More from oftwominds-Charles Hugh Smith
The fires that have been ignited are not yet visible. There's a eerie calm after an earthquake. Those trapped in collapsed buildings are aware of the consequences, but the majority experience a silence, as if the world stopped and has yet to restart. The full consequences are as yet unknown, and so we breathe a sigh of relief. Whew. Everything looks OK. But this initial assessment is off the mark, as much of the damage is not immediately visible. As reports start coming in of broken infrastructure and fires break out, we start realizing the immensity of the damage and the rising risks of conflagration. Uncertainty and rapidly accelerating chaos reign. President Trump used a medical analogy for what I'm calling The Tariff Earthquake: the patient underwent a procedure and has had a shock, but it's all for the good as the healing is already underway. We often use medical or therapeutic analogies, but in this case the earthquake analogy is more insightful in making sense of what happens to economic structures that have been systemically disrupted. The key parallel is the damage is often hidden, and only manifests later. The scene after the initial shock looks normal, but water mains have been broken beneath the surface, foundations have cracked, and though structures look undamaged and safe, they're closer to collapse than we imagine, as the structural damage is hidden. Another parallel is the potential for damage arising from forces other than the direct destruction from the temblor. The earthquake that destroyed much of San Francisco in 1906 damaged many structures, but the real devastation was the result of fires that started in the aftermath that could not be controlled due to the water mains being broken and streets clogged with debris, inhibiting the movement of the fire brigades, which were inadequate to the task even if movement had been unobstructed. The earthquake damaged the city, but the fire is what destroyed it. What was considered rock-solid and safe is revealed as vulnerable in ways that are poorly understood. Structures that met with official approval collapse despite the official declarations. What was deemed sound and safe cracked when the stresses exceeded the average range. The Tariff Earthquake exhibits many of these same features. Much of the damage has yet to reveal itself; much remains uncertain as the chaos spreads. Like an earthquake, the damage is systemic: both infrastructure and households are disrupted. The potential for second-order effects (fires in the earthquake analogy) to prove more devastating than expected is high. (First order effects: actions have consequences. Second order effects: consequences have consequences.) The uncertainty is itself a destructive force. Enterprises must allocate capital and labor based on forecasts of future supply and demand. If the future is inherently unpredictable, forecasting becomes impossible and so conducting business becomes impossible. Just as the 1906 fires sweeping through San Francisco were only contained by the US Army blowing up entire streets of houses to create a fire break, the containment efforts themselves may well be destructive. We had to destroy the village in order to save it is a tragic possibility. Here is a building damaged in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake that struck the San Francisco Bay region. The residents may have initially reckoned their home had survived intact, but the foundation and first floor were so severely damaged that the entire structure was at risk of collapse. On this USGS map of recent earthquakes around the world, note the clustering of quakes on the "Ring of Fire" that traces out the dynamic zones where the planet's tectonic plates meet. Earthquakes can trigger other events along these dynamic intersections of tectonic forces. In a similar fashion, The Tariff Earthquake is unleashing economic reactions across the globe, each of which influences all the other dynamic intersections, both directly and via second-order effects generated by the initial movement. Anyone claiming to have a forecast of all the first-order and second-order effects of the The Tariff Earthquake will be wrong, as it's impossible to foresee the consequences of so many forces interacting or make an informed assessment of all the damage that's been wrought that's not yet visible. The fires that have been ignited are not yet visible. They're smoldering but not yet alarming, and so the observers who are confident that everything's under control have yet to awaken to the potential for events to spiral out of control. New podcast: The Coming Global Recession will be Longer and Deeper than Most Analysts Anticipate (42 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Randall R. ($200), for your beyond-outrageously generous founding subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Mark H. ($7/month), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Michael R. 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There may be no winners of the game of Global Domination (tm), and that is likely the best outcome. Okay, players: jokers are wild, but with a twist: the entire deck is jokers. Since everyone at the table will have five Aces, nobody wins. Welcome to the Trade War Poker Table: nobody wins, as everyone has the same hand of jokers. This is not to say that exploitive, mercantilist "free trade" (no such thing has ever existed) is desirable, much less possible. We're reaping the consequences of what was passed off as "free trade": corporations gleefully gutted National Security to boost profits by offshoring everything that could be offshored. Every nation can impose tariffs or limit imports by other means. Tit for tat tariffs, concessions, grand deals, side deals--everyone has access to the same deck of cards. Who wins each round of play is an open question, as is who wins the game. There are several time-tested strategies in the game for Global Domination (tm). One is domination gained by exporting far more than you import, building up treasure in the form of vast trade surpluses. The problem with this strategy is eventually the nations being stripped by your mercantilist strategy wise up and limit your exports. There is only one way to get around this: military force, i.e. establish a Colonial Empire in which your colonies are forced to buy your surplus production (exports) via a bayonet in their back. Absent force and a colonial empire, mercantilism is eventually defeated by its own success. There is another way to play for Global Domination (tm), and it's the exact opposite of mercantilism: run large, sustained trade deficits by importing more than you export, which beneath the surface is a remarkable flow of trade: the importing nation "exports" its currency in size in exchange for goods and services. Once this currency is "exported" in sufficient quantities, it becomes the dominant currency simply from its ubiquity, its liquidity (i.e. its quantity and ubiquity make it easy to trade everywhere) and its trustworthiness due to its wide ownership across global markets: since the currency is spread across the globe, the issuing nation no longer controls its valuation; that's now set by the market. This is Global Domination (tm) via financing trade rather than by running trade surpluses by exporting tangible goods. Pick one, as you can't have both: either export goods to run mercantilist trade surpluses, and build up a trove of other nation's currencies, or "export" your own currency via sustained trade deficits so it becomes the global lingua franca of financing trade. Due to the demands of the Cold War, this was the U.S. strategy in the postwar era. As I have often explained, the U.S. was not merely in an arms race with the Soviet Union; it was also in a war for influence and alliances. The strongest adhesive in alliances is self-interest; by absorbing the surplus production of its allies in Europe and Asia in exchange for dollars, the U.S. cemented alliances that essentially encircled the Soviet Empire. This strategy was far more effective than open conflict, but it came with a cost. Just as the success of mercantilism generates its own undoing, so too does maintaining a reserve currency via trade deficits / exporting one's currency. Should the issuing nation (in this era, the U.S.) decide to limit imports and reduce its trade deficit, its currency will slowly lose the global scale needed to sustain its market dominance. This is Triffin's Paradox, which I've addressed many times over the years: any currency--and the system for creating and distributing the currency--has two masters it cannot possibly serve equally: the domestic economy and the global economy. Any nation that wants to control the valuation of its currency cannot possibly achieve global financial dominance, as the only way to gain and maintain global financial dominance is to surrender control of the currency's valuation to the market via exporting currency in such vast quantities that the global market sets the value. There's a profound irony in this. To manage the domestic economy, the state wants to control everything: the issuance of currency and its valuation via its relative abundance or scarcity, which is reflected in the cost of credit (i.e. interest rates) and asset prices. But to gain the high ground in the global financial landscape, the currency must serve the global demand for a currency that is ubiquitous, extremely liquid and trustworthy precisely because its value cannot be reset by state diktat. The valuation of a truly global currency is constantly influenced by interest rates, bond issuance, demand and so on--all the features of a transparent marketplace. The game of Global Domination (tm) will never be decided by a deck of jokers. The real game is 5-card draw: you play the cards you've been dealt by Nature, history, culture and chance. Every nation has a spectrum of strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages. Some are rich in resources, some are poor in resources. Some have advantageous geography, some less so. Some have cultural coherence, others have diversity; each is a strength and a weakness. In Nature, the winner is not necessarily the strongest or the one most blessed by chance. The winner tends to be the one with the greatest capacity and incentives for flexibility, experimentation, a level playing field (i.e. social mobility) decentralized capital and all the traits of fast adaptation: if not an appetite then at least a capacity for a continual churn of instability, failure and self-criticism, which are the necessary components of experimentation. There may be no winners of the game of Global Domination (tm), and that is likely the best outcome. Any form of dominance generates its own undoing. New podcast: The Coming Global Recession will be Longer and Deeper than Most Analysts Anticipate (42 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, DawgPond ($70), for your splendidly generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Lucia U. ($70), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Peter C. 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The global recession will be deeper and longer than those relying on models based on the past two decades of hyper-globalization and hyper-financialization anticipate. While everyone focuses on conflicts between nations, few look at the problems shared by nations. Richard Bonugli and I discuss both sets of problems in our latest podcast. The conflict sphere is dominated by the trade wars that are bubbling up here in the first inning of the global rebalancing of national interests and global trade/financial frameworks. Supporting these frameworks benefits participating nations until they don't, at which point they're jettisoned. The conviction that these frameworks, linch-pinned by the U.S. since the end of World War II in 1945, no longer serve America's core national security interests, is reaching a rough consensus, and as a result some describe the U.S. as a "rogue superpower." In other words, now that the U.S. is no longer the dumping ground for global surpluses of production, it's seen as "going rogue." There's a certain naivete in the notion that any nation acts selflessly for the good of all. All nation-states act in their own interests, just as global corporations act to optimize shareholder value and profits while proclaiming the wonderfulness of their products and services. Nations support cooperative arrangements when it benefits them, and exit those arrangements when they morph from benefit to burden. This rebalancing of cooperation and self-interest is taking place in the larger context of non-trade problems shared by all developed nations. Developing nations share many of these same problems as well: soaring debt loads, resource scarcities, corruption, mal-investment, high inflation, stagnating economies, aging populations, shrinking workforces, rising social costs and massive public health issues, many of which have been expanding rapidly behind the focus on trade and conflicting interests. The ubiquity of these issues is striking. In some ways, developed nations share more problems than they seem to realize. Consider the global rise of lifestyle diseases generated by dramatic shifts in diets and fitness. These manifest as metabolic disorders (prediabetes, diabetes) and a broad range of other chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancers. Metabolic disorders generated by changing lifestyles are now weighing heavily on nations around the world, from the U.S. and Mexico to China, India, the Mideast and beyond. The problems generated by aging populations and declining birthrates are also shared by many nations. The same is true of rising debt levels, both public and private, which threaten to destabilize economies via either ruinously high inflation or fiscal frugality, i.e. austerity. Here is total credit in the U.S., a sobering chart that mirrors the debt loads of many other nations--debt that is outstripping GDP and income as interest rates rise in the new era of global inflationary forces. The world's nations have awakened to the risks of becoming dependent on other nations for essential commodities, manufactured goods and markets. Tariffs may well be merely the at-bat players in the first innings. If history is any guide, outright bans on imports from selected nations will eventually be viewed as the only available option to rebalance national security priorities. The degrees of national dependence will become increasingly consequential as mercantilist nations that have relied on exports for growth will find markets for their exports shutting down, crippling domestic growth. Nations that attempt to become self-sufficient will find the demands for capital investment will pressure consumer spending, even as the decline of cheap imports institutionalizes inflation and price increases that outstrip wage increases. Stagflation will hinder both investment and consumer spending. Austerity will crimp fiscal borrowing and spending, and capital sloshing around the world seeking low-risk returns will face unprecedented challenges as capital controls proliferate and nations change the rules overnight. I often focus on scale because this is a limiting factor. While there may well be growth opportunities for investing in developing nations, the scale of capital sloshing around global markets will find the investment pipelines the equivalent of a straw: there is no way to deploy $100 billion in small markets and economies, never mind $1 trillion or $10 trillion. As Immanuel Wallerstein observed, Capitalism may no longer be attractive to capitalists as all these dynamics play out in a vast, inter-connected, unpredictable rebalancing of global interests and increasingly destabilizing attempts to solve complex, intractable problems with cobbled-together expediencies or doing more of what's already failed. There won't be any "saves" in this rebalancing, and so the global recession will be deeper and longer than those relying on models based on the past two decades of hyper-globalization and hyper-financialization anticipate. New podcast: The Coming Global Recession will be Longer and Deeper than Most Analysts Anticipate (42 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Larry M. ($70), for your splendidly generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership. Thank you, Gordon L. ($70), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Alan D. ($70), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Kurt N. ($70), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.
Consuming more of this Ultra-Processed World is not a path to "the good life," it's a path to the destruction and derangement of an Ultra-Processed Life. The digital realm, finance, and junk food have something in common: they're all ultra-processed, synthetic versions of Nature that have been designed to be compellingly addictive, to the detriment of our health and quality of life. In focusing on the digital realm, money (i.e. finance, "growth," consuming more as the measure of all that is good) and eating more of what tastes good, we now have an Ultra-Processed Life. All three-- the digital realm, money in all its manifestations and junk food--are all consumed: they all taste good, i.e. generate endorphin hits, and so they draw us into their synthetic Ultra-Processed World. We're so busy consuming that we don't realize they're consuming us: in focusing on producing and consuming more goods and services as the sole measure of "the good life," it's never enough: if we pile up $1 million, we focus on piling up $2 million. If we pile up $2 million, we focus on accumulating $3 million. And so on, in every manifestation of money and consumption. The digital realm consumes our lives one minute and one hour at a time, for every minute spent focusing on a screen is a minute taken from the real world, which is the only true measure of the quality of our life. Ultra-processed food is edible, but it isn't nutritious. It tastes good, but it harms us in complex ways we don't fully understand. This is the core dynamic of the synthetic "products and services" that dominate modern life: the harm they unleash is hidden beneath a constant flow of endorphin hits, distractions, addictive media and unfilled hunger for all that is lacking in our synthetic Ultra-Processed World: a sense of security, a sense of control, a sense of being grounded, and the absence of a hunger to find synthetic comforts in a world stripped of natural comforts. In effect, we're hungry ghosts in this Ultra-Processed World, unable to satisfy our authentic needs in a synthetic world of artifice and inauthenticity. The more we consume, the hungrier we become for what is unavailable in an Ultra-Processed Life. We're told there's no upper limit on "growth" of GDP, wealth, abundance, finance or consumption, but this is a form of insanity, for none of this "growth" addresses what's lacking and what's broken in our lives, the derangements generated by consuming (and being consumed by) highly profitable synthetic versions of the real world. Insanity is often described as doing the same thing and expecting a different result. So our financial system inflates yet another credit-asset bubble and we expect that this bubble won't pop, laying waste to everyone who believed that doing the same thing would magically generate a different result. But there is another form of insanity that's easily confused with denial: we are blind to the artificial nature of this Ultra-Processed World and blind to its causal mechanisms: there is only one possible output of this synthetic version of Nature, and that output is a complex tangle of derangements that we seek to resolve by dulling the pain of living a deranged life. We're not in denial; we literally don't see our Ultra-Processed World for what it is: a manufactured mirror world of commoditized derangements and distortions that have consumed us so completely that we've lost the ability to see what's been lost. Ultra-processed snacks offer the perfect metaphor. We can't stop consuming more, yet the more we consume the greater the damage to our health. The worse we feel, the more we eat to distract ourselves, to get that comforting endorphin hit. It's a feedback loop that ends in the destruction of our health and life. Once we've been consumed by money, the digital realm and ultra-processed foods, we've lost the taste for the real world. A fresh raw carrot is sweet, but once we're consuming a diet of sugary cold cereals and other equivalents of candy, we no longer taste the natural sweetness of a carrot; it's been lost in the rush of synthetic extremes of salt, sugar and fat that make ultra-processed foods so addictive. To recover the taste of real food, we first have to completely abandon ultra-processed foods-- Go Cold Turkey. The idea that we can consume junk food and maintain the taste for real food in some sort of balance is delusional, for the reasons stated above: junk food destroys our taste for real food and its artificially generated addictive qualities will overwhelm our plan to "eat healthy" half the time. Just as there is no "balance" between ultra-processed food and real food, there is no balance between the synthetic Ultra-Processed World and the real world. We choose one or the other, either by default or by design. Credit--borrowing money created out of thin air--is the financial equivalent of ultra-processed food. The machinery that spews out the addictive glop is complicated: in the "food" factory, real ingredients are processed into addictive snacks. In finance, reverse repos, swaps, derivatives, mortgages, etc. generate a highly addictive financial product: credit. Just as with ultra-processed food, the more credit we consume, the more it consumes us. I owe, I owe, so off to work I go. The derangements of synthetic food, digital realms and finance have yet to fully play out. Consuming more of this Ultra-Processed World is not a path to "the good life," it's a path to the destruction and derangement of an Ultra-Processed Life. New podcast: Roaring 20s or Great Depression 2.0? (40 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Deliteful ($70), for your splendidly generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Mark N. ($70), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Jim L. ($7/month), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Steve ($7/month), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.
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I was boarding a plane for a trip to Latin America late in the evening last Wednesday (April 2), and as is my practice, I was checking the score on the Yankee game, when I read the tariff news announcement. Coming after a few days where the market seemed to have found its bearings (at least partially), it was clear from the initial reactions across the world that the breadth and the magnitude of the tariffs had caught most by surprise, and that a market markdown was coming. Not surprisingly, the markets opened down on Thursday and spent the next two days in that mode, with US equity indices declining almost 10% by close of trading on Friday. Luckily for me, I was too busy on both Thursday and Friday with speaking events, since as the speaker, I did not have the luxury (or the pain) of checking markets all day long. In my second venue, which was Buenos Aires, I quipped that while Argentina was trying its best to make its way back from chaos towards stability, the rest of the world was looking a lot more like Argentina, in terms of uncertainty. On Saturday, on a long flight back to New York, I wrestled with the confusion, denial and panic that come with a market meltdown, and tried to make sense of what had happened, and more importantly of what is coming. That thinking is still a work-in-progress but as in prior crises, I find that putting even unfinished thoughts down on paper (or in a post) is healthy, and perhaps a critical component to finding your way back to serenity. The Tariffs and Markets Since talk of tariffs has filled the airwaves for most of this year, you may wonder why markets reacted so strongly to the announcement on Wednesday. One reason might have been that investors and businesses were not expecting the tariff hit to be as wide and as deep as they turned out to be. Note that while Canada and Mexico were not on the Wednesday list of tariff targets that was released on Wednesday, they have been targeted separately, and that the remaining countries that do not show up on this map (Russia and North Korea, for instance) are under sanctions that prevent them from trading in the first place. Another reason for the market reaction was that the basis for the tariff estimates, which have now been widely shared, are not easily fixable, since they are not based on tariffs imposed by other countries, but on the magnitude of the trade deficit of the United States with these countries. Thus, any country with which the US runs a significant trade deficit faces a large tariff, and smaller countries are more exposed than larger ones since the trade deficit is computed on a percentage basis, from exports and imports related to that country. Thus, the easy out, where other countries offer to reduce or even remove their tariffs may have no or little effect on the tariffs, to the extent that the trade deficit may have little to do with tariffs. Equities The extent of the market hit can be seen by looking at the major US equity indices, the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ, all of which shed significant portions of their value on Thursday and Friday: Looking beyond these indices and across the globe, the negative reaction has been global, as can be seen in the returns to equity across sub-regions, with all returns denominated in US dollars: The worst hit regions of the world is Small Asia, which is Asia not counting India, China and Japan, which saw equity values in the aggregate decline by 12.61% in the last week. US equities had the biggest decline in dollar value terms, losing $5.3 trillion in value last week, a 9.24% decline in value from the Friday close on March 28, 2025. China and India have held up the best in the last week, perhaps because both countries have large enough domestic markets to sustain them through a trade war. It is also a factory that with time differences, these markets both closed before the Friday beatdown on Wall Street unfolded, and the open on Monday may give a better indication of the true reaction. Breaking down just US equities, by sector, we can see the damage across sectors: The technology sector lost the most in value last week, both in dollar terms, shedding almost $1.8 trillion (and 11.6%) in equity value, and consumer staples and utilities held up the best, dropping 2.30% and 4.40% respectively. In percentage terms, energy stocks have lost the most in value, with market capitalizations dropping by 14.2%, dragged down by declining oil prices. Staying with US equities, and breaking down companies, based upon their market capitalizations coming into 2025, we can again see write downs in equity value across the spectrum from last week's sell off: As you can see, it looks like there is little to distinguish across the market cap spectrum, as the pain was widely distributed across the market cap classes, with small and large companies losing roughly the same percent of value. To the extent that market crisis usually cause a flight to safety, I looked at US stocks, broken down by decile into earnings yield (Earnings to price ratios), over the last week: The lowest earnings to price ratio (highest PE) stocks, in the aggregate, lost 10.91% of their market capitalization last week, compared to the 8.08% decline in market cap at the highest earnings to price (lowest PE ratio) companies, providing some basis for the flight to safety hypothesis. Staying with the safety theme, I looked at US companies, broken down by debt burden (measured as debt to EBITDA): On this dimension, the numbers actually push against the flight to safety hypothesis, since the companies with the least debt performed worse than those with the most debt. Finally, I looked at whether dividend paying and cash returning companies were better protected in the sell off, by looking at dividend paying (buying back stock) companies versus non-dividend paying (not buying back stock) companies: While dividend paying stocks did drop by less than non-dividend paying stocks, companies buying back stock underperformed those that did not buy back stock in 2024. If you came into last week, believing that stocks were over priced, you would expect the correction to be worse at companies that have been bid up the most, and to test this, I classified US stocks based upon percentage stock price performance in 2024: While the worst performers from last year came into the week down only 1.83% through March 28, whereas the best performers from 2024 were down 6.46% over the same period, there was little to distinguish between the two groups last week. Finally, I looked at the Mag Seven stocks, since they have, in large part, carried US equities for much of the last two years; Collectively, the Mag Seven came into last last week, already down 14.79% for the year (2025), but their losses last week, which massive in dollar value terms ($1.55 trillion) were close in percentage terms to the losses in the rest of the market. Other Markets As equity markets reacted to the tariff announcement, other markets followed. US treasury rates, which had entered the week down from the start of the year, continued to decline during the course of the week: While the 3-month treasury bill rate remained fairly close to what it was at the start of the week, the rates at the longer end, from 2-year to 30-year all saw drops during the week, perhaps reflecting a search for safety on the part of investors. The drops, at least so far, have been modest and much smaller than what you would expect from a market sell off, where US equities dropped by $5.3 trillion. Looking past financial markets, I focused on three diverse markets - the oil market as a stand-in for commodity markets overall, the gold market, representing the time-tested collectible, and Bitcoin, which is perhaps the millennial version of gold: Oil prices dropped last week, especially as financial asset markets melted down on Thursday and Friday, while both gold and bitcoin held their own last week. For bitcoin advocates, that is good news, since in other market crises since its creation, it has behaved more like risky stock than a collectible. Of course, it I still early in this crisis, and the true tests will come in the next few weeks. Summing up In sum, the data seems to point more to a mark down in equity values than to panic selling, at least based upon the small sample of two days from last week. There was undoubtedly some panic selling on Friday, but the flight to safety, whether it be in moving into treasuries or high dividend paying stocks, was muted. The Crisis Cycle Each crisis is unique both in its origins and in how it plays out, but there is still value in looking across crises, to see how they unfold, what causes them to crest, and how and why they recede. In this section, I will present a crisis cycle, which almost every crisis works its way through, with big differences in how quickly, and with how much damage. The crisis cycle starts with a trigger event, which can be economic, political or financial, though there are often smaller events ahead of is occurrence that point to its coming. The immediate effect is in markets, where investors respond with the only instrument the they control, which is the prices they pay for assets, which they mark down to reflect at least their initial response to the crisis. In the language of risk, they are demanding higher prices for risk, translating into higher risk premiums. In conjunction, they often move their money to safer assets, with treasuries and collectibles historically benefiting from the fund flows. In the days and weeks that follow, there are aftershocks from the trigger event, both on the news and the market fronts, and while these aftershocks can sometimes be positive for markets, the net effect is usually negative. The effects find their way into the real economy, as consumers and businesses pull back, causing an economic slowdown or a recession, with negative effects on earnings and cash flows, at least in the near term. In the long term, the trigger event can change the economic dynamics, causing a resetting of real growth and inflation expectations, which then feed back into markets; To illustrate, consider the 2008 banking crisis, where the Lehman collapse over the weekend before September 15 triggered a sell off in the stock market that caused equities to drop by 28% between September 12 and December 31, 2008, and triggered a steep recession, causing unemployment to hit double digits in 2009. The earnings for S&P 500 companies took a 40% hit in 2008, and long term, neither the economy nor earnings recovered back to pre-crisis levels until 2012. During that crisis, I started a practice of estimating equity risk premiums by day, reflecting my belief that it is day-to-day movements in the price of risk that cause equity markets to move as much as they do in a crisis: Spreadsheet with raw data Equity risk premiums which started the crisis at around 4% peaked at almost 8% on November 21, 2008, before ending the year at 6.43%, well above the levels at the start of 2008. Those equity risk premiums did not get back to pre-2008 levels until almost 15 years later. Moving to 2020 and looking at the COVID crisis, the trigger event was a news story out of Italy about COVID cases in the country that could not be traced to either China or cruise ships, shattering the delusion that the pandemic would be contained to those settings. In the weeks after, the S&P 500 shed 33% of its value before bottoming out on March 23, 2020, and treasury rates plunged to historic lows, hitting 0.76% on that day. The key difference from 2008 was that the damage to the economy and earnings was mostly short term, and by the end of the year, both (economy and earnings) were on the mend, helped undoubtedly by multi-trillion dollar government support and central banking activism: As in 2008, I computed equity risk premiums by day all through 2020, and the graph below tells the story: Spreadsheet with raw data As you can see, the equity risk premium which started at 4.4% on February 14, 2020, peaked a few weeks later at 7.75% on March 23, 2020, and as with the economy and earnings, it was back down to pre-crisis levels by September 2020. The Perils of Post Mortems Each crisis gives rise to postmortems, where investors, regulators and researchers pore over the data, often emerging with conclusions that extrapolate too much from what happened. For investors: The lesson that many investors get out of looking at past crises is that markets come back from even the worst meltdowns, and that contrarian investing with a long time horizon always works. While that may be comforting, this lesson ignores the reality that the fact that a catastrophe did not occur in the crisis in question does not imply that the probability of it occurring was always zero. Markets assess risks in real time. For regulators: To the extent that crises expose the weakest seams in markets and businesses, regulators often come in with fixes for those seams, mostly by dealing with the symptoms, rather than the causes. After the 2008 crisis, the conclusions were that the problems was banks behaving badly and ratings agencies that were not doing their job, both merited judgments, but the question of risk incentives that had led them on their risk taking misadventures were largely left untouched. For researchers: With the benefit of hindsight, regulators weave stories about crises that are built around their own priors, by selectively picking up data items that support them. Thus, behavioral economists find every crisis to be an example of bubbles bursting and corrections for irrational investing, and efficient market theorists use the same crisis as an illustration of the magic of markets working. It is worth remembering that each crisis is a sample size of one, and since each crises is different, aggregating or averaging across them can be difficult to do. Thus, the danger is that we try to learn too much from past crises rather than too little. The Tariff Crisis? I don't believe that it is premature to put the tariff news and reaction into the crisis category. It has the potential to change the global economic order, and a market reaction is merited. It is, however, early in the process, since we are just past the trigger event (tariff announcement) and the initial market reaction, with lots of unknowns facing us down the road: There are clearly stages of this crisis that have played out, but based on what we know now, here is how I see them: After shocks: The tariff story will have after shocks, with both negatives (other countries imposing their own tariffs, and the US responding) and positives (a pause in tariffs, countries dropping tariffs). Those after shocks will create more market volatility, and if history is any guide, there is more downside than upside in the near term. In addition, the market volatility can feed itself, as levered investors are forced to close out positions and fund flows to markets reflect investor concerns and uncertainty. If you add on top of that the possibility that global investors may decide to reduce their US equity holdings, that reallocation will have price effects. Real economy (near term): In the near term, the real economy will slow down, with the plus being that while tariff-related price increases are coming, a cooling down in the economy will dampen inflation. The likelihood of a recession has spiked in the days since the tariff announcement, and while we will have to wait for the numbers on real growth and unemployment to come in, it does look likely that real growth will be impacted negatively. The steep declines in commodity prices suggests that investors see an economic slowdown on the horizon. As Real economy (long term): Global economic growth will slow, and the US, as the world’s largest economy, will slow with it.. There are other dynamics at play including a restructuring of old economic and political alliances (Is there a point to having a G7 meeting?) and a new more challenging environment for global companies that have spent the last few decades building supply chains that stretch across the globe, and selling to consumers all over. It is worth noting that if we measure winning by not the size of the pie (the size of the entire economy) but who gets what slice of that economy, it is possible that tariffs could reapportion the pie, with capital (equity markets) getting a smaller slice, and workers getting a larger slice,. In fact, much of this administration's defense of the tariff has been on this front, and time will tell whether that works out to be the case. In the two days after the announcement, stock prices have dropped and the price of risk has risen, as investors reassess the economy and markets: The implied equity risk premium has risen from 4.57% on April 2 to 5.08% by the close of trading on Friday. The road ahead of us is long, but I plan to continue to compute these implied equity risk premiums every day for as long as I believe we are in crisis-mode, and I will keep these updated numbers on my webpage. As stocks have been revalued with higher prices of risk, that same uncertainty is playing out in the corporate bond market, where corporate default spreads widened on Thursday (April 3) and Friday (April 4): As with the equity risk premiums, the price of risk in the bond market had already risen between the start of 2025 and March 28, 2025, but they surged last week, with the lowest ratings showing the biggest surges. With treasury rates, equity risk premiums and default spreads all on the move it may be time for companies and investors to be reassessing their costs of equity and capital. What now? If you have stayed with me so far on this long and rambling discourse, you are probably looking for my views on how this crisis will unfold, and how investors should respond now. I am afraid that dishing out investment advice is not my cup of tea, but I will try to explain how I plan to deal with what's coming, with the caveat that what I do may not work for you A (Personal) Postscript In the midst of every market meltdown, you will see three groups of experts emerge. The first will be the "I told you so" group, eager to tell you that this is the big one, the threat that they have spent a decade or more warning you about. They will of course not let on that if you had followed their advice from inception, you would have been invested in cash for the last decade, and even with a market crash, you would not be made hold again. The second will include "knee jerk contrarians", arguing that stock markets always come back, and that every market dip is a buying opportunity, an extraordinarily lazy philosophy that gets the rewards (none) that its deserves. The third will be the "indecisives", who will present every side of the argument, conclude that there is too much uncertainty right now to either buy or sell, but to wait until the uncertainty passes. There are elements of truth in all three arguments, but they all have blind spots. In the midst of a crisis, the market becomes a pricing game, where perception gets the better of reality, momentum overwhelms fundamentals and day-to-day movements cannot be rationalized. Anyone who tells you that their crystal balls, data or charts can predict what's coming is lying or delusional, and there is no one right response to this (or any other) crisis. It will depend on: Cash needs and time horizon: If you are or will soon be in need of cash, to pay for health care, buy a home or pay tuition, and you are invested in equities, you should take the cash out now. Waiting for a better time to do so, when the clock is ticking is the equivalent of paying Russian Roulette and just as dangerous. Conversely, if you do not need the cash and are patient, you have the flexibility of waiting, though having a longer time horizon does not necessarily mean that you should wait to act. Macro views: The effects on markets and the real economy will depend on how you see the tariffs playing out, with the outcomes ranging from a no-holds-barred trade war (with tariffs and counter tariffs) to a partial trade war (with some countries capitulating and others fighting) to a complete clearing of the air (where the tariff threat is scaled down or put on the back burner). While you may be inclined to turn this over to macro economists, this is less about economics and more about game theory, where an expert poker player will be better positioned to forecast what will happen than an economic think tank. Investment philosophy: I have long argued (and teach a class to that effect) that every investor needs an investment philosophy, attuned to his or her personal make up. That philosophy starts with a set of beliefs about how markets make mistakes and corrects them, and manifests in strategies designed to take advantage of those mistakes. My investment philosophy starts with the belief that markets, for the most part, do a remarkable job in aggregating and reflecting crowd consensus, but that they sometimes make big mistakes that take long periods to correct, especially in periods and portions of the market where there is uncertainty. I am terrible at gauging market mood and momentum, but feel that I have an edge (albeit a small one) in assessing individual companies, though that may be my delusion. My response to this crisis (or any other) will follow this script: Daily ERP: As in prior crises, I will continue to monitor the equity risk premiums, treasury rates and the expected return on stocks every day until I feel comfortable enough to let go. Note that this process lasted for months after the 2008 and 2020 crises, but as earnings updates for the S&P 500 reflect tariffs, my confidence in my assessments will increase. (As mentioned earlier, you will find these daily updates at this link) Revalue companies in my portfolio: While I was comfortable with the companies in my portfolio on March 28, viewing them as under valued or at least not over valued enough to merit a sell, the tariffs may have an significant effect on their values, and I plan to revalue them in batches, starting with my big tech holdings (the Mag Five, since I did sell Tesla and most of my Nvidia holdings) and working through the rest. Buy value: I have drawn a contrast between great companies and great investments, with the former characterized by large moats, great management and strong earnings power, and the latter by being priced too low. There are companies that I believe are great companies, but are priced so highly by the market that they are sub-standard investments and I choose not to invest in them. During a crisis, where investors often sell without discrimination, there companies can become buys, and I have to be ready to buy at the right price. Since buying in the face of a market meltdown can require fortitude that I may not have, I have been scouring my list of great companies, revaluing them with the tariff effects built in, and putting buys at limit prices below those values. In the last week, both BYD, a company that I said that I liked, a few weeks ago in my post on globalization and disruption, and Mercado Libre, a Latin American powerhouse, that has the disruptive potential of an Amazon combined with a fintech enterprise, have moved from being significantly overvalued to within shouting distance of the limit prices I have on them. Go back to living: I certainly don't see much gain watching the market hour-to-hour and day-to-day, since its doings are out of my control and anything that I do in response is more likely to do harm than good. Instead, I plan on living my life, enjoying life's small pleasures, like a Yankee win or taking my dog for a walk, to big ones, like celebrating my granddaughter's birthday in a couple of days. I hope that you find your own path back to serenity in the face of this market volatility, and that whatever you end up doing with your portfolio allows you to pass the sleep test, where you don't lie awake at night thinking about your portfolio (up or down). YouTube Video Data Links Equity risk premiums by day, Banking Crisis in 2008 Equity risk premiums by day, COVID Crisis in 2020 Equity risk premiums by day, Tariff Crisis in 2025 (ongoing)
From Manheim Consulting today: Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index Shows Seasonal Decline in March Despite Strong Market Demand Wholesale used-vehicle prices (on a mix, mileage, and seasonally adjusted basis) were lower in March compared to February. The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index (MUVVI) declined to 202.6, which is a decrease of 0.2% from a year ago and also lower than the February levels. The seasonal adjustment caused the index to decline for the month, as non-seasonally adjusted values rose but not enough to account for the normal seasonal move. The non-adjusted price in March increased by 2.7% compared to February, moving the unadjusted average price up 0.4% year over year. emphasis added Click on graph for larger image. The Manheim index suggests used car prices decreased in March (seasonally adjusted) and were down 0.2% YoY. The tariffs will likely make imported used cars more attractive.
In 2003, Warren Buffett wrote an article with a proposal to address the trade deficit. It deserves more attention in the current tariff debate.
Plus! The Market; Supply and Demand; The March Continues; ETFs; Intellectual Property