I was boarding a plane for a trip to Latin America late in the evening last Wednesday (April 2), and as is my practice, I was checking the score on the Yankee game, when I read the tariff news announcement. Coming after a few days where the market seemed to have found its bearings (at least partially), it was clear from the initial reactions across the world that the breadth and the magnitude of the tariffs had caught most by surprise, and that a market markdown was coming. Not surprisingly, the markets opened down on Thursday and spent the next two days in that mode, with US equity indices declining almost 10% by close of trading on Friday. Luckily for me, I was too busy on both Thursday and Friday with speaking events, since as the speaker, I did not have the luxury (or the pain) of checking markets all day long. In my second venue, which was Buenos Aires, I quipped that while Argentina was trying its best to make its way back from chaos towards stability, the rest of the world was looking a lot more like Argentina, in terms of uncertainty. On Saturday, on a long flight back to New York, I wrestled with the confusion, denial and panic that come with a market meltdown, and tried to make sense of what had happened, and more importantly of what is coming. That thinking is still a work-in-progress but as in prior crises, I find that putting even unfinished thoughts down on paper (or in a post) is healthy, and perhaps a critical component to finding your way back to serenity. The Tariffs and Markets     Since talk of tariffs has filled the airwaves for most of this year, you may wonder why markets reacted so strongly to the announcement on Wednesday. One reason might have been that investors and businesses were not expecting the tariff hit to be as wide and as deep as they turned out to be.      Note that while Canada and Mexico were not on the Wednesday list of tariff targets that was released on Wednesday, they have been targeted separately, and that the remaining countries that do not show up on this map (Russia and North Korea, for instance) are under sanctions that prevent them from trading in the first place.      Another reason for the market reaction was that the basis for the tariff estimates, which have now been widely shared, are not easily fixable, since they are not based on tariffs imposed by other countries, but on the magnitude of the trade deficit of the United States with these countries. Thus, any country with which the US runs a significant trade deficit faces a large tariff, and smaller countries are more exposed than larger ones since the trade deficit is computed on a percentage basis, from exports and imports related to that country.  Thus, the easy out, where other countries offer to reduce or even remove their tariffs may have no or little effect on the tariffs, to the extent that the trade deficit may have little to do with tariffs.       Equities     The extent of the market hit can be seen by looking at the major US equity indices, the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ, all of which shed significant portions of their value on Thursday and Friday: Looking beyond these indices and across the globe, the negative reaction has been global, as can be seen in the returns to equity across sub-regions, with all returns denominated in US dollars: The worst hit regions of the world is Small Asia, which is Asia not counting India, China and Japan, which saw equity values in the aggregate decline by 12.61% in the last week. US equities had the biggest decline in dollar value terms, losing $5.3 trillion in value last week, a 9.24% decline in value from the Friday close on March 28, 2025. China and India have held up the best in the last week, perhaps because both countries have large enough domestic markets to sustain them through a trade war. It is also a factory that with time differences, these markets both closed before the Friday beatdown on Wall Street unfolded, and the open on Monday may give a better indication of the true reaction. Breaking down just US equities, by sector, we can see the damage across sectors: The technology sector lost the most in value last week, both in dollar terms, shedding almost $1.8 trillion (and 11.6%) in equity value, and consumer staples and utilities held up the best, dropping 2.30% and 4.40% respectively. In percentage terms, energy stocks have lost the most in value, with market capitalizations dropping by 14.2%, dragged down by declining oil prices.     Staying with US equities, and breaking down companies, based upon their market capitalizations coming into 2025, we can again see write downs in equity value across the spectrum from last week's sell off: As you can see, it looks like there is little to distinguish across the market cap spectrum, as the pain was widely distributed across the market cap classes, with small and large companies losing roughly the same percent of value. To the extent that market crisis usually cause a flight to safety, I looked at US stocks, broken down by decile into earnings yield (Earnings to price ratios), over the last week: The lowest earnings to price ratio (highest PE) stocks, in the aggregate, lost 10.91% of their market capitalization last week, compared to the 8.08% decline in market cap at the highest earnings to price (lowest PE ratio) companies, providing some basis for the flight to safety hypothesis. Staying with the safety theme, I looked at US companies, broken down by debt burden (measured as debt to EBITDA): On this dimension, the numbers actually push against the flight to safety hypothesis, since the companies with the least debt performed worse than those with the most debt. Finally, I looked at whether dividend paying and cash returning companies were better protected in the sell off, by looking at dividend paying (buying back stock) companies versus non-dividend paying (not buying back stock) companies: While dividend paying stocks did drop by less than non-dividend paying stocks, companies buying back stock underperformed those that did not buy back stock in 2024.        If you came into last week, believing that stocks were over priced, you would expect the correction to be worse at companies that have been bid up the most, and to test this, I classified US stocks based upon percentage stock price performance in 2024: While the worst performers from last year came into the week down only 1.83% through March 28, whereas the best performers from 2024 were down 6.46% over the same period, there was little to distinguish between the two groups last week.      Finally, I looked at the Mag Seven stocks, since they have, in large part, carried US equities for much of the last two years; Collectively, the Mag Seven came into last last week, already down 14.79% for the year (2025), but their losses last week, which massive in dollar value terms ($1.55 trillion) were close in percentage terms to the losses in the rest of the market. Other Markets     As equity markets reacted to the tariff announcement, other markets followed. US treasury rates, which had entered the week down from the start of the year, continued to decline during the course of the week: While the 3-month treasury bill rate remained fairly close to what it was at the start of the week, the rates at the longer end, from 2-year to 30-year all saw drops during the week, perhaps reflecting a search for safety on the part of investors. The drops, at least so far, have been modest and much smaller than what you would expect from a market sell off, where US equities dropped by $5.3 trillion.     Looking past financial markets, I focused on three diverse markets - the oil market as a stand-in for commodity markets overall, the gold market, representing the time-tested collectible, and Bitcoin, which is perhaps the millennial version of gold: Oil prices dropped last week, especially as financial asset markets melted down on Thursday and Friday, while both gold and bitcoin held their own last week. For bitcoin advocates, that is good news, since in other market crises since its creation, it has behaved more like risky stock than a collectible. Of course, it I still early in this crisis, and the true tests will come in the next few weeks.   Summing up     In sum, the data seems to point more to a mark down in equity values than to panic selling, at least based upon the small sample of two days from last week. There was undoubtedly some panic selling on Friday, but the flight to safety, whether it be in moving into treasuries or high dividend paying stocks, was muted.    The Crisis Cycle     Each crisis is unique both in its origins and in how it plays out, but there is still value in looking across crises, to see how they unfold, what causes them to crest, and how and why they recede. In this section, I will present a crisis cycle, which almost every crisis works its way through, with big differences in how quickly, and with how much damage. The crisis cycle starts with a trigger event, which can be economic, political or financial, though there are often smaller events ahead of is occurrence that point to its coming. The immediate effect is in markets, where investors respond with the only instrument the they control, which is the prices they pay for assets, which they mark down to reflect at least their initial response to the crisis. In the language of risk, they are demanding higher prices for risk, translating into higher risk premiums. In conjunction, they often move their money to safer assets, with treasuries and collectibles historically benefiting from the fund flows. In the days and weeks that follow, there are aftershocks from the trigger event, both on the news and the market fronts, and while these aftershocks can sometimes be positive for markets, the net effect is usually negative. The effects find their way into the real economy, as consumers and businesses pull back, causing an economic slowdown or a recession, with negative effects on earnings and cash flows, at least in the near term. In the long term, the trigger event can change the economic dynamics, causing a resetting of real growth and inflation expectations, which then feed back into markets; To illustrate, consider the 2008 banking crisis, where the Lehman collapse over the weekend before September 15 triggered a sell off in the stock market that caused equities to drop by 28% between September 12 and December 31, 2008, and triggered a steep recession, causing unemployment to hit double digits in 2009. The earnings for S&P 500 companies took a 40% hit in 2008, and long term, neither the economy nor earnings recovered back to pre-crisis levels until 2012. During that crisis, I started a practice of estimating equity risk premiums by day, reflecting my belief that it is day-to-day movements in the price of risk that cause equity markets to move as much as they do in a crisis: Spreadsheet with raw data Equity risk premiums which started the crisis at around 4% peaked at almost 8% on November 21, 2008, before ending the year at 6.43%, well above the levels at the start of 2008. Those equity risk premiums did not get back to pre-2008 levels until almost 15 years later.     Moving to 2020 and looking at the COVID crisis, the trigger event was a news story out of Italy about COVID cases in the country that could not be traced to either China or cruise ships, shattering the delusion that the pandemic would be contained to those settings. In the weeks after, the S&P 500 shed 33% of its value before bottoming out on March 23, 2020, and treasury rates plunged to historic lows, hitting 0.76% on that day. The key difference from 2008 was that the damage to the economy and earnings was mostly short term, and by the end of the year, both (economy and earnings) were on the mend, helped undoubtedly by multi-trillion dollar government support and central banking activism: As in 2008, I computed equity risk premiums by day all through 2020, and the graph below tells the story: Spreadsheet with raw data As you can see, the equity risk premium which started at 4.4% on February 14, 2020, peaked a few weeks later at 7.75% on March 23, 2020, and as with the economy and earnings, it was back down to pre-crisis levels by September 2020. The Perils of Post Mortems     Each crisis gives rise to postmortems, where investors, regulators and researchers pore over the data, often emerging with conclusions that extrapolate too much from what happened. For investors: The lesson that many investors get out of looking at past crises is that markets come back from even the worst meltdowns, and that contrarian investing with a long time horizon always works. While that may be comforting, this lesson ignores the reality that the fact that a catastrophe did not occur in the crisis in question does not imply that the probability of it occurring was always zero. Markets assess risks in real time. For regulators: To the extent that crises expose the weakest seams in markets and businesses, regulators often come in with fixes for those seams, mostly by dealing with the symptoms, rather than the causes. After the 2008 crisis, the conclusions were that the problems was banks behaving badly and ratings agencies that were not doing their job, both merited judgments, but the question of risk incentives that had led them on their risk taking misadventures were largely left untouched. For researchers: With the benefit of hindsight, regulators weave stories about crises that are built around their own priors, by selectively picking up data items that support them. Thus, behavioral economists find every crisis to be an example of bubbles bursting and corrections for irrational investing, and efficient market theorists use the same crisis as an illustration of the magic of markets working. It is worth remembering that each crisis is a sample size of one, and since each crises is different, aggregating or averaging across them can be difficult to do. Thus, the danger is that we try to learn too much from past crises rather than too little. The Tariff Crisis?     I don't believe that it is premature to put the tariff news and reaction into the crisis category. It has the potential to change the global economic order, and a market reaction is merited. It is, however, early in the process, since we are just past the trigger event (tariff announcement) and the initial market reaction, with lots of unknowns facing us down the road: There are clearly stages of this crisis that have played out, but based on what we know now, here is how I see them: After shocks: The tariff story will have after shocks, with both negatives (other countries imposing their own tariffs, and the US responding) and positives (a pause in tariffs, countries dropping tariffs). Those after shocks will create more market volatility, and if history is any guide, there is more downside than upside in the near term. In addition, the market volatility can feed itself, as levered investors are forced to close out positions and fund flows to markets reflect investor concerns and uncertainty. If you add on top of that the possibility that global investors may decide to reduce their US equity holdings, that reallocation will have price effects. Real economy (near term): In the near term, the real economy will slow down, with the plus being that while tariff-related price increases are coming, a cooling down in the economy will dampen inflation. The likelihood of a recession has spiked in the days since the tariff announcement, and while we will have to wait for the numbers on real growth and unemployment to come in, it does look likely that real growth will be impacted negatively. The steep declines in commodity prices suggests that investors see an economic slowdown on the horizon. As Real economy (long term): Global economic growth will slow, and the US, as the world’s largest economy, will slow with it.. There are other dynamics at play including a restructuring of old economic and political alliances (Is there a point to having a G7 meeting?) and a new more challenging environment for global companies that have spent the last few decades building supply chains that stretch across the globe, and selling to consumers all over. It is worth noting that if we measure winning by not the size of the pie (the size of the entire economy) but who gets what slice of that economy, it is possible that tariffs could reapportion the pie, with capital (equity markets) getting a smaller slice, and workers getting a larger slice,. In fact, much of this administration's defense of the tariff has been on this front, and time will tell whether that works out to be the case.     In the two days after the announcement, stock prices have dropped and the price of risk has risen, as investors reassess the economy and markets: The implied equity risk premium has risen from 4.57% on April 2  to 5.08% by the close of trading on Friday. The road ahead of us is long, but I plan to continue to compute these implied equity risk premiums every day for as long as I believe we are in crisis-mode, and I will keep these updated numbers on my webpage. As stocks have been revalued with higher prices of risk, that same uncertainty is playing out in the corporate bond market, where corporate default spreads widened on Thursday (April 3) and Friday (April 4): As with the equity risk premiums, the price of risk in the bond market had already risen between the start of 2025 and March 28, 2025, but they surged last week, with the lowest ratings showing the biggest surges. With treasury rates, equity risk premiums and default spreads all on the move it may be time for companies and investors to be reassessing their costs of equity and capital.  What now?     If you have stayed with me so far on this long and rambling discourse, you are probably looking for my views on how this crisis will unfold, and how investors should respond now. I am afraid that dishing out investment advice is not my cup of tea, but I will try to explain how I plan to deal with what's coming, with the caveat that what I do may not work for you A (Personal) Postscript      In the midst of every market meltdown, you will see three groups of experts emerge. The first will be the "I told you so" group, eager to tell you that this is the big one, the threat that they have spent a decade or more warning you about. They will of course not let on that if you had followed their advice from inception, you would have been invested in cash for the last decade, and even with a market crash, you would not be made hold again. The second will include "knee jerk contrarians", arguing that stock markets always come back, and that every market dip is a buying opportunity, an extraordinarily lazy philosophy that gets the rewards (none) that its deserves. The third will be the "indecisives", who will present every side of the argument, conclude that there is too much uncertainty right now to either buy or sell, but to wait until the uncertainty passes. There are elements of truth in all three arguments, but they all have blind spots.     In the midst of a crisis, the market becomes a pricing game, where perception gets the better of reality, momentum overwhelms fundamentals and day-to-day movements cannot be rationalized. Anyone who tells you that their crystal balls, data or charts can predict what's coming is lying or delusional, and there is no one right response to this (or any other) crisis. It will depend on: Cash needs and time horizon: If you are or will soon be in need of cash, to pay for health care, buy a home or pay tuition, and you are invested in equities, you should take the cash out now. Waiting for a better time to do so, when the clock is ticking is the equivalent of paying Russian Roulette and just as dangerous. Conversely, if you do not need the cash and are patient, you have the flexibility of waiting, though having a longer time horizon does not necessarily mean that you should wait to act. Macro views: The effects on markets and the real economy will depend on how you see the tariffs playing out, with the outcomes ranging from a no-holds-barred trade war (with tariffs and counter tariffs) to a partial trade war (with some countries capitulating and others fighting) to a complete clearing of the air (where the tariff threat is scaled down or put on the back burner). While you may be inclined to turn this over to macro economists, this is less about economics and more about game theory, where an expert poker player will be better positioned to forecast what will happen than an economic think tank. Investment philosophy: I have long argued (and teach a class to that effect) that every investor needs an investment philosophy, attuned to his or her personal make up. That philosophy starts with a set of beliefs about how markets make mistakes and corrects them, and manifests in strategies designed to take advantage of those mistakes.  My investment philosophy starts with the belief that markets, for the most part, do a remarkable job in aggregating and reflecting crowd consensus, but that they sometimes make big  mistakes that take long periods to correct, especially in periods and portions of the market where there is uncertainty.  I am terrible at gauging market mood and momentum, but feel that I have an edge (albeit a small one) in assessing individual companies, though that may be my delusion. My response to this crisis (or any other) will follow this script: Daily ERP: As in prior crises, I will continue to monitor the equity risk premiums, treasury rates and the expected return on stocks every day until I feel comfortable enough to let go. Note that this process lasted for months after the 2008 and 2020 crises, but as earnings updates for the S&P 500 reflect tariffs, my confidence in my assessments will increase. (As mentioned earlier, you will find these daily updates at this link) Revalue companies in my portfolio: While I was comfortable with the companies in my portfolio on March 28, viewing them as under valued or at least not over valued enough to merit a sell, the tariffs may have an significant effect on their values, and I plan to revalue them in batches, starting with my big tech holdings (the Mag Five, since I did sell Tesla and most of my Nvidia holdings) and working through the rest.  Buy value: I have drawn a contrast between great companies and great investments, with the former characterized by large moats, great management and strong earnings power, and the latter by being priced too low. There are companies that I believe are great companies, but are priced so highly by the market that they are sub-standard investments and I choose not to invest in them. During a crisis, where investors often sell without discrimination, there companies can become buys, and I have to be ready to buy at the right price. Since buying in the face of a market meltdown can require fortitude that I may not have, I have been scouring my list of great companies, revaluing them with the tariff effects built in, and putting buys at limit prices below those values. In the last week, both BYD, a company that I said that I liked, a few weeks ago in my post on globalization and disruption, and Mercado Libre, a Latin American powerhouse, that has the disruptive potential of an Amazon combined with a fintech enterprise, have moved from being significantly overvalued to within shouting distance of the limit prices I have on them.  Go back to living: I certainly don't see much gain watching the market hour-to-hour and day-to-day, since its doings are out of my control and anything that I do in response is more likely to do harm than good. Instead, I plan on living my life, enjoying life's small pleasures, like a Yankee win or taking my dog for a walk, to big ones, like celebrating my granddaughter's birthday in a couple of days.  I hope that you find your own path back to serenity in the face of this market volatility, and that whatever you end up doing with your portfolio allows you to pass the sleep test, where you don't lie awake at night thinking about your portfolio (up or down).  YouTube Video Data Links Equity risk premiums by day, Banking Crisis in 2008 Equity risk premiums by day, COVID Crisis in 2020 Equity risk premiums by day, Tariff Crisis in 2025 (ongoing)

From Manheim Consulting today: Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index Shows Seasonal Decline in March Despite Strong Market Demand Wholesale used-vehicle prices (on a mix, mileage, and seasonally adjusted basis) were lower in March compared to February. The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index (MUVVI) declined to 202.6, which is a decrease of 0.2% from a year ago and also lower than the February levels. The seasonal adjustment caused the index to decline for the month, as non-seasonally adjusted values rose but not enough to account for the normal seasonal move. The non-adjusted price in March increased by 2.7% compared to February, moving the unadjusted average price up 0.4% year over year. emphasis added Click on graph for larger image. The Manheim index suggests used car prices decreased in March (seasonally adjusted) and were down 0.2% YoY. The tariffs will likely make imported used cars more attractive.

Like orbiting space debris, every loan that has been collateralized by an illiquid asset is a high-speed projectile with the potential to disable any other part of the system it impacts. Complex systems can undergo what's known as phase shifts, where the state of the system changes abruptly. The classic example of this is liquid water turning to ice. Since the mechanisms at work--temperature, saline levels, etc.--is known and measurable, then this phase transition is predictable. Complex systems with emergent properties are unpredictable, and so their phase transitions catch us off guard. The system looks stable, as the risk of sudden instability resolving in a phase shift is not visible. Emergent properties arise from the interactions of various parts of the system rather than from the characteristics of the parts themselves. Interactions in complex systems that are tightly bound --i.e. highly interconnected--are dynamic and so the consequences of unexpected interactions are unpredictable. In other words, we think we understand all the possible interactions, but we're forgetting second-order effects: first-order effects: interactions have consequences. Second order effects: consequences have consequences. This illusion of control leads us to tinker with systems such as the global financial system to suppress any interactions we see as threatening the stability of the entire system. But this tinkering to lower risk has a hidden consequence. As Nassim Taleb noted in a 2011 article: "Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks." Which brings us to a second example of a phase shift: The Kessler Syndrome: The Kessler syndrome, proposed by NASA scientist Donald Kessler, describes a hypothetical scenario where the accumulation of space debris in Earth's orbit triggers a chain reaction of collisions, creating even more debris, potentially rendering parts of space unusable. While this is described as "hypothetical," the potential for a Kessler Effect to occur rises sharply with the quantity of space junk / debris speeding around low-Earth orbits in what I call The Orbital Landfill, a space-age analog of The Landfill Economy we've created here on the planet's surface. And voila, the number of bits of high-speed debris is rising, along with the number of satellites being lifted into orbit: Catastrophe Looms Above: Space Junk Problem Grew 'Significantly Worse' In 2024 That's brings us to the nightmare scenario that should fill you with dread: The Kessler Effect. I submit that the Kessler Syndrome is an apt analogy for what may be happening in the global financial system: interactions that few anticipated are setting off second-order consequences that are themselves interacting with other parts of the system in unpredictable ways that will cascade, in effect clearing entire orbits of the global financial system. So once a margin call impacts a functioning satellite and shatters it into random projectiles, the fallout / debris from that impact then strikes everything that is tightly bound to that part of the system. These consequences then impact other parts, triggering margin calls and liquidation of assets that then shatter and those destructive projectiles become so numerous that they clear the entire orbit of functional parts of the system. In a financial Kessler Effect, every critical element is shattered into dangerous debris that cascades through the entire global system. Being tightly bound, the global financial system is exquisitely sensitive to cascading margin calls and forced liquidations of assets. Like orbiting space debris, every loan that has been collateralized by an illiquid asset (i.e. an asset that can't be sold with the click of a button and the transaction clears second later) is a high-speed projectile with the potential to disable any other part of the system it impacts. The problem with markets that Taleb described so succinctly is that the risk of apparently liquid markets freezing up and becoming illiquid is not visible until it's too late to sell. Conventional market theory holds that there will always be a buyer to take an asset off a seller's hands. But buyers disappear in crashes, as nobody wants to catch the falling knife. Assets that were presumed to be liquid become illiquid, and their valuation plummets. This collapse of collateral then triggers margin calls (loans being called in, demands for cash) which then trigger more liquidations into an illiquid market. And that's how a Financial Kessler Effect clears entire orbits of the global financial system. What looked robust and low-risk is reduced to debris. New podcast: The Coming Global Recession will be Longer and Deeper than Most Analysts Anticipate (42 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. 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Early in February, I expressed my "increasing concern" about the negative economic impact of "executive / fiscal policy errors", however, I concluded that post by noting that I was not currently on recession watch. Now I am on recession watch, but still not yet predicting a recession for several reasons: the U.S. economy is very resilient and was on solid footing at the beginning of the year, the administration might reverse many of the tariffs (we've seen that before), and Congress might take back complete authority for tariffs.  Also, perhaps these tariffs are not enough to topple the economy. Over the weekend, Goldman Sachs economists put out a note: Countdown to Recession "If most of the April 9 tariffs do take effect, then the effective tariff rate will rise by an estimated 20pp once those increases and likely sectoral tariffs take effect, even allowing for some country-specific agreements at a later date. If so, we expect to change our forecast to a recession." Here is some of the data I'm watching.   Housing:  Housing is the basis of one of my favorite models for business cycle forecasting.  This graph uses new home sales, single family housing starts and residential investment.  (I prefer single family starts to total starts).   The purpose of this graph is to show that these three indicators generally reach peaks and troughs together. Note that Residential Investment is quarterly and single-family starts and new home sales are monthly. Click on graph for larger image. The arrows point to some of the earlier peaks and troughs for these three measures - and the most recent peak. New home sales peaked in 2020 as pandemic buying soared.  Then new home sales and single-family starts turned down in 2021, but that was partly due to the huge surge in sales during the pandemic.   In 2022, both new home sales and single-family starts turned down in response to higher mortgage rates.    This decline in residential investment would typically have suggested that a recession was coming, however I looked past the pandemic distortions and correctly predicted no recession!  The low level of existing home inventory led me to predict that new home sales would pick up - and that happened.  This is a reminder that we can't be a slave to any model. This second graph shows the YoY change in New Home Sales from the Census Bureau.  Currently new home sales (based on 3-month average of NSA data) are down 4% year-over-year. Usually when the YoY change in New Home Sales falls about 20%, a recession will follow.  An exception for this data series was the mid '60s when the Vietnam buildup kept the economy out of recession.   Another exception was in late 2021 - we saw a significant YoY decline in new home sales related to the pandemic and the surge in new home sales in the second half of 2020.  I ignored that downturn as a pandemic distortion.  Also note that the sharp decline in 2010 was related to the housing tax credit policy in 2009 - and was just a continuation of the housing bust. The YoY change in new home sales in late 2022 and early 2023 suggested a possible recession.  But as I noted earlier, I was able to look past the pandemic distortion and was able to predict a pickup in new home sales due to the low level of existing home inventory and because homebuilders could offer mortgage incentives that would somewhat offset the sharp increase in mortgage rates. There are no special circumstances now, and if this measure falls to off 20% a recession seems likely. Yield Curve: The yield curve is a commonly used leading indicator.  I dismissed it when the yield curve inverted in 2019 and again in 2022. Both times dismissing the yield curve was correct (the recession in 2020 was obviously due to the pandemic, so we will never know if the yield curve failed to predict a recession in 2019). Here is a graph of 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity from FRED since 1976.   The yield curve reverted to normal last year and is currently slightly positive at 0.33.  If this inverts, this might suggest a recession is coming. Click here for interactive graph at FRED. Heavy Truck (and Vehicle Sales): Another indicator I like to use is heavy truck sales.  This graph shows heavy truck sales since 1967 using data from the BEA. he dashed line is the March 2025 seasonally adjusted annual sales rate (SAAR) of 403 thousand. Note: "Heavy trucks - trucks more than 14,000 pounds gross vehicle weight." Heavy truck sales were at 403 thousand SAAR in March, down from 436 thousand in February, and down 12.1% from 459 thousand SAAR in February 2025. Usually, heavy truck sales decline sharply prior to a recession. Perhaps heavy truck sales will be revised up, but sales in March were somewhat weak. On the other hand, light vehicle sales were strong in March.   This graph shows light vehicle sales since the BEA started keeping data in 1967.   This is more of a concurrent indicator than heavy trucks.  Light vehicle sales surged to 17.77 million SAAR in March, up 11.0% from February, and up 13.3% from March 2024 as some buyers rushed to beat the tariffs. Unemployment: Two other concurrent indicators are the unemployment rate (using the "Sahm Rule") and weekly unemployment claims. Here is a graph of the Sahm rule from FRED since 1959. Dr. Claudia Sahm said at the time: “I am not concerned that, at this moment, we are in a recession,” she told Fortune ... “This time really could be different,” Sahm said. “[The Sahm Rule] may not tell us what it’s told us in the past, because of these swings from labor shortages, with people dropping out of the labor force, to now having immigrants coming lately. That all can show up in changes in the unemployment rate, which is the core of the Sahm Rule.” And weekly unemployment claims always rise sharply at the beginning of a recession (other events - like hurricane Katrina - can cause a temporary spike in weekly claims). As I noted earlier, I'm not sure how to estimate the economic damage caused by these tariffs. And they might just go away (no one knows).  There are also boycotts of U.S. goods and less international tourism based on both the tariffs and the inflammatory rhetoric of the new administration.   For now, I'll focus on the leading indicators (especially housing) and I'll update this post monthly while I'm on recession watch.

In 2003, Warren Buffett wrote an article with a proposal to address the trade deficit. It deserves more attention in the current tariff debate.