereign Ratings: Measures and Process     Since few of us have the resources or the time to dedicate to understanding small and unfamiliar countries, it is no surprise that third parties have stepped into the breach, with their assessments of sovereign default risk. Of these third-party assessors, bond ratings agencies came in with the biggest advantages: They have been assessing default risk in corporations for a hundred years or more and presumably can transfer some of their skills to assessing sovereign risk. Bond investors who are familiar with the ratings measures, from investing in corporate bonds, find it easy to extend their use to assessing sovereign bonds. Thus, a AAA rated country is viewed as close to riskless whereas a C rated country is very risky.  Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch’s have been rating corporate bond offerings since the early part of the twentieth century. Moody’s has been rating corporate bonds since 1919 and started rating government bonds in the 1920s, when that market was an active one. By 1929, Moody’s provided ratings for almost fifty central governments. With the Great Depression and the Second World War, investments in government bonds abated and with it, the interest in government bond ratings. In the 1970s, the business picked up again slowly. As recently as the early 1980s, only about thirteen  governments, mostly in developed and mature markets, had ratings, with most of them commanding the highest level (Aaa). The decade from 1985 to 1994 added 34 countries to the sovereign rating list, with many of them having speculative or lower ratings and by 2024, Moody's alone was rating 143 countries, covering 75% of all emerging market countries and almost every developed market.  table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } Not only have ratings agencies become more active in adding countries to their ratings list, but they have also expanded their coverage of countries with more default risk/ lower ratings.  In fact, the number of Aaa rated countries was the same in 1985, when there were thirteen rated countries, as in 2025, when there were 143 rated countries. In the last two decades, at least five sovereigns, including Japan, the UK, France and now the US, have lost their Aaa ratings.  In addition to more countries being rated, the ratings themselves have become richer. Moody’s and S&P now provide two ratings for each country – a local currency rating (for domestic currency debt/ bonds) and a foreign currency rating (for government borrowings in a foreign currency).      In assessing these sovereign ratings, ratings agencies draw on a multitude of data, quantitative and qualitative. Moody's describes its sovereign ratings process in the picture below: The process is broad enough to cover both political and economic factors, while preserving wiggle room for the ratings agencies to make subjective judgments on default that can lead to different ratings for two countries with similar economic and political profiles. The heat map below provides the sovereign ratings, from Moody's, for all rated countries the start of 2025: Moody's sovereign ratings Note that the greyed out countries are unrated, with Russia being the most significant example; the ratings agencies withdrew their rating for Russia in 2022 and not reinstated it yet. There were only a handful of Aaa rated countries, concentrated in North America (United States and Canada), Northern Europe (Germany, Scandinavia), Australia & New Zealand and Singapore (the only Aaa-rated Asian country. In 2025, there have been a eight sovereign ratings changes, four upgrades and four downgrades, with the US downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 as the highest profile change With the US downgrade, the list of Aaa-rated countries has become shorter, and as Canada and Germany struggle with budget imbalances, the likelihood is that more companies will drop off the list. Sovereign Ratings:  Performance and Alternatives     If sovereign ratings are designed to measure exposure to default risk, how well do they do? The answer depends on how you evaluate their performance. The ratings agencies provide tables that list defaults by rating that back the proposition that sovereign ratings and default are highly correlated. A Moody's update of default rates by sovereign ratings classes, between 1983 and 2024, yielded the following: Default rates rise as sovereign ratings decline, with a default rate of 24% for  speculative grade sovereign debt (Baa2 and below) as opposed to 1.8% for investment grade (Aaa to Baa1) sovereign debt.     That said, there are aspects of sovereign ratings that should give pause to anyone considering using them as their proxy for sovereign default, they do come with caveats and limitations: Ratings are upward biased: Ratings agencies have been accused by some of being far too optimistic in their assessments of both corporate and sovereign ratings. While the conflict of interest of having issuers pay for the rating is offered as the rationale for the upward bias in corporate ratings, that argument does not hold up when it comes to sovereign ratings, since not only are the revenues small, relative to reputation loss, but a proportion of sovereigns are rated for no fees. There is herd behavior: When one ratings agency lowers or raises a sovereign rating, other ratings agencies seem to follow suit. This herd behavior reduces the value of having three separate ratings agencies, since their assessments of sovereign risk are no longer independent. Too little, too late: To price sovereign bonds (or set interest rates on sovereign loans), investors (banks) need assessments of default risk that are updated and timely. It has long been argued that ratings agencies take too long to change ratings, and that these changes happen too late to protect investors from a crisis. Vicious Cycle: Once a market is in crisis, there is the perception that ratings agencies sometimes overreact and lower ratings too much, thus creating a feedback effect that makes the crisis worse. This is especially true for small countries that are mostly dependent on foreign capital for their funds. Regional biases: There are many, especially in Asia and Latin America, that believe that the ratings agencies are too lax in assessing default risk for North America and Europe,  overrating countries in  those regions, while being too stringent in their assessments of default in Asia, Latin America and Africa, underrating countries in those regions.  In sum, the evidence suggests that while sovereign ratings are good measures of country default risk, changes in ratings often lag changes on the ground, making them less useful to lenders and investors.     If the key limitation of sovereign ratings is that they are not timely assessors of country default risk, that failure is alleviated by the development of the sovereign CDS market, a market where investors can buy insurance against country default risk by paying an (annualized) price. While that market still has issues in terms of counterparty risk and legal questions about what comprises default, it has expanded in the last two decades, and at the start of 2025, there were about 80 countries with sovereign CDS available on them. The heat map below provides a picture of sovereign (10-year)  CDS spreads on January 1, 2025: As you can see, even at the start of 2025, the market was drawing a distinction between  the safest Aaa-rated countries (Scandinavia, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand), all with sovereign CDS spreads of 0.20% or below, and more risky Aaa-rated countries (US, Germany, Canada). During 2025, the market shocks from tariff and trade wars have had an effect, with sovereign CDS spreads increasing, especially in April. The US, which started 2025 with a sovereign CDS spread of 0.41%, saw a widening of the spread to 0.62% in late April, before dropping back a bit in May, with the Moody's downgrade having almost no effect on the US sovereign CDS spread. The US Downgrade: Lead-in and Aftermath     With that background on sovereign default and ratings, let's take a look at the story of the moment, which is the Moody's downgrade of the US from Aaa to Aa1. In the weeks since, we have not seen a major upheaval in markets, and the question that we face as investors and analysts is whether anything of consequence has changed as a result of the downgrade. The Lead-in     As I noted at the start of this post, Moody's was the last of the big three sovereign ratings agencies giving the United States a Aaa rating, with S&P (in 2011) and Fitch (in 2023) having already downgraded the US. In fact, the two reasons that both ratings agencies provided at the time of their downgrades were rising government debt and politically dysfunction were also the reasons that Moody's noted in their downgrade. On the debt front, one of the measures that ratings agencies use to assess a country's financial standing is its debt to GDP ratio, and it is undeniable that this statistic has trended upwards for the United States: The ramping up of US debt since 2008 is reflected in total federal debt rising from 80% of GDP in 2008  to more than 120% in 2024. While some of the surge in debt can be attributed to the exigencies caused by crises (the 2008 banking crisis and the 2020 COVID bailouts), the troubling truth is that the debt has outlasted the crises and blaming the crises for the debt levels today is disingenuous.      The problem with the debt-to-GDP measure of sovereign fiscal standing is that it is an imperfect indicator, as can be seen in this list of countries that scored highest and lowest on this measure in 2023: IMF Many of the countries with the highest debt to GDP ratios would be classified as safe and some have Aaa ratings, whereas very few of the countries on the lowest debt to GDP list would qualify as safe. Even if it it the high debt to GDP ratio for the US that triggered the Moody's downgrade, the question is why Moody's chose to do this in 2025 rather than a year or two or even a decade ago, and the answer to that lies, I think, in the political component. A sovereign default has both economic and political roots, since a government that is intent on preserving its credit standing will often find ways to pay its debt and avoid default. For decades now, the US has enjoyed special status with markets and institutions (like ratings agencies), built as much on its institutional stability (legal and regulatory) as it was on its economic power. The Moody's downgrade seems to me a signal that those days might be winding down, and that the United States, like the rest of the world, will face more accountability for lack of discipline in its fiscal and monetary policy. Market Reaction     The ratings downgrade was after close of trading on Friday, May 16, and there was concern about how it would play out in markets, when they opened on Monday, May 19. US equities were actually up on that day, though they lost ground in the subsequent days: If equity markets were relatively unscathed in the two weeks after the downgrade, what about bond markets, and specially, the US treasury market? After all, an issuer downgrade for any bond is bad news, and rates should be expected to rise to reflect higher default risk: While rates did go up in the the first few days after the downgrade, the effect was muddled by the passage of a reconciliation bill in the house that potentially could add to the deficit in future years. In fact, by the May 29, 2025, almost all of the downgrade effect had faded, with rates close to where they were at the start of the year.     You may be surprised that markets did not react more negatively to the ratings downgrade, but I am not for three reasons: Lack of surprise effect: While the timing of the Moody's downgrade was unexpected, the downgrade itself was not surprising for two reasons. First, since S&P and Fitch had already downgraded the US, Moody's was the outlier in giving the US a Aaa rating, and it was only a matter of time before it joined the other two agencies. Second, in addition to reporting a sovereign rating, Moody's discloses when it puts a country on a watch for a ratings changes, with positive (negative) indicating the possibility of a ratings upgrade (downgrade). Moody's changed its outlook for the US to negative in November 2023, and while the rating remained unchanged until May 2025, it was clearly considering the downgrade in the months leading up to it. Magnitude of private capital: The immediate effect of a sovereign ratings downgrade is on government borrowing, and while the US does borrow vast amounts, private capital (in the form of equity and debt) is a far bigger source of financing and funding for the economy.  Ratings change: The ratings downgrade ws more of a blow to pride than to finances, since the default risk (and default spread) difference between an Aaa rating and a Aa1 rating is small. Austria and Finland, for instance, had Aa1 ratings in May 2025, and their ten-year bonds, denominated in Euros, traded at a spread of about 0.15- 0.20% over the German ten-year Euro bond; Germany had a Aaa rating. Consequences for valuation and investment analysis    While the immediate economic and financial consequences of a downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 will be small, there are implications for analysts around the world. In particular, analysts will have to take steps when working with US dollars that they may already be taking already when working with most other currencies in estimating basic inputs into financial analysis.     Let's start with the riskfree rate, a basic building block for estimating costs of equity and capital, which are inputs into intrinsic valuation. In principle, the riskfree rate is what you will earn on a guaranteed investment in a currency, and any risk premiums, either for investing in equity (equity risk premium) or in fixed income securities (default spreads), are added to the riskfree rate. It is standard practice in many textbooks and classrooms to use the government bond rate as the risk free rate, but that is built on the presumption that governments cannot default (at least on bonds issued in the local currency). Using a Aaa (AAA) rating as a (lazy) proxy for default-free, that is the rationale we used to justify government bond rates as riskfree rates at the start of 2025, in Australian, Singapore and Canadian dollars, the Euro (Germany). Swiss francs and Danish krone. As we noted in the first section, the assumption that governments don't default  is violated in practice, since some countries choose to default on local currency bonds, rather than face up to inflation. If that is the case, the government bond rate is no longer truly a riskfree rate, and getting to a riskfree rate will require netting out a default spread from the government bond rate: Risk free rate = Government Bond rate − Default spread for the government  The default spread can be estimated either from the sovereign bond rating (with a look up table) or a sovereign CDS spread, and we used that process to get riskfree in rates in a  host of currencies, where local currency government bonds had default risk, at the start of 2025: Thus, to get a riskfree rate in Indian rupees, Brazilian reals or Turkish lira, we start with government bonds in these currencies and net out the default spreads for the countries in question. We do this to ensure that we don't double count country risk by first using the government bond (which includes default risk) as a riskfree rate and then using a larger equity risk premium to allow for the same country risk.       Now that the US is no longer Aaa rated, we have to follow a similar process to get a riskfree rate in US dollars: US 10-year treasury bond rate on May 30, 2025  = 4.41% Default spread based on Aa1 rating on May 30, 2025  = 0.40% Riskfree rate in US dollars on May 30, 2025 = US 10-year treasury rate - Aa1 default spread = 4.41% - 0.40% = 4.01% This adjustment yields a riskfree rate of 4.01% in US dollars, and it is also built on the presumption that the default spread manifested after the Moody's downgrade on May 16, when the more realistic reading is that US treasury markets have been carrying a  default spread embedded in them for years, and that we are not making it explicit.     The ratings downgrade for the US will also affect the equity risk premium computations that I use to estimate the cost of equity for companies. As some of you who track my equity risk premiums by country know, I estimate an equity risk premium for the S&P 500, and at least until the start of this year, I used that as a premium for all mature markets (with a AAA (Aaa) rating as the indicator of maturity). Thus, countries like Canada, Germany, Australia and Singapore were all assigned the same premium as that attributed to the S&P 500. For countries with ratings below Aaa, I added an "extra country risk premium"  computed based upon the default spreads that went with the country ratings: With the ratings downgrade, I will have to modify this process in three ways. The first is that when computing the equity risk premium for the S& P 500, I will have to net out the adjusted riskfree rate in US dollars rather than the US treasury rate, yielding a higher equity risk premium for the US. Second, for Aaa rated countries, to the extent that they are safer than the US will have to be assigned an equity risk premium lower than the US, with the adjustment downward reflecting the Aa1 rating for the US. The third is that for all other countries, the country risk premium will be computed based upon the the their default spreads and the equity risk premium estimated for Aaa rated countries (rather than the US equity risk premium): How will the cost of equity for a firm with all of its revenues in the United States be affected as a consequence? Let's take three companies, one below-average risk, one average-risk and one above average risk, and compute their costs of equity on May 30, 2025, with and without the downgrade favored in: As you can see, the expected return on the S&P 500 as of May 30, 2025, reflecting the index level then and the expected cash flows, is 8.64%. Incorporating the effects of the downgrade changes the composition of that expected return, resulting in a lower riskfree rate (4.01% instead of 4.41%) and a higher equity risk premium (4.63% instead of 4.23%). Thus, while the expected return for the average stock remains at 8.64%, the expected return increases slightly for riskier stocks and decreases slightly for safer stocks, but the effects are so small that investors will hardly notice. If there is a lesson for analysts here, it is that the downgrade's effects on the discount rates (costs of equity and capital) are minimal, and that staying with the conventional approach (of using the ten-year US treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate and using that rate to compute the equity risk premium) will continue to work. Conclusion     The Moody's ratings downgrade of the US made the news, and much was made of it during the weekend that followed. The financial and economic consequences, at least so far, have been inconsequential, with equity and bond markets shrugging off the downgrade, perhaps because the surprise factor was minimal. The downgrade also has had only a minimal impact on costs of equity and capital for US companies, and while that may change, the changes will come from macroeconomic news or from crises. For the most part, analysts should be able to continue to work with the US treasury rate as a riskfree rate and forward-looking equity risk premiums, as they did before the downgrade. With all of that said, though, the Moody's action does carry symbolic weight, another indicator that US exceptionalism, which allowed the US to take economic and fiscal actions that would have brought blowback for other countries, especially in emerging markets, is coming to an end. That is healthy, in the long term, for both the United States and the rest of the world, but it will come with short term pain. YouTube Video

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OpenAI featured chatbot is pushing extreme surgeries to “subhuman” men

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The Origin of the Tatas

How one of the oldest business empires on the subcontinent got started, and how one man’s values laid the foundation for five generations of business conduct.

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April 2025 – balmy weather, barmy markets

Better late than never, I’m doing a quick update on April. More for the record than because anything particularly notable happened in the portfolio, ignoring the mid month gyrations. It was a lovely month, April. I did a bit of travelling, but the UK had generally lovely spring weather – as the photos illustrate. I… Continue reading April 2025 – balmy weather, barmy markets →

a week ago 9 votes
Claude 4 Has Arrived: Anthropic’s AI Agents Raise the Bar for Autonomous Intelligence

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a week ago 11 votes