It is true that most investing lessons are directed at those who invest only in stocks and bonds, and mostly with long-only strategies. It is also true that in the process, we are ignoring vast swaths of the investment universe, from other asset classes (real estate, collectibles, cryptos) to private holdings (VC, PE) to strategies that short stocks or use derivatives (hedge funds). These ignored investment classes are what fall under the rubric of alternative investments, and while many of these choices have been with us for as long as we have had financial markets, they were accessible to only a small subset of investors for much of that period. In the last two decades, alternative investments have entered the mainstream, first with choices directed at institutional investors, but more recently, in offerings for individual investors. Without giving too much away, the sales pitch for adding alternative investments to a portfolio composed primarily of stocks and bonds is that the melding will create a better risk-return tradeoff, with higher returns for any given risk level, albeit with two different rationales. The first is that they have low correlations with financial assets (stocks and bonds), allowing for diversification benefits and the second is investments in some of these alternative asset groupings have the potential to earn excess returns or alphas. While the sales pitch has worked, at least at the institutional level, in getting buy-in on adding alternative investments, the net benefits from doing so have been modest at best and negative at worst, raising questions about whether there need to be more guardrails on getting individual investors into the alternative asset universe. The Alternative Investment Universe     The use of the word "alternative" in the alternative investing pitch is premised on the belief that much of investing advice is aimed at long-only investors allocating their portfolios between traded stocks, bonds and cash (close to riskless and liquid investments). In that standard investment model, investors choose a stock-bond mix, for investing, and use cash as a buffer to bring in not only liquidity needs and risk preferences, but also views on stock and bond markets (being over or under priced): The mix of stocks and bonds is determined both by risk preferences, with more risk taking associated with a higher allocation to stocks, and market timing playing into more invested in stocks (if stocks are viewed as under priced) or more into bonds (if stocks are over priced and bond are viewed as neutral investments).      This framework accommodates a range of choices, from the purely mechanical (like the much touted 60% stocks/40% bonds mix) to more flexible, where allocations can vary across time and be a function of market conditions. This general framework allows for variants, including different view on markets (from those who believe that markets are efficient to stock pickers and market timers) as well as investors with very different time horizons and risk levels. However, there are clearly large segments of investing that are left out of this mix from private businesses (since they are not listed and traded) to short selling (where you can have negative portfolio weights not just on individual investments but on entire markets) to asset classes that are not traded. In fact, the best way to structure the alternative investing universe if by looking at alternatives through the lens of these missing pieces. 1. Long-Short    In principle, there is little difference between being long on an investment and holding a short position, with the only real difference being in the sequencing of cash flows, with the former requiring a negative cash flow at the time of the action (buying the stock or an asset) and a positive cash flow in a subsequent period (when it is sold), and the latter reversing the process, with the positive cash flow occurring initially (when you sell a stock or an asset that you do not own yet) and the negative cash flow later. That said, they represent actions that you would take with diametrically opposite views of the same stock (asset), with being long (going short) making sense on assets where you expect prices to go up (down). In practice, though, regulators and a subset of investors seem to view short selling more negatively, often not just attaching loaded terms like "speculation" to describe it, but also adding restrictions of how and when it can be done.     Many institutional investors, including most mutual, pension and endowment funds, are restricted from taking short positions on investments, with exceptions sometimes carved out for hedging. For close to a century, at least in the United States, hedge funds have been given the freedom to short assets, and while they do not always use that power to benefit, it is undeniable that having that power allows them to create return distributions (in terms of expected returns, volatility and other distributional parameters) that are different from those faced by long-only investors. Within the hedge fund universe, there are diverse strategies that not only augment long-only strategies (value, growth) but also invest across multiple markets (stocks, bonds and convertibles) and geographies.     The opening up of derivatives markets has allowed some investors to create investment positions and or structured products that use options, futures, swaps and forwards to create cash flow and return profiles that diverge from stock and bond market returns.  2. Public-Private     While much of our attention is spent on publicly traded stocks and bonds, there is a large segment of the economy that is composed of private businesses that are not listed or traded. In fact, there are economies, especially in emerging markets, where the bulk of economic activity occurs in the private business space, with only a small subset of businesses meeting the public listing/trading threshold. Many of these private businesses are owned and funded by their owners, but a significant proportion do need outside equity capital, and historically, there have been two providers: For young private businesses, and especially those that aspire to become bigger and eventually go public, it is venture capital that fills the void, covering the spectrum from angel financing for idea businesses to growth capital for firms further along in their evolution. From its beginnings in the 1950s, venture capital has grown bigger and carries more heft, especially as technology companies have come to dominate the market in the twenty first century. For more established private businesses, some of which need capital to grow and some of which have owners who want to cash out, the capital has come from private equity investors. Again, while private equity has been part of markets for a century or more, it has become more formalized and spread its reach in the last four decades, with the capacity to raise tens of billions of dollars to back up deal making. On the debt front, the public debt and bank debt market is supplemented by private credit,  where investors pool funds to lend to private businesses, with negotiated rates and terms. again a process that has been around a while, but one that has also become formalized and a much larger source of funds. Advocates for private credit investing argue that it can be value-adding partly because of the borrower composition (often cut off from other sources of credit, either because of their size or default history) and partly because private credit providers can be more discerning of true default risk. Even as venture capital, private equity and private credit have expanded as capital sources, they remained out of reach for both institutional and individual investors until a couple of decades ago, but are now integral parts of the alternative investing universe. 3. Asset classes     Public equity and debt, at least in the United States, cover a wide spectrum of the economy, and by extension, multiple asset classes and businesses, but there are big investment classes that are either underrepresented in public markets or missing. Real estate: For much of the twentieth century, real estate remained outside the purview of public markets, with a segmented investor base and illiquid investments, requiring localized knowledge. That started to change with the creation of real estate investment trusts, which securitized a small segment of the market, creating liquidity and standardized units for public market investors. The securitization process gained stream in the 1980s with the advent of mortgage-backed securities. Thus, real estate now has a presence in public markets, but that presence is far smaller than it should be, given the value of real estate in the economy. Collectibles: The collectible asset class spans an array of investment, most of which generate little or no cash flows, but derive their pricing from scarcity and enduring demand. The first and perhaps the longest standing collectible is gold, a draw for investors during inflationary period or when they lose faith in fiat currencies and governments. The second is art, ranging from paintings from the masters to digital art (non-fungible tokens or NFTs), that presumably offers owners not just financial returns but emotional dividends. At the risk of raising the ire of crypto-enthusiasts, I would argue that much of the crypto space (and especially bitcoin) also fall into this grouping, with a combination of scarcity and trading demand determining pricing.  Institutional and individual investors have dabbled with adding these asset classes to their portfolios, but the lack of liquidity and standardization and the need for expert assessments (especially on fine art) have limited those attempts. The Sales Pitch for Alternatives     The strongest pitch for adding alternative investments to a portfolio dominated by publicly traded stocks and bonds comes from a basic building block for portfolio theory, which is that adding investments that have low correlation to the existing holdings in a portfolio can create better risk/return tradeoffs for investors. That pitch has been supplemented in the last two decades with arguments that alternative investments also offer a greater chance of finding market mistakes and inefficiencies, partly because they are more likely to persist in these markets, and partly because of superior management skills on the part of alternative investment managers, particularly hedge funds and private equity. The Correlation Argument     Much of portfolio theory as we know it is built on the insight that combining two investments that are not perfectly correlated with each other can yield mixes that deliver higher returns for any given level of risk than holding either of the investments individually. That argument has both a statistical basis, with the covariance between the two investments operating as the mechanism for the risk reduction, and an economic basis that the idiosyncratic movements in each investment can offset to create a less risky combination.      In that vein, the argument for adding alternative investments to a portfolio composed primarily of stocks and bonds rests on a correlation matrix of stocks and bonds with alternative investments (hedge funds, private equity, private credit, fine art, gold and collectibles): Guggenheim Investments While the correlations in this matrix are non-stationary (with the numbers changing both with time periods used and the indices that stand in for the asset classes) and have a variety of measurement issues that I will highlight later in this post, it is undeniable that they at least offer a chance of diversification that may not be available in a long-only stock/bond portfolio.     Using historical correlations as the basis, advocates for alternative investments are able to create portfolios, at least on paper, that beat stock/bond combinations on a risk/return tradeoff, as can be see in this graph: EquityMultiple Investment Partners, Green Street Advisors, and JPMorgan Asset Management Note that the comparison is to a portfolio composed 60% of stocks and 40% of bonds, a widely used mix among portfolio managers, and in each of the cases, adding alternative investments to that portfolio results in a mix that yields  higher returns with lower risk. The Alternative Alpha Argument     The correlation-based argument for adding alternative investments to a portfolio is neither new nor controversial, since it is built on core portfolio theory arguments for diversification. For some advocates of alternative investments, though, that captures only a portion of the advantage of adding alternative investments. They argue that the investment classes from alternative investments draw on, which include non-traded real estate, collectibles and private businesses (young and old), are also the classes where market mistakes are more likely to persist, because of their illiquidity and opacity, and that alternative asset managers have the localized knowledge and intellectual capacity to find and take advantage of these mistakes. The payoff from doing so takes the form of "excess returns" which will supplement the benefits that flow from just diversification.     This alpha argument is often heard most frequently with those advocating for adding hedge funds, venture capital and private equity to conventional portfolios, where the perception of superior investment management persists, but is that perception backed up by the numbers? In the graph below, I reproduce a study that looks at looked at 20-year annualized returns, from 2003 to 2022, on many alternative asset classes: Opto Insights Given the differences in risk across alternative investment classes, the median returns themselves do not tell us much about whether they earn excess returns, but two facts come through nevertheless. The first is that the variation across managers within investment classes is significant in both private equity and venture capital. The second, and this is not visible in this graph, is that persistence in outperformance is more common in venture capital and private equity than it is in public market investors, with winners more likely to continue winning and losers dropping out. I expanded on some of the reasons for this persistence, at least in venture capital, in a post from some years ago.    The bottom line is that there is some basis for the argument that as investment classes, hedge funds, private equity and venture capital, generate excess returns, albeit modest, relative to other investors, but it is unclear whether these excess returns are just compensation for the illiquidity and opacity that go with the investments that they have to make. In addition, given the skewed payoffs, where there are a few big and persistent winners, the median hedge fund, private equity investor or venture capitalist may be no better at generating alpha than the average mutual fund manager. The Rise of Alternative Investing     No matter what you think of the alternative investing sales pitch, it is undeniable that it has worked, at least at the institutional investor level, for some of its adopted, especially in the last two decades. In the graph below, for instance, you can track the rise of alternative investments in pension fund holdings in this graph (from KKR): Source: KKR That move towards alternatives is not just restricted to pension funds, as other allcators have joined the mix: Source: KKR Some of the early movers into alternative asset classes were lauded and used as role models by others in the space. David Swensen, at Yale, for instance, burnished a well-deserved reputation as a pioneer in investment management by moving Yale's endowment into private equity and hedge funds earlier than other Ivy League schools, allowing Yale to outpace them in the returns race for much of this century: As other fund managers have followed Yale into the space, that surge has been good for private equity and hedge fund managers, who have seen their ranks grow (both in terms of numbers and dollar value under management) over time. Where's the beef?     As funds have increased their allocations to alternative investments, drawn by the perceived gains on paper and the success of early adopters, it is becoming increasingly clear that the results from the move have been underwhelming. In short, the actual effects on returns and risk from adding alternative investments to portfolios are not matching up to the promise, leading to questions of why and where the leakage is occurring.   The Questionable Benefits of Alternative Investing     In theory and principle, adding investments from groupings of investments that are less correlated with stocks and bonds should yield benefits for investors, and at least in the aggregate, over long time periods that may hold. Cambridge Associates, in their annual review of endowments, presents this graph of returns and standard deviations, as a function of how much each endowment allocated to private investments over a ten-year period (from 2012-2022): Cambridge Associates With the subset of endowments that Cambridge examined, both annual returns and Sharpe ratios  were higher at funds that invested more in private investments (which incorporates much of the alternative investment space). Those results, though, have been challenged by others looking at a broader group of funds. In an article in CFA magazine, Nicolas Rabener looked at the two arguments for adding hedge funds to a portfolio, i.e., that they increase Sharpe ratios and reduce drawdowns in fund value during market downturns, and found both absent in practice: Nicolas Ramener, CFA Institute With hedge funds, admittedly just one component of alternative investing, Rabener finds that notwithstanding the low correlations that some hedge fund strategies have with a conventional equity/bond portfolio, there is no noticeable improvement in Sharpe ratios or decrease in drawdowns from adding them to the portfolio.     Richard Ennis, a long-time critic of alternative investing, has a series of papers that question the benefits to funds from adding them to the mix.  Richard Ennis, SSRN In the Ennis sample, the excess returns become more negative as the allocation to alternative investments is increased, undercutting a key sales pitch for the allocation. While alternative investing advocates will take issue with the Ennis findings, on empirical and statistical bases, even long-term beneficiaries from alternative investing seem to have become more skeptical about its benefits over time. In a 2018 paper, Fragkiskos, Ryan and Markov noted that among Ivy League endowments, properly adjusting for risk causes any benefits in terms of Sharpe ratios, from adding alternative investments to the mix, to disappear. In perhaps the most telling sign that the bloom is off the alternative investing rose, Yale's endowment announced its intent to sell of billions of dollars of private equity holdings in June 2025, after years of under performance on its holdings in that investment class. Correlations: Real and Perceived     At the start of this post, I noted that a key sales pitch for alternative investments is their low correlation with stock/bond markets, and to the extent that this historical correlations seem to back this pitch, it may be surprising that the actual results don't measure up to what is promised. There are two reasons why these historical correlations may be understated for most  private investment classes: Pricing lags; Unlike publicly traded equities and bonds, where there are observable market prices from current transactions, most private assets are not liquid and the pricing is based upon appraisals. In theory, these appraisers are supposed to mark-to-market, but in practice, the pricing that they attach to private assets lag market changes. Thus, when markets are going up or down quickly, private equity and venture capital can look like they are going up or down less than public equity markets, but that is because of the lagged prices.  Market crises: While correlations between investment classes are often based upon long periods, and across up and down markets, the truth is that investors care most about risk (and correlations) during market crises, and many investment classes that exhibit low correlation during sideways or stable markets can have lose that feature and move in lock step with public markets during crisis. That was the case during the banking crisis in the last quarter of 2008 and during the COVID meltdown in the first quarter of 2020, when funds with large private investment allocations felt the same drawdown and pain as funds without that exposure. In my view, this understatement of correlation is most acute in private equity and venture capital, which are after all equity investments in businesses, albeit private, instead of public. It is less likely to be the case for truly differentiated investment classes, such as gold, collectibles and real estate, but even here, correlations with public markets have risen, as they have become more widely held by funds. With hedge funds, it is possible to construct strategies that should have lower correlation with public markets, but some of these strategies can have catastrophic breakdowns (with the potential for wipeout) during market crises. Illiquidity and Opacity (lack of transparency)     Even the strongest advocates for alternative investments accept that they are less liquid than public market investments, but argue that for investors with long time horizons and clearly defined cash flow needs (like pension and endowment funds), that illiquidity should not be a deal breaker. The problem with this argument is that much as investors like to believe that they control their time horizons and cash needs, they do not, and find their need for liquidity rising during acute market crises or panics. The other problem with illiquidity is that it manifests in transactions costs, manifesting both in terms of bid-ask spreads and in price impact that drains from returns.     The other aspect of the private investment market that is mentioned but then glossed over is that many of its vehicles tend to be opaque in terms of governance structure and reporting. Investors, including many large institutional players, that invest in hedge funds, private equity and venture capital are often on the outside looking in, as deals get structured and gains get apportioned. Again, that absence of transparency may be ignored in good times, but could make bad times worse. Disappearing Alphas     When alternative investing first became accessible to institutional investors, the presumption was that market-beating opportunities abounded in private markets, and that hedge fund, private equity and venture capital managers brought superior abilities to the investment game. That may have been true then, but that perception has faded for many reasons. First, as the number of funds and money under management in these investment vehicles has increased, the capacity to make easy money has also faded, and in my view, the average venture capital, private equity or hedge fund manager is now no better or worse than the average mutual fund manager. Second, the investment game has also become more difficult to win, as the investment world has become flatter, with many of the advantages that fund managers used to extract excess returns dissipating over time. Third, the entry of passive investment vehicles like exchange traded funds (ETFS) that can spot and replicate active investors who are beating the market has meant that excess returns, even if present, do not last for long.     With hedge funds, the fading of excess returns over time has been chronicled. Sullivan looked at hedge funds between 1994 and 2019 and noted that even by 2009, the alpha had dropped to zero or below: Sullivan, Hedge fund alpha: Cycle or Sunset In a companion paper, Sullivan also noted another phenomenon undercutting the benefits of adding hedge funds to a public market portfolio, which is that correlations between hedge fund returns and public market returns have risen over time from 0.65 in the 1990s to 0.87 in the last decade.     With private investment funds, the results are similar, when performance is compared over time. A paper looking at private equity returns over time concluded that private equity returns, which ran well above public market returns between 1998 and 2007, have started to resemble public market returns in most recent years. Ilmanen, Chandra and McQuinn The positive notes in both hedge funds and private equity, as we noted in an earlier section on venture capital, is that while the typical manager in each group has converged to the average, the best managers in these groups have shown more staying power than in public markets. Put simple, the hope is that you can invest your money with these superior managers, and ride their success to earn more than you would have earned elsewhere, but there is a catch even with that scenario, which we will explore next. The Cost Effect    Let's assume that even with fading alphas and higher correlations with public markets, some hedge funds and private market investors still provide benefits to funds invested primarily in public markets. Those benefits, though, still come with significant costs, since the managers of these alternative investment vehicles charge far more for their services than their equivalents in public markets. In general, the fees for alternative investments are composed of a management fee, specified as a percent of assets under management, and a performance fee, where the alternative investment manager gets a percent of returns earned over and above a specified benchmark. In the two-and-twenty model that many hedge and PE fund models used to adhere to, the fund managers collect 2% of the assets under management and 20% of returns in excess of the benchmark. Both numbers have been under downward pressure in recent years, as alternative investing has spread: Even with the decline, though, these costs represent a significant drag on performance, and  the chances of gaining a net benefit from adding an alternative investing class to a fund drop towards zero very quickly. An Epitaph for Alternative Investing?     It is clear, looking at the trend lines, that the days of easy money for those selling alternative investments as well as those buying these investments have wound down. Even  savvy institutional investors, who have been long-term believers in the benefits of alternative investing, are questioning whether private equity, hedge funds and venture capital have become too big and are too costly to be value-adding. As institutional investors become less willing to jump into the alternative investing fray, it looks like individual investors are now being targeted for the alternative investing sales pitch, and as with all things investing, I would suggest that buyer beware, and that investors, institutions and individual, keep the following in mind, when listening to alternative investing pitches: Be picky about alternatives: Given that the alpha pitch (that hedge fund and private equity managers deliver excess returns) has lost its heft, it is correlations that should guide investor choices on alternative investments. That will reduce the attractiveness of private equity and venture capital, as investment vehicles, and increase the draw of some hedge funds, gold and many collectibles. As for cryptos, the jury is still out, since bitcoin, the highest profile component, has behaved more like risky equity, rising and falling with the market, than a traditional collectible. Avoid high-cost and exotic vehicles: Investing is a tough enough game to win, without costs, and adding high cost vehicles makes it even more difficult. At the risk of drawing the ire of some, I would argue that any endowment or pension fund managers who pay two-and-twenty to a hedge fund, no matter how great its track record, first needs their heads examined and then summarily fired. On a related noted, alternative investments that are based upon strategies that are so complex that neither the seller nor buyer has an intuitive sense of what exactly they are trying to do should be avoided. Be realistic about time horizon and liquidity needs: As noted many times through this post, alternative investing, no matter how well structured and practiced, will come with less liquidity and transparency than public investing, making it a better choice for investors with longer time horizons and well-specified cash needs. On this front, individual investors need to be honest with themselves about how susceptible they are to panic attacks and peer-group pressure, and institutional investors have to recognize that their time horizons are determined by their clients, and not by their own preferences. Be wary of correlation matrices and historical alphas: The alternative investing sales pitch is juiced by correlation matrices (indicating that the alternative investing vehicle in question does not move with public markets) and historic alphas (showing that vehicle delivering market beating risk/return tradeoffs and Sharpe ratios). If there is one takeaway from this post, I hope that it is that historical correlations, especially when you have non-traded investments at play, are untrustworthy and that alphas fade over time, and more so when the vehicles that delivered them are sold relentlessly. YouTube video

I was on a family vacation in August 2011 when I received an email from a journalist asking me what I thought about the S&P ratings downgrade for the US. Since I stay blissfully unaware of most news stories and things related to markets when I am on the beach, I had to look up what he was talking about, and it was S&P's decision to downgrade the United States, which had always enjoyed AAA, the highest sovereign rating  that can be granted to a country, to AA+, reflecting their concerns about both the fiscal challenges faced by the country, with mounting trade and budget deficits, as well as the willingness of its political institutions to flirt with the possibility of default. For more than a decade, S&P remained the outlier, but in 2023, Fitch joined it by also downgrading the US from AAA to AA+, citing the same reasons. That left Moody's, the third of the major sovereign ratings agencies, as the only one that persisted with a Aaa (Moody's equivalent of AAA) for the US, but that changed on May 16, 2025, when it too downgraded the US from Aaa (negative) to Aa1 (stable). Since the ratings downgrade happened after close of trading on a Friday, there was concern that markets would wake up on the following  Monday (May 19) to a wave of selling, and while that did not materialize, the rest of the week was a down week for both stocks and US treasury bonds, especially at the longest end of the maturity spectrum. Rather than rehash the arguments about US debt and political dysfunction, which I am sure that you had read elsewhere, I thought I would take this moment to talk about sovereign default risk, how ratings agencies rate sovereigns, the biases and errors in sovereign ratings and their predictive power, and use that discussion as a launching pad to talk about how the US ratings downgrade will affect equity and bond valuations not just in the US, but around the world. Sovereign Defaults: A History     Through time, governments have often been dependent on debt to finance themselves, some in the local currency and much in a foreign currency. A large proportion of sovereign defaults have occurred with foreign currency sovereign borrowing, as the borrowing country finds itself short of the foreign currency to meet its obligations. However, those defaults, and especially so in recent years, have been supplemented by countries that have chosen to default on local currency borrowings. I use the word "chosen" because most countries  have the capacity to avoid default on local currency debt, being able to print money in that currency to pay off debt, but chose not to do so, because they feared the consequences of the inflation that would follow more than the consequences of default. BoC/BoE Sovereign Default Database While the number of sovereign defaults has ebbed and flowed over time, there are two points worth making about the data. The first is that, over time, sovereign defaults, especially on foreign currency debt, have shifted from bank debt to sovereign bonds, with three times as many sovereign defaults on bonds than on bank loans in 2023. The second is that local currency defaults are persistent over time, and while less frequent than foreign currency defaults, remain a significant proportion of total defaults.     The consequences of sovereign default have been both economic and political. Besides the obvious implication that lenders to that government lose some or a great deal of what is owed to them, there are other consequences. Researchers who have examined the aftermath of default have come to the following conclusions about the short-term and long-term effects of defaulting on debt: Default has a negative impact on the economy, with real GDP dropping between 0.5% and 2%, but the bulk of the decline is in the first year after the default and seems to be short lived. Default does affect a country’s long-term sovereign rating and borrowing costs. One study of credit ratings in 1995 found that the ratings for countries that had defaulted at least once since 1970 were one to two notches lower than otherwise similar countries that had not defaulted. In the same vein, defaulting countries have borrowing costs that are about 0.5 to 1% higher than countries that have not defaulted. Here again, though, the effects of default dissipate over time. Sovereign default can cause trade retaliation. One study indicates a drop of 8% in bilateral trade after default, with the effects lasting for up to 15 years, and another one that uses industry level data finds that export-oriented industries are particularly hurt by sovereign default. Sovereign default can make banking systems more fragile. A study of 149 countries between 1975 and 2000 indicates that the probability of a banking crisis is 14% in countries that have defaulted, an eleven percentage-point increase over non-defaulting countries. Sovereign default also increases the likelihood of political change. While none of the studies focus on defaults per se, there are several that have examined the after-effects of sharp devaluations, which often accompany default. A study of devaluations between 1971 and 2003 finds a 45% increase in the probability of change in the top leader (prime minister or president) in the country and a 64% increase in the probability of change in the finance executive (minister of finance or head of central bank). In summary, default is costly, and countries do not (and should not) take the possibility of default lightly. Default is particularly expensive when it leads to banking crises and currency devaluations; the former has a longstanding impact on the capacity of firms to fund their investments whereas the latter create political and institutional instability that lasts for long periods. Sovereign Ratings: Measures and Process     Since few of us have the resources or the time to dedicate to understanding small and unfamiliar countries, it is no surprise that third parties have stepped into the breach, with their assessments of sovereign default risk. Of these third-party assessors, bond ratings agencies came in with the biggest advantages: They have been assessing default risk in corporations for a hundred years or more and presumably can transfer some of their skills to assessing sovereign risk. Bond investors who are familiar with the ratings measures, from investing in corporate bonds, find it easy to extend their use to assessing sovereign bonds. Thus, a AAA rated country is viewed as close to riskless whereas a C rated country is very risky.  Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch’s have been rating corporate bond offerings since the early part of the twentieth century. Moody’s has been rating corporate bonds since 1919 and started rating government bonds in the 1920s, when that market was an active one. By 1929, Moody’s provided ratings for almost fifty central governments. With the Great Depression and the Second World War, investments in government bonds abated and with it, the interest in government bond ratings. In the 1970s, the business picked up again slowly. As recently as the early 1980s, only about thirteen  governments, mostly in developed and mature markets, had ratings, with most of them commanding the highest level (Aaa). The decade from 1985 to 1994 added 34 countries to the sovereign rating list, with many of them having speculative or lower ratings and by 2024, Moody's alone was rating 143 countries, covering 75% of all emerging market countries and almost every developed market.  table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } Not only have ratings agencies become more active in adding countries to their ratings list, but they have also expanded their coverage of countries with more default risk/ lower ratings.  In fact, the number of Aaa rated countries was the same in 1985, when there were thirteen rated countries, as in 2025, when there were 143 rated countries. In the last two decades, at least five sovereigns, including Japan, the UK, France and now the US, have lost their Aaa ratings.  In addition to more countries being rated, the ratings themselves have become richer. Moody’s and S&P now provide two ratings for each country – a local currency rating (for domestic currency debt/ bonds) and a foreign currency rating (for government borrowings in a foreign currency).      In assessing these sovereign ratings, ratings agencies draw on a multitude of data, quantitative and qualitative. Moody's describes its sovereign ratings process in the picture below: The process is broad enough to cover both political and economic factors, while preserving wiggle room for the ratings agencies to make subjective judgments on default that can lead to different ratings for two countries with similar economic and political profiles. The heat map below provides the sovereign ratings, from Moody's, for all rated countries the start of 2025: Moody's sovereign ratings Note that the greyed out countries are unrated, with Russia being the most significant example; the ratings agencies withdrew their rating for Russia in 2022 and not reinstated it yet. There were only a handful of Aaa rated countries, concentrated in North America (United States and Canada), Northern Europe (Germany, Scandinavia), Australia & New Zealand and Singapore (the only Aaa-rated Asian country. In 2025, there have been a eight sovereign ratings changes, four upgrades and four downgrades, with the US downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 as the highest profile change With the US downgrade, the list of Aaa-rated countries has become shorter, and as Canada and Germany struggle with budget imbalances, the likelihood is that more companies will drop off the list. Sovereign Ratings:  Performance and Alternatives     If sovereign ratings are designed to measure exposure to default risk, how well do they do? The answer depends on how you evaluate their performance. The ratings agencies provide tables that list defaults by rating that back the proposition that sovereign ratings and default are highly correlated. A Moody's update of default rates by sovereign ratings classes, between 1983 and 2024, yielded the following: Default rates rise as sovereign ratings decline, with a default rate of 24% for  speculative grade sovereign debt (Baa2 and below) as opposed to 1.8% for investment grade (Aaa to Baa1) sovereign debt.     That said, there are aspects of sovereign ratings that should give pause to anyone considering using them as their proxy for sovereign default, they do come with caveats and limitations: Ratings are upward biased: Ratings agencies have been accused by some of being far too optimistic in their assessments of both corporate and sovereign ratings. While the conflict of interest of having issuers pay for the rating is offered as the rationale for the upward bias in corporate ratings, that argument does not hold up when it comes to sovereign ratings, since not only are the revenues small, relative to reputation loss, but a proportion of sovereigns are rated for no fees. There is herd behavior: When one ratings agency lowers or raises a sovereign rating, other ratings agencies seem to follow suit. This herd behavior reduces the value of having three separate ratings agencies, since their assessments of sovereign risk are no longer independent. Too little, too late: To price sovereign bonds (or set interest rates on sovereign loans), investors (banks) need assessments of default risk that are updated and timely. It has long been argued that ratings agencies take too long to change ratings, and that these changes happen too late to protect investors from a crisis. Vicious Cycle: Once a market is in crisis, there is the perception that ratings agencies sometimes overreact and lower ratings too much, thus creating a feedback effect that makes the crisis worse. This is especially true for small countries that are mostly dependent on foreign capital for their funds. Regional biases: There are many, especially in Asia and Latin America, that believe that the ratings agencies are too lax in assessing default risk for North America and Europe,  overrating countries in  those regions, while being too stringent in their assessments of default in Asia, Latin America and Africa, underrating countries in those regions.  In sum, the evidence suggests that while sovereign ratings are good measures of country default risk, changes in ratings often lag changes on the ground, making them less useful to lenders and investors.     If the key limitation of sovereign ratings is that they are not timely assessors of country default risk, that failure is alleviated by the development of the sovereign CDS market, a market where investors can buy insurance against country default risk by paying an (annualized) price. While that market still has issues in terms of counterparty risk and legal questions about what comprises default, it has expanded in the last two decades, and at the start of 2025, there were about 80 countries with sovereign CDS available on them. The heat map below provides a picture of sovereign (10-year)  CDS spreads on January 1, 2025: As you can see, even at the start of 2025, the market was drawing a distinction between  the safest Aaa-rated countries (Scandinavia, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand), all with sovereign CDS spreads of 0.20% or below, and more risky Aaa-rated countries (US, Germany, Canada). During 2025, the market shocks from tariff and trade wars have had an effect, with sovereign CDS spreads increasing, especially in April. The US, which started 2025 with a sovereign CDS spread of 0.41%, saw a widening of the spread to 0.62% in late April, before dropping back a bit in May, with the Moody's downgrade having almost no effect on the US sovereign CDS spread. The US Downgrade: Lead-in and Aftermath     With that background on sovereign default and ratings, let's take a look at the story of the moment, which is the Moody's downgrade of the US from Aaa to Aa1. In the weeks since, we have not seen a major upheaval in markets, and the question that we face as investors and analysts is whether anything of consequence has changed as a result of the downgrade. The Lead-in     As I noted at the start of this post, Moody's was the last of the big three sovereign ratings agencies giving the United States a Aaa rating, with S&P (in 2011) and Fitch (in 2023) having already downgraded the US. In fact, the two reasons that both ratings agencies provided at the time of their downgrades were rising government debt and politically dysfunction were also the reasons that Moody's noted in their downgrade. On the debt front, one of the measures that ratings agencies use to assess a country's financial standing is its debt to GDP ratio, and it is undeniable that this statistic has trended upwards for the United States: The ramping up of US debt since 2008 is reflected in total federal debt rising from 80% of GDP in 2008  to more than 120% in 2024. While some of the surge in debt can be attributed to the exigencies caused by crises (the 2008 banking crisis and the 2020 COVID bailouts), the troubling truth is that the debt has outlasted the crises and blaming the crises for the debt levels today is disingenuous.      The problem with the debt-to-GDP measure of sovereign fiscal standing is that it is an imperfect indicator, as can be seen in this list of countries that scored highest and lowest on this measure in 2023: IMF Many of the countries with the highest debt to GDP ratios would be classified as safe and some have Aaa ratings, whereas very few of the countries on the lowest debt to GDP list would qualify as safe. Even if it it the high debt to GDP ratio for the US that triggered the Moody's downgrade, the question is why Moody's chose to do this in 2025 rather than a year or two or even a decade ago, and the answer to that lies, I think, in the political component. A sovereign default has both economic and political roots, since a government that is intent on preserving its credit standing will often find ways to pay its debt and avoid default. For decades now, the US has enjoyed special status with markets and institutions (like ratings agencies), built as much on its institutional stability (legal and regulatory) as it was on its economic power. The Moody's downgrade seems to me a signal that those days might be winding down, and that the United States, like the rest of the world, will face more accountability for lack of discipline in its fiscal and monetary policy. Market Reaction     The ratings downgrade was after close of trading on Friday, May 16, and there was concern about how it would play out in markets, when they opened on Monday, May 19. US equities were actually up on that day, though they lost ground in the subsequent days: If equity markets were relatively unscathed in the two weeks after the downgrade, what about bond markets, and specially, the US treasury market? After all, an issuer downgrade for any bond is bad news, and rates should be expected to rise to reflect higher default risk: While rates did go up in the the first few days after the downgrade, the effect was muddled by the passage of a reconciliation bill in the house that potentially could add to the deficit in future years. In fact, by the May 29, 2025, almost all of the downgrade effect had faded, with rates close to where they were at the start of the year.     You may be surprised that markets did not react more negatively to the ratings downgrade, but I am not for three reasons: Lack of surprise effect: While the timing of the Moody's downgrade was unexpected, the downgrade itself was not surprising for two reasons. First, since S&P and Fitch had already downgraded the US, Moody's was the outlier in giving the US a Aaa rating, and it was only a matter of time before it joined the other two agencies. Second, in addition to reporting a sovereign rating, Moody's discloses when it puts a country on a watch for a ratings changes, with positive (negative) indicating the possibility of a ratings upgrade (downgrade). Moody's changed its outlook for the US to negative in November 2023, and while the rating remained unchanged until May 2025, it was clearly considering the downgrade in the months leading up to it. Magnitude of private capital: The immediate effect of a sovereign ratings downgrade is on government borrowing, and while the US does borrow vast amounts, private capital (in the form of equity and debt) is a far bigger source of financing and funding for the economy.  Ratings change: The ratings downgrade ws more of a blow to pride than to finances, since the default risk (and default spread) difference between an Aaa rating and a Aa1 rating is small. Austria and Finland, for instance, had Aa1 ratings in May 2025, and their ten-year bonds, denominated in Euros, traded at a spread of about 0.15- 0.20% over the German ten-year Euro bond; Germany had a Aaa rating. Consequences for valuation and investment analysis    While the immediate economic and financial consequences of a downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 will be small, there are implications for analysts around the world. In particular, analysts will have to take steps when working with US dollars that they may already be taking already when working with most other currencies in estimating basic inputs into financial analysis.     Let's start with the riskfree rate, a basic building block for estimating costs of equity and capital, which are inputs into intrinsic valuation. In principle, the riskfree rate is what you will earn on a guaranteed investment in a currency, and any risk premiums, either for investing in equity (equity risk premium) or in fixed income securities (default spreads), are added to the riskfree rate. It is standard practice in many textbooks and classrooms to use the government bond rate as the risk free rate, but that is built on the presumption that governments cannot default (at least on bonds issued in the local currency). Using a Aaa (AAA) rating as a (lazy) proxy for default-free, that is the rationale we used to justify government bond rates as riskfree rates at the start of 2025, in Australian, Singapore and Canadian dollars, the Euro (Germany). Swiss francs and Danish krone. As we noted in the first section, the assumption that governments don't default  is violated in practice, since some countries choose to default on local currency bonds, rather than face up to inflation. If that is the case, the government bond rate is no longer truly a riskfree rate, and getting to a riskfree rate will require netting out a default spread from the government bond rate: Risk free rate = Government Bond rate − Default spread for the government  The default spread can be estimated either from the sovereign bond rating (with a look up table) or a sovereign CDS spread, and we used that process to get riskfree in rates in a  host of currencies, where local currency government bonds had default risk, at the start of 2025: Thus, to get a riskfree rate in Indian rupees, Brazilian reals or Turkish lira, we start with government bonds in these currencies and net out the default spreads for the countries in question. We do this to ensure that we don't double count country risk by first using the government bond (which includes default risk) as a riskfree rate and then using a larger equity risk premium to allow for the same country risk.       Now that the US is no longer Aaa rated, we have to follow a similar process to get a riskfree rate in US dollars: US 10-year treasury bond rate on May 30, 2025  = 4.41% Default spread based on Aa1 rating on May 30, 2025  = 0.40% Riskfree rate in US dollars on May 30, 2025 = US 10-year treasury rate - Aa1 default spread = 4.41% - 0.40% = 4.01% This adjustment yields a riskfree rate of 4.01% in US dollars, and it is also built on the presumption that the default spread manifested after the Moody's downgrade on May 16, when the more realistic reading is that US treasury markets have been carrying a  default spread embedded in them for years, and that we are not making it explicit.     The ratings downgrade for the US will also affect the equity risk premium computations that I use to estimate the cost of equity for companies. As some of you who track my equity risk premiums by country know, I estimate an equity risk premium for the S&P 500, and at least until the start of this year, I used that as a premium for all mature markets (with a AAA (Aaa) rating as the indicator of maturity). Thus, countries like Canada, Germany, Australia and Singapore were all assigned the same premium as that attributed to the S&P 500. For countries with ratings below Aaa, I added an "extra country risk premium"  computed based upon the default spreads that went with the country ratings: With the ratings downgrade, I will have to modify this process in three ways. The first is that when computing the equity risk premium for the S& P 500, I will have to net out the adjusted riskfree rate in US dollars rather than the US treasury rate, yielding a higher equity risk premium for the US. Second, for Aaa rated countries, to the extent that they are safer than the US will have to be assigned an equity risk premium lower than the US, with the adjustment downward reflecting the Aa1 rating for the US. The third is that for all other countries, the country risk premium will be computed based upon the the their default spreads and the equity risk premium estimated for Aaa rated countries (rather than the US equity risk premium): How will the cost of equity for a firm with all of its revenues in the United States be affected as a consequence? Let's take three companies, one below-average risk, one average-risk and one above average risk, and compute their costs of equity on May 30, 2025, with and without the downgrade favored in: As you can see, the expected return on the S&P 500 as of May 30, 2025, reflecting the index level then and the expected cash flows, is 8.64%. Incorporating the effects of the downgrade changes the composition of that expected return, resulting in a lower riskfree rate (4.01% instead of 4.41%) and a higher equity risk premium (4.63% instead of 4.23%). Thus, while the expected return for the average stock remains at 8.64%, the expected return increases slightly for riskier stocks and decreases slightly for safer stocks, but the effects are so small that investors will hardly notice. If there is a lesson for analysts here, it is that the downgrade's effects on the discount rates (costs of equity and capital) are minimal, and that staying with the conventional approach (of using the ten-year US treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate and using that rate to compute the equity risk premium) will continue to work. Conclusion     The Moody's ratings downgrade of the US made the news, and much was made of it during the weekend that followed. The financial and economic consequences, at least so far, have been inconsequential, with equity and bond markets shrugging off the downgrade, perhaps because the surprise factor was minimal. The downgrade also has had only a minimal impact on costs of equity and capital for US companies, and while that may change, the changes will come from macroeconomic news or from crises. For the most part, analysts should be able to continue to work with the US treasury rate as a riskfree rate and forward-looking equity risk premiums, as they did before the downgrade. With all of that said, though, the Moody's action does carry symbolic weight, another indicator that US exceptionalism, which allowed the US to take economic and fiscal actions that would have brought blowback for other countries, especially in emerging markets, is coming to an end. That is healthy, in the long term, for both the United States and the rest of the world, but it will come with short term pain. YouTube Video

I started the month on a trip to Latin America, just as the tariff story hit my newsfeed and the market reacted with a sell off that knocked more than $9 trillion in market cap for global equities in the next two days. The month was off to a bad start, and tariffs remained the lead story for much of the month, contributing to both its biggest down days (with stories of trade war escalation) and to the biggest up days (with news of relief from the fight). To add to the volatility, there was talk midway through the month of replacing Jerome Powell as the Fed Chair, and assorted news adding to uncertainty about the direction of the economy. An observer reading just the news stories and asked to guess what the market did during the month would probably have bet on stocks falling steeply, but he or she would have lost that bet, because markets managed to surprise us all again, ending the month almost where they began. Equities: Storm Clouds gather (and dissipate)!     It would be an understatement to describe equity markets in April 2025 as volatile, with the equity indices going through stomach wrenching up and down movements intraday and across days, as investors struggled to price in a world of tariffs, trade wars and policy uncertainty. The journey that the indices went through during the course of the month has been extraordinary. Each of the indices lost close to 10%  in the first two days of the month, went deeper into the hole in the second week of the month, but by the end of the month, they had each found their way back to almost where they started the month at, with the S&P 500, NASDAQ and the MSCI world index all within 1% of their start-of-the-month levels.     As I noted in my post right after the first couple of days of this month, where I framed the market crisis around tariffs, the indices sometimes obscure markets shifts that are occurring under the surface, and that looking at all publicly traded stocks on an aggregated basis provides a more complete picture. I will start by looking at the regional breakdown of what the month delivered in terms of change in market cap, in both dollar and percentage terms: The crisis may have been birthed in the United States, but as has been the case with market crises in this century, it has spread across the world, with disparate impacts. There are truly no standouts in either direction, with China being the worst performing region, in terms of percentage change in dollar value, down 3.69%, and India and Latin America tied for best performing, up 3.57%.  These are dollar returns, and since the US dollar came under selling pressure during the course of the month, the local currency returns were worse, especially in markets, like the EU, where the Euro gained about 5% in the courser of the month.     At the start of the month, as has been the case for much of the last decade, the focus was on technology, partly because of its large weight in overall equity value at the start of 2025, and partly because of the punishment meted out to tech stocks during the first quarter of the year.  Focusing just on US equities, technology companies, which accounted for 29.4% of the overall market capitalization of all US companies at the start of 2025, lost $2.34 trillion (about 13.19%) in market capitalization in the first quarter of 2025. In the first few days of April, that trend continued as technology initially led the rout, losing an additional $1.78 trillion, but by the end of April, tech had made at least a partial comeback: As you can see, technology ended the month as the second best performing sector, up 1.67% for the month, and in spite of the handwringing about their poor performance, their share of the market cap pie has barely changed after the first four months of 2025. While the first quarter continues to weigh the sector down, as was the case in 2022, the obituaries written for technology investing may have been premature.     Staying in the weeds, I also looked at the push and pull of growth versus value, by breaking US equities down into deciles based on earnings to price ratios and assessing their performance leading into April and in April 2025 alone: As you can see, while there is no clearly discernible pattern across deciles of US stocks based upon earnings to price ratios, breaking down US stocks into a top and bottom half, based upon the ratio, yields the conclusion that while high PE stocks had a bad start to the year, losing 10.9% of their value in the first quarter, they made a comeback in April, up 1.74% for the year,  while low PE stocks were down 2.22% for the month. That pattern of a reversal in April 2025 of trends that had been forming in the first quarter of 2025 shows upon in other proxies for the value versus growth tussle: Looking at companies broken down by market capitalization into deciles, you find that larger cap companies outperformed small cap stocks during April,  Breaking down stocks based on dividends, dividend paying stocks and companies buying back stock underperformed non-cash returning stocks, indicating that there was no flight to safety in April.     Finally, I classified companies based upon their stock price performance in 2024 to see if what we are seeing in 2025 is just a correction of overreach in 2024. After all, if that is the case, we should see the stocks that have performed the best in 2024 be the ones that have taken the most punishment this year: As you can see, momentum returned in force in April, with the best performing stocks in 2024 up 0.76% during the month, while the worst performing stocks of 2024 were down 5.31% for the month. In fact, the year-to-date numbers for 2025 indicate that momentum remains in the driver's seat, extending a long period of outperformance.      In sum, the market stresses in April 2025 seems to have pushed the market back into its 2024 ways, after a first quarter that promised reversal, as technology, growth and momentum all made a comeback in the last three weeks of April. The performance of the Mag Seven, which represent a combination of all three forces (large, high growth and technology), in April provides a tangible measure of this shift: The Mag Seven have had a bad year to date, losing $2.6 trillion in market capitalization, but they made a comeback from the depths to finish April at about the same market cap that they had at the start of the month, recovering almost all of the $1.55 trillion that they lost in the first week of the month.     In short, not only did equities recover in the last three weeks of April 2025, but there seems have been a shift in sentiment back the forces that have borne markets upwards for the last few years, with technology, growth and momentum returning as market drivers. Of course, three weeks is a short time, but this is a trend worth watching for the rest of this year. The Rest of the Market: Swirling Winds?     As equities careened through April 2025 between panic and delirium, the other asset classes were surprisingly staid, at least on the surface, starting with the US treasuries. Unlike other crises, where US treasuries saws funds flow in, pushing down yields and pushing up prices, treasury rates remained relatively stable through much of April: Not only did rates remain almost unchanged across the maturity spectrum, but they were stable on a week-to-week basis. The yield curve, downward sloping for much of the last two years,  is now u-shaped, with 3-month rates and 2-year rates higher than 5-year rates, before reverting back to higher longer term (10-year and 30-year rates). Coming from the camp that we read too much economic significance into yield curve slopes and dynamics, I am reluctant to draw big conclusions, but some of this can be attributed to expectations of higher inflation in the near term. There is another force at play in this crisis that has not been as visible in past ones, at least in the US treasury market, and that is concerns about the trustworthiness of the US government Though this is still an early indicator, that can be seen in the sovereign CDS market, where investors pay for insurance against default risk, and where the US CDS spread has risen in April: The sovereign CDS spread for the US has risen about 38% during the course of this month, and the interesting part is that much of that rise happened in the last three weeks of the month, and during the first week, when equities were collapsing. The rise in perceptions of US default risk is more likely to have been precipitated by the threat to fire Jerome Powell, and by extension to the independence of the Fed as an institution. While that threat was withdrawn, the sovereign CDS spread has stayed high, and it will be worth watching whether it will come back down or whether some permanent damage has been done to US treasuries as a safe haven. As some of you who follow my thinking on riskfree rates may know, I argue that the riskfree rate in a currency is not necessarily the government bond rate in that currency, and that the default spread has to netted out from the government bond rate two get to a riskfree rate, if the sovereign in question is not viewed as default-free. Building on that principle, I may soon have to revisit my practice of using the US treasury rate as the riskfree rate in US dollars and net out a default spread for the US from that rate to get to a riskfree rate.     During April 2025, commodity prices were also on the move, and in the graph below, I look at oil prices as well as an overall commodity index during the month:  In the first third of the month, oil prices, in particular, and commodity prices, in general, joined equities, as they moved down, but in the last part of the month, they delinked, and stayed down, even as stock prices bounced back up. To the extent that the demand for commodities is driven by real economic growth, that would suggest that at least in the near term, the tariffs that precipitated the crisis will slow down global economies and reduce demand for commodities.      The concerns about central banking independence that triggered the surge in the US sovereign CDS spread also played out in currency markets, where the US dollar, already weakened in the first quarter, continued its decline in April. In the graph below, I look at the dollar-euro exchange rate and an index measuring the strength of the dollar against multiples currencies. The dollar continued its decline in April, down about 3% against a broad basket of currencies, and more than 5% against the Euro.      Finally, I looked at two other investment classes - gold and bitcoin - for the same reasons that I brought them into the discussion at the start of April. They are collectibles, i.e., investments that investors are drawn to during crisis periods or when they lose faith in paper currencies and governments: Download data Gold had a good month in April, up about 5.3%, and hitting $3.500 towards the end of the month, but Bitcoin did even better rising almost 14.12% during the course of the month. That said, the fact that financial asset markets (equity and bond) recovered over the second part of the month made this a month where collectibles were not put to their test as crisis investments, and the rise in both can be attributed more to the loss of trust that has driven  the sovereign CDS spread up and the US dollar down. Risk and Co-movement     Early in April, I argued that the one number that would track the balance between greed and fear in markets would be the price of risk in markets, and I resolved to estimate that price every day, through April, for both equity and bond markets. With equity markets, the price of risk is the equity risk premium, and at least  in my estimation process, it is a forward-looking number determined by the level of stock prices and expected cash flows. In the table below, I report on my estimates of the equity risk premium for the S&P 500 every trading day in April, in conjunction with the VIX, and equity volatility index that should be correlated: Download day-to-day data After rising above 5% in the first third of the month, the equity risk premium decreased in fits and starts over the rest of the month to end at almost the same value (4.58%) as at the start of the month (4.59%). In parallel, the VIX soared in the first few days of the month to peak at 52.33 on April 8, and then decreased over the rest of the month to a level (24.70) close to where it was at the start of the month (22.28).     In the bond market, the price of risk takes the form of default spreads, and these spreads followed a similar path to the equity risk measures: Download data The default spread on high yield bonds surged, rising by more than 1% between the start of the month and April 7, before declining, but unlike the equity risk measures, the bond default spreads did end the month at levels higher than at the start, indicating at least at this point that near term concerns about the economy and the ensuing default risk have not subsided.     As a final exercise, I looked at the correlation in price changes across investment classes - stocks, treasuries, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, commodities, gold and bitcoin: Download data With the caveat that this is just 22 trading days in one month, it does yield some preliminary results about co-movements. First, stock and treasury bond prices moved together much of the month, not something that you would expect during a crisis, when bond prices gain as stock prices fall. Second, while both gold and bitcoin prices moved with stocks, gold prices movements were more closely tied to stock price movements, at least during the month. In sum, the movement across asset markets affirms our conclusion from looking at company-level data that this was more a month of asset reprising than panic selling or buying.     In sum, if I were to summarize what the data is pointing me towards, here are the general conclusions that I would draw, albeit with a small sample: The market movements through much of the month were less driven by panic and more by investors trying to reprice companies to reflect a world with more trade barriers and tariffs and political turmoil. While equities, in the aggregate, ended the month roughly where they started the month, a shift in sentiment seemed to occur in the last three weeks of the month, as technology, growth and momentum, three forces that seemed to be in retreat in the first quarter of 2025, made a come back. With US treasuries, there was little movement on the rates, but under the surface, there were shifts  that could be tectonic in the long term. There was clearly a drop in trust in the US government and its institutions, which played out in rising sovereign CDS spreads and a declining dollar, and trust once lost can be difficult to gain back. The investment classes that are most vulnerable to the real economy, i.e.. commodities and higher yield corporate bonds, were down for the month, indicating a slowing down of global economic growth. In the coming months, we will see whether the last three weeks of April were an aberration or the start of something bigger. Lessons Learned     Every market meltdown carries pain to investors, but that pain is often spread unevenly across these investors, with the variation driven as much as by what they held coming into the crisis, as it is by how they behaved in response to the sell off. I am not sure April 2025 falls into the crisis column, but it did feel like one early in the month, and as I look back at the month, I come back to three market characteristics that stood out. Market resilience: In the last five years, markets have repeatedly not only got the big trends right, but they have also shown far more resilience than any expert group. I would wager that if you had given a group of macro economists or market strategists just the news stories that came out during the course of the month and asked them to guess how they would play out in market reaction, almost none of them would have guessed the actual outcome (of flat markets). At the time of COVID, I argued that one reason for market resilience is that market influence has become diffuse, with social media and alternative sources of information supplementing and often replacing the traditional influencers - the financial press, media and investment talking heads, and market movements are less driven by large portfolio managers exhibiting herd behavior and more by disparate groups of traders, with different motives, models and patterns.  Market power: A key reason for the turnaround in markets during April was the administration's decision to walk back, reverse or delay actions that the market reacted to strongly and negatively. The "liberation day" tariffs that triggered the initial sell off have largely been put on hold or suspended, and the talk about replacing the Fed Chair was walked back quickly the week after it was made. In short, an administration that has been impervious to Wall Street journal editorials, warnings from economists and counter threats from other governments has been willing to bend to market selling pressure. Market unpredictability: As markets rose and fell during the course of the month, the debate about the value added by active investing kicked into full gear. I heard quite a few advocates of active investing argue that it was during times like this (volatility and crisis) that the "sage counsel" and "timely decisions" of wealth or fund managers would protect investors on the downside. I would suggest the opposite, and am willing to bet that the extent of damage that April did to investor portfolios was directly proportional to how much time they spent watching CNBC and listening to (or reading) what market experts told them to do. On a personal note, I stuck to my resolution early in the crisis to use it to stay true to my investment philosophy. As someone who stinks at market timing, I made no attempt to buy and sell the market through the month, perhaps leaving a great deal of money on the table, or more likely, saving myself just as much from getting the timing wrong. In the middle of April, I talked about three strands of  contrarian investing, and in that post, I put myself  in the opportunistic contrarian camp. I did use the mid-month sell off to add BYD, a stock that I like, to my portfolio, when its price dipped below my limit price ($80). Palantir and Mercado Libre (my two other limit buys) came close but not low enough to break through my limits, but I am willing to wait, revisiting my valuations along the way.     I do have some portfolio maintenance work that I need to do in the coming weeks, especially on the six of the seven Mag Seven stocks that remain in my portfolio (Tesla is out of my portfolio and Nvidia is at a quarter of my original holding). As these companies report their first quarter earnings, I plan to revisit my valuations from last year, when in the face of mild to moderate over valuation, I chose to maintain my holdings. As in prior years, I will post my assessments of value and my hold/sell judgments, but that has to wait because I do have more immediate priorities. First, as a teacher, with the semester end approaching, I have a stack of grading that has to get done. Second, as a father, I am looking forward to my daughter having her first child next week, and the market and my portfolio take a distant second place to getting acquainted with my new granddaughter. YouTube Video My Posts (from April 2025) Anatomy of a Market Crisis: Tariffs, Markets and the Economy! Buy the Dip: The Draws and Dangers of Contrarian Investing Data Links Day-to-day numbers (ERP, default spreads and asset prices)

I was boarding a plane for a trip to Latin America late in the evening last Wednesday (April 2), and as is my practice, I was checking the score on the Yankee game, when I read the tariff news announcement. Coming after a few days where the market seemed to have found its bearings (at least partially), it was clear from the initial reactions across the world that the breadth and the magnitude of the tariffs had caught most by surprise, and that a market markdown was coming. Not surprisingly, the markets opened down on Thursday and spent the next two days in that mode, with US equity indices declining almost 10% by close of trading on Friday. Luckily for me, I was too busy on both Thursday and Friday with speaking events, since as the speaker, I did not have the luxury (or the pain) of checking markets all day long. In my second venue, which was Buenos Aires, I quipped that while Argentina was trying its best to make its way back from chaos towards stability, the rest of the world was looking a lot more like Argentina, in terms of uncertainty. On Saturday, on a long flight back to New York, I wrestled with the confusion, denial and panic that come with a market meltdown, and tried to make sense of what had happened, and more importantly of what is coming. That thinking is still a work-in-progress but as in prior crises, I find that putting even unfinished thoughts down on paper (or in a post) is healthy, and perhaps a critical component to finding your way back to serenity. The Tariffs and Markets     Since talk of tariffs has filled the airwaves for most of this year, you may wonder why markets reacted so strongly to the announcement on Wednesday. One reason might have been that investors and businesses were not expecting the tariff hit to be as wide and as deep as they turned out to be.      Note that while Canada and Mexico were not on the Wednesday list of tariff targets that was released on Wednesday, they have been targeted separately, and that the remaining countries that do not show up on this map (Russia and North Korea, for instance) are under sanctions that prevent them from trading in the first place.      Another reason for the market reaction was that the basis for the tariff estimates, which have now been widely shared, are not easily fixable, since they are not based on tariffs imposed by other countries, but on the magnitude of the trade deficit of the United States with these countries. Thus, any country with which the US runs a significant trade deficit faces a large tariff, and smaller countries are more exposed than larger ones since the trade deficit is computed on a percentage basis, from exports and imports related to that country.  Thus, the easy out, where other countries offer to reduce or even remove their tariffs may have no or little effect on the tariffs, to the extent that the trade deficit may have little to do with tariffs.       Equities     The extent of the market hit can be seen by looking at the major US equity indices, the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ, all of which shed significant portions of their value on Thursday and Friday: Looking beyond these indices and across the globe, the negative reaction has been global, as can be seen in the returns to equity across sub-regions, with all returns denominated in US dollars: The worst hit regions of the world is Small Asia, which is Asia not counting India, China and Japan, which saw equity values in the aggregate decline by 12.61% in the last week. US equities had the biggest decline in dollar value terms, losing $5.3 trillion in value last week, a 9.24% decline in value from the Friday close on March 28, 2025. China and India have held up the best in the last week, perhaps because both countries have large enough domestic markets to sustain them through a trade war. It is also a factory that with time differences, these markets both closed before the Friday beatdown on Wall Street unfolded, and the open on Monday may give a better indication of the true reaction. Breaking down just US equities, by sector, we can see the damage across sectors: The technology sector lost the most in value last week, both in dollar terms, shedding almost $1.8 trillion (and 11.6%) in equity value, and consumer staples and utilities held up the best, dropping 2.30% and 4.40% respectively. In percentage terms, energy stocks have lost the most in value, with market capitalizations dropping by 14.2%, dragged down by declining oil prices.     Staying with US equities, and breaking down companies, based upon their market capitalizations coming into 2025, we can again see write downs in equity value across the spectrum from last week's sell off: As you can see, it looks like there is little to distinguish across the market cap spectrum, as the pain was widely distributed across the market cap classes, with small and large companies losing roughly the same percent of value. To the extent that market crisis usually cause a flight to safety, I looked at US stocks, broken down by decile into earnings yield (Earnings to price ratios), over the last week: The lowest earnings to price ratio (highest PE) stocks, in the aggregate, lost 10.91% of their market capitalization last week, compared to the 8.08% decline in market cap at the highest earnings to price (lowest PE ratio) companies, providing some basis for the flight to safety hypothesis. Staying with the safety theme, I looked at US companies, broken down by debt burden (measured as debt to EBITDA): On this dimension, the numbers actually push against the flight to safety hypothesis, since the companies with the least debt performed worse than those with the most debt. Finally, I looked at whether dividend paying and cash returning companies were better protected in the sell off, by looking at dividend paying (buying back stock) companies versus non-dividend paying (not buying back stock) companies: While dividend paying stocks did drop by less than non-dividend paying stocks, companies buying back stock underperformed those that did not buy back stock in 2024.        If you came into last week, believing that stocks were over priced, you would expect the correction to be worse at companies that have been bid up the most, and to test this, I classified US stocks based upon percentage stock price performance in 2024: While the worst performers from last year came into the week down only 1.83% through March 28, whereas the best performers from 2024 were down 6.46% over the same period, there was little to distinguish between the two groups last week.      Finally, I looked at the Mag Seven stocks, since they have, in large part, carried US equities for much of the last two years; Collectively, the Mag Seven came into last last week, already down 14.79% for the year (2025), but their losses last week, which massive in dollar value terms ($1.55 trillion) were close in percentage terms to the losses in the rest of the market. Other Markets     As equity markets reacted to the tariff announcement, other markets followed. US treasury rates, which had entered the week down from the start of the year, continued to decline during the course of the week: While the 3-month treasury bill rate remained fairly close to what it was at the start of the week, the rates at the longer end, from 2-year to 30-year all saw drops during the week, perhaps reflecting a search for safety on the part of investors. The drops, at least so far, have been modest and much smaller than what you would expect from a market sell off, where US equities dropped by $5.3 trillion.     Looking past financial markets, I focused on three diverse markets - the oil market as a stand-in for commodity markets overall, the gold market, representing the time-tested collectible, and Bitcoin, which is perhaps the millennial version of gold: Oil prices dropped last week, especially as financial asset markets melted down on Thursday and Friday, while both gold and bitcoin held their own last week. For bitcoin advocates, that is good news, since in other market crises since its creation, it has behaved more like risky stock than a collectible. Of course, it I still early in this crisis, and the true tests will come in the next few weeks.   Summing up     In sum, the data seems to point more to a mark down in equity values than to panic selling, at least based upon the small sample of two days from last week. There was undoubtedly some panic selling on Friday, but the flight to safety, whether it be in moving into treasuries or high dividend paying stocks, was muted.    The Crisis Cycle     Each crisis is unique both in its origins and in how it plays out, but there is still value in looking across crises, to see how they unfold, what causes them to crest, and how and why they recede. In this section, I will present a crisis cycle, which almost every crisis works its way through, with big differences in how quickly, and with how much damage. The crisis cycle starts with a trigger event, which can be economic, political or financial, though there are often smaller events ahead of is occurrence that point to its coming. The immediate effect is in markets, where investors respond with the only instrument the they control, which is the prices they pay for assets, which they mark down to reflect at least their initial response to the crisis. In the language of risk, they are demanding higher prices for risk, translating into higher risk premiums. In conjunction, they often move their money to safer assets, with treasuries and collectibles historically benefiting from the fund flows. In the days and weeks that follow, there are aftershocks from the trigger event, both on the news and the market fronts, and while these aftershocks can sometimes be positive for markets, the net effect is usually negative. The effects find their way into the real economy, as consumers and businesses pull back, causing an economic slowdown or a recession, with negative effects on earnings and cash flows, at least in the near term. In the long term, the trigger event can change the economic dynamics, causing a resetting of real growth and inflation expectations, which then feed back into markets; To illustrate, consider the 2008 banking crisis, where the Lehman collapse over the weekend before September 15 triggered a sell off in the stock market that caused equities to drop by 28% between September 12 and December 31, 2008, and triggered a steep recession, causing unemployment to hit double digits in 2009. The earnings for S&P 500 companies took a 40% hit in 2008, and long term, neither the economy nor earnings recovered back to pre-crisis levels until 2012. During that crisis, I started a practice of estimating equity risk premiums by day, reflecting my belief that it is day-to-day movements in the price of risk that cause equity markets to move as much as they do in a crisis: Spreadsheet with raw data Equity risk premiums which started the crisis at around 4% peaked at almost 8% on November 21, 2008, before ending the year at 6.43%, well above the levels at the start of 2008. Those equity risk premiums did not get back to pre-2008 levels until almost 15 years later.     Moving to 2020 and looking at the COVID crisis, the trigger event was a news story out of Italy about COVID cases in the country that could not be traced to either China or cruise ships, shattering the delusion that the pandemic would be contained to those settings. In the weeks after, the S&P 500 shed 33% of its value before bottoming out on March 23, 2020, and treasury rates plunged to historic lows, hitting 0.76% on that day. The key difference from 2008 was that the damage to the economy and earnings was mostly short term, and by the end of the year, both (economy and earnings) were on the mend, helped undoubtedly by multi-trillion dollar government support and central banking activism: As in 2008, I computed equity risk premiums by day all through 2020, and the graph below tells the story: Spreadsheet with raw data As you can see, the equity risk premium which started at 4.4% on February 14, 2020, peaked a few weeks later at 7.75% on March 23, 2020, and as with the economy and earnings, it was back down to pre-crisis levels by September 2020. The Perils of Post Mortems     Each crisis gives rise to postmortems, where investors, regulators and researchers pore over the data, often emerging with conclusions that extrapolate too much from what happened. For investors: The lesson that many investors get out of looking at past crises is that markets come back from even the worst meltdowns, and that contrarian investing with a long time horizon always works. While that may be comforting, this lesson ignores the reality that the fact that a catastrophe did not occur in the crisis in question does not imply that the probability of it occurring was always zero. Markets assess risks in real time. For regulators: To the extent that crises expose the weakest seams in markets and businesses, regulators often come in with fixes for those seams, mostly by dealing with the symptoms, rather than the causes. After the 2008 crisis, the conclusions were that the problems was banks behaving badly and ratings agencies that were not doing their job, both merited judgments, but the question of risk incentives that had led them on their risk taking misadventures were largely left untouched. For researchers: With the benefit of hindsight, regulators weave stories about crises that are built around their own priors, by selectively picking up data items that support them. Thus, behavioral economists find every crisis to be an example of bubbles bursting and corrections for irrational investing, and efficient market theorists use the same crisis as an illustration of the magic of markets working. It is worth remembering that each crisis is a sample size of one, and since each crises is different, aggregating or averaging across them can be difficult to do. Thus, the danger is that we try to learn too much from past crises rather than too little. The Tariff Crisis?     I don't believe that it is premature to put the tariff news and reaction into the crisis category. It has the potential to change the global economic order, and a market reaction is merited. It is, however, early in the process, since we are just past the trigger event (tariff announcement) and the initial market reaction, with lots of unknowns facing us down the road: There are clearly stages of this crisis that have played out, but based on what we know now, here is how I see them: After shocks: The tariff story will have after shocks, with both negatives (other countries imposing their own tariffs, and the US responding) and positives (a pause in tariffs, countries dropping tariffs). Those after shocks will create more market volatility, and if history is any guide, there is more downside than upside in the near term. In addition, the market volatility can feed itself, as levered investors are forced to close out positions and fund flows to markets reflect investor concerns and uncertainty. If you add on top of that the possibility that global investors may decide to reduce their US equity holdings, that reallocation will have price effects. Real economy (near term): In the near term, the real economy will slow down, with the plus being that while tariff-related price increases are coming, a cooling down in the economy will dampen inflation. The likelihood of a recession has spiked in the days since the tariff announcement, and while we will have to wait for the numbers on real growth and unemployment to come in, it does look likely that real growth will be impacted negatively. The steep declines in commodity prices suggests that investors see an economic slowdown on the horizon. As Real economy (long term): Global economic growth will slow, and the US, as the world’s largest economy, will slow with it.. There are other dynamics at play including a restructuring of old economic and political alliances (Is there a point to having a G7 meeting?) and a new more challenging environment for global companies that have spent the last few decades building supply chains that stretch across the globe, and selling to consumers all over. It is worth noting that if we measure winning by not the size of the pie (the size of the entire economy) but who gets what slice of that economy, it is possible that tariffs could reapportion the pie, with capital (equity markets) getting a smaller slice, and workers getting a larger slice,. In fact, much of this administration's defense of the tariff has been on this front, and time will tell whether that works out to be the case.     In the two days after the announcement, stock prices have dropped and the price of risk has risen, as investors reassess the economy and markets: The implied equity risk premium has risen from 4.57% on April 2  to 5.08% by the close of trading on Friday. The road ahead of us is long, but I plan to continue to compute these implied equity risk premiums every day for as long as I believe we are in crisis-mode, and I will keep these updated numbers on my webpage. As stocks have been revalued with higher prices of risk, that same uncertainty is playing out in the corporate bond market, where corporate default spreads widened on Thursday (April 3) and Friday (April 4): As with the equity risk premiums, the price of risk in the bond market had already risen between the start of 2025 and March 28, 2025, but they surged last week, with the lowest ratings showing the biggest surges. With treasury rates, equity risk premiums and default spreads all on the move it may be time for companies and investors to be reassessing their costs of equity and capital.  What now?     If you have stayed with me so far on this long and rambling discourse, you are probably looking for my views on how this crisis will unfold, and how investors should respond now. I am afraid that dishing out investment advice is not my cup of tea, but I will try to explain how I plan to deal with what's coming, with the caveat that what I do may not work for you A (Personal) Postscript      In the midst of every market meltdown, you will see three groups of experts emerge. The first will be the "I told you so" group, eager to tell you that this is the big one, the threat that they have spent a decade or more warning you about. They will of course not let on that if you had followed their advice from inception, you would have been invested in cash for the last decade, and even with a market crash, you would not be made hold again. The second will include "knee jerk contrarians", arguing that stock markets always come back, and that every market dip is a buying opportunity, an extraordinarily lazy philosophy that gets the rewards (none) that its deserves. The third will be the "indecisives", who will present every side of the argument, conclude that there is too much uncertainty right now to either buy or sell, but to wait until the uncertainty passes. There are elements of truth in all three arguments, but they all have blind spots.     In the midst of a crisis, the market becomes a pricing game, where perception gets the better of reality, momentum overwhelms fundamentals and day-to-day movements cannot be rationalized. Anyone who tells you that their crystal balls, data or charts can predict what's coming is lying or delusional, and there is no one right response to this (or any other) crisis. It will depend on: Cash needs and time horizon: If you are or will soon be in need of cash, to pay for health care, buy a home or pay tuition, and you are invested in equities, you should take the cash out now. Waiting for a better time to do so, when the clock is ticking is the equivalent of paying Russian Roulette and just as dangerous. Conversely, if you do not need the cash and are patient, you have the flexibility of waiting, though having a longer time horizon does not necessarily mean that you should wait to act. Macro views: The effects on markets and the real economy will depend on how you see the tariffs playing out, with the outcomes ranging from a no-holds-barred trade war (with tariffs and counter tariffs) to a partial trade war (with some countries capitulating and others fighting) to a complete clearing of the air (where the tariff threat is scaled down or put on the back burner). While you may be inclined to turn this over to macro economists, this is less about economics and more about game theory, where an expert poker player will be better positioned to forecast what will happen than an economic think tank. Investment philosophy: I have long argued (and teach a class to that effect) that every investor needs an investment philosophy, attuned to his or her personal make up. That philosophy starts with a set of beliefs about how markets make mistakes and corrects them, and manifests in strategies designed to take advantage of those mistakes.  My investment philosophy starts with the belief that markets, for the most part, do a remarkable job in aggregating and reflecting crowd consensus, but that they sometimes make big  mistakes that take long periods to correct, especially in periods and portions of the market where there is uncertainty.  I am terrible at gauging market mood and momentum, but feel that I have an edge (albeit a small one) in assessing individual companies, though that may be my delusion. My response to this crisis (or any other) will follow this script: Daily ERP: As in prior crises, I will continue to monitor the equity risk premiums, treasury rates and the expected return on stocks every day until I feel comfortable enough to let go. Note that this process lasted for months after the 2008 and 2020 crises, but as earnings updates for the S&P 500 reflect tariffs, my confidence in my assessments will increase. (As mentioned earlier, you will find these daily updates at this link) Revalue companies in my portfolio: While I was comfortable with the companies in my portfolio on March 28, viewing them as under valued or at least not over valued enough to merit a sell, the tariffs may have an significant effect on their values, and I plan to revalue them in batches, starting with my big tech holdings (the Mag Five, since I did sell Tesla and most of my Nvidia holdings) and working through the rest.  Buy value: I have drawn a contrast between great companies and great investments, with the former characterized by large moats, great management and strong earnings power, and the latter by being priced too low. There are companies that I believe are great companies, but are priced so highly by the market that they are sub-standard investments and I choose not to invest in them. During a crisis, where investors often sell without discrimination, there companies can become buys, and I have to be ready to buy at the right price. Since buying in the face of a market meltdown can require fortitude that I may not have, I have been scouring my list of great companies, revaluing them with the tariff effects built in, and putting buys at limit prices below those values. In the last week, both BYD, a company that I said that I liked, a few weeks ago in my post on globalization and disruption, and Mercado Libre, a Latin American powerhouse, that has the disruptive potential of an Amazon combined with a fintech enterprise, have moved from being significantly overvalued to within shouting distance of the limit prices I have on them.  Go back to living: I certainly don't see much gain watching the market hour-to-hour and day-to-day, since its doings are out of my control and anything that I do in response is more likely to do harm than good. Instead, I plan on living my life, enjoying life's small pleasures, like a Yankee win or taking my dog for a walk, to big ones, like celebrating my granddaughter's birthday in a couple of days.  I hope that you find your own path back to serenity in the face of this market volatility, and that whatever you end up doing with your portfolio allows you to pass the sleep test, where you don't lie awake at night thinking about your portfolio (up or down).  YouTube Video Data Links Equity risk premiums by day, Banking Crisis in 2008 Equity risk premiums by day, COVID Crisis in 2020 Equity risk premiums by day, Tariff Crisis in 2025 (ongoing)