It was an interesting year for interest rates in the United States, one in which we got more evidence on the limited power that central banks have to alter the trajectory of market interest rates. We started 2024 with the consensus wisdom that rates would drop during the year, driven by expectations of rate cuts from the Fed. The Fed did keep its end of the bargain, cutting the Fed Funds rate three times during the course of 2024, but the bond markets did not stick with the script, and market interest rates rose during the course of the year. In this post, I will begin by looking at movements in treasury rates, across maturities, during 2024, and the resultant shifts in yield curves. I will follow up by examining changes in corporate bond rates, across the default ratings spectrum, trying to get a measure of how the price of risk in bond markets changed during 2024. Treasury Rates in 2024     Coming into 2024, interest rates had taken a rollicking ride, surging in 2022, as inflation made its come back, before settling in 2023. At the start of 2024, the ten-year treasury rate stood at 3.88%, unchanged from its level a year prior, but the 3-month treasury bill rate had climbed to 5.40%. In the chart below, we look the movement of treasury rates (across maturities) during the course of 2024: Download daily data During the course of 2024, long term treasury rates climbed in the first half of the year, and dropped in the third quarter, before reversing course and increasing in the fourth quarter, with the 10-year rate ending  the year at 4.58%, 0.70% higher than at the start of the year. The 3-month treasury barely budged in the first half of 2024, declined in the third quarter, and diverged from long term rates and continued its decline in the last quarter, to end the year at 4.37%, down 1.03% from the start of the year. I have highlighted the three Fed rate actions, all cuts to the Fed Funds rate, on the chart, and while I will come back to this later in this post, market rates rose after all three.     The divergence between short term and long term rates played out in the yield curve, which started 2024, with a downward slope, but flattened out over the course of the year: Download daily data Writing last year about the yield curve, which was then downward sloping, I argued that notwithstanding prognostications of doom,  it was a poor prediction of recessions. This year, my caution would be to not read too much, at least in terms of forecasted economic growth, into the flattening or even mildly upward sloping yield curve.      The increase in long term  treasury rates during the course of the year was bad news for treasury bond investors, and the increase in the 10-year treasury bond rate during the course of the year translated into an annual return of -1.64% for 2024: With the inflation of 2.75% in 2024 factored in, the real return on the 10-year bond is -4.27%. With the 20-year and 30-year bonds, the losses become larger, as time value works its magic. It is one reason that I argue that any discussion of riskfree rates that does not mention a time horizon is devoid of a key element. Even assuming away default risk, a ten-year treasury is not risk free, with a one time horizon, and a 3-month treasury is definitely not riskfree, if you have a 10-year time horizon. The Drivers of Interest Rates     Over the last two decades, for better or worse, we (as investors, consumers and even economics) seem to have come to accept as a truism the notion that central banks set interest rates. Thus, the answer to questions about past interest rate movements (the low rates between 2008 and 2021, the spike in rates in 2022) as well as to where interest rates will go in the future has been to look to central banking smoke signals and guidance. In this section, I will argue that the interest rates ultimately are driven by macro fundamentals, and that the power of central banks comes from preferential access to data about these fundamentals, their capacity to alter those fundamentals (in good and bad ways) and the credibility that they have to stay the course. Inflation, Real Growth and Intrinsic Riskfree Rates     It is worth noting at the outset that interest rates on borrowing pre-date central banks (the Fed came into being in 1913, whereas bond markets trace their history back to the 1600s), and that lenders and borrowers set rates based upon fundamentals that relate specifically to what the former need to earn to cover  expected inflation and default risk, while earning a rate of return for deferring current consumption (a real interest rate). If you set the abstractions aside, and remove default risk from consideration (because the borrower is default-free), a riskfree interest rate in nominal terms can be viewed, in its simplified form, as the sum of the expected inflation rate and an expected real interest rate: Nominal interest rate = Expected inflation + Expected real interest rate This equation, titled the Fisher Equation, is often part of an introductory economics class, and is often quickly forgotten as you get introduced to more complex (and seemingly powerful) monetary economics lessons. That is a pity, since so much of misunderstanding of interest rates stems from forgetting this equation. I use this equation to derive what I call an "intrinsic riskfree rate", with two simplifying assumptions: Expected inflation: I use the current year's inflation rate as a proxy for expected inflation. Clearly, this is simplistic, since you can have unusual events during a year that cause inflation in that year to spike. (In an alternate calculation, I use an average inflation rate over the last ten years as the expected inflation rate.) Expected real interest rate: In the last two decades, we have been able to observe a real interest rate, at least in the US, using inflation-protected treasury bonds(TIPs). Since I am trying to estimate an intrinsic real interest rate, I use the growth rate in real GDP as my proxy for the real interest rate. That is clearly a stretch when it comes to year-to-year movements, but in the long term, the two should converge. With those simplistic proxies in place, my intrinsic riskfree rate can be computed as follows: Intrinsic riskfree rate = Inflation rate in period t + Real GDP growth rate in period t In the chart below, I compare my estimates of the intrinsic riskfree rate to the observed ten-year treasury bond rate each year: Download data While the match is not perfect, the link between the two is undeniable, and the intrinsic riskfree rate calculations yield results that help counter the stories about how it is the Fed that kept rates low between 2008 and 2021, and caused them to spike in 2022.  While it is true that the Fed became more active (in terms of bond buying, in their quantitative easing phase) in the bond market in the last decade, the low treasury rates between 2009 and 2020 were driven primarily by low inflation and anemic real growth. Put simply, with or without the Fed, rates would have been low during the period. In 2022, the rise in rates was almost entirely driven by rising inflation expectations, with the Fed racing to keep up with that market sentiment. In fact, since 2022, it is the market that seems to be leading the Fed, not the other way around. Entering 2025, the gap between intrinsic and treasury rates has narrowed, as the market consensus settles in on expectations that inflation will stay about the Fed-targeted 2% and that economic activity will be boosted by tax cuts and a business-friendly administration. The Fed Effect     I am not suggesting that central banks don't matter or that they do not affect interest rates, because that would be an overreach, but the questions that I would like to address are about how much of an impact central banks have, and through what channels. To the first question of how much of an impact, I started by looking at the one rate that the Fed does control, the Fed Funds rate, an overnight interbank borrowing rate that nevertheless has resonance for the rest of the market. To get a measure of how the Fed Funds rate has evolved over time, take a look at what the rate has done between 1954 and 2024: As you can see the Fed Funds was effectively zero for a long stretch in the last decade, but has clearly spiked in the last two years. If the Fed sets rates story is right, changes in these rates should cause market set rates to change in the aftermath, and in the graph below, I look at monthly movements in the Fed Funds rate and two treasury rates - the 3-month T.Bill rate and the 10-year T.Bond rate. The good news for the "Fed did it" story is that the Fed rates and treasury rates clearly move in unison, but all this chart shows is that Fed Funds rate move with treasury rates contemporaneously, with no clear indication of whether market rates lead to Fed Funds rates changing, or vice versa. To look at whether the Fed funds leads the rest of the market, I look at the correlation between changes in the Fed Funds rate and changes in treasury rates in subsequent months.  As you can see from this table, the effects of changes in the Fed Funds rate on short term treasuries is positive, and statistically significant, but the relationship between the Fed Funds rate and 10-year treasuries is only 0.08, and barely meets the statistical significance test. In summary, if there is a case to be made that Fed actions move rates, it is far stronger at the short end of the treasury spectrum than at the long end, and with substantial noise in predictive effects. Just as an add on, I reversed the process and looked to see if the change in treasury rates is a good predictor of change in the Fed Funds rate and obtained correlations that look very similar.  In short, the evidence is just as strong for the hypothesis that market interest rates lead the Fed to act, as they are for "Fed as a leader" hypothesis.     As to why the Fed's actions affect market interest rates, it has less to do with the level of the Fed Funds rate and more to do with the market reads into the Fed's actions. Ultimately, a central bank's effect on market interest rates stems from three factors: Information: It is true that the Fed collects substantial data on consumer and business behavior that it can use to make more reasoned judgments about where inflation and real growth are headed than the rest of the market, and its actions often are viewed as a signal of that information. Thus, an unexpected increase in the Fed Funds rate may signal that the Fed sees higher inflation  than the market perceives at the moment, and a big drop in the Fed Funds rates may indicate that it sees the economy weakening at a time when the market may be unaware. Central bank credibility: Implicit in the signaling argument is the belief that the central bank is serious in its intent to keep inflation in check, and that is has enough independence from the government to be able to act accordingly. A central bank that is viewed as a tool for the government will very quickly lose its capacity to affect interest rates, since the market will tend to assume other motives (than fighting inflation) for rate cuts or raises. In fact, a central bank that lowers rates, in the face of high and rising inflation, because it is the politically expedient thing to do may find that market interest move up in response, rather than down. Interest rate level: If the primary mechanism for central banks signaling intent remains the Fed Funds rate (or its equivalent in other markets), with rate rises indicating that the economy/inflation is overheating and rate cuts suggesting the opposite, there is an inherent problem that central banks face, if interest rates fall towards zero. The signaling becomes one sided i.e., rates can be raised to put the economy in check, but there is not much room to cut rates. This, of course, is exactly what the Japanese central bank has faced for three decades, and European and US banks in the last decade, reducing their signal power. The most credible central banks in history, from the Bundesbank in Deutsche Mark Germany to the Fed, after the Volcker years, earned their credibility by sticking with their choices, even in the face of economic disruption and political pushback. That said, in both these instances, central bankers chose to stay in the background, and let their actions speak for themselves. Since 2008, central bankers, perhaps egged on by investors and governments, have become more visible, more active and, in my view, more arrogant, and that, in a strange way, has made their actions less consequential. Put simply, the more the investing world revolves around FOMC meetings and the smoke signals that come out of them, the less these meetings matter to markets.  Forecasting Rates     I am wary of Fed watchers and interest rate savants, who claim to be able to sense movements in rates before they happen for two reasons. First, their track records are so awful that they make soothsayers and tarot card readers look good. Second, unlike a company's earnings or risk, where you can claim to have a differential advantage in estimating it, it is unclear to me what any expert, no matter how credentialed, can bring to the table that gives them an edge in forecasting interest rates. In my valuations, this skepticism about interest rate forecasting plays out in an assumption where I do not try to second guess the bond market and replace current treasury bond rates with fanciful estimates of normalized or forecasted rates. If you look back at my S&P 500 valuation in my second data post for this year, you will see that I left the treasury bond rate at 4.58% (its level at the start of 2025) unchanged through time.      If you feel the urge to play interest forecaster, I do think that it is good practice to make sure that your views on the direction of interest rates are are consistent with the views of inflation and growth you are building into your cash flows. If you buy into my thesis that it is changes in expected inflation and real growth that causes rates to change in interest rates, any forecast of interest rates has be backed up by a story about changing inflation or real growth. Thus, if you forecast that the ten-year treasury rate will rise to 6% over the next two years, you have to follow through and explain whether rising inflation or higher real growth (or both) that is triggering this surge, since that diagnosis have different consequences for value. Higher interest rates driven by higher inflation will generally have neutral effects on value, for companies with pricing power, and negative effects for companies that do not. Higher interest rates precipitated by stronger real growth is more likely to be neutral for the market, since higher earnings (from the stronger economy) can offset the higher rates. The most empty forecasts of interest rates are the ones where the forecaster's only reason for predicting higher or lower rates is central banks, and I am afraid that the discussion of interest rates has become vacuous over the last two decades, as the delusion that the Fed sets interest rates becomes deeply engrained. Corporate Bond Rates in 2024     The corporate bond market gets less attention that the treasury bond market, partly because rates in that market are very much driven by what happens in the treasury market. Last year, as the treasury bond rate rose from 3.88% to 4.58%, it should come as no surprise that corporate bond rates rose as well, but there is information in the rate differences between the two markets. That rate difference, of course, is the default spread, and it will vary across different corporate bonds, based almost entirely on perceived default risk.  Default spread = Corporate bond rate - Treasury bond rate on bond of equal maturity Using bond ratings as measures of default risk, and computing the default spreads for each ratings class, I captured the journey of default spreads during 2024: During 2024, default spreads decreased over the course of the year, for all ratings classes, albeit more for the lowest rated bonds. Using a different lexicon, the price of risk in the bond market decreased during the course of the year, and if you relate that back to my second data update, where I computed a price of risk for equity markets (the equity risk premium), you can see the parallels. In fact, in the graph below, I compare the price of risk in both the equity and bond markets across time: In most years, equity risk premiums and bond default spreads move in the same direction, as was the case in 2024. That should come as little surprise, since the forces that cause investors to spike up premiums (fear) or bid them down (hope and greed) cut across both markets. In fact, lookin a the ratio of the equity risk premium to the default spread, you could argue that equity risk premiums are too high, relative to bond default spreads, and that you should see a narrowing of the difference, either with a lower equity premium (higher stock prices) or a higher default spread on bonds.     The decline of fear in corporate bond markets can be captured on another dimension as well, which is in bond issuances, especially by companies that face high default risk. In the graph below, I look at corporate bond issuance in 2024, broken down into investment grade (BBB or higher) and high yield (less than BBB).  Note that high yield issuances which spiked in 2020 and 2021, peak greed years, almost disappeared in 2022. They made a mild comeback in 2023 and that recovery continued in 2024.      Finally, as companies adjust to a new interest rate environment, where short terms rates are no longer close to zero and long term rates have moved up significantly from the lows they hit before 2022, there are two other big shifts that have occurred, and the table below captures those shifts: First, you will note that after a long stretch, where the percent of bond that were callable declined, they have spiked again. That should come as no surprise, since the option, for a company, to call back a bond is most valuable, when you believe that there is a healthy chance that rates will go down in the future. When corporates could borrow money at 3%, long term, they clearly attached a lower likelihood to a rate decline, but as rates have risen, companies are rediscovering the value of having a  calculability option. Second, the percent of bond issuances with floating rate debt has also surged over the last three years, again indicating that when rates are low, companies were inclined to lock them in for the long term with fixed rate issuances, but at the higher rates of today,  they are more willing to let those rates float, hoping for lower rates in future years. In Conclusion     I spend much of my time in the equity market, valuing companies and assessing risk. I must confess that I find the bond market far less interesting, since so much of the focus is on the downside, and while I am glad that there are other people who care about that, I prefer to operate in a space where there there is more uncertainty. That said, though, I dabble in bond markets because what happens in those markets, unlike what happens in Las Vegas, does not stay in bond markets. The spillover effects into equity markets can be substantial, and in some cases, devastating. In my posts looking back at 2022, I noted how a record bad year for bond markets, as both treasury and corporate bonds took a beating for the ages, very quickly found its ways into stocks, dragging the market down. On that count, bond markets had a quiet year in 2024, but they may be overdue for a clean up. YouTube Data Updates for 2025 Data Update 1 for 2025: The Draw (and Danger) of Data! Data Update 2 for 2025: The Party continued for US Equities Data Update 3 for 2025: The times they are a'changin'! Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! Data Links Intrinsic risk free rates and Nominal interest rates Bond Default Spreads and Equity Risk Premiums

In my last post, I noted that the US has extended its dominance of global equities in recent years, increasing its share of market capitalization from 42% in at the start of 2023 to 44% at the start of 2024 to 49% at the start of 2025. That rise was driven by a surge in US equity values during 2024, with the S&P 500 delivering returns of close to 25%, all the more impressive, given that the index delivered returns in excess of 26% in 2023. In this post, I will zero in on US equities, in the aggregate, first by looking at month-by-month returns during 2024, and then putting their performance in the last two years in a historical context. I will follow up by trying to judge where markets stand at the start of 2025, starting with PE ratios, moving on to earnings yields and ending with a valuation of the index. US Equities in 2024     Entering 2024, there was trepidation about where stocks would go during the year especially coming off a a strong bounce back year in 2023, and there remained real concerns about inflation and a recession. The hopeful note was that the Fed would lower the Fed Funds rate during the course of the year, triggering (at least in the minds of Fed watchers) lower interest rates across the yield curve, Clearly, the market not only fought through those concerns, but did so in the face of rising treasury rates, especially at the long end of the spectrum.      While the market was up strongly for the year, it is worth remembering that the there were months during 2024, where the market looked shaky, as can be seen in the month to month returns on the S&P 500 during the course of 2025: The market’s weakest month was April 2025, and it ended the year or a weak note, down 2.50% in December. Overall, though the index was up 23.31% for the year, and adding the dividend yield of 1.57% (based upon the expected dividends for 2025 and the index at the start of the years) yields a total return 24.88% for the year: As is almost always the case, the bulk of the returns from equity came from price appreciation, with the caveat that the dividend yield portion has shrunk over the last few decades in the United States. Historical Context     To assess stock returns in 2024, it makes sense to step back and put the year's performance into historical perspective. In the graph below, I look at returns (inclusive of dividends) on the S&P 500 every year from 1928 to 2024.  Download historical data Across the 97 years that I have estimated annual returns, stocks have had their ups and downs, delivering positive returns in 71 years and negative returns in the other 26 years. The worst year in history was 1931, with stocks returning -43.84%, and the best year was 1954, when the annual return was 52.56%. If you wanted to pick a benchmark to compare annual returns to pass judgment on whether a year was above or below average, you can can go with either the annual return (11.79%) or the median return (14.82%) across the entire time period.     Looking at the 24.88% return in 2024 in terms of rankings, it ranks as the 27th best year across the last 97 years, indicating that while it was a good year, there have been far better years for US stocks. Combining 2023 and 2024 returns yield a cumulative a two-year return for the S&P 500 of 57.42%, making it one the ten best two-year periods in US market history.      The riskless alternative to investing in US stocks during this period, in US dollar terms, are US treasuries, and in 2024, that contest was won, hands down, by US equities: Equity risk premium earned in 2024, over 3-month  treasury bills  = Return on stocks - Return on 3-month treasuries (averaged over 2024)  = 24.88% -4.97% = 19.91% Equity risk premium earned in 2024, over 10-year treasuries = Return on stocks - Return on 10-year treasury = 24.88% -(-1.64%) = 26.52% The ten-year treasury return was negative, because treasury bond rates rose during 2024.      Equity risk premiums are volatile over time, and averaging them makes sense, and in the table below, I look at the premium that stocks have earned over treasury bills and treasury bonds, going back to 1928, using both simple averages (of the returns each year) and geometric averages (reflecting the compounding effect): Download historical data These returns are nominal returns, and inflation would have taken a bite out of returns each year. Computing the returns in real terms, by taking out inflation in each year from that year's returns, and recomputing the equity risk premiums: Download historical data Note that the equity risk premiums move only slightly, because inflation finds its way into both stock and treasury returns.     Many valuation practitioners use these historical averages, when forecasting equity risk premiums in the future, but it is a practice that deserves scrutiny, partly because it is backward looking (with the expectation that things will revert back to the way they used to be), but mostly because the estimates that you get for the equity risk premium have significant error terms (see standard errors listed below the estimates in the table). Thus, if are using the average equity risk premium for the last 97 years of 5.44% (7.00%), i.e., the arithmetic or geometric averages, it behooves you to also inform users that the standard error of 2.12% will create a range of about 4% on either side of the estimate. Pricing Questions     Coming into 2025, investors are right to be trepidatious, for many reasons, but mostly because we are coming off two extraordinarily good years for the market, and a correction seems due. That is, however, a poor basis for market timing, because stock market history is full of examples to the contrary. There are other metrics, though, which are signaling danger, and in this section, I will wrestle with what they tell us about stocks in 2025. PE ratios and Earnings Yields     Even as we get new and updated pricing metrics, it is undeniable that the most widely used metric of stock market cheapness or expensiveness is the price earnings ratio, albeit with variations in the earning number that goes into the denominator on timing (current, last 12 months or trailing or next 12 month of forward), share count (diluted, primary) and measurement (ordinary or extraordinary). In the graph below, I focus on trailing earnings for all companies in the S&P 500 and compute the aggregated PE ratio for the index to be 24.16 at the start of 2025, higher than the average value for that ratio in every decade going back to 1970.  Download data Just for completeness, I compute two other variants of the PE, the first using average earnings over the previous ten years (normalized) and the second using the average earnings over the last ten years, adjusted for inflation (CAPE or Shiller PE). At the start of 2025, the normalized PE and CAPE also come in at well above historical norms.     If I have terrified you with the PE story, and you have undoubtedly heard variants of this story from market experts and strategists for much of the last decade, I would hasten to add that investing on that basis would have kept you out of stocks for much of the last ten years, with catastrophic consequences for your portfolio. For some of this period, at least, you could justify the higher PE ratios with much lower treasury rates than historic norms,, and one way to see this is to compare the earnings yield, i.e., the inverse of the PE ratio, with the treasury yields, which is what I have done in the graph below: Download data If you compare the earnings yield to the ten-year treasury rate, you can see that for much of the last decade, going into 2022, the earnings yield, while low, was in excess of the ten-year rate. As rates have risen, though, the difference has narrowed, and at the start of 2025, the earnings yield exceeded the treasury rate. If you see market strategists or journalists talking about negative equity risk premiums, this (the difference between the earnings yield and the treasury rate) is the number that they are referencing.     At this stage, you may be ready to bail on stocks, but I have one final card to play. In a post in 2023, I talked about equity risk premiums, and the implicit assumptions that you make when you use the earning to price ratio as your measure of the expected return on stocks. It works only if you make one of two assumptions: That there will be no growth in earnings in the future, i.e., you will earn last year's earnings every year in perpetuity, making stocks into glorified bonds.  In a more subtle variants, there will be growth, but that growth will come from investments that earn returns equal to the cost of equity. The problem with both assumptions is that they are in conflict with the data. First, the earnings on the S&P 500 companies has increased 6.58% a year between 2000 and 2024, making the no-growth assumption a non-started. Second, the return on equity for the S&P 500 companies was 20.61% in 2023, and has averaged 16.38% since 2000, both numbers well in excess of the cost of equity.     So, what is the alternative? Starting 30 years ago, I began estimating a more complete expected return on stocks, using the S&P 500, with the level of the index standing in for the price you pay for stocks, and expected earnings and cash flows, based upon consensus estimates of earnings and cash payout ratios. I solve for an internal rate of return for stocks, based upon these expected cash flows: The expected return from this approach will be different from the earnings to price ratio because it incorporate expected growth and changes in cash flow patterns. The critique that this approach requires assumptions about the future (growth and cash flows) is disingenuous, since the earnings yield approach makes assumptions about both as well (no growth or no excess returns), and I will wager that the full ERP approach is on more defensible ground than the earning yield approach.      Using this approach at the start of 2025 to the S&P 500, I back out an implied expect return of 8.91% for the index, and an implied equity risk premium of 4.33% (obtained by netting out the ten-year bond rate on Jan 1, 2025, of 4.58%): Implied ERP calculation in 2025 You are welcome to take issue with the number that I use there, lowering the growth rates for the future or changing the assumptions about payout. That is a healthy debate, and one that provides far more room for nuance that looking at the earnings yield.         How does an implied equity risk premium play out in market level arguments? Every argument about markets (from them being in a bubble to basement level bargains) can be restated in terms of the equity risk premium. If you believe that the equity risk premium today (4.33%) is too low, you are, in effect, stating that stocks are overvalued, and if you view it as too high, you are taking the opposite position. If you are not in the market timing business, you take the current premium as a fair premium, and move on. To provide perspective on the ERP at the start of 2025, take a look at this graph, that lists implied ERP at the start of each year going back to 1960: Historical implied ERP There is something here for almost point of view. If you are sanguine about stock market levels, you could point to the current premium (4.33%) being close to the historical average across the entire time period (4.25%). If you believe that stocks are over priced, you may base that on the current premium being lower than the average since 2005. I will not hide behind the "one hand, other hand" dance that so many strategists do. I think that we face significant volatility (inflation, tariffs, war) in the year to come, and I would be more comfortable with a higher ERP. At the same time, I don't fall into the bubble crowd, since the ERP is not 2%, as it was at the end of 1999.  Valuation Questions     Pulling together the disparate strands that are part of this post, I valued the index at the start of 2025, using the earnings expectations from analysts as the forecasted earnings for 2025 and 2026, before lowering growth rates to match the risk free rate in 2029. As the growth rates changes, I also adjust the payout ratios, given the return on equity for the S&P 500 companies: Download spreadsheet With the assumption that the equity risk premium will climb back to 4.5%, higher than the average for the 1960-2024 period, but lower than the post-2008 average, the value that I get for the index is about 5260, about 12% lower than the index at the start of the year. Note that this is a value for the index today, and if you wanted to adopt the market strategist approach of forecasting where the index will be a year from now, you would have to grow the value at the price appreciation portion (about 7.5%) of the expected return (which is 9.08%).     As I see it, there are two major dangers that lurk, with the first being higher inflation (translating into higher treasury rates) and the second being a market crisis that will push up the equity risk premium, since with those pieces in play, the index becomes much more significantly over valued. From an earnings perspective, the risk is that future earnings will come in well below expectations, either because the economy slows or because of trade frictions. Rather than wring my hands about these uncertainties, I fell back on a tool that I use when confronted with change, which is a simulation: Crystal Ball used for simulations While the base case conclusion that the market is overvalued stays intact, not surprising since my distributions for the input variables were centered on my base assumptions, there is a far richer set of output. Put simply, at today's price levels, there is an 80% chance that stocks are overvalued and only a 20% chance that they are undervalued. That said, though, if you are bullish, I can see a pathway to getting to a higher value, with higher earnings, lower interest rates and a continued decline in the equity risk premium. Conversely, you are bearish, I understand your point of view, especially if you see earnings shocks (from a recession or a tariff war), rising inflation or a market crisis coming up.     I don't dish out market advice, and as one whose market timing skills are questionable, you should not take my (or anyone else's) assessments at face value, especially heading into a year, where change will be the byword. It is possible that lower taxes and less regulation may cause to come in higher than expected, and that global investment fund flows will keep interest rates and equity risk premiums low. My advice is that you download the valuation spreadsheet, change the inputs to reflect your views of the world, and value the index yourself. Good investing requires taking ownership of the decisions and judgments you make, and I am glad to provide tools that help you in that process. YouTube Video Data Updates for 2025 Data Update 1 for 2025: The Draw (and Danger) of Data! Data Update 2 for 2025: The Party continued for US Equities Datasets Historical returns on stocks: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/histretSP.xlsx Historical implied ERP: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/histimpl.xls  PE ratios for the S&P 500: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/PEforS&P500updatedJan25.xlsx Spreadsheets  Implied ERP at the start of 2025: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/implprem/ERPJan25.xlsx Valuation of the index on Jan 1, 2025: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/blog/S&PValueJan25.xlsx

For the last four decades, I have spent the first week of each year collecting and analyzing data on publicly traded companies and sharing what I find with anyone who is interested. It is the end of the first full week in 2025, and my data update for the year is now up and running, and I plan to use this post to describe my data sample, my processes for computing industry statistics and the links to finding them. I will also repeat the caveats about how and where the data is best used, that I have always added to my updates. The Draw (and Dangers) of Data    It is the age of data, as both companies and investors claim to have tamed it to serve their commercial  interests. While I believe that data can lead to better decisions, I am wary about the claims made about what it can and cannot do in terms of optimizing decision making. I find its greatest use is on two dimensions: Fact-checking assertions: It has always been true that human beings assert beliefs as facts, but with social media at play, they can now make these assertion to much bigger audiences. In corporate finance and investing, which are areas that I work in, I find myself doing double takes as I listen to politicians, market experts and economists making statements about company and market behavior that are fairy tales, and data is often my weapon for discerning the truth.  Noise in predictions: One reason that the expert class is increasingly mistrusted is because of the unwillingness on the part of many in this class to admit to uncertainty in their forecasts for the future. Hiding behind their academic or professional credentials, they ask people to trust them to be right, but that trust has eroded. If these predictions are based upon data, as they claim they are, it is almost always the case that they come with error (noise) and that admitting to this is not a sign of weakness. In some cases, it is true that the size of that errors may be so large that those listening to the predictions may not act on them, but that is a healthy response. As I listen to many fall under the spell of data, with AI and analytics add to its allure, I am uncomfortable with the notion that data has all of the answers, and there two reasons why: Data can be biased: There is a widely held belief that data is objective, at least if it takes numerical form. In the hands of analysts who are biased or have agendas, data can be molded to fit pre-conceptions. I would like to claim to have no bias, but that would be a lie, since biases are often engrained and unconscious, but I have tried, as best as I can, to be transparent about the sample that I use, the data that I work with and how I compute my statistics. In some cases, that may frustrate you, if you are looking for precision, since I offer a range of values, based upon different sampling and estimation choices.  Taking a look at my tax rate calculations, by industry, for US companies, int the start of 2025, I report the following tax rates across companies. Effective tax rates, by Industry (US) Note, that the tax rates for US companies range from 6.75% to 26.43%, depending on how I compute the rate, and which companies I use to arrive at that estimate. If you start with the pre-conception that US companies do not pay their fair share in taxes, you will latch on to the 6.75% as your estimated tax rate, whereas if you are in the camp that believes that US companies pay their fair share (or more), you may find 26.43% to be your preferred estimate.  Past versus Future: Investors and companies often base their future predictions on the past, and while that is entirely understandable, there is a reason why every investment pitch comes with the disclaimer that “past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance”. I have written about how mean reversion is at the heart of many active investing strategies, and why assuming that history will repeat can be a mistake. Thus, as you peruse my historical data on implied equity risk premiums or PE ratios for the S&P 500 over time, you may be tempted to compute averages and use them in your investment strategies, or use my industry averages for debt ratios and pricing multiples as the target for every company in the peer group, but you should hold back.  The Sample     It is undeniable that data is more accessible and available than ever before, and I am a beneficiary. I draw my data from many raw data sources, some of which are freely available to everyone, some of which I pay for and some of which I have access to, because I work at a business school in a university. For company data, my primary source is S&P Capital IQ, augmented with data from a Bloomberg terminal. For the segment of my data that is macroeconomic, my primary source is FRED, the data set maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank, but I supplement with other data that I found online, including NAIC for bond spread data and Political Risk Services (PRS) for country risk scores.      My dataset includes all publicly traded companies listed at the start of the year, with a market price available, and there were 47810 firms in my sample, roughly in line with the sample sizes in the last few years. Not surprisingly, the company listings are across the world, and I look at the breakdown of companies, by number and market cap, by geography: As you can see, the market cap of US companies at the start of 2025 accounted for roughly 49% of the market cap of global stocks, up from 44% at the start of 2024 and 42% at the start of 2023. In the table below, we compare the changes in regional market capitalizations (in $ millions) over time. Breaking down companies by (S&P) sector,  again both in numbers and market cap, here is what I get: While industrials the most listed stocks, technology accounts for 21% of the market cap of all listed stocks, globally, making it the most valuable sector. Thee are wide differences across regions, though, in sector breakdown: Much of the increase in market capitalization for US equities has come from a surging technology sector, and it is striking that Europe has the lowest percent of value from tech companies of any of the broad subgroups in this table.     I also create a more detailed breakdown of companies into 94 industry groups, loosely structured to stay with industry groupings that I originally created in the 1990s from Value Line data, to allow for comparisons across time. I know that this classification is at odds with the industry classifications based upon SIC or NAICS codes, but it works well enough for me, at least in the context of corporate finance and valuation. For some of you, my industry classifications may be overly broad, but if you want to use a more focused peer group, I am afraid that you will have to look elsewhere. The industry averages that I report are also provided using the regional breakdown above. If you want to check out which industry group a company falls into, please click on this file (a very large one that may take a while to download) for that detail. The Variables     The variables that I report industry-average statistics for reflect my interests, and they range the spectrum, with risk, profitability, leverage, and dividend metrics thrown into the mix. Since I teach corporate finance and valuation, I find it useful to break down the data that I report based upon these groupings. The corporate finance grouping includes variables that help in the decisions that businesses need to make on investing, financing and dividends (with links to the US data for 2025, but you can find more extensive data links here.) table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; }  Corporate Governance & Descriptive      1. Insider, CEO & Institutional holdings      2. Aggregate operating numbers      3. Employee Count & Compensation           Investing Principle Financing Principle Dividend Principle  Hurdle RateProject ReturnsFinancing MixFinancing TypeCash ReturnDividends/Buybacks 1. Beta & Risk1. Return on Equity1. Debt Ratios & Fundamentals1. Debt Details1. Dividends and Potential Dividends (FCFE)1.Buybacks 2. Equity Risk Premiums2. Return on (invested) capital2. Ratings & Spreads2. Lease Effect2. Dividend yield & payout  3. Default Spreads3. Margins & ROC3. Tax rates    4. Costs of equity & capital4. Excess Returns on investments 4. Financing Flows     5. Market alpha    (If you have trouble with the links, please try a different browser) Many of these corporate finance variables, such as the costs of equity and capital, debt ratios and accounting returns also find their way into my valuations, but I add a few variables that are more attuned to my valuation and pricing data needs as well. table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } Valuation Pricing  Growth & ReinvestmentProfitabilityRiskMultiples 1. Historical Growth in Revenues & Earnings1. Profit Margins1. Costs of equity & capital1. Earnings Multiples 2. Fundamental Growth in Equity Earnings2. Return on Equity2. Standard Deviation in Equity/Firm Value2. Book Value Multiples 3. Fundamenal Growth in Operating Earnings  3. Revenue Multiples 4. Long term Reinvestment (Cap Ex & Acquisitons)  4. EBIT & EBITDA multiples 5. R&D    6. Working capital needs   (If you have trouble with the links, please try a different browser) Not that while much of this data comes from drawn from financial statements, some of it is market-price driven (betas, standard deviations, trading data), some relates to asset classes (returns on stocks, bonds, real estate) and some are macroeconomic (interest rates, inflation and risk premiums).  While some of the variables are obvious, others are subject to interpretation, and I have a glossary, where you can see the definitions that I use for the accounting variables. In addition, within each of the datasets (in excel format), you will find a page defining the variables used in that dataset.  The Timing     These datasets were all compiled in the last four days and reflect data available at the start of 2025. For market numbers, like market capitalization, interest rates and risk premiums, these numbers are current, reflecting the market's judgments at the start of 2025. For company financial numbers, I am reliant on accounting information, which gets updated on a quarterly basis. As a consequence, the accounting numbers reflect the most recent financial filings (usually September 30, 2024), and I use the trailing 12-month numbers through the most recent filing for flow numbers (income statement and cash flow statements) and the most recent balance sheet for stock numbers (balance sheet values).      While this practice may seem inconsistent, it reflects what investors in the market have available to them, to price stocks. After all, no investor has access to calendar year 2024 accounting numbers at the start of 2025, and it seems entirely consistent to me that the trailing PE ratio at the start of 2025 be computed using the price at the start of 2025 divided by the trailing income in the twelve months ending in September 2024. In the same vein, the expected growth rates for the future and earnings in forward years are obtained by looking at the most updated forecasts from analysts at the start of 2025.      Since I update the data only once a year, it will age as we go through 2025, but that aging will be most felt, if you use my pricing multiples (PE, PBV, EV to EBITDA etc.) and not so much with the accounting ratios (accounting returns). To the extent that interest rates and risk premiums will change over the course of the year, the data sets that use them (cost of capital, excess returns) allow for updating these macro numbers. In short, if the ten-year treasury rate climbs to 5% and equity risk premiums surge, you can update those numbers in the cost of capital worksheet, and get updated values. The Estimation Process     While I compute the data variables by company, I am restricted from sharing company-specific data by my raw data providers, and most of the data I report is at the industry level. That said, I have wrestled with how best to estimate and report industry statistics, since almost every statistical measure comes with caveats. For a metric like price earnings ratios, computing an average across companies will result in sampling bias (from eliminating money-losing firms) and be skewed by outliers in one direction (mostly positive, since PE ratios cannot be negative). Since this problem occurs across almost all the variables, I use an aggregated variant, where with PE, for instance, I aggregate the market capitalization of all the companies (including money losing firms) in an industry grouping and divide by the aggregated net income of all the companies, including money losers.      Since I include all publicly traded firms in my sample, with disclosure requirements varying across firms, there are variables where the data is missing or not disclosed. Rather than throw out these firms from the sample entirely, I keep them in my universe, but report values for only the firms with non-missing data. One example is my data on employees, a dataset that I added two years ago, where I report statistics like revenue per employee and compensation statistics. Since this is not a data item that is disclosed voluntarily only by some firms, the statistics are less reliable than on where there is universal disclosure.      On an upbeat note,  and speaking from the perspective of someone who has been doing this for a few decades, accounting standards around the world are less divergent now than in the past, and the data, even in small emerging markets, has far fewer missing items than ten or twenty years ago.  Accessing and Using the Data     The data that you will find on my website is for public consumption, and I have tried to organize it to make it easily accessible on my webpage. Note that the current year’s data can be accessed here: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar//New_Home_Page/datacurrent.html If you click on a link and it does not work, please try a different browser, since Google Chrome, in particular, has had issues with downloads on my server.     If you are interested in getting the data from previous years, it should be available in the archived data section on my webpage: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar//New_Home_Page/dataarchived.html This data goes back more than twenty years, for some data items and for US data, but only a decade or so for global markets.        Finally, the data is intended primarily for practitioners in corporate finance and valuation, and I hope that I can save you some time and help in valuations in real time. It is worth emphasizing that every data item on my page comes from public sources, and that anyone with time and access to data can recreate it.  For a complete reading of data usage, try this link: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar//New_Home_Page/datahistory.html If you are in a regulatory or legal dispute, and you are using my data to make your case, you are welcome to do so, but please do not drag me into the fight.  As for acknowledgements when using the data, I will repeat that I said in prior years. If you use my data and want to acknowledge that usage, I thank you, but if you skip that acknowledgement, I will not view it as a slight, and I certainly am not going to threaten you with legal consequences.     As a final note, please recognize that this I don't have a team working for me, and while that gives me the benefit of controlling the process, unlike the pope, I am extremely fallible. If you find mistakes or missing links, please let me know and I will fix them as quickly as I can. Finally, I have no desire to become a data service, and I cannot meet requests for customized data, no matter how reasonable they may be. I am sorry! YouTube Video Links Current data (start of 2025) Archived data (from prior years) Companies/Industries Data definitions Data Updates for 2025 Data Update 1 for 2025: The Draw (and Danger) of Data! Data Update 2 for 2025: The Resilience of US Equities

I am a teacher at heart, and every year, for more than two decades, I have invited people to join me in the classes that I teach at the Stern School of Business at New York University. Since I teach these classes only in the spring, and the first sessions for each of the classes will be in late January, I think this is a good time to provide some details on the classes, including content and structure. If you have read these missives in prior years, much of what I say will sound familiar, but I have added new content and updated the links you will need to partake in the classes.  My Motives for Teaching     I was in the second year of my MBA program at UCLA, when I had my moment on grace. I had taken a job as a teaching assistant, almost entirely because I needed the money to pay my tuition and living expenses, and in a subject (accounting) that did not excite me in the least. A few minutes after I walked in to teach my first class, I realized that I had found what I wanted to do for the rest of my life, and I have been a teacher ever since. Since that was 1983, this will be my forty first year teaching, and I have never once regretted my choice.     I know that teaching is not a profession held in high esteem anymore, for good and bad reasons, and I will not try to defend it here. It is possible that some of the critics are right, and I teach because I cannot do, but I like to think that there is more to my career choice than ineptitude. My motivations for teaching are manifold, and let me list some of them: I like the stage: I believe that every teacher, to some extent, has a little bit of a repressed actor in him or her, and I do enjoy being in front of an audience, with the added benefit that I get to review the audience, with the grades that I given them, rather than the other way around. I like to make a difference: I do not expect my students to agree with all or even much of what I have to say, but I would like to think that I sometimes change the way they think about finance, and perhaps even affect their choice of professions. I am lucky enough to hear from students who were in my classes decades ago, and to find out that my teaching made a difference in their lives.  I like not having a boss: I would be a terrible employee, since I am headstrong, opinionated and awfully lazy, especially when I must do things I don’t like to do. As a teacher, I am my own boss and find my foibles completely understandable and forgivable. I know that teaching may not be your cup of tea, but I do hope that you enjoy whatever you do, as much as I do teaching, and I would like to think that some of that joy comes through. My Teaching Process     I do a session on how to teach for business school faculty, and I emphasize that there is no one template for a good teacher. I am an old-fashioned lecturer, a control freak when it comes to what happens in my classroom. In forty years of teaching, I have never once had a guest lecturer in my classroom or turned my class over to a free-for-all discussion. Class narrative: This may be a quirk of mine, but I stay away from teaching classes that are collections of topics. In my view, having a unifying narrative not only makes a class more fun to teach, but also more memorable. As you look at my class list in the next section, you will note that each of the classes is built around a story line, with the sessions building up to what is hopefully a climax. Bulking up the reasoning muscle: When asked a question in class, even if I know the answer, I try to not only reason my way to an answer, but to also be open about doubts that I may have about that answer. In keeping with the old saying that it is better to teach someone to fish, than to give them fish, I believe it is my job to equip my students with the capacity to come up with answers to questions that they may face in the future. In my post on the threat that AI poses to us, I argued that one advantage we have over AI is the capacity to reason, but that the ease of looking up answers online, i.e., the Google search curse, is eating away at that capacity. Make it real: I know that, and especially so in business schools, students feel that what they are learning will not work in the real world. I like to think that my classes are firmly grounded in reality, with my examples being real companies in real time. I am aware of the risks that when you work with companies in real time, your mistakes will also play out in real time, but I am okay with being wrong.  Straight answers: When I was a student, I remember being frustrated by teachers, who so thoroughly hedged themselves, with the one hand and the other hand playing out, that they left me unclear about what they were saying. I would like to think that I do not hold back, and that I stay true to the motto that I would rather be transparently wrong than opaquely right. It has sometimes got me some blowback, when I expressed my views about value investing being rigid, ritualistic and righteous and the absolute emptiness of virtue concepts like ESG and sustainability, but so be it. I am aware of things that I need to work on. My ego sometimes still gets in the way of admitting when I am wrong, I often do not let students finish their questions before answering them, I am sometimes more abrupt (and less kind) than I should be, especially when I am trying to get through material and my jokes can be off color and corny (as my kids point out to me). I do keep working on my teaching, though, and if you are a teacher, no matter what level you teach at, I think of you as a kindred spirit.  My Class Content     In my first two years of teaching, from 1984 to 1986, I was a visiting professor at the University of California at Berkeley, and like many visiting faculty around the world, I was asked to plug in holes in the teaching schedule. I taught six different classes ranging from a corporate finance class to undergraduates to a central banking for executive MBAs, and while I spent almost all of my time struggling to stay ahead of my students, with the material, it set me on a pathway to being a generalist. Once I came to NYU in 1986, I continued to teach classes across the finance spectrum, from corporate finance to valuation to investing, and I am glad that I did so. I am a natural dabbler, and I enjoy looking at big financial questions and ideas from multiples perspectives.          There are two core classes that I have taught to the MBAs at Stern, almost every year since 1986. The first is corporate finance, a class about the first principles that should govern how to run a business, and thus a required class (in my biased view) for everyone in business.  If you are a business owner or operator, this class should give you the tools to use to make business choices that make the most financial sense. If you work in a business, whether it be in marketing, strategy or HR, this class is designed to provide perspective on how what you do fits into value creation at your business. If you are just interested in business, just as an observer, you may find this class useful in examining why companies do what they do, from acquisitions to buybacks, and when corporate actions violate common sense.     The second is valuation, a class about how to value or price almost anything, with a tool set for those who need to put numbers on assets.  Again, I teach this class to a broad audience, from appraisers/analysts whose jobs revolve around valuation/pricing to portfolio managers who are often users of analyst valuations to business owners, whose interests in valuation can range from curiosity (how much is my business worth?) to the transactional (how much of my business should I give up for a capital infusion?)      While my class schedule has been filled with these two courses, I developed a third course, investment philosophies, a class about how to approach investing, trying to explain why investors with very different market views and investment strategies can co-exist in a market, and why there is no one philosophy that dominates.  My endgame for this class is to provide as unbiased a perspective as I can for a range of philosophies from trading on price patterns to market timing, with stops along the way from value investing, growth investing and information trading. It is my hope that this class will allow you to find the investment philosophy that best fits you, given your financial profile and psychological makeup.     In 2024, I added a fourth course to the mix, one centered around my view that businesses age like human beings do, i.e., there is a corporate life cycle, and that how businesses operate and how investors value them, changes as they move from youth to demise. I have used the corporate life cycle perspective to structure my thinking on almost every class that I teach, and in this class, I isolate it to examine how businesses age and how they respond to to aging, sometimes in destructive ways.     In my corporate finance and valuation classes, the raw material comes from financial statements, and I realized early on that my students, despite having had a class or two on accounting, still struggled with reading and using financial statements, and I created a short accounting class, specifically designed with financial analysis and valuation in mind. The class is structured around the three financial statements that embody financial reporting - the income statement, balance sheet and statement of cash flows - and how the categorization (and miscategorization) of expenses into operating, financing and capital expenses plays out in these statements. As many of you who may have read my work know, I think that fair value accounting is not just an oxymoron but one that has done serious damage to the informativeness of financial statements, and I use this class to explain why.     Since so much of finance is built around the time value of money (present value) and an understanding of financial markets and securities, I also have a short online foundational class in finance: As you can see, this class covers the bare basics of macroeconomics, since that is all I am capable to teaching, but in my experience, it is all that I have needed in finance.     As our access to financial data and tools has improved, I added a short course on statistics, again with the narrow objective of providing the basic tools of data analysis.  A statistics purist would probably blanch at my treatment of regressions, correlations and descriptive statistics, but as a pragmatist, I am willing to compromise and move along.          As you browse through the content of these classes, and consider whether you want to take one, it is worth noting that they are taught in different formats. The corporate finance and valuation classes will be taught in the spring, starting in late January and ending in mid-May, with two eighty-minute sessions each week that will be recorded and accessible shorts after they are delivered in the classroom. There are online versions of both classes, and the investment philosophies class, that take the form of shorter recorded online classes (about twenty minutes), that you can either take for free on my webpage or for a certificate from NYU, for a fee.  The accounting, statistics and foundations classes are only in online format, on my webpage, and they are free. All in all, I know that some of you are budget-constrained, and others of you are time-constrained, and I hope that there is an offering that meeting your constraints.     If you are interested, the table below lists the gateways to each of the classes listed above. Note that the links for the spring 2025 classes will lead you to webcast pages, where there are no sessions listed yet, since the classes start in late January 2025. The links to the NYU certificate classes will take you to the NYU page that will allow you to enroll if you are interested, but for a price. The links to the free online classes will take you to pages that list the course sessions, with post-class tests and material to go with each session: table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } ClassNYU Spring 2025 Online (free)NYU CertificateWhatsApp Discussion Group Corporate FinanceLinkLinkLink (Fall)Link ValuationLinkLinkLink (Spring & Fall)Link Investment PhilosophiesNALinkLink (Spring)Link Corporate Life CycleNALinkNALink AccountingNALinkNA  Foundations of FinanceNALinkNA  StatisticsNALinkNA The last column represents WhatsApp groups that I have set up for each class, where you can raise and answer questions from others taking the class. My Book (and Written) Content     Let me begin by emphasizing that you do not need any of my books to take my classes. In fact, I don't even require them, when I teach my MBA and undergraduate classes at NYU. The classes are self contained, with the material you need in the slides that I use for each class, and these slides will be accessible at no cost, either as a packet for the entire class or as a link to the session (on YouTube). To the extent that I use other material, spreadsheets or data in each session, the links to those as well will be accessible as well.      If you prefer to have a book, I do have a few that cover the classes that I teach, though some of them are obscenely overpriced (in my view, and there is little that I can do about the publishing business and its desire for self immolation.) You can find my books, and the webpages that support these books, at this link, and a description of the books is below: table.tableizer-table { font-size: 12px; border: 1px solid #CCC; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; } .tableizer-table td { padding: 4px; margin: 3px; border: 1px solid #CCC; } .tableizer-table th { background-color: #104E8B; color: #FFF; font-weight: bold; } Corporate Finance Valuation Investment Philosophies Corporate Life Cycle Applied Corporate Finance (Wiley, 4th Ed): This is the book that is most closely tied to this class and represents my views of what should be in a corporate finance class most closely. Investment Valuation (Wiley, 3rd Ed, 4th ed forthcoming): This is my only valuation textbook, designed for classroom teaching. At almost 1000 pages, it is overkill but it is also the most comprehensive of the books in terms of coverage. Investment Philosophies (Wiley, 2nd Ed): This is the best book for this class, and provides background and evidence for each investment philosophy, with a listing of the personal characteristics that you need to make that philosophy work for you. Corporate Life Cycle (Penguin Random House, 1st Ed): This is the most recent of my books and it introduces the phases of the corporate life cycle and why business, management, valuation and investment challenges change with each phase. Corporate Finance (Wiley, 2nd Ed): This is a more conventional corporate finance book, but it has not seen a new edition in almost 20 years. Little Book of Valuation (Wiley, 2nd Ed): This is the shortest of the books, but it provides the essentials of valuation, and at a reasonable price. Investment Management (Wiley, 1st Ed): This is a very old book, and one that I co-edited with the redoubtable Peter Bernstein, focused on writings on different parts of the investment process. It is dated but it still has relevance (in my view).   Strategic Risk Taking (Wharton, 1s Ed): This is a book specifically about measuring risk, dealing with risk and how risk taking/avoidance affect value. Dark Side of Valuation (Prentice Hall, 3rd Ed): This is a book about valuing difficult-to-value companies, from young businesses to cyclical/commodity companies. It is a good add-on to the valuation class. Investment Fables (FT Press, 1st Ed): This book is also old and badly in need of a second edition, which I may turn to next year, but it covers stories that we hear about how to beat the market and get rich quickly, the flaws in these stories, and why it pays to be a skeptic.     Damodaran on Valuation (Wiley, 2nd Ed): This was my very first book, and it is practitioner-oriented, with the second half of the book dedicated to loose ends in vlauation (control, illiquidity etc.)       Narrative and Numbers (Columbia Press, 1st Ed): This was the book I most enjoyed writing, and it ties storytelling to numbers in valuation, providing a basis for my argument that every good valuation is a bridge between stories and numbers.        Finally, I discovered early on how frustrating it is to be dependent on outsiders for data that you need for corporate financial analysis and valuation, and I decided to become self sufficient and create my own data tables, where I report industry averages on almost every statistic that we track and estimate in finance. These data tables should be accessible and downloadable (in excel), and if you find yourself stymied, when doing so, trying another browser often helps. The data is updated once a year, at the start of the year, and the 2025 data update will be available around January 10, 2025. A Class Guide     I would be delighted, if you decide to take one or more of my classes, but I understand that your lives are busy, with jobs, family and friends all competing for your time. You may start with the intent of taking a course, but you may not be able to finish for any number of reasons, and if that happens, I completely understand. In addition, the courses that you find useful will depend on your end game. If you own a business, work in the finance department of a company, or are a consultant, you may find the corporate finance course alone will suffice, providing most of what you need. If you are in the appraisal or valuation business, either as an appraiser or as an equity research analyst (buy or sell side), valuation is the class that will be most directly tied to what you will do. I do believe that to value businesses, you need to understand how to run them, making corporate finance a good lead in. If you plan to be in active investment, working at a mutual fund, wealth management or hedge fund,  or are an individual investor trying to find your way in investing, I think that starting with a valuation class, and following up with investment philosophy will yield the biggest payoff. Finally, the corporate life cycle class, which spans corporate finance, valuation and investing, with doses of management and strategy, will be a good add on to any of the other pathways, or as a standalone for someone who has little patience for finance classes but wants a framework for understanding businesses. As a lead-in to any of these paths, I will leave it to you to decide whether you need to take the accounting, statistics, and foundations classes, to either refresh content you have not seen in a long time or because you find yourself confused about basics: If you find yourself overwhelmed with any or all of these paths, you always have the option of watching a session or two of any class of your choice. As you look at the choices, you have to consider three realities.  The first is that, unless you happen to be a NYU Stern student, you will be taking these classes online and asynchronously (not in real time). As someone who has been teaching online for close to two decades now, I have learned that watching a class on a computer or display screen is far more draining than being in a  physical class, which is one reason that I have created the online versions of the classes with much shorter session lengths.  The second is that the biggest impediment to finishing classes online, explaining why completion rates are often 5% or lower, even for the best structured online classes, is maintaining the discipline to continue with a class, when you fall behind. While my regular classes follow a time line, you don't have to stick with that calendar constraint, and can finish the class over a longer period, if you want, but you will have to work at it.  The third is that learning, especially in my subject area, requires doing, and if all you do is watch the lecture videos, without following through (by trying out what you have learned on real companies of your choosing), the material will not stick.     I will be teaching close to 800 students across my three NYU classes, in the spring, and they will get the bulk of my attention, in terms of grading and responding to emails and questions. With my limited bandwidth and time, I am afraid that I will not be able to answer most of your questions, if you are taking the free classes online; with the certificate classes, there will be zoom office hours once every two weeks for a live Q&A. I have created WhatsApp forums (see class list above) for you, if you are interested, to be able to interact with other students who are in the same position that you are in, and hopefully, there will be someone in the forum who can address your doubts. Since I have never done this before, it is an experiment, and I will shut them down, if the trolls take over. In Closing…     I hope to see you (in person or virtually) in one of my classes, and that you find the content useful. If you are taking one of my free classes, please recognize that I share my content, not out of altruism, but because like most teachers, I like a big audience. If you are taking the NYU certificate classes, and you find the price tag daunting, I am afraid that I cannot do much more than commiserate, since the university has its own imperatives. If you do feel that you want to thank me, the best way you can do this is to pass it on, perhaps by teaching someone around you.  YouTube Video Class list with links Corporate Finance (NYU MBA): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastcfspr25.htm  Valuation (NYU MBA): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcasteqspr25.htm  Corporate Finance (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastcfonline.htm  Valuation (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastvalonline.htm  Corporate Finance (NYU Certificate): https://execed.stern.nyu.edu/products/corporate-finance-with-aswath-damodaran  Valuation (NYU Certificate): https://execed.stern.nyu.edu/products/advanced-valuation-with-aswath-damodaran  Investment Philosophies (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastinvphil.htm  Investment Philosophies (NYU Certificate): https://execed.stern.nyu.edu/products/investment-philosophies-with-aswath-damodaran  Corporate Life Cycle (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastCLC.htm  Accounting 101 (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastacctg.htm  Foundations of Finance (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcastfoundationsonline.htm  Statistics 101 (Free Online): https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/webcaststatistics.htm