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It seems we're supposed to mourn the last gasp of The Landfill Economy. Perhaps we should celebrate its demise. Globalization's great gift wasn't low prices--it was the collapse of durability, transforming the global economy into a Landfill Economy of shoddy products made of low-cost components guaranteed to fail, poor quality control, planned obsolescence and accelerated product cycles--all hyper-profitable, all to the detriment of consumers and the planet. Globalization also accelerated another hyper-profitable gambit: . Since all the products are now made with the same low-quality components, they all fail regardless of brand or price. The $2,000 refrigerator lasts no longer than the $700 fridge. Since the manufacturers and retailers all know the products are destined for the landfill by either design or default, warranties are uniformly one-year--and it's semi-miraculous if the consumer can find anyone to act on replacing or repairing the failed product even with the...
a month ago

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More from oftwominds-Charles Hugh Smith

Tariffs Are Not Enough

The tariff sledgehammer has a role, but it's a limited one. There's an inherent tension in State-Corporate Capitalism. Proponents of the free market hold that any state Industrial Policy will fail because the State cannot pick the winners and losers as effectively as The Market. Yet Corporate Capitalism continually lobbies the State to lower interest rates and taxes, weaken the currency to make corporate products cheaper in overseas markets, erect tariff / trade barriers against mercantilist global competitors, etc. In other words, the State should butt out of the free market except when it serves our purposes. The other source of inherent tension is the State's responsibility for more than boosting private-sector profits. Enterprises have the luxury of focusing on one thing: boosting profits and "shareholder value." Governments have responsibilities far broader than boosting profits--for example, national security, which has been gutted by de-industrialization and the wholesale transfer of supply chains overseas. Steep tariffs are now being deployed to correct the corporate offshoring that boosted profits so wondrously. The problem is tariffs are not enough to reverse offshoring to reshoring. Tariffs act as a useful sledgehammer but a sledgehammer has a limited scope of utility. There are more moving parts in the decision to reshore than tariffs. What few realize is every State has a de facto Industrial Policy set by the entirety of State policies and regulations. This Industrial Policy is implicit rather than an explicit set of goals and policies, and so various pieces of this implicit Industrial Policy may actually be contradictory. Just as the State doesn't have the luxury of focusing solely on profit, corporations don't have the luxury of gambling the company's future based on one State policy that's likely to change. Enterprises must consider a great many factors before committing billions of dollars to moving supply chains and production facilities. These include: 1. Tax structures 2. Regulatory burdens 3. Environmental requirements 4. Workforce availability and cost 5. Cost of capital 6. Availability of credit 7. Cost of healthcare for the workforce 8. Automation / AI 9. Domestic and global market conditions and competition 10. Public sentiment The State's policies set many parameters that affect decisions about reshoring: the complexity of tax codes, the cost of healthcare, the cost of capital, environmental regulations, the relative ease or difficulty of doing business, the availability and skills of the workforce, and so on. The de facto Industrial Policy of the U.S. has incentivized hyper-globalization and hyper-financialization, to the detriment of the national interests and security. Wall Street, the political class and Corporate America benefited from these de facto policies while the bottom 90% lost ground. The New Cost of American Inequality: $80 Trillion Measuring the Income Gap from 1975 to 2023 (RAND) $1 Trillion of Wealth Was Created for the 19 Richest U.S. Households Last Year The richest of the rich in America control record slice of nation's wealth. (WSJ.com) These are not the result of "market forces," they're the result of State policies. The point is all of these State policies have to be changed if we as a nation are serious about reshoring critical supply chains. Tariffs are not enough. I have long advocated here for a radically simplified corporate tax structure that's a flat tax of 5% paid on whatever profits are reported pro forma quarterly. Corporate taxes could be reduced for companies that source all components and assembly of their products in North America. There many ways to incentivize reshoring that are more reliable and actionable than tariffs alone. I've advocated shifting the tax burden from workers and employers (Social Security and Medicare taxes paid by all workers and employers) to capital via transaction fees on all capital transactions and the elimination of tax giveaways / breaks for capital. Since the top 10% own / control 80% to 90% of all income-producing capital, a policy shift from labor / employers to capital would transfer the tax burden to the wealthiest Americans, those who have benefited so richly from the de facto policies of hyper-globalization and hyper-financialization. I've also noted here many times that the current healthcare system will bankrupt the nation all by itself. Radical reforms are required to improve the overall health of Americans and reduce skyrocketing costs, many of which qualify as profiteering, fraud or needless paper-shuffling. The tariff sledgehammer has a role, but it's a limited one. If we're serious about reshoring strategic supply chains, we have to tackle all the hard stuff that the wealthiest class wants to leave as-is because they've benefited so mightily from existing policies. None of these reforms will be easy. There are many competing interests and complex trade-offs that must be negotiated so whatever pain is required will be distributed primarily to those who can best afford it. These are the folks with the wealth and incentives to lobby the hardest for their exclusion from any pain, and therein lies the political challenge: do we leave the status quo intact because it favors the most powerful few, or do we put national security above private-sector spoils? New podcasts: Dismantling the Economic Divide (1 hour) (hosts Emerson and Amy) Retirement Lifestyle Advocates w/ Charles Hugh Smith (host Dennis Tubergen) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Mark S.C. ($70), for your wondrously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership.   Thank you, Jeff T. ($70), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Tempos L. ($70), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership.   Thank you, Ohio Chris ($7/month), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.

4 weeks ago 15 votes
It Was 20 Years Ago Today I Started this Blog: What Surprises Me

I've managed to maintain a sense of humor and curiosity--or at least the comforting delusion that I've maintained them. It was 20 years ago today--well, actually, yesterday--that I launched this blog into the swirling rapids of the Web. As we know, time flies when you're having fun. In these two decades, I've written 4,854 posts and 745 Musings Reports for my supporters / subscribers, and further amused myself by publishing a number of books and posting a number of original songs. I started with nothing and have reached a state of grace peculiar to the media realm. I am an Untouchable to the Brahmins of the mainstream media, but far from the Media Shambala of being an influencer with hundreds of thousands or millions of avid followers whose devotion generates pasha-scale incomes. Betwixt and between, I've managed to maintain a sense of humor and curiosity--or at least the comforting delusion that I've maintained them. I can relate to Emperor Norton in old San Francisco, who declared himself Emperor and was treated with amusement and respect, a heady combination. I am emperor of the Of Two Minds empire, which exists solely in the confines of my own mind and as an ephemeral dot in the Great Oort Cloud of innumerable websites www.oftwominds.com. Like Emperor Norton, I depend on the financial support of kind supporters--in my case, my subscribers. I've survived the rapids of the Web which began with a Wild West burst of freedom and a sense that anything was possible, to the present domination of a handful of corporate platforms, a peculiarly oppressive mix of Kafka and Orwell--(you have violated our community standards but we won't divulge what triggered your algorithmic trial; you are hereby sentenced to Digital Siberia)--and Huxley (we love your servitude to our platforms, and so do you). The scramble to cash in is the coin of the realm. This offers its own amusements. An attractive person on Only Fans shared the fact that her earnings exceeded $43 million. How can we not gaze in wonderment? I should be cynical enough by now to find nothing surprising, but alas, a number of things still surprise me. I'm still surprised how creating more money is all it takes to keep the status quo from falling apart, a travesty of a mockery of a sham that's been playing to full houses for 17 years. I'm surprised that so great is our fear of losing whatever we have that we accept that the vast majority of this newly created "wealth" flows upward into the hands of the wealthiest few-- $1 Trillion of Wealth Was Created for the 19 Richest U.S. Households Last Year (WSJ.com, paywalled) (Yahoo News)--while 41.7 million American workers (31.3% of the workforce) earn under $12 an hour. The average rent for an apartment in the U.S. is $1,750 per month, which exceeds the take-home pay of full-time workers earning $12 an hour. As the article notes, and I documented in The Winners and Losers in 21st Century America, the top 1% of households own 31% of the net worth and the bottom 50% of American households own 2.5%. Fear is a powerful motivator. So too is hyper-normalization: we all know the system is broken and rotten to the core, but we don't see any alternative or way to change the system, so we play-act that everything's fine as a means of not going crazy. But of course we go crazy anyway. It's just the craziness manifests in ways that are acceptable. I shouldn't be surprised, but I am still surprised at the appeal of simplistic solutions. This is of course a primary feature of hyper-normalization: now that life is so interconnected and complex, there's no way to make sense of it, much less reform it, so we cling to something that does make sense. So if we just returned to sound money, the system would automatically right itself and we'd all be good to go. This sounds reasonable except for one hitch: the system is terminally rotten and corrupt, and so sound money would serve the corrupt, just like unsound money. I'm surprised I have an audience. This is a continuing source of surprise, for I have no credentials, no institutional seal of approval, and I'm indistinguishable from the old guy in front of you in the checkout line who you hope doesn't fumble around with coins to pay the exact amount. A very dear reader in San Francisco posted on social media that he thought he saw me fumbling around in confusion with my phone by a BART subway ticket machine. He kindly went over to help. It wasn't me, though it might have been. I happened to see the post and thanked the reader for his kindness--an increasingly rare treasure--and sent him a copy of my latest book as a gesture. Though my empire-of-the-mind appears disheveled, I do manage to keep up with the technology needed not to tip over in the rapids. In the cut-throat digital media realm, a sufficient grasp of evolving technologies is necessary for our survival. There's always room on the train to Digital Siberia, and always a way to stumble off the cliff into the bottomless canyon of de-monetization. We hear your screams briefly, and then the endless scroll distracts us from your fate. I have found great truth in former Intel CEO Andy Grove's dictum that only the paranoid survive. I don't trust either the state or Corporate America, the married couple who we see feuding in the parking lot over who forgot to buy broccoli but who are absolutely committed to their power marriage. I confess to being surprised by the durability of the duct tape keeping the machinery from flying apart. The fragilities and risks are hidden, but that's not the same as saying they don't exist. It's good to be industrious. It's good to be a producer and not just a consumer. It's good to learn some useful skill, or improve a useful skill. It's good to be curious, especially as things get curiouser and curiouser. I thank you for your kind readership and indulgence. I would be honored if you consider me like the old gent in line fumbling with loose change, mumbling to himself, who suddenly turns to you and says something that you think about afterward. Onward to the next 20-- My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, John K. ($100), for your outrageouslu generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership.   Thank you, Robert B. ($32), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership. Thank you, Joseph R. ($32), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership.   Thank you, Lucky Lizard ($32), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.

a month ago 28 votes
The Terminal Rot in Corporate America

Corporate America took advantage of the Covid shortages and fiscal largesse to profiteer on a scale criminals could only dream of. One of humanity's most pernicious traits is the ease with which we habituate to conditions over time that we would have rejected out of hand if the transition had been sudden. This is the essence of what I term Anti-Progress: over time, what was solid melts away into thin air, what worked no longer works, but we no longer notice because wretchedness and decay have been normalized, i.e. accepted as "the way things are," or hyper-normalized: everyone knows things no longer work but we're unable to change the system, so we play-act that everything's fine as a means of not going crazy. Which brings us to the terminal rot in Corporate America, a rot so deep and pervasive that few recall that Corporate America once had some purpose other than increasing profits next quarter to boost "shareholder value." The moral rot in Corporate America goes unnoticed in a society in terminal moral decay. Why should corporate fraud, profiteering, deception and extortion attract our attention when self-service is the norm, lobbyists write regulations, legislators tell us we'll find out what's in the bill after they pass it into law, tax fraud by the wealthy is accepted practice, and so on in an endless stream of avarice and corruption? But the rot isn't just moral; it's also the rot of reducing the entirety of enterprise to one goal: increase profits by any means available. Correspondent Bruce H. neatly summarized the decay of "the business class": "This is the culture that created the McNamara fallacy (also known as the quantitative fallacy), named for Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, that one can make policy decisions based solely on quantitative observations (or metrics) and ignoring all others. The Atlantic ran an interesting piece a few years ago, which documented the destruction of the middle class and the disparate wealth imbalance between the top 10% and the rest of the population. It began in the late 1960s with the rise of business schools and how those graduates were hoovered up by consultants who then sent these newly-minted efficiency experts out into the desperate businesses suffering from the stagflation of the '70s to help them become profitable again. Their preferred solution was to fire 'extraneous' staff. The net result of this was the elimination of the lower middle class. The foremen who managed a team of six to ten workers, the lower managers who managed four or five foremen, and so on. Skip to the 80s. The corporations had trimmed employment costs, managers now directly managed between 50 and 100 people and the formerly well-paid foremen and mangers were now unemployed and no longer part of the economy, which started to deflate. At the same time, Jack 'chainsaw' Welch was gutting General Electric and creating 15% ROI for shareholders, year after year. For his tenure, he was hailed as the ne-plus-ultra of business geniuses, regularly on the cover of business magazines and anyone who didn't follow suit was ousted from every other business. Thus the change in orientation from running a business to profit-at-all-costs. The second problem was the hiring of the chainsaw consultants by the very companies they had just cut into, directly into the upper-management level. Thus began a noxious process of business-school graduates going straight into consultancy jobs, then from there into the upper-echelons of businesses without every having worked for those businesses. Thus the people running the businesses were hired for their ability to make money, not their understanding of the purpose and goals of the businesses. My own experience was the quarterly reports stopped talking about what awesome service we were providing while making a profit to gloating over what great profits we were making, and thus it has remained largely so to this day. As a wise businessman said, if you want to make money, you can go do anything, but the business will be a hollow shell. You need to have a sense of purpose, some service to the community to exist to truly have a good business with happy employees. The result of this change can be seen in the people at the top: in the 1960s, 90% of corporate CEOs had started on the shop floor and worked their way up to the top. By the late 1990s, only 10% had done so. The ones in the middle of the 20th Century saw their roles as providing a service or product, by the end of the century, the ones at the top saw their job as making profits and the business was just a means. We don't need a new way of living, we need an old way of living." Thank you, Bruce. Well said. Here we see corporate profits, which leaped 50% (+$1.2 trillion) virtually overnight as Corporate America took advantage of the Covid shortages and fiscal largesse to profiteer on a scale criminals could only dream of. But this stripmining wasn't illegal; it was all legal, of course, as corruption isn't just legal in America, it's celebrated. Did corporate products and services improve in quantity and quality? No, they shrank in quantity and quality declined--but the price went up, and unprecedented profits resulted. "Shareholder value" increased smartly. And who are these "shareholders" who are benefiting so mightily from corporate profiteering? I know you're shocked, shocked, that the top 1% own half of all the shares, and the top 10% own around 90%. No wonder CEOs and corporate "innovators" are busy building private bunkers to protect themselves from the banquet of consequences they've laid out. To say this out loud is unacceptable, for those running the show are, well, shareholders. My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, John K. ($100), for your outrageouslu generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership.   Thank you, Robert B. ($32), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership. Thank you, Joseph R. ($32), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership.   Thank you, Lucky Lizard ($32), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.

a month ago 93 votes
25 Years of Higher Interest Rates Ahead?

Interest rates are linked to inflation, but they're also linked to risk. As a result of recency bias, where we assume the recent past is a permanent state of affairs, many believe near-zero interest rates are "normal." They aren't. As the chart of 10-year US Treasury yields--a proxy for interest rates throughout the economy--illustrates, rates in the 3% or lower were an anomaly that only occurred in the relatively brief period of 2011-2022. For the five decades between 1960 and 2007, interest rates of 4% and higher were the norm. These included the glorious decades of stable growth and rising stocks / housing valuations--the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s and up to 2007, just before the financial crisis of 2008-09. For 33 of those years, interest rates of 5.75% or higher were the norm, from 1967 to 2000. No one said that the economy would collapse if interest rates didn't drop to 3%, for it was understood that super-low interest rates would ignite inflation and incentivize destructive speculative excesses. For the 25 years between 1970 and 1994, rates between 5.75% and 8% were normal. The 10-year Treasury yield is now around 4% to 4.2%--far lower than what was considered normal for 25 years. It's long been noted that interest rate cycles tend to run for decades, not years. Interest rates rose for around 25 years, and then declined for 40 years from 1981 to 2020--a period that was longer than average, thanks to the dominance of central bank monetary policies, or perhaps more accurately, the growing dependence of economies on extraordinarily low interest rates for their "growth." If history is any guide, interest rates will rise back to the historic range between 5.75% and 8% and linger there for the better part of two decades. Alternatively, rates break above that range and skyrocket into the realm of debt / inflationary crises. The return of Treasury yields to the historically "normal" range of 4% and higher has doubled the Federal interest payments on Federal debt. It was easily predictable that super-low interest rates would encourage an orgy of borrowing and spending of all that "nearly free money," which is precisely what happened. The interest paid by households has also soared for the same reason: not just because interest rates rose, but because the borrowed money (debt) being serviced exploded higher due to low interest rates. Higher debt / interest payments squeeze out other spending. Debt payments come first, or the entity defaults on its debts and enters bankruptcy--a bankruptcy that tends to bankrupt the lenders who will be lucky to collect pennies on every dollar they lent out. Households are going to have a hard time servicing debt and spending more as rates rise, for wage earners' share of the economy has been in a freefall for 50 years. Less income + higher debt service payments = lower discretionary income to spend + inability to borrow more money to spend = recession. Interest rates are linked to inflation, but they're also linked to risk. The cost of money isn't simply tied to inflation expectations--it's also tied to speculative excesses blowing credit-asset bubbles which implode, destroying the phantom wealth generated by the bubble. The lenders that survive the implosion are wary of lending money to all but the most conservative, risk-averse, creditworthy borrowers backed by ample collateral. That excludes the majority of households and enterprises. New podcast: Adaptability: The Key to Future Success, with the Contrarian Capitalist (53:40 min) New podcast: Trade, Tariffs and Globalization with Richard Bonugli (35:51 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Keith S. ($100), for your outrageously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership.   Thank you, Lar ($7/month), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Julius L. ($50), for your magnificently generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership.   Thank you, Daniel L. ($50), for your superbly generous contribution to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.

a month ago 10 votes
The Potential Winners and Losers in Reshoring Supply Chains

Until values, priorities and incentives change, "the lifestyle you ordered is currently out of stock and on back order, with no estimate of a future delivery date." The ultimate winners and losers in reshoring supply chains to North America have yet to be determined, and may change depending on the time frame. In the short-term, there are ample reasons to reckon consumers will be the losers as shortages and price-gouging ("it's the tariffs" will be the excuse given for profiteering) take their toll. Matt Stoller has posted two comprehensive essays on these topics: How Monopolies Could Exploit the Tariff Shock How to Prepare for the Coming Supply Chain Shock In the longer term, however, consumers could be winners as reshored supply chains will be more stable and predictable than globalized supply chains. Stability has a value that isn't recognized until it's absent--as do durability and quality. One set of potential winners might be large retail corporations that choose to switch from "horizontal" global supply chains to vertically integrated domestic production, in which raw materials are turned into finished products in one production facility. Ford Motor Company was an early adopter of this model, constructing the immense Ford River Rouge complex from 1917 to 1928 that turned iron ore into finished automobiles in one integrated production process. "With its own docks in the dredged Rouge River, 100 miles (160 km) of interior railroad track, its own electricity plant, and integrated steel mill, the titanic Rouge was able to turn raw materials into running vehicles within this single complex, a prime example of vertical-integration production." While it can be argued that vertical integration is less efficient in terms of cost, once again the value of complete control, stability and predictability is not included in spreadsheets, though it becomes readily apparent when long single-source global supply chains break down or are crippled by bottlenecks, artificial scarcities triggered by geopolitical blackmail or a host of other causal factors. Establishing domestic sources for materials, tooling, robotics, etc. would remove many of the uncertainties that are inherent in a global supply chain breaking down along geopolitical, regional and national lines. Were unions to regain wide public support, industrial unions might be winners should the public support unionizing new production facilities. The sustained erosion of labor's share of the nation's income over the past five decades might finally gain recognition as a core driver of wealth-income inequality and unionized labor might be understood as a necessary rebalancing of an economy that has favored finance and capital over labor for nearly three generations. Were the public to begin valuing local production and jobs over "lower prices" and equally low quality, local supply chains might become winners. Note that I've mentioned the public's values and priorities as key drivers changing economic incentives and policies. In the current zeitgeist, the public is assumed to be "rational economic robots" who respond solely to price. Once the full banquet of consequences of rampant hyper-financialization and hyper-globalization has played out, the public might begin to grasp the importance of valuing something other than low prices (and the low quality that comes with low prices). As a general rule, the public leads the private sector and government, not the other way round. For example, the public might start valuing national security, which is ultimately dependent on stable, predictable domestic production supply chains owned and controlled by domestic companies. Until values, priorities and incentives change, the lifestyle you ordered is currently out of stock and on back order, with no estimate of a future delivery date. New podcast: Adaptability: The Key to Future Success, with the Contrarian Capitalist (53:40 min) New podcast: Trade, Tariffs and Globalization with Richard Bonugli (35:51 min) My recent books: Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases originated via links to Amazon products on this site. The Mythology of Progress, Anti-Progress and a Mythology for the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, Hardcover $24 (215 pages, 2024) Read the Introduction and first chapter for free (PDF) Self-Reliance in the 21st Century print $18, (Kindle $8.95, audiobook $13.08 (96 pages, 2022) Read the first chapter for free (PDF) The Asian Heroine Who Seduced Me (Novel) print $10.95, Kindle $6.95 Read an excerpt for free (PDF) When You Can't Go On: Burnout, Reckoning and Renewal $18 print, $8.95 Kindle ebook; audiobook Read the first section for free (PDF) Global Crisis, National Renewal: A (Revolutionary) Grand Strategy for the United States (Kindle $9.95, print $24, audiobook) Read Chapter One for free (PDF). A Hacker's Teleology: Sharing the Wealth of Our Shrinking Planet (Kindle $8.95, print $20, audiobook $17.46) Read the first section for free (PDF). Will You Be Richer or Poorer?: Profit, Power, and AI in a Traumatized World (Kindle $5, print $10, audiobook) Read the first section for free (PDF). The Adventures of the Consulting Philosopher: The Disappearance of Drake (Novel) $4.95 Kindle, $10.95 print); read the first chapters for free (PDF) Money and Work Unchained $6.95 Kindle, $15 print) Read the first section for free Become a $3/month patron of my work via patreon.com. Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, David E. ($7/month), for your splendidly generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your steadfast support and readership.   Thank you, Smurf77 ($7/month), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. 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Sovereign Ratings, Default Risk and Markets: The Moody's Downgrade Aftermath!

I was on a family vacation in August 2011 when I received an email from a journalist asking me what I thought about the S&P ratings downgrade for the US. Since I stay blissfully unaware of most news stories and things related to markets when I am on the beach, I had to look up what he was talking about, and it was S&P's decision to downgrade the United States, which had always enjoyed AAA, the highest sovereign rating  that can be granted to a country, to AA+, reflecting their concerns about both the fiscal challenges faced by the country, with mounting trade and budget deficits, as well as the willingness of its political institutions to flirt with the possibility of default. For more than a decade, S&P remained the outlier, but in 2023, Fitch joined it by also downgrading the US from AAA to AA+, citing the same reasons. That left Moody's, the third of the major sovereign ratings agencies, as the only one that persisted with a Aaa (Moody's equivalent of AAA) for the US, but that changed on May 16, 2025, when it too downgraded the US from Aaa (negative) to Aa1 (stable). Since the ratings downgrade happened after close of trading on a Friday, there was concern that markets would wake up on the following  Monday (May 19) to a wave of selling, and while that did not materialize, the rest of the week was a down week for both stocks and US treasury bonds, especially at the longest end of the maturity spectrum. Rather than rehash the arguments about US debt and political dysfunction, which I am sure that you had read elsewhere, I thought I would take this moment to talk about sovereign default risk, how ratings agencies rate sovereigns, the biases and errors in sovereign ratings and their predictive power, and use that discussion as a launching pad to talk about how the US ratings downgrade will affect equity and bond valuations not just in the US, but around the world. Sovereign Defaults: A History     Through time, governments have often been dependent on debt to finance themselves, some in the local currency and much in a foreign currency. A large proportion of sovereign defaults have occurred with foreign currency sovereign borrowing, as the borrowing country finds itself short of the foreign currency to meet its obligations. However, those defaults, and especially so in recent years, have been supplemented by countries that have chosen to default on local currency borrowings. I use the word "chosen" because most countries  have the capacity to avoid default on local currency debt, being able to print money in that currency to pay off debt, but chose not to do so, because they feared the consequences of the inflation that would follow more than the consequences of default. BoC/BoE Sovereign Default Database While the number of sovereign defaults has ebbed and flowed over time, there are two points worth making about the data. The first is that, over time, sovereign defaults, especially on foreign currency debt, have shifted from bank debt to sovereign bonds, with three times as many sovereign defaults on bonds than on bank loans in 2023. The second is that local currency defaults are persistent over time, and while less frequent than foreign currency defaults, remain a significant proportion of total defaults.     The consequences of sovereign default have been both economic and political. Besides the obvious implication that lenders to that government lose some or a great deal of what is owed to them, there are other consequences. Researchers who have examined the aftermath of default have come to the following conclusions about the short-term and long-term effects of defaulting on debt: Default has a negative impact on the economy, with real GDP dropping between 0.5% and 2%, but the bulk of the decline is in the first year after the default and seems to be short lived. Default does affect a country’s long-term sovereign rating and borrowing costs. One study of credit ratings in 1995 found that the ratings for countries that had defaulted at least once since 1970 were one to two notches lower than otherwise similar countries that had not defaulted. In the same vein, defaulting countries have borrowing costs that are about 0.5 to 1% higher than countries that have not defaulted. Here again, though, the effects of default dissipate over time. Sovereign default can cause trade retaliation. One study indicates a drop of 8% in bilateral trade after default, with the effects lasting for up to 15 years, and another one that uses industry level data finds that export-oriented industries are particularly hurt by sovereign default. Sovereign default can make banking systems more fragile. A study of 149 countries between 1975 and 2000 indicates that the probability of a banking crisis is 14% in countries that have defaulted, an eleven percentage-point increase over non-defaulting countries. Sovereign default also increases the likelihood of political change. While none of the studies focus on defaults per se, there are several that have examined the after-effects of sharp devaluations, which often accompany default. A study of devaluations between 1971 and 2003 finds a 45% increase in the probability of change in the top leader (prime minister or president) in the country and a 64% increase in the probability of change in the finance executive (minister of finance or head of central bank). In summary, default is costly, and countries do not (and should not) take the possibility of default lightly. Default is particularly expensive when it leads to banking crises and currency devaluations; the former has a longstanding impact on the capacity of firms to fund their investments whereas the latter create political and institutional instability that lasts for long periods. Sovereign Ratings: Measures and Process     Since few of us have the resources or the time to dedicate to understanding small and unfamiliar countries, it is no surprise that third parties have stepped into the breach, with their assessments of sovereign default risk. Of these third-party assessors, bond ratings agencies came in with the biggest advantages: They have been assessing default risk in corporations for a hundred years or more and presumably can transfer some of their skills to assessing sovereign risk. Bond investors who are familiar with the ratings measures, from investing in corporate bonds, find it easy to extend their use to assessing sovereign bonds. Thus, a AAA rated country is viewed as close to riskless whereas a C rated country is very risky.  Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch’s have been rating corporate bond offerings since the early part of the twentieth century. Moody’s has been rating corporate bonds since 1919 and started rating government bonds in the 1920s, when that market was an active one. By 1929, Moody’s provided ratings for almost fifty central governments. With the Great Depression and the Second World War, investments in government bonds abated and with it, the interest in government bond ratings. In the 1970s, the business picked up again slowly. As recently as the early 1980s, only about thirteen  governments, mostly in developed and mature markets, had ratings, with most of them commanding the highest level (Aaa). The decade from 1985 to 1994 added 34 countries to the sovereign rating list, with many of them having speculative or lower ratings and by 2024, Moody's alone was rating 143 countries, covering 75% of all emerging market countries and almost every developed market.  table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } Not only have ratings agencies become more active in adding countries to their ratings list, but they have also expanded their coverage of countries with more default risk/ lower ratings.  In fact, the number of Aaa rated countries was the same in 1985, when there were thirteen rated countries, as in 2025, when there were 143 rated countries. In the last two decades, at least five sovereigns, including Japan, the UK, France and now the US, have lost their Aaa ratings.  In addition to more countries being rated, the ratings themselves have become richer. Moody’s and S&P now provide two ratings for each country – a local currency rating (for domestic currency debt/ bonds) and a foreign currency rating (for government borrowings in a foreign currency).      In assessing these sovereign ratings, ratings agencies draw on a multitude of data, quantitative and qualitative. Moody's describes its sovereign ratings process in the picture below: The process is broad enough to cover both political and economic factors, while preserving wiggle room for the ratings agencies to make subjective judgments on default that can lead to different ratings for two countries with similar economic and political profiles. The heat map below provides the sovereign ratings, from Moody's, for all rated countries the start of 2025: Moody's sovereign ratings Note that the greyed out countries are unrated, with Russia being the most significant example; the ratings agencies withdrew their rating for Russia in 2022 and not reinstated it yet. There were only a handful of Aaa rated countries, concentrated in North America (United States and Canada), Northern Europe (Germany, Scandinavia), Australia & New Zealand and Singapore (the only Aaa-rated Asian country. In 2025, there have been a eight sovereign ratings changes, four upgrades and four downgrades, with the US downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 as the highest profile change With the US downgrade, the list of Aaa-rated countries has become shorter, and as Canada and Germany struggle with budget imbalances, the likelihood is that more companies will drop off the list. Sovereign Ratings:  Performance and Alternatives     If sovereign ratings are designed to measure exposure to default risk, how well do they do? The answer depends on how you evaluate their performance. The ratings agencies provide tables that list defaults by rating that back the proposition that sovereign ratings and default are highly correlated. A Moody's update of default rates by sovereign ratings classes, between 1983 and 2024, yielded the following: Default rates rise as sovereign ratings decline, with a default rate of 24% for  speculative grade sovereign debt (Baa2 and below) as opposed to 1.8% for investment grade (Aaa to Baa1) sovereign debt.     That said, there are aspects of sovereign ratings that should give pause to anyone considering using them as their proxy for sovereign default, they do come with caveats and limitations: Ratings are upward biased: Ratings agencies have been accused by some of being far too optimistic in their assessments of both corporate and sovereign ratings. While the conflict of interest of having issuers pay for the rating is offered as the rationale for the upward bias in corporate ratings, that argument does not hold up when it comes to sovereign ratings, since not only are the revenues small, relative to reputation loss, but a proportion of sovereigns are rated for no fees. There is herd behavior: When one ratings agency lowers or raises a sovereign rating, other ratings agencies seem to follow suit. This herd behavior reduces the value of having three separate ratings agencies, since their assessments of sovereign risk are no longer independent. Too little, too late: To price sovereign bonds (or set interest rates on sovereign loans), investors (banks) need assessments of default risk that are updated and timely. It has long been argued that ratings agencies take too long to change ratings, and that these changes happen too late to protect investors from a crisis. Vicious Cycle: Once a market is in crisis, there is the perception that ratings agencies sometimes overreact and lower ratings too much, thus creating a feedback effect that makes the crisis worse. This is especially true for small countries that are mostly dependent on foreign capital for their funds. Regional biases: There are many, especially in Asia and Latin America, that believe that the ratings agencies are too lax in assessing default risk for North America and Europe,  overrating countries in  those regions, while being too stringent in their assessments of default in Asia, Latin America and Africa, underrating countries in those regions.  In sum, the evidence suggests that while sovereign ratings are good measures of country default risk, changes in ratings often lag changes on the ground, making them less useful to lenders and investors.     If the key limitation of sovereign ratings is that they are not timely assessors of country default risk, that failure is alleviated by the development of the sovereign CDS market, a market where investors can buy insurance against country default risk by paying an (annualized) price. While that market still has issues in terms of counterparty risk and legal questions about what comprises default, it has expanded in the last two decades, and at the start of 2025, there were about 80 countries with sovereign CDS available on them. The heat map below provides a picture of sovereign (10-year)  CDS spreads on January 1, 2025: As you can see, even at the start of 2025, the market was drawing a distinction between  the safest Aaa-rated countries (Scandinavia, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand), all with sovereign CDS spreads of 0.20% or below, and more risky Aaa-rated countries (US, Germany, Canada). During 2025, the market shocks from tariff and trade wars have had an effect, with sovereign CDS spreads increasing, especially in April. The US, which started 2025 with a sovereign CDS spread of 0.41%, saw a widening of the spread to 0.62% in late April, before dropping back a bit in May, with the Moody's downgrade having almost no effect on the US sovereign CDS spread. The US Downgrade: Lead-in and Aftermath     With that background on sovereign default and ratings, let's take a look at the story of the moment, which is the Moody's downgrade of the US from Aaa to Aa1. In the weeks since, we have not seen a major upheaval in markets, and the question that we face as investors and analysts is whether anything of consequence has changed as a result of the downgrade. The Lead-in     As I noted at the start of this post, Moody's was the last of the big three sovereign ratings agencies giving the United States a Aaa rating, with S&P (in 2011) and Fitch (in 2023) having already downgraded the US. In fact, the two reasons that both ratings agencies provided at the time of their downgrades were rising government debt and politically dysfunction were also the reasons that Moody's noted in their downgrade. On the debt front, one of the measures that ratings agencies use to assess a country's financial standing is its debt to GDP ratio, and it is undeniable that this statistic has trended upwards for the United States: The ramping up of US debt since 2008 is reflected in total federal debt rising from 80% of GDP in 2008  to more than 120% in 2024. While some of the surge in debt can be attributed to the exigencies caused by crises (the 2008 banking crisis and the 2020 COVID bailouts), the troubling truth is that the debt has outlasted the crises and blaming the crises for the debt levels today is disingenuous.      The problem with the debt-to-GDP measure of sovereign fiscal standing is that it is an imperfect indicator, as can be seen in this list of countries that scored highest and lowest on this measure in 2023: IMF Many of the countries with the highest debt to GDP ratios would be classified as safe and some have Aaa ratings, whereas very few of the countries on the lowest debt to GDP list would qualify as safe. Even if it it the high debt to GDP ratio for the US that triggered the Moody's downgrade, the question is why Moody's chose to do this in 2025 rather than a year or two or even a decade ago, and the answer to that lies, I think, in the political component. A sovereign default has both economic and political roots, since a government that is intent on preserving its credit standing will often find ways to pay its debt and avoid default. For decades now, the US has enjoyed special status with markets and institutions (like ratings agencies), built as much on its institutional stability (legal and regulatory) as it was on its economic power. The Moody's downgrade seems to me a signal that those days might be winding down, and that the United States, like the rest of the world, will face more accountability for lack of discipline in its fiscal and monetary policy. Market Reaction     The ratings downgrade was after close of trading on Friday, May 16, and there was concern about how it would play out in markets, when they opened on Monday, May 19. US equities were actually up on that day, though they lost ground in the subsequent days: If equity markets were relatively unscathed in the two weeks after the downgrade, what about bond markets, and specially, the US treasury market? After all, an issuer downgrade for any bond is bad news, and rates should be expected to rise to reflect higher default risk: While rates did go up in the the first few days after the downgrade, the effect was muddled by the passage of a reconciliation bill in the house that potentially could add to the deficit in future years. In fact, by the May 29, 2025, almost all of the downgrade effect had faded, with rates close to where they were at the start of the year.     You may be surprised that markets did not react more negatively to the ratings downgrade, but I am not for three reasons: Lack of surprise effect: While the timing of the Moody's downgrade was unexpected, the downgrade itself was not surprising for two reasons. First, since S&P and Fitch had already downgraded the US, Moody's was the outlier in giving the US a Aaa rating, and it was only a matter of time before it joined the other two agencies. Second, in addition to reporting a sovereign rating, Moody's discloses when it puts a country on a watch for a ratings changes, with positive (negative) indicating the possibility of a ratings upgrade (downgrade). Moody's changed its outlook for the US to negative in November 2023, and while the rating remained unchanged until May 2025, it was clearly considering the downgrade in the months leading up to it. Magnitude of private capital: The immediate effect of a sovereign ratings downgrade is on government borrowing, and while the US does borrow vast amounts, private capital (in the form of equity and debt) is a far bigger source of financing and funding for the economy.  Ratings change: The ratings downgrade ws more of a blow to pride than to finances, since the default risk (and default spread) difference between an Aaa rating and a Aa1 rating is small. Austria and Finland, for instance, had Aa1 ratings in May 2025, and their ten-year bonds, denominated in Euros, traded at a spread of about 0.15- 0.20% over the German ten-year Euro bond; Germany had a Aaa rating. Consequences for valuation and investment analysis    While the immediate economic and financial consequences of a downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 will be small, there are implications for analysts around the world. In particular, analysts will have to take steps when working with US dollars that they may already be taking already when working with most other currencies in estimating basic inputs into financial analysis.     Let's start with the riskfree rate, a basic building block for estimating costs of equity and capital, which are inputs into intrinsic valuation. In principle, the riskfree rate is what you will earn on a guaranteed investment in a currency, and any risk premiums, either for investing in equity (equity risk premium) or in fixed income securities (default spreads), are added to the riskfree rate. It is standard practice in many textbooks and classrooms to use the government bond rate as the risk free rate, but that is built on the presumption that governments cannot default (at least on bonds issued in the local currency). Using a Aaa (AAA) rating as a (lazy) proxy for default-free, that is the rationale we used to justify government bond rates as riskfree rates at the start of 2025, in Australian, Singapore and Canadian dollars, the Euro (Germany). Swiss francs and Danish krone. As we noted in the first section, the assumption that governments don't default  is violated in practice, since some countries choose to default on local currency bonds, rather than face up to inflation. If that is the case, the government bond rate is no longer truly a riskfree rate, and getting to a riskfree rate will require netting out a default spread from the government bond rate: Risk free rate = Government Bond rate − Default spread for the government  The default spread can be estimated either from the sovereign bond rating (with a look up table) or a sovereign CDS spread, and we used that process to get riskfree in rates in a  host of currencies, where local currency government bonds had default risk, at the start of 2025: Thus, to get a riskfree rate in Indian rupees, Brazilian reals or Turkish lira, we start with government bonds in these currencies and net out the default spreads for the countries in question. We do this to ensure that we don't double count country risk by first using the government bond (which includes default risk) as a riskfree rate and then using a larger equity risk premium to allow for the same country risk.       Now that the US is no longer Aaa rated, we have to follow a similar process to get a riskfree rate in US dollars: US 10-year treasury bond rate on May 30, 2025  = 4.41% Default spread based on Aa1 rating on May 30, 2025  = 0.40% Riskfree rate in US dollars on May 30, 2025 = US 10-year treasury rate - Aa1 default spread = 4.41% - 0.40% = 4.01% This adjustment yields a riskfree rate of 4.01% in US dollars, and it is also built on the presumption that the default spread manifested after the Moody's downgrade on May 16, when the more realistic reading is that US treasury markets have been carrying a  default spread embedded in them for years, and that we are not making it explicit.     The ratings downgrade for the US will also affect the equity risk premium computations that I use to estimate the cost of equity for companies. As some of you who track my equity risk premiums by country know, I estimate an equity risk premium for the S&P 500, and at least until the start of this year, I used that as a premium for all mature markets (with a AAA (Aaa) rating as the indicator of maturity). Thus, countries like Canada, Germany, Australia and Singapore were all assigned the same premium as that attributed to the S&P 500. For countries with ratings below Aaa, I added an "extra country risk premium"  computed based upon the default spreads that went with the country ratings: With the ratings downgrade, I will have to modify this process in three ways. The first is that when computing the equity risk premium for the S& P 500, I will have to net out the adjusted riskfree rate in US dollars rather than the US treasury rate, yielding a higher equity risk premium for the US. Second, for Aaa rated countries, to the extent that they are safer than the US will have to be assigned an equity risk premium lower than the US, with the adjustment downward reflecting the Aa1 rating for the US. The third is that for all other countries, the country risk premium will be computed based upon the the their default spreads and the equity risk premium estimated for Aaa rated countries (rather than the US equity risk premium): How will the cost of equity for a firm with all of its revenues in the United States be affected as a consequence? Let's take three companies, one below-average risk, one average-risk and one above average risk, and compute their costs of equity on May 30, 2025, with and without the downgrade favored in: As you can see, the expected return on the S&P 500 as of May 30, 2025, reflecting the index level then and the expected cash flows, is 8.64%. Incorporating the effects of the downgrade changes the composition of that expected return, resulting in a lower riskfree rate (4.01% instead of 4.41%) and a higher equity risk premium (4.63% instead of 4.23%). Thus, while the expected return for the average stock remains at 8.64%, the expected return increases slightly for riskier stocks and decreases slightly for safer stocks, but the effects are so small that investors will hardly notice. If there is a lesson for analysts here, it is that the downgrade's effects on the discount rates (costs of equity and capital) are minimal, and that staying with the conventional approach (of using the ten-year US treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate and using that rate to compute the equity risk premium) will continue to work. Conclusion     The Moody's ratings downgrade of the US made the news, and much was made of it during the weekend that followed. 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