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We all have a pretty good idea that our finances are being snooped on, but most of us aren't quite able to articulate how. We know that we're being snooped on by two groups, corporations and the government. This post will focus on how the government surveils our transactions, because democratic governments generally (but certainly not always!) tell us ahead of time what information they will gather, and how the data will be used. Governments snoop on law abiding citizens' financial data for good reasons – they are trying to trace the money in order to catch bad guys. The government has been given the power to collect this information without having to ask a judge for approval, say by requesting a search warrant.  I think there is a degree of acceptance among citizens that some amount of warrantless financial snooping is okay, because it reduces crime. But as the intensity of surveillance increases it eventually reaches creepy territory, at which point most of us would prefer the brakes...
a year ago

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Trump-proofing Canada means ending our dependence on SWIFT

It's time to stop staring into the headlights and respond to the fact that Canada is being eyed as a choice morsel by a much larger predator: our former ally the United States of America. In President Trump's very own words, he wants to use "economic force" to join Canada and the United States together. In anticipation of the U.S. turning its economic might against us, we need to locate all the ways in which our access points to various crucial financial networks are controlled by this predator, and switch those dependencies off, quickly, before they are used to hurt us. One of our most glaring dependencies is the SWIFT network. Banking and payments run on networks. And network users tend to coalesce around a single dominant network, like SWIFT or the Visa and MasterCard networks. Which leaves whomever controls the dominant network, often the U.S, with tremendous power over all the network's other users. If Canada can reduce our exposure to some of these networks now, then we can't be exploited by the Trump regime down the road to weaken us economically, sap our strength, and threaten to take our resources or annex us. I've already written about one point of failure: our dependency on the U.S.-controlled MasterCard and Visa card networks. Canada has enjoyed huge conveniences by being connected to the U.S. card networks. However, if Trump were to suddenly cut off our access, Canadian credit cards would be rendered ineffective in one stroke, throwing us into chaos. The good news, I wrote back then, is that our MasterCard/Visa dependency can be solved by building a domestic credit card system, underpinned by Interac, our made-in-Canada interbank debit network. With a domestic fall-back in place, the threat of a Trump disconnection would no longer loom over our heads. Canada wouldn't be doing anything unique. All sorts of nations have their own indigenous credit card systems, including India, Indonesia, Brazil, France, and Japan. The next chokepoint we need to address, and quickly, is Canada's dependence on the SWIFT network. Most Canadians don’t realize that SWIFT isn't just an international payment tool. It is deeply embedded in our domestic financial system, too. What is the SWIFT network? Payments are really just synchronized updates of bank databases. A paying bank subtracts numbers from its database while the receiving bank credits its own. To initiate these updates, banks need to communicate with each other, which is where SWIFT comes in. Think of SWIFT as WhatsApp for bankers. It's a highly secure communications network that banks can use to coordinate bank-to-bank payments, otherwise known as wire transfers, between each other on behalf of their customers, using specialized financial languages like ISO 20022 or FIN. The SWIFT network, owned by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a non-profit based in Belgium, has over the years become the global standard for banks to signal cross-border database updates. There is currently no alternative. Decades ago, everyone gravitated toward using the SWIFT network for international payments; so that's where a banker has gotta be. Canada's SWIFT exposure is especially problematic. Many of the world's largest nations only rely on the SWIFT network for international payments; they do not use SWIFT for domestic payments. For security reasons, these nations have built their own bespoke messaging networks and require their banks to use the domestic network for making within-country wires. For example, India has the Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS), the U.S. uses FedLine*, and Japan has the Zengin Data Telecommunication System. Yet a group of smaller countries, including Canada, also rely on the SWIFT network for domestic payments. The UK, Australia, and South Africa are part of this group, too. (I wrote about this domestic reliance a few years ago, if you want more details.) What it boils down to is that if a Toronto-based customer of Royal Bank wants to wire $1 million to a Calgary-based customer of TD Bank, it is the SWIFT network that conducts the communications necessary to complete this within-Canada wire payment. That is, our domestic payment system is fully reliant on a piece of Belgian infrastructure. And this domestic reliance is a huge weakness. Cutting countries off from SWIFT has become one of the U.S.'s standard tools for disciplining enemies. Over the years North Korea, Iran, and Russia have all undergone it. Being de-SWIFTed isn't a killing blow, but it makes it much tougher for the offending nation's banks to interact with counterparties to make payments. Without SWIFT, bankers fall back on ad hoc networks of fax machines, email, and telex. Efficiency is replaced by clunky, error-prone workarounds. In 2025, Canada suddenly finds itself in the same boat as North Korea, Iran, and Russia: we are all U.S. targets (or is Russia about to become a U.S. friend again?) And so Canada faces a genuine threat of being de-SWIFTed. Some of you are thinking: "But wait, JP. SWIFT is a European-based platform. As a liberal democracy, Europe is on Canada's side. They would never allow us to be cut off, right?" Yes and no. The U.S. market is far bigger than the Canadian market. Given a U.S. ultimatum between disconnecting Canada's banking system and facing U.S. punishment, SWIFT and the Europeans may very well choose to take the path of least resistance and cut Canada off. A potential European betrayal is precisely what happened to Iran when it was severed from SWIFT in 2018. Recall that the U.S., Europe and other partners had signed a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 whereby Iran agreed to cease its efforts to get the bomb in exchange for a cessation of western sanctions. Trump reneged on the deal in 2018, enraging the Europeans, who wanted to continue honoring it. The U.S.'s 45th president began to pressure SWIFT to remove Iran from its network, threatening sanctions and travel bans on SWIFT execs. At the time, I thought SWIFT might resist Trump's pressure. Europe remained supportive of Iran, after all, and the EU's "blocking statute" makes it illegal for EU firms like SWIFT to comply with American sanction demands. But Europe caved and Iran was quietly unplugged from SWIFT. In short, Canada, like Iran, can't rely on Europe to uphold its SWIFT access. As I said earlier, a de-SWIFTing is doubly serious for Canada. Not only would it sever our banks from the sole communications network through which they can make foreign payments. We would also lose our ability to make local wire payments in Canadian dollars. Need to pay $500,000 by wire to close a house purchase? Too bad. It won't go through. For those interested in visuals, the chart below illustrates our SWIFT dependence. Note how all arrows pass through the SWIFT network: How a Canadian wire transfer works: When a Canadian bank (i.e. the "instructing agent") makes a wire payment to another Canadian bank (the "instructed agent") on behalf of a customer, it starts by initiating a PACS message. This message is sent to the SWIFT network, which notifies Lynx, Canada's high value payments system. All Canadian banks have accounts at the Bank of Canada, our nation's central bank. Lynx's role is to debit the central bank account of the first bank and credit the account of the second bank. A confirmation message then flows back from Lynx to SWIFT and on to the recipient bank. SWIFT is central to this entire flow. All arrow lead to or away from it. If SWIFT is no longer permitted to bridge Canadian banks and Lynx because of a Trump ban, then this entire payments flow ceases to function. Image source: Payments Canada While we can't do much about losing access to SWIFT's international payments services, we do have options for mitigating the effects of lost access on local transactions. Canada must build its own proprietary domestic financial messaging network — urgently. For argument's sake I'll call it MapleFIN. Once built, the government could require domestic banks like BMO and TD Bank to support MapleFIN along with the existing SWIFT option, giving financial institutions two routes for passing on financial messages to other Canadian banks. Then if we are threatened with a de-SWIFTing, at least our domestic payments system won't be paralyzed; we can fall back on MapleFIN. The oddest thing for me about the sudden emergence of the U.S. threat is that I've been looking to bad actors like Russia and Iran for inspiration on how Canada must harden itself. Like Canada, Russia was historically dependent on the SWIFT network for "almost all" domestic transactions. For many years it had no domestic financial messaging system. Then Russia unjustly invaded Crimea in 2014. It was only at that point that, realizing its vulnerability, the rogue nation belatedly built its own domestic messaging network: the Sistema peredachi finansovykh soobscheniy, or System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). When Russia's banks finally began to be de-SWIFTed in 2022, they were cut off from making cross-border payments, but at least they could fall back on SPFS for making domestic payments, saving its economy from all sorts of extra chaos. Iran, too, has its own domestic financial messaging system, having introduced SEPAM in 2013, so when Trump's 2018 de-SWIFTing hit, at least Iran's domestic payments still went through. We need to do what Russia and Iran did and build domestic payments networks. A recent design change by the European Union really drives home the point that no nation should be 100% reliant on SWIFT. Like Canada, the EU has always used SWIFT for all of its domestic financial messaging traffic. SWIFT is based in the EU, so you'd think that Europeans would be comfortable being wholly dependent on it. But they aren't. In 2023, European Central Bank modified the domestic payments system so that in addition to SWIFT, banks could also transmit payment messages via a non-SWIFT competitor, SIAnet. (I wrote two articles, here and here, on Europe's decision to reduce its SWIFT reliance). I worry that many Canadians are still stuck in the early stages of coping with the loss of our privileged relationship with the U.S. There's plenty of anger and betrayal. Many are in denial and think things will return to normal once Trump's regime comes to an end, assuming it ever does. But if we want to safeguard our economy against the years of instability ahead, we can't just stew. We need to accept that things have changed and quickly move forward to mitigate the threat. Financial messaging systems are not irrelevant bits of financial arcanery. They are a vital part of Canada's plumbing through which a large chunk of the nation's commerce flows. If the plumbing seizes up, our financial lives go on pause. Let's fix this, now. *The Federal Reserve used to refer to its network as FedNet, but appears to have switched its nomenclature to FedLine.

3 months ago 20 votes
If it's crypto it's not money laundering

It appears to be official now. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, when illicit activity is routed via crypto infrastructure, then it no longer qualifies as money laundering. Earlier this week the Department of Justice's deputy attorney general Todd Blanche sent out an internal staff memo saying that the digital asset industry (read: crypto) is "critical to the nation’s economic development." (Editor's note: it's not.) As such, staff have been instructed to stop targeting crypto platforms such as exchanges, mixers like Tornado Cash and ChipMixer, and offline wallets for the "acts of their end users."  What does "the acts of their end users" mean? Further clarity arrives deeper into Blanche's memo. It helpfully draws attention to how cartels operating in the fentanyl trade often use digital assets. This is well known. Tether, for instance, is a popular payments platform in the fentanyl trade. (See here, here, and here). And yet, the Department goes on to explain that while it will continue to pursue cartels, terrorist organizations, and other illicit enterprises for their financial crimes, it "will not pursue actions against the platforms that these enterprises utilize to conduct their illegal activities." This marks a radical departure from long-established financial law on Planet Earth, where financial institutions are generally held responsible for the "acts of their end users," and are pursued when criminals use them to "conduct their illegal activities." It's what's known in law as money laundering. Money laundering is a two-sided crime. There's the first leg: a criminal who has dirty money. And there is the second leg: the criminal's counterparty, a financial intermediary (a bank, crypto exchange, remittance platform, money courier, or helpful individual) who processes the dirty funds. Both legs are prosecutable. That's precisely what happened to both TD Bank and its cartel-linked customers when they were charged last year. Financial providers are held liable for the crimes of their users. The same two-sidedness goes for sanctions evasion. There is the sanctioned party and there is the financial platform that facilitates their evasion. Both are indictable.   If, as Blanche suggests, digital asset platforms are no longer to be targeted for the "acts of their end users," that's effectively saying that the second leg of a money laundering or sanctions violation is no longer a violation, at least not when a crypto platform is involved. So if cartel deposits dirty money at an exchange like Binance which facilitates their crypto transactions, the exchange won't be pursued. Only the cartel will be. In effect the entire technology has been handed a get-out-of-money-laundering-jail-free card. A detached observer could safely assume that crypto platforms will respond by easing up on their compliance measures—they won't be indicted, after all—which, in turn, will allow more bad actors to make use of their services. The memo provides more details. It's quite likely that both the ongoing Tornado Cash case (which I've written about extensively) and the ChipMixer case will be dropped, as the memo explicitly states that the Department will no longer target mixing and tumbling services. Tornado Cash, a smart-contract based mixer, operates with a large proportion of its infrastructure running through automated code, whereas first-generation mixers like ChipMixer are entirely human-operated. The latter had mostly disappeared thanks to a series of successful criminal convictions, but will spring back into action as the threat of indictment recedes—leading to more anonymity for the entire system, including for criminals. The memo's prohibition against Department lawyers targeting "offline wallets" likely refers to "unhosted wallets," which presumably applies to stablecoins—a highly popular type of crypto token pegged to national currencies. Stablecoin users can either hold balances of a stablecoin like Tether or USDC in unhosted format, within their personal crypto wallets, or hold them with the issuer for redemption into actual dollars, in which case they become "hosted." The implication seems to be that if unhosted stablecoins are used by bad actors, the issuers themselves won't be targeted. It's a fantastic policy—if your goal was to encourage fentanyl cartels to use stablecoins. This decriminalization of crypto money laundering is a ratification of how much of the crypto ecosystem already operates. Just last week, for example, I wrote about stablecoin issuers like Tether and Circle allowing Garantex, a sanctioned Russian exchange, to hold balances of their stablecoins. The issuers seem to believe that providing access to illicit end users like Garantex is legal. And now, it seems, the government has confirmed their view by no longer targeting unhosted wallets for the "acts of their end users." Now that we've explored some of the immediate legal and technical consequences of this decision, it's worth asking: who on earth benefits from this sudden shift in policy? Because clearly most people will be made worse off.  I'm only speculating, but here's who this policy may be designed to appease and/or reward: Trump-voting libertarians who have arrived at the odd belief that money laundering shouldn't be a crime. San Francisco crypto entrepreneurs who want to create financial platforms on the cheap, without the burden of building expensive compliance programs to prevent criminals usage. These entrepreneurs also want their crypto platforms to have access to bank accounts, but banks have been hesitant due to the high risk of crypto-based money laundering. Now that crypto has immunity, banks no longer have to worry. Crypto entrepreneurs voted for Trump, funded him, and are a big part of his administration. This is their payback. Trump himself who seems intent on building a murky authoritarian system of bribery and patronage à la Putin or Orban. This system requires money laundering-friendly financial infrastructure, and the Department's memo may be an early step to creating it. (The Trump family, with its many crypto-based entrepreneurial efforts, is also part of the second group.) In the long term, banks and other traditional providers may benefit, too. With crypto-based finance now unburdened of a major law, every single financial provider operating outside of this crypto-friendly zone, such as traditional banks and fintechs, will be incentivized to switch their database infrastructure over to crypto in order to qualify for this loophole. That means shifting your Wells Fargo U.S. dollar savings account over to a blockchain-based dollar saving account. Doing so will allow banks and fintechs to cut compliance costs and increase their profits. Once the entire financial sector has migrated through the loophole, it will no longer be a crime to launder funds for criminals. And with mixers no longer being charged by the Department of Justice, that means blanket anonymity for everyone. As far as the public's welfare goes, the memo is awful. Like theft and fraud, money laundering is immoral and should be punished. Giving one stratum of society a free pass from any law, whether that be money laundering or theft or murder, erodes trust in government and the financial-legal system. More broadly, society's money laundering laws are a key defence against all types of other crimes. The so-called predicate offences to money laundering such as robbery, human smuggling, and corruption become much more tricky to carry out when, thanks to money laundering laws, the financial system does its best to shut them out. The dissuasive effect engendered by this effort stops many would-be criminals from ever leaving the licit economy. Take away those laws and the case for becoming a criminal becomes much more persuasive.

3 months ago 50 votes
Why sanctions didn’t stop Russia's Garantex from using stablecoins

Stablecoins, a new type of financial institution, are unique in two ways. First, they use decentralized databases like Ethereum and Tron to run their platforms. Secondly, and more important for the purposes of this article, they grant access to almost anyone, no questions asked.  I'm going to illustrate this openness by showing how Garantex, a sanctioned Russian exchange that laundered ransomware and darknet payments, has enjoyed almost continual access to financial services offered by stablecoin platforms like Tether and USDC throughout its six year existence, despite a well-known reputation as a bad actor.  Last month, law enforcement seizures combined with an indictment and arrest of Garantex's operators appear to have finally severed Garantex's stablecoin connection... or not. Evidence shows that Garantex simply rebranded and slipped right back onto stablecoin platforms.   Stablecoins' no-vetting model is a stark departure from the finance industry's default due diligence model, adhered to by banks (such as Wells Fargo) and fintechs (such as PayPal). We all know the drill—provide two pieces of ID to open a payments account. Requirements for businesses will probably be more onerous. Anyone on a sanctions list will be left at the door. Banks and fintechs must identify who they let on their platforms because the law requires it. By contrast, to access the Tether or USDC platforms, the two leading U.S. dollar stablecoins, no ID is required. Anyone can start using stablecoin payments services without having to pass through a due diligence process. Sanctioned customers won't get kicked off, as Garantex's long-uninterrupted access shows. Regulators seem to tolerate this arrangement—so far, no stablecoin operators have faced penalties for money laundering or sanctions evasion. A quick history of the Tether-Garantex nexus Garantex became notorious early on for its role in laundering ransomware payments. Russian ransomware gangs hacked Western firms, extorted them for bitcoin ransoms, and cashed out at Moscow-based exchanges like Garantex. Garantex also became a popular venue for laundering darknet-related proceeds, particularly Hydra, once the largest darknet market. Reports allege that the exchange's shareholders have Kremlin links and that terror groups Hezbollah and Quds Force have used it. Founded in 2019, Garantex was connected to Tether's platform by August 2020. We know this because an archived version of Garantex's website from that month show trading and payment services being offered using Tether's token, USDT. Archived Garantex.org trading page from March 2024 with USDT-to-ruble, Dai-ruble, and USDC-ruble markets [link] This connection to Tether allowed Garantex's customers to transfer their Tether balances to Garantex's Tether wallet, in the same way that a shopper might use their U.S. dollar account at PayPal to make payments to a business with a PayPal account. This allowed Garantex's users to trade U.S. dollars (in the form of Tether) on its platform for bitcoins or ether, two volatile cryptocurrencies, and vice versa. The Tether linkage also meant that Garantex could offer a market for trading ruble-USD. By April 2022, Garantex's bad behaviour had caught up to it: the exchange was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). U.S. individual and entities were now prohibited from doing business with Garantex. Out of fear of being penalized, most non-Russian financial institutions would have quickly severed ties with it. Yet Tether, based in the British Virgin Islands at the time, permitted its relationship with Garantex to continue without interruption. Archived copies of Garantex's trading page from mid-2022 and 2023 show that Tether-denominated services were still being offered. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2023 that around 80% of the exchange’s trading involved Tether, despite sanctions being in place. The net amounts were not small. According to Bloomberg, an alleged $20 billion worth of Tether had been transacted via Garantex post-sanctions. A 2024 Wall Street Journal report revealed that sanctions-evading middlemen used Tether to "break up the connection" between buyers like Kalashnikov and sellers in Hong Kong, with Garantex serving as their venue for acquiring Tether balances.  Finally, analysis from Elliptic, a blockchain analytics firm, alleges that Garantex offered USDT trading services to North Korean hacking group Lazarus in June 2023. This transaction flow is illustrated below: The Garantex/Tether nexus in 2023: Elliptic alleges that North Korean hackers stole ether from Atomic Wallet, converted it to Tether using a decentralized exchange 1inch, and then sent Tether to Garantex to trade for bitcoin. (Click to enlarge.) Source: Twitter, Elliptic Tether's excuse for not off-boarding sanctioned entities such as Garantex? A supposed lack of government clarity.  When Tornado Cash was sanctioned in 2022, for instance, the company said that it would "hold firm" and not comply because the U.S. Treasury had "not indicated" whether stablecoin issuers were required to ban sanctioned entities from using what Tether refers to as "secondary market addresses." Translating, Tether was saying that if bad actors wanted to use Tether's platform to transact with other Tether users (i.e. in the "secondary market"), it would let them do so. Tether's only obligation, the company believed, was to stop sanctioned users from asking Tether itself to directly cash them out of the platform into U.S. dollars (i.e. the "primary market"). This is quite the statement. Imagine if PayPal allowed everyone—including sanctioned actors—to open an account without ID and send funds freely within its system, only intervening when bad actors asked PayPal to cash them out into regular dollars. That was Tether's stance. Or if Wells Fargo let sanctioned actors make payments with other Wells Fargo customers, but only stopped them from withdrawing at ATM. Banks and fintechs can't get away with such a bare bones compliance strategy; they must do due diligence on all their users. But Tether seemed to believe that a different set of rules applied to it. In December 2023, Tether reversed course. It would now initiate a new "voluntary" policy of freezing out all OFAC-listed actors using its platform, not just "primary market" sanctioned users seeking direct cash-outs. This brought Tether into what it described as "alignment" with the U.S. Treasury. Soon after, Tether froze three wallets linked by OFAC in 2022 to Garantex. However, this action was largely symbolic. By the time Tether froze those wallets, Garantex had already abandoned them and opened new ones, thus allowing the exchange to maintain access to Tether's platform. Tether's no-vetting model permitted this pivot. Archived versions of Garantex's trading page show that it continued offering Tether services throughout 2024 and early 2025. The U.S. Department of Justice recently confirmed Garantex's tactic of replacing wallets in its March 2025 indictment of the exchange's operators. It alleges that Garantex frequently cycled through new Tether wallet addresses—sometimes on a daily basis—to evade detection by U.S.-based crypto exchanges like Coinbase and Kraken, which are legally required to block customer payments made to sanctioned entities. That the relationship between Tether and Garantex continued even after Tether's supposed 180 degree turn to "align" itself with the U.S. government is backed up by several reports from blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis. The first, published in August 2024, found that a large purchaser of Russian drones used Garantex to process more than $100 million in Tether transactions. The second describes how Russian disinformation campaigners received $200,000 worth of Tether balances in 2023 and 2024, much of it directly from Garantex. In a March 2024 podcast, Chainalysis executives allege that "a majority" of activity on Garantex continued to be in stablecoins. After years of regular access to Tether's stablecoin platform, a rupture finally occurred earlier this month when Tether froze $23 million worth of Garantex's USDT balances at the request of law enforcement authorities. The move came in conjunction with a seizure by law enforcement of Garantex's website and servers.  Garantex's website was seized in March 2025 by a collection of law enforcement agencies. In a press release, Tether claimed that its actions against Garantex illustrated its ability to "track transactions and freeze USDt." But if Tether was so good at tracking its users, why did it connect a sanctioned party like Garantex in the first place, and continue to service it for over four years? Something doesn't add up. Not just Tether: other stablecoins offered Garantex access, too Tether doesn't appear to have been the only stablecoin platform to provide Garantex with access to its platform. MakerDAO (recently rebranded as Sky) and Circle Internet may have done so, too. Circle, based in Boston, manages the second-largest stablecoin, USDC. When OFAC put Garantex on its sanctions list in April 2022, Circle was quick to freeze one of the designated addresses. It did no hold any USDC balances. However, like Tether, Circle's no-vetting policy means that it doesn't do due diligence on users (sanctioned or not) who open new wallets, hold USDC in those wallets, and use them to make payments within the USDC system. Circle only checks the ID of users who ask it to cash them out. Thus, it would have been a cinch for Garantex to dodge Circle's initial freeze: just open up a new access point to the USDC platform. Which is exactly what appears to have happened. On March 30, 2022, Garantex used its Twitter/X account to announce that it was offering USDC-denominated services. Beginning at some point in the first half of 2022, close to the time that the U.S. Treasury's sanctions were announced, Garantex began to list USDC on its trading page (see screenshot at top). The exchange's trading page continued to advertise USDC-denominated financial services through 2023, 2024, and 2025 until its website was seized last month.  Tether, Circle's competitor, proceeded to freeze $23 million worth of USDT on behalf of law enforcement authorities, as already outlined. However, respected blockchain sleuth ZachXBT says that Circle did not itself interdict Garantex's access to the USDC payments platform, alleging that "a few Garantex addresses" holding USDC had not been blacklisted. MakerDAO is a geography-free financial institution that maintains and governs the Dai stablecoin, pegged to the U.S. dollar. Archived screenshots show that Garantex added Dai to its trading list by September 2020, not long after the exchange had enabled Tether connectivity. According to blockchain analytics firm Elliptic, Russian ransomware group Conti has used Garantex to get Dai-denominated financial services. Garantex is able to access the Dai platform because MakerDAO uses the same no-vetting model as Tether. In fact, MakerDAO takes an even more hands-off approach than the other stablecoin platforms: it didn't seize any of the original 2022 addresses emphasized by OFAC. That's because Dai was designed without freezing functionality. Not vetting users is lucrative Providing financial services to a sanctioned Garantex would have been profitable for Tether and competing stablecoin platforms managed by Circle and MakerDAO.  All stablecoins hold assets—typically treasury bills and other short term assets—to "back" the U.S. dollar tokens they have issued. They get to keep all the interest these assets generate for themselves rather than paying it to customers like Garantex. If we assume an average interest rate of 5% and that Garantex maintained a consistent $23 million in Tether balances over the 34 months from April 2022 (when it was sanctioned) to March 2025 (when it was finally frozen out), Tether could have earned approximately $3.2 million in interest courtesy of its relationship.  Not only does their no-vetting model mean that stablecoin platforms get to earn ongoing income from bad actors like Garantex, this model also seems... not illegal? Stablecoin legal teams have signed off on the setup, both those in the U.S. and overseas. Government licensing bodies like the New York Department of Financial Services don't seem to care that licensed stablecoins don't ask for ID, or at least they turn a blind eye. (Perhaps these government agencies are simply unaware?) Nor has the U.S. Department of Justice indicted a single stablecoin platform for money laundering, sanctions violations, or failing to have a compliance program, despite it being eleven years now since Tether's no-vetting model first appeared. The model seem to have legal chops. Or not? Banks and fintechs are no doubt looking on jealously at the no-vetting model. Had either PayPal or Wells Fargo allowed Garantex to get access to their payments services, the punishment would have been a large fine or even criminal charges. Sanctions violations are a strict liability offence, meaning that U.S. financial institutions can be held liable even if they only accidentally engage in sanctioned transactions. But more than a decade without punishment suggests stablecoins may be exempt. This hands-off approach benefits stablecoins not only on the revenue side (i.e they can earn ongoing revenues from sanctioned actors). It also reduces their costs: they can hire far fewer sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance staff than an equivalent bank or fintech platform. Tether earned $13 billion in last year with just 100 or so employees. That's more profits than Citigroup, the U.S.'s fourth largest bank with 229,000 employees, a gap due in no small part to Tether's no-vetting access model.  The coming financial migration? Zooming out from Garantex's stablecoin experience, what is the bigger picture?  I suspect that a great financial migration is likely upon us. Financial institutions can now seemingly provide services to the Garantex's of the world as long as the deliver them on a new type of substrate: decentralized databases. If so, banks and fintechs will very quickly shift their existing services over from centralized databases to decentralized ones in order to take advantage of their superior revenue opportunities and drastically lower compliance costs.  This impending shift isn't from an inferior technology to a superior one, but from an older rule-bound technology to a rule-free one. PayPal recently launching its own stablecoin is evidence that this migration is afoot. The argument many stablecoins advocates make to justify the replacement of full due diligence with a no-vetting access model is one based on financial inclusion. Consumers and legal businesses in places such as Turkey or Latin America, which suffer from high inflation, may want to hold digital dollars but don't necessarily have access to U.S. dollar accounts provided by local banks, perhaps because they don't qualify or lack trust in the domestic banking system. An open access model without vetting solves their problem.       What about the American voting public? Do they agree with this migration? The last few decades have been characterized by a policy whereby the government requires financial institutions to screen out dangerous actors like Garantex in order to protect the public. Forced to the fringes of the financial system, criminals encounter extra operating dangers and costs. The effort to sneak back in serves as an additional choke point to catch them. To boot, the additional complexity created by bank due diligence serves to dissuade many would-be criminals from engaging in crime. Is the public ready to let the Garantexes back in by default? I'm not so sure it is. Tether is available at Grinex, a Garantex reboot. [link] Garantex's stablecoin story didn't end with last month's seizures and indictment. According to blockchain analytics firm Global Ledger, the exchange has been renamed Grinex and continues to operate. Tether services are already available on this new look-alike exchange, as the screenshot above reveals. Global Ledger says that $29.6 million worth of Tether have already been moved to Grinex as of March 14, 2025.  This is the reality of an open-access, no-vetting financial system: bad actors slip in, eventually get cut off, and re-enter minutes later—an endless game of whack-a-mole that seems, for now at least, to be tolerated. It will only get larger as more financial institutions, eager to cut costs, gravitate to it.

4 months ago 48 votes
Canadian banks as U.S. hostages?

BMO Financial Center at Market Square in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Donald Trump has said he wants to use "economic force" against Canada. In my previous post, I worried that one way this force could be wielded was through Canada's dangerous dependence on U.S.-controlled MasterCard and Visa. But there's an even bigger risk. Canadian banks with large U.S. operations may have become unwitting financial hostages in Trump's 51st state strategy. As recently as a few months ago, back when things still seemed normal, it was widely accepted that big Canadian banks needed a U.S. expansion strategy. If one of our Big-6 banks wasn't building its U.S. banking footprint, its stock outlook suffered. Canada is a mature, low-growth banking market, after all, whereas the U.S. market remains fragmented and ripe for consolidation. This motivated a steady Canadian trek into U.S. branch banking. BMO entered the U.S. in the 1980s and steadily expanded, most recently acquiring Bank of the West in 2023, making it the 13th-largest U.S. bank. TD Bank entered in the early 2000s and has since climbed to 10th place. Given this trajectory, by 2030 or 2035, one of the U.S.’s five largest banks could very well have been Canadian. This strategy hasn’t been without flaws. Royal Bank's first U.S. retail banking foray, its acquisition of Centura, eventually failed, though its second attempt has been more successful. TD just paid the largest anti-money-laundering fine in U.S. history. But overall, the move south has been profitable for Canadian banks and their shareholders, who constitute a large chunk of the Canadian population. The U.S. has benefited, too. Canadians have historically been decent bankers, having got through the 2008 credit crisis unscathed. Allowing a bigger slice of the American market to fall under the prudential management of Canadian executives probably isn't a bad thing, TD's money laundering gaff notwithstanding. But in just a few months, Trump has upended this entire calculus. Canada is now a U.S. enemy, or at least no longer a friend. We are somewhere on Trump's timeline to becoming the 51st state, against our wishes. Our existing border treaties are no longer valid, says the President, and need to be redrawn. Trump has threatened to use "economic force" as his weapon to achieve this. The attacks have already begun, beginning with tariffs to soften us up for final annexation. Next up? My worry is that Canada's banking industry may become a second front in this war, and the hint is a stream of strange pronouncements from Trump and his surrogates about Canadian banking. According to Trump, the Canadian banking system is stacked against U.S. banks: "Canada doesn’t allow American Banks to do business in Canada, but their banks flood the American Market. Oh, that seems fair to me, doesn’t it?" This grievance is false, as I explained last month, but accuracy probably isn't the point. A charitable reading is that Trump is laying the groundwork for U.S. banks to gain more access to Canada’s banking sector—a manageable concern. My worry is that it's the reverse. His complaints may signal a shift in how Canadian banks operating in the U.S. are to be treated. Trump may have teed up a financial version of the Gulf of Tonkin incident; an imaginary affront that can serve as a pretext for justifying aggressive action against Canadian banks' U.S. subsidiaries. After years of U.S. expansion, Canada’s largest banks now have relatively large American retail banking footprints, making them tempting financial hostages. Both TD Bank and Bank of Montreal now have more branches in the U.S. than in Canada. Nearly half of BMO's revenue (44%) come from south of the border while in TD's case it's 38%. Royal Bank also has deep ties. According to a recent Bank of Canada paper, half of the Big 6 Canadian banks' assets are now foreign, far more than the roughly 40% or so in 2014, with much of that chunk being American assets. Is TD just another bank doing business in Florida, or a financial hostage? By damaging their large U.S. subsidiaries, Trump would directly weaken the Canadian parent companies, potentially causing havoc with the overall Canadian banking system. And a weakened financial sector plays right into Trump’s stated goal of economically undermining Canada in order to annex it. How can Trump hurt Canadian banks' U.S. subsidiaries? Trump and his allies control much of the U.S. financial regulatory apparatus, and he has shown little regard for legal constraints. To begin with, he could set the FBI and Department of Justice on Canadian banks, increasing scrutiny of TD, BMO, and Royal Bank’s U.S. operations under the guise of enforcing anti-money-laundering laws. More surveillance would inevitably lead to a wave of fines. To avoid punishment, a Canadian bank operating stateside will have to spend much more on anti-money laundering measures than an equivalent U.S. bank. Another tactic could be limiting access to shared financial infrastructure, such as government liquidity programs or bank deposit insurance. Trump could also try to increase the hoops that TD, BMO, and RBC must leap through to maintain their all-important accounts at the Federal Reserve, which provides access to Fedwire, the U.S.'s crucial large-value payments system. Trump’s regulators could also impose higher capital requirements on Canadian banks compared to their U.S. peers, forcing the parents to divert ever more resources to their U.S. subsidiaries. If Canadian banks are squeezed hard enough, they may eventually be forced to sell their U.S. operations at distressed prices. Trump could worsen this situation by imposing punitive exit fees, ensuring that Canadian banks take even bigger losses on the sale of their U.S. subsidiaries. The impairments caused to the parents' bank balance sheets would weaken the Canadian banking system and might even force the Federal government to step in with financial aid. Meanwhile, the discounted assets of Canadian banks could be handed over to Trump’s preferred U.S. banking CEOs. Trump, after all, seems to be on course to building a kleptocracy, and key to that is the leader's ability to generate a series of gifts (i.e. acquisition approvals) that can be bestowed on business leaders who have demonstrated their obeisance. To limit the damage, Canada may need to act quickly. The first step is freezing any further U.S. investment by BMO and the others. If Canadian banks are already financial hostages, deepening their exposure would be reckless. Bank executives may very well have already halted their U.S. growth plans of their own accord, but if not, high-level discussions with Canadian officials should drive home the urgency of the situation. Instead of doubling down on the U.S., Canadian banks should pivot toward growth opportunities in Europe, the U.K., Australia, Latin America, and Asia. Our banks have histories dealing with these geographies. Bank of Nova Scotia, for instance, is one of the leading banks in the Caribbean and Central America. Finally, there’s also a case to be made for a preemptive retreat. Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank, and TD Bank could start selling off their U.S. operations today before things escalate. It's a terribly difficult step to take; Canadian banks have spent decades painstakingly building their U.S. franchises. But by exiting now, they could secure better prices and avoid becoming tools for harming Canada down the road. What was once a symbol of Canadian financial success—our banks’ expansion into what used to be a friendly U.S.—has become a national security risk. Hoping Trump forgets his fixation on the Canadian banking system and his dream of annexing us is not a strategy. There’s a high chance he won’t, and Canada must prepare accordingly.

4 months ago 45 votes
Trump-proofing Canada means ditching MasterCard and Visa

We're all busy doing our best to boycott U.S. products. I can't buy Special K cereal anymore, because it's made in the U.S. by Kellogg's. But I'm still buying Shreddies, which is made in Niagara Falls, Ontario. Even that's a grey area, since Shreddies is owned by Post, a big American company. Should I be boycotting it? Probably. However, the disturbing thing is that I'm paying for my carefully-curated basket of Canadian groceries with my MasterCard. If we really want to avoid U.S. products, we can't just vet the things we are buying. We also need to be careful about how we are doing our buying. Our Canadian credit cards are basically made-in-U.S. goods. They rely on the U.S-based Visa or MasterCard networks for processing. Each credit card transaction you make generates a few cents in revenue for these two American mega-corporations. It doesn't sound like much, but when multiplied by millions of Canadians using their cards every day, it adds up. Vigilant Canadians shouldn't be using them. Canadians who want to boycott American card networks have two options. Go back to paying with cash, which is 100% Canadian. Or transact with your debit card. Debit card transactions are routed via the made-in-Canada Interac debit network.* We're lucky to have a domestic debit card option. Our European friends are in a worse position, since many European countries (Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria) are entirely reliant on MasterCard and Visa for both debit and credit card transactions.  Unfortunately, going back to debit cards means doing without all of the consumer protection that credit cards offer in an online environment. Worse, you're giving up your credit card rewards or cash back. If you don't pay with your 2% cash back credit card, for instance, and use your debit card instead, which doesn't offer a reward, you're effectively losing out on $2 for every $100 you spend. This should illustrate to you, I hope, the golden shackles imposed on us by our U.S.-based credit cards. It's fairly easy to replace your American-grown tomatoes with Mexican ones or your U.S.-made car with a Japanese car. But networks, which tend towards monopolization, are not so easy to bypass. Which gets us into the meatier issue of national sovereignty. The difficulty we all face boycotting the MasterCard and Visa networks reveals how Canada has let itself become over-reliant on these critical pieces of U.S financial infrastructure. My fear is that our neighbour's political leadership is only going to fall further into authoritarianism and belligerence, eventually making a play to slowly annex Canada—not by invasion, but by "Canshluss". If so, this will involve using our dependencies on U.S. systems, including the card networks, to extract concessions from us. "Canada, if you don't do x for me," says Trump in 2026, "we're TURNING OFF all your credit cards!"  In anticipation, we need to remove this particular financial dependency, quick. We're already safe when it comes to debit cards; we've got Interac. But we need the same independence for our credit cards. More specifically, we need to pursue an end-goal in which all Canadian credit cards are "co-badged". That means our credit cards would be able to use both the Visa/Mastercard card networks and Interac (or, if Interac can't be repurposed for credit cards, some other yet-to-be-built domestic credit card network). With co-badging, if your credit card payment can't be executed by Visa because of a Trump freeze order, at least the Canadian network will still process it. This is how the French card system works. While much of Europe suffers from a massive dependency on MasterCard and Visa, France is unique in having built a 100% French card solution. The local Carte Bancaire (CB) network can process both French debit card transactions, like Interac can, but goes one step further by also handling French credit card purchases. Before paying for their groceries with a card, French card holders get to choose which network to use, the local one or the international one. THIS IS WHAT CANADA NEEDS: This French credit card, issued by Credite Agricole, is co-badged with the domestic Carte Bancaire (CB) network and the international MasterCard network. When incidents occur on one route (CB, for instance), traffic is automatically routed to the back-up route, MasterCard, and vice versa. I think that a Canadian solution to the Trump problem would look something like this French CB card. The incoming Carney government should move to co-sponsor a CB-style domestic credit card network along with the big banks (perhaps a simple upgrade to Interac will do?). All Canadian financial institutions that issue credit cards would be required to co-badge them so that Canadians can connect to this new network as well as Visa or MasterCard. Even if annexation never actually occurs, at least we've got a more robust card system in place to deal with outages arising from hacking or natural disasters. Along with France, we can take inspiration from India, which introduced their Visa/MasterCard alternative, Rupay, in 2012. Thirteen years later, RuPay is now a genuine competitor with the American card networks. I can't believe I'm saying this, but we can also use Russia as a model, which was entirely dependent on Visa and MasterCard for card payments until it deployed its Mir card network in 2016—in the nick of time before Visa and MasterCard cut ties in 2022. Europe will have to push harder, too. The EU has been trying to rid itself of its Visa and MasterCard addiction for over a decade now, without much luck. Its first attempt, the Euro Alliance of Payment Schemes, was abandoned in 2013.  (In fact, one of the reasons the European Central Bank is exploring its own digital currency is to provide an alternative to the American card networks.) As Canada builds out its own domestic credit card workaround, we can learn from the European mistakes. The U.S. is no longer a clear friend. Boycotting U.S. products is one thing. But if we truly want to reduce the external threat, we need to build our own card infrastructure—before it's too late. * In-person debit payments are processed by the Interac network. However, online debit card transactions default to the Visa or MasterCard networks. While Interac does allow for online purchases, many retailers don't offer the option, and when they do, the checkout process requires the user to log into their online banking, which is more of a hassle than using a card.

4 months ago 50 votes

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The Imitation Game: Defending against AI's Dark Side!

A few weeks ago, I started receiving a stream of message about an Instagram post that I was allegedly starring in, where after offering my views on Palantir's valuation, I was soliciting investors to invest with me (or with an investment entity that had ties to me). I was not surprised, since I have lived with imitations for years, but I was bemused, since I don't have an Instagram account and have not posted on Facebook more than once or twice in a decade. In the last few days, those warnings have been joined by others, who have noted that there is now a video that looks and sounds like me, adding to the sales pitch with promises of super-normal returns if they reach out, and presumably send their money in. (Please don't go looking for these scams online, since the very act of clicking on them can expose you to their reach.)     I would like to think that readers of my books or posts, or students in my classes, know me well enough to be able to tell that these are fakes, and while this is not the first time I have been targeted, it is clear that AI has upped the ante, in terms of creating posts and videos that look authentic. In response, I cycled through a series of emotions, starting with surprise that there are some out there who think that using my name alone will draw in investors, moving on to anger at the targeting of vulnerable investors and ending with frustration at the social media platforms that allow these fakes to exist. As a teacher, though, curiosity beat out all of these emotions, and I thought that the best thing that I can do, in addition to the fruitless exercise of notifying the social media companies about the fakes, is to talk about what these AI imitators got right, what they were off target on and what they got wrong in trying to create these fakes of me. Put simply, I plan to grade my AI imitator, as I would any student in my class, recognizing that being objective in this exercise will be tough to do. In the lead-in, though, I have to bore you with details of my professional life and thought process, since that is the key to creating a general framework that you will be able to use to detect AI imitations, since the game will only get more sophisticated in the years to come. An Easy Target?     In a post last year, I talked about a bot in my name, that was in development phase at NYU, and while officially sanctioned, it did open up existential challenges  for me. In discussing that bot, I noted that this bot had accessed everything that I had ever written, talked about or valued in my lifetime, and that I had facilitated its path by making that access easy. I will explain my rationale for the open access, and provide you with the links if you want to get to them, hoping to pre-empt those who will try to charge you for that content. My Open Access Policy     I have said this before, but there is no harm in saying it again, but I am a teacher, first and foremost, and almost every choice I make in my profession life reflects that mindset. A teacher, like an actor or singer, craves an audience, and the larger and more enthusiastic that audience, the better. When I started teaching in 1986, my audience was restricted to those in my physical classroom at NYU's business school, and my initial attempts at expanding that audience were very limited. I had video recorders set up to record my lectures, made three copies of each lecture tape, and put them on the shelves at NYU's library for patrons to check out and watch. The internet, for all of its sins, changed the game for me, allowing me to share not only class materials (slides, exams) but also my lecture videos, in online formats. Though my early attempts to make these conversions were primitive, the technology for recording classes and putting them online has made a quantum leap. In spring 2025, every one of my NYU classes was recorded by cameras that are built into classroom, the conversions to online videos happened in minutes, right after the class is done, and YouTube has been a game changer, in allowing access to anyone with an internet connection anywhere in the world.     As the internet has expanded its reach, and social media platforms have joined the mix, I have also shared the other components that go into my classes more widely, starting with the data on industry averages that I need and use in my own valuations, the spreadsheets that contain these valuations and blog posts on markets and companies and any other tools that I use in my own analyses. While I am happy to receive compliments for the sharing and praise for being unselfish, the truth is that my sharing is driven less by altruism (I am no Mother Theresa!) and more  by two other forces. The first is that, as I noted in my post on country equity risk premiums last week, there much of what I know or write about is pedestrian, and holding it in secret seems silly. The second is that, while I am not easily outraged, I am driven to outrage by business consultants and experts who state the obvious (replacing words you know with buzzwords and acronyms), while making outrageous claims of what they can deliver and charging their customers absurd amounts for their advice and appraisals. If I can save even a few of these customers from making these payments, I consider it to be a win. My Sharing Spots     Everything that I have ever written, worked on or taught is somewhere online, almost always with no protective shields (no passwords or subscriptions), and there are four places where you can find them: Webpage: The oldest platform for my content remains my webpage, damodaran.com, and while it can be creaky, and difficult to navigate, it contains the links to my writing, teaching, data, spreadsheets and other tools.  Teaching: I teach two classes at Stern, corporate finance and valuation, and have four other classes - a lead-into-valuation accounting class, a made-for-finance statistics class, a class on investment philosophies and one on corporate life cycles, and I described these classes in a post on teaching at the start of 2025. You can find them all by going to the teaching link on my webpage, https://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/teaching.html including my regular classes (class material, lecture notes, exams and quizzes and webcasts of the classes) in real time, as well as archived versions from previous semesters. In addition, the online classes are at the same link, with material, post- class tests and webcasts of sessions for each class. This is also the place where you can find links to seminars that I teach in the rest of the world, with slides and materials that I used for those classes (though I have been tardy about updating these). Data: At the start of every year for the last three decades, I have shared my analysis of data on publicly traded companies, breaking down the data into corporate finance and valuation categories. This link, https://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html, will take you to the entry page, and you can then either access the most recent data (from the start of 2025, since I update only once a year, for most datasets) or archived data (from previous years). My raw data comes from a variety of sources, and in the interests of not stepping on the toes of my data providers, my data usually reflects industry averages, rather than company-specific data, but it does include regional breakdowns: US, Europe, Emerging Markets (with India and China broken out individually, Australia & Canada & New Zealand) and Japan.   Spreadsheets: I am not an Excel ninja, and while my spreadsheet-building skills are adequate, my capacity to make them look polished is limited. I do share the spreadsheets that I use in my classes and work here, with my most-used (by me) spreadsheet being one that I use to value most companies at this link, with a webcast explaining its usage. Books: I have written eleven books and co-edited one, spread out across corporate finance, valuation and investing, and you can find them all listed here. Many of these books are in their third or fourth editions, but with each one, you should find a webpage that contains supplementary material for that book or edition (slides, answers to questions at the end of each chapter, data, spreadsheets backing the examples). This is the only section of the spreadsheet where you may encounter a gatekeeper, asking you for a password, and only if you seek access to instructor material. If you are wondering what is behind the gate, it is only the powerpoint slides, with my notes on each slide, but the pdf versions of these slides should be somewhere on the same page, without need for a password. Papers: I don't much care much for academic research, but I do like to write about topics that interest or confound me, and you can find these papers at this link. My two most widely downloaded papers are updates I do each year on the equity risk premium (in March) and country risk premiums (in July). Much of the material in these papers has made its way into one or more of my books, and thus, if you find the books unaffordable, you can get that material here for free. Blog posts: I will confess that when I write my first blog post on September 17, 2008, I had no idea what a blog was, what I was doing with it, and whether it would last through the following week. In the years since, this blog has become my first go-to, when I have doubts or questions about something, and I am trying to resolve those doubts for myself. In short, my blog has becoming my therapy spot, in times of uncertainty, and I have had no qualms about admitting to these doubts. During 2020, as COVID made us question almost everything we know about markets and the economy, for instance, I posted on where I was in the uncertainty spectrum every week from February 14, 2020 (when the virus became a global problem, not one restricted to China and cruise ships) to November 2020, when the vaccine appeared. You can get all of those posts in one paper, if you click on this link. While my original blog was on Google, in the last two years, I have replicated these posts on Substack (you need to be a subscriber, but it is free) and on LinkedIn. If you are on the latter, you are welcome to follow me, but I have hit my connections limit (I did not even know there was one, until I hit it) and am unable to add connections. YouTube: For the last decade, I have posted my class videos on YouTube, grouping them into playlists for each class. You can start with the link to my YouTube channel here, but if you are interested in taking a class, my suggestion is that you click on the playlists and pick on the one that corresponds to the class. Here, for instance, are my links to my Spring 2025 MBA valuation class and my Spring 2025 Corporate Finance class. Starting about a decade, I have also accompanied every one of my blog posts with a YouTube video, that contains the same material, and you can find those posts in its own (very long) playlist.  X (Twitter): Some of you have strong feelings about X, with some of those feelings reflecting your political leanings and others driven by the sometimes toxic posting on the platform. I have been a user of the platform since April 2009, and I have used it as a bulletin board, to alert people to content being posted elsewhere. In fact, outside of these "alert" posts, I almost never post on X, and steer away as far away as I can from debates and discussions on the platform, since a version of Gresham's law seems to kick in, where the worst and least informed posters hijack the debate and take it in directions that you do not want it to go. I cannot think of a single item of content that I have produced in the last decade that is not on one of these platforms, making my professional life an open book, and thus also accessible to any AI entity. The Damodaran bot that I wrote about last year has access to all of this material, and while I signed off on that and one other variant, there are multiple unauthorized versions that have been works-in-progress.  The Commonalities     My content has taken many forms including posts, videos, data and spreadsheets, and is on multiple platforms, but there are a few common features that they share: Low tech: I am decidedly low tech, and it shows in my sharing. My website looks like it was designed two decades ago, because it was, and contains none of the bells and whistles that make for a modern website. My blog remains on Google blogger, notwithstanding everything I have been told about how using WordPress would make it more attractive/adaptable, and my posts are neither short nor punchy. Every week, I get people reaching out to me to tell me that my YouTube videos are far too long and verbose, and that I would get more people watching with shorter videos and catchier descriptions, and much as I appreciate their offers to help, I have not taken them up on it., In addition, I shoot almost every one of my videos in my office, sometimes with my dog in the background, and often with ambient noise and mistakes embedded, making them definitely unpolished.  On twitter, I have only recently taken to stringing tweets together and I have never used the long text version that some professional twitter users have mastered. In my defense, I could always claim that I am too old to learn new tricks, but the truth is that I did not start any of my sharing as a means to acquiring a larger social media following, and it may very well be true that keeping my presence low-tech operates as a screener, repelling mismatched users. Process over product: In my writing and teaching, I am often taken to task for not getting to the bottom line (Is the stock cheap or expensive? Should I buy or sell?) quickly, and spending so much time on the why and how, as opposed to the what. Much as my verbosity may frustrate you, it reflects what I think my job is as a teacher, which is to be transparent about process, i.e., explain how I reasoned my way to getting an answer than giving you my answer. Pragmatism over Purity: Though I am often criticized for being an “academic”, I am a terrible one, and if there were an academic fraternity, I would be shunned. I view much of an academic research as navel gazing, and almost everything I write and teach is for practitioners. Consequently, I am quick to adapt and modify models to make them fit both reality and the available data, and make assumptions that would make a purist blanch.  No stock picks or investment advice: In all my years of writing about and valuing markets and individual stocks, I have tried my best to steer away from making stock picks or offering investment advice. That may sound odd, since so much of what I do relates to valuation, and the essence of valuation is that you act on your estimates of value, but here is how I explain the contradiction. I value stocks (like Meta or Nvidia or Amazon or Mercado Libre) and I act (buy or sell) those stocks, based on my valuations, but it is neither my place nor my role to try to get other people to do the same. That said, I will share my story and valuation spreadsheet with you, and if you want to adapt that story/spreadsheet to make it your own, I am at peace with that choice, even if it is different from mine. The essence of good investing is taking ownership of your investment actions, and it is antithetical to that view of the world for me or anyone else to be telling you what to buy or sell. No commercial entanglements: If you do explore my content on any of the platforms it is available on, you will notice that they are free, both in terms of what you pay and how you access them. In fact, none of them are monetized, and if you do see ads on my YouTube videos, it is Google that is collecting the revenue, not me. One reason for this practice is that I am lazy, and monetizing any of these platforms requires jumping through hoops and catering to advertisers that I neither have the time nor the inclination to do. The other is that I believe (though this may be more hope than truth) that one of the reasons that people read what I write or listen to me is because, much as they may disagree with me, I am perceived as (relatively) unbiased. I fear that formalizing a link with any commercial entity (bank, consultant, investor), whether as advisor, consultant or as director, opens the door to the perception of bias. The one exception to the "no commercial entranglements' clause is for my teaching engagements, with the NYU Certificate program and for the handful of valuation seminars I teach in person in the rest of the world. I am grateful that NYU has allowed me to share my class recordings with the world, and I will not begrudge them whatever they make on my certificate classes, though I do offer the same content for free online, on my webpage. I am also indebted to the people and organizations that manage the logistics of my seminars in the rest of the world, and if I can make their life easier by posting about these seminars, I will do so.     The Imitation Game     Given that my end game in sharing is to give access to people who want to use my material, I have generally taken a lax view of others borrowing my slides, data, spreadsheets or even webcasts, for their own purposes. For the most part, I categorize this borrowing as good neighbor sharing, where just as I would lend a neighbor a key cooking ingredient to save them the trouble of a trip to the grocery store, I am at peace with someone using my material to help in their teaching, save time on a valuation or a corporate finance project, prepare for an interview, or even burnish their credentials. An acknowledgement, when this happens, is much appreciated, but I don't take it personally when none is forthcoming.  There are less benign copycat versions of the imitation game - selectively using data from my site to back up arguments, misreading or misinterpreting what I have said and reproducing large portions of my writing without acknowledgement. To be honest, if made aware of these transgressions, I have gently nudged the culprits, but I don't have a legal hammer to follow up. The most malignant variations of this game are scams, where the scammers use my content or name to separate people from their money - the education companies that used my YouTube videos and charge for classes, the data sites that copy my data or spreadsheets and sell them to people, and the valuation/investment sites that try to get people to invest money, with my name as a draw. Until now, I have tried, as best as I can, to let people know that they are being victimized, but for the most part, these scams have been so badly designed that they have tended to collapse under the weight of their own contradictions. It is clear to me that AI is now going to change this game, and that I will have to think about new ways to counter its insidious reach. To get a measure of what the current AI scams that are making the rounds get right and wrong, I did take the time to take a closer look at both the Instagram post and the fake video that are making the rounds.  What they get right: The Instagram post, which is in shown below, uses language that clearly is drawn from my posts and an image that is clearly mine. Not only does this post reflect the way I write, but it also picked Nvidia and  Palantir as the two firms to highlight,  the first a company that I own and have valued on my blog, and the second a company that I have been talking about as one that I am interested in owning, at the right price, giving it a patina of authenticity. The video looks and sounds like me, which should be no surprise since it had thousands of hours of YouTube videos to use as raw data. Using a yiddish word that I picked up in my days in New York, I have the give the scammers credit for chutzpah, on this front,, but I will take a notch off the grade, for the video's slickness, since my videos have much more of a homemade feel to them. What they struggled with most: The scam does mention that Palantir is "overhyped", a word that I use rarely, and while it talks about the company’s valuation, it is cagey about what that value is and there is little of substance to back up the claim. Palantir is a fascinating company, but to value it, you need a story of a data/software firm, with two channels for value creation, one of which looks at the government as a customer (a lower-margin, stickier and lower growth business) and the other at its commercial market (higher margin, more volatile and higher growth). Each of the stories has shades of grey, with the potential for overlap and conflict, but this is not a company where you can extrapolate the past, slap numbers on revenue growth and profitability, and arrive at a value. This post not only does not provide any tangible backing for its words in terms of value, but it does not even try. If these scammers had truly wanted to pull this off, they could have made their AI bot take my class, construct a plausible Palantir story, put it into my valuation spreadsheet and provide it as a link.  What they get wrong: To get a sense of what this post gets wrong, you should revisit the earlier part of the post where I talk about my sharing philosophy, and with as much distance as I can muster, here are the false notes in this scam. First, this scam pushes people to join an investment club, where I will presumably guide them on what to buy or sell. Given that my view of clubs is very much that of Groucho Marx, which is that I would not be belong to any club which would admit me as a member, the notion of telling people which stocks to buy cuts against every grain of my being. Second, there is a part of this scam where I purportedly promise investors who decide to partake that they will generate returns of 60% or higher, and as someone who has chronicled that not only do most active investors not keep up with the market, and argued that anyone who promises to deliver substantially more than the market in the long term is either a liar or fraud, this is clearly not me.  In sum, there is good news and bad news in this grading assessment. The good news is that this AI scam gets my language and look right, but it is sloppily done in terms of content and capturing who I am as a person. The bad news is that it if this scammer was less lazy and more willing to put in some work, even with the current state of AI, it would have been easy to bring up the grades on content and message. I will wager that the Damodaran Bot that I mentioned earlier on in this post that is being developed at NYU Stern would have created a post that would have been much more difficult for you to detect as fake, making it a Frankenstein monster perhaps in the making. The worse news is that AI technology is evolving, and it will get better on every one of these fronts at imitating others, and you should prepare yourself for a deluge of investment scams. An AI Protective Shield     I did think long about writing this post, wondering whether it would make a difference. After all, if you are a frequent reader of this blog or have read this post all the way down to this point, it is unlikely that you were fooled by the Instagram post or video. It remains an uncomfortable truth that the people most exposed to these scams are the ones who have read little or none of what I have written, and I wish there were a way that I could pass on the following suggestions on how they can protect themselves against the other fakes and scams that will undoubtedly be directed at them.  "Looks & sounds like" not good enough: Having seen the flood of fake AI videos in the news and on social media, I hope that you have concluded that “looks and sounds Iike” is no longer good enough to meet the authenticity test. This remains AI’s strongest suit, especially in the hands of the garden variety scammer, and you should prepare yourself for more fake videos, with political figures, investing luminaries and experts targeted. Steer away from arrogance & hype: I have always been skeptical of the notion that there is “smart” money, composed of investors who know more than the rest of us and are able to beat the market consistently, and for long periods. For the most part, when you see a group of investors (hedge funds, private equity) beating the market, luck is more of a contributor as skill, and success is fleeting. In a talk on the topic, I argued that investors should steer away from arrogance and bombast, and towards humility, when it comes to who they trust with their money, and that applies in spades in the world of AI scams. Since most scammers don’t understand the subtlety of this idea, screening investment sales pitches for outlandish claims alone will eliminate most scams. Do your homework: If you decide to invest with someone, based upon a virtual meet or sales pitch, you should do your homework and that goes well beyond asking for their track records in terms of performance. In my class on investment philosophies, I talk about how great investors through the ages have had very different views of markets and ways of making money, but each one has had an investment philosophy that is unique, consistent and well thought through. It is malpractice to invest with anyone, no matter what their reputation for earning high returns, without understanding that person’s investment philosophy, and this understanding will also give you a template for spotting fakes using that person’s name.  Avoid ROMO & FOMO: In my investing classes, I talk about the damage that ROMO (regret over missing out) and FOMO (fear of missing out) can do to investor psyches and portfolio.  With ROMO (regret over missing out), where you look back in time and regret not buying Facebook at its IPO price in 2012 or selling your bitcoin in  November 2013, when it hit $1000, you expose yourself to two emotions. The first is jealousy, especially at those who did buy Facebook at its IPO or have held on to their bitcoin to see its price hit six digits. The second is that you start buying into conspiracy theories, where you convince yourself that these winners (at least in the rear view mirror) were able to win, because the game was fixed in their favor. Both make you susceptible to chasing after past winners, and easy prey for vendors of conspiracies. With FOMO (fear of missing out), your overwhelming concern is that you will miss the next big multi-bagger, an investment that will increase five or ten fold over the next year or two. The emotion that is triggered is greed, leading you to overreach in your investing, cycling through your investments, as most of them fall short of your unrealistic expectations, and searching for the next “big thing”, making you susceptible to anyone offering a pathway to get there. Much as we think of scammers as the criminals and the scammed as the victims, the truth is that scams are more akin to tangos, where each side needs the other. The scammer’s techniques work because they trigger the emotions (fear, greed) of the scammed, to respond, and AI will only make this easier to do. Looking to regulators or the government to protection will do little more than offer false comfort, and the best defense is “caveat emptor” or “buyer beware”.  YouTube Video Links Webpage: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/home.htm  Blog:  (1) Google: https://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com  (2) Substack: https://aswathdamodaran.substack.com  (3) LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/aswathdamodaran/  YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLvnJL8htRR1T9cbSccaoVw X: https://x.com/aswathdamodaran?lang=en

3 days ago 6 votes
AI is polytheistic, not monotheistic

And ten more thoughts on AI.

5 days ago 14 votes
Country Risk 2025: The Story behind the Numbers!

At the start of July, I updated my estimates of equity risk premiums for countries, in an semiannual ritual that goes back almost three decades. As with some of my other data updates, I have mixed feelings about publishing these numbers. On the one hand, I have no qualms about sharing these estimates, which I use when I value companies, because there is no secret sauce or special insight embedded in them. On the other, I worry about people using these premiums in their valuations, without understanding the choices and assumptions that I had to make to get to them. Country risk, in particular, has many components to it, and while you have to ultimately capture them in numbers, I wanted to use this post to draw attention to the many layers of risk that separate countries. I hope, and especially if you are a user of my risk premiums, that you read this post, and if you do have the time and the stomach, a more detailed and much longer update that I write every year. Country Risk - Dimensions     When assessing business risk from operating in a country, you will be affected by uncertainty that arises from almost every source, with concerns about political structure (democracies have very different risk profiles than authoritarian regimes), exposure to violence (affecting both costs and revenues),  corruption (which operates an implicit tax) and legal systems (enforcing ownership rights) all playing out in business risk. I will start with political structure, where the facile answer is that it less risky to operate a business in a democracy than in an authoritarian regime, but where the often unpalatable truth is that each structure brings its own risks. With democracies, the risk is that newly elected governments can revisit, modify or discard policies that a previous government have adopted, requiring businesses to adapt and change to continuous changes in policy. In contrast, an authoritarian government can provide long term policy continuity, with the catch being that changes in the government, though infrequent, can create wrenching policy shifts that businesses have to learn to live with. Keeping the contrast between the continuous risk of operating in a democracy and the discontinuous risk in an authoritarian structure in mind, take a look at this picture of how the world looked in terms of democracy leading into 2025: Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) It is worth noting that there are judgment calls that the Economist made in measuring democracy that you and I might disagree with, but not only is a large proportion of the world under authoritarian rule, but the trend lines on this dimension  also have been towards more authoritarianism in the last decade.         On the second dimension, exposure to violence, the effects on business are manifold. In addition to the threat that violence can affect operations, its presence shows up as higher operating costs (providing security for employees and factories) and as insurance costs (if the risks can be insured). To measure exposure to violence, from both internal and external sources, I draw on measures developed and updated by the Institute of  Economics & Peace across countries in 2024: Institute of Economics & Peace The Russia-Ukraine war has caused risk to flare up in the surrounding states and the Middle East and central Africa continue to be risk cauldrons, but at least according to the Institute's measures, the parts of the world that are least exposed to violence are in Northern Europe, Australia and Canada. Again, there are judgments that are made in computing these scores that will lead you to disagree with specific country measures (according the Peace Institute, the United States and Brazil have higher exposures to violence than Argentina and Chile, and India has more exposure to violence than China), but the bottom line is that there are significant differences in exposure to violence across the world.          Corruption is a concern for everyone, but for businesses, it manifests in two ways. First, it puts more honest business operators at a disadvantage in a corrupt environment, since they are less willing to break the rules and go along with corrupt practices than their less scrupulous competitors. Second, even for those businesses that are willing to play the corruption game, it creates costs that I would liken to an implicit tax that reduces profits, cash flows and value. The measure of corruption that I use comes from Transparency International, and leading into July 2025, and the heat map below captures corruption scores (with higher scores indicating less corruption), as well as the ten most and least corrupt countries in the world:  Transparency International As you can see from the map, there are vast swaths of the world where businesses have to deal with corruption in almost every aspect of business, and while some may attribute this to cultural factors, I have long argued that corruption almost inevitably follows in bureaucratic settings, where you need licenses and approvals for even the most trivial of actions, and the bureaucrats (who make the licensing decisions) are paid a pittance relative to the businesses that they regulate.           As a final component, I look at legal systems, especially when it comes to enforcing contractual agreements and property rights, central to running successful businesses. Here, I used estimates from the IPRI, a non-profit institution that measures the quality of legal systems around the world. In their latest rankings from 2024, here is how countries measured up in 2024: Property Rights Alliance In making these assessments, you have to consider not just the laws in place but also the timeliness with which these laws get enforced, since a legal system where justice is delayed for years or even decades is almost as bad as one that is capricious and biased.  Country Risk - Measures     The simplest and most longstanding measure of country risk takes the form of sovereign ratings, with the same agencies that rate companies (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) also rating countries, with the ratings ranging from Aaa (safest) to D (in default). The number of countries with sovereign ratings available on them has surged in the last few decades; Moody’s rated 13 countries in 1985, but that number increased to 143 in 2025, with the figure below listing the number of rated countries over time: Note that that the number of Aaa rated countries stayed at eleven, even while more countries were rated, and has dropped from fifteen just a decade ago, with the UK and France losing their Aaa ratings during that period. In May 2025, Moody's downgraded the United States, bringing them in line with the other ratings agencies; S&P downgraded the US in 2011 and Fitch in 2023. The heat map below captures sovereign ratings across the world in July 2025: Moody's While sovereign ratings are useful risk measures, they do come with caveats. First, their focus on default risk can lead them to be misleading measures of overall country risk, especially in countries that have political risk issues but not much default risk; the Middle East, for instance, has high sovereign ratings. Second, the ratings agencies have blind spots, and some have critiqued these agencies for overrating European countries and underrating Asian, African and Latin American countries. Third, ratings agencies are often slow to react to events on the ground, and ratings changes, when they do occur, often lag changes in default risk.     If you are leery about trusting ratings agencies, I understand your distrust, and there is an alternative measure of sovereign default risk, at least for about half of all countries, and that is the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, which investors can buy protection against country default. These market-determined numbers will reflect events on the ground almost instantaneously, albeit with more volatility than ratings. At the end of June 2025, there were about 80 countries with sovereign CDS available on them, and the figure below captures the values: The sovereign CDS spreads are more timely, but as with all market-set numbers, they are subject to mood and momentum swings, and I find using them in conjunction with ratings gives me a better sense of sovereign default risk.     If default risk seems like to provide too narrow a focus on countr risk, you can consider using country risk scores, which at least in principle, incorporate other components of country risk. There are many services that estimate country risk scores, including the Economist and the World Bank, but I have long used Political Risk Services (PRS) for my scores.. The PRS country risk scores go from low to high, with the low scores indicative of more country risk, and the table below captures the world (at least according to PRS): Political Risk Services (PRS) There are some puzzling numbers here,  with the United States coming in as riskier than Vietnam and Libya, but that is one reason why country risk scores have never acquired traction. They vary across services, often reflecting judgments and choices made by each service, and there is no easy way to convert these scores into usable numbers in business and valuation or compare them across services.      Country Risk - Equity Risk Premiums     My interest in country risk stems almost entirely from my work in corporate finance and valuation, since this risk finds its way into the costs of equity and capital that are critical ingredients in both disciplines. To estimate the cost of equity for an investment in a risky country. I will not claim that the approaches I use to compute equity risk premiums for countries are either original or brilliant, but they do have the benefit of consistency, since I have used them every year (with an update at the start of the year and mid-year) since the 1990s.      The process starts with my estimate of the implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500, and I make this choice not for parochial reasons but because getting the raw data that you need for the implied equity risk premium is easiest to get for the S&P 500, the most widely tracked index in the world. In particular, the process requires data on dividends and stock buybacks on the stocks in the index, as well as expected growth in these cash flows over time, and involves finding the discount rate (internal rate of return) that makes the present value of cash flows equal to the level of the index. On June 30, 2025, this assessment generated an expected return of 8.45% for the index: Download ERP spreadsheet Until May 2025, I just subtracted the US 10-year treasury bond rate from this expected return, to get to an implied equity risk premium for the index, with the rationale that the US T.Bond rate is the riskfree rate in US dollars. The Moody’s downgrade of the US from Aaa to Aa1 has thrown a wrench into the process, since it implies that the T.Bond rate has some default risk associated with it, and thus incorporates a default spread. To remove that risk, I net out the default spread associated with Aa1 rating from the treasury rate to arrive at a riskfree rate in dollars and an equity risk premium based on that: Riskfree rate in US dollars       = T.Bond rate minus Default Spread for Aa1 rating                                                             = 4.24% - 0.27% = 3.97% Implied equity risk premium for US = Expected return on S&P 500 minus US $ riskfree rate                                                             = 8.45% - 3.97% = 4.48% Note that this approach to estimating equity risk premiums is model agnostic and reflects what investors are demanding in the market, rather than making a judgment on whether the premium is right or what it should be (which I leave to market timers).        To get the equity risk premiums for other countries, I need a base premium for a mature market, i.e., one that has no additional country risk, and here again, the US downgrade has thrown a twist into the process. Rather than use the US equity risk premium as my estimate of the mature market premium, my practice in every update through the start of 2025, I adjusted that premium (4.48%) down to take out the US default spread (0.27%), to arrive at the mature market premium of 4.21%. That then becomes the equity risk premium for the eleven countries that continue to have Aaa ratings, but for all other countries, I estimate default spreads based upon their sovereign ratings. As a final adjustment, I scale these default spreads upwards to incorporate the higher risk of equities, and these become the country risk premiums, which when added to the mature market premium, yields equity risk premiums by country. The process is described below: Download spreadsheet The results from following this process are captured in the picture below, where I create both a heat map based on the equity risk premiums, and report on the ratings, country risk premiums and equity risk premiums, by country: Download equity risk premium, by country If you compare the equity risk premium heat map with the heat maps on the other dimensions of country risk (political and legal structures, exposure to violence and corruption), you will notice the congruence. The parts of the world that are most exposed to corruption and violence, and have capricious legal systems, tend to have higher equity risk premiums. The effects of the US ratings downgrade also manifest in the table, with the US now having a higher equity risk premium than its Aaa counterparts in Northern Europe, Australia and Canada. A User's Guide      My estimates of equity risk premiums, by country, are available for download, and I am flattered that there are analysts that have found use for these number. One reason may be that they are free, but I do have concerns sometimes that they are misused, and the fault is mine for not clarifying how they should be used. In this section, I will lay out steps in using these equity risk premiums in corporate finance and valuation practice, and  if I have still left areas of  grey, please let me know. Step 1: Start with an understanding of what the equity risk premium measures     The starting point for most finance classes is with the recognition that investors are collectively risk averse, and will demand higher expected returns on investments with more risk. The equity risk premium is a measure of the “extra” return that investors need to make, over and above the riskfree rate, to compensate for the higher risk that they are exposed to, on equities collectively. In the context of country risk, it implies that investments in riskier countries will need to earn higher returns to beat benchmarks than in safer countries. Using the numbers from July 2025, this would imply that investors need to earn 7.46% more than the riskfree rate to invest in an average-risk investment in India, and 10.87% more than the riskfree rate to invest in an average risk investment in Turkey.     It is also worth recognizing how equity risk premiums play out investing and valuation. Increasing the equity risk premium will raise the rate of return you need to make on an investment, and by doing so, reduce its value. That is why equity risk premiums and stock prices move inversely, with the ERP rising as stock prices drop (all other thins being held constant) and falling as stock prices increase.  Step 2: Pick your currency of analysis (and estimate a riskfree rate)     I start my discussions of currency in valuation by positing that currency is a choice, and that not only can you assess any project or value any company in any currency, but also that your assessment of project worth or company value should not be affected by that choice. Defining the equity risk premium as the extra return that investors need to make, over and above the risk free rate, may leave you puzzled about what riskfree rate to use, and while the easy answer is that it should be the riskfree rate in the currency you chose to do the analysis in, it is worth emphasizing that this riskfree rate is not always the government bond rate, and especially so, if the government does not have Aaa rating and faces default risk. In that case, you will need to adjust the government bond rate (just as I did with the US dollar) for the default spread, to prevent double counting risk.   Staying with the example of an Indian investment, the expected return on an average-risk investment in Indian rupees would be computed as follows: Indian government bond rate on July 1, 2025 = 6.32% Default spread for India, based on rating on July 1, 2025 = 2.16% Indian rupee risk free rate on July 1, 2025 = 6.32% - 2.16% = 4.16% ERP for India on July 1, 2025 = 7.46% Expected return on average Indian equity in rupees on July 1, 2025 = 4.16% + 7..46% = 11.62% Note also that if using the Indian government bond rate as the riskfree rate in rupees, you would effectively be double counting Indian country risk, once in the government bond rate and once again in the equity risk premium.     I know that the ERP is in dollar terms, and adding it to a rupee riskfree rate may seem inconsistent, but it will work well for riskfree rates that are reasonably close to the US dollar risk free rate. For currencies, like the Brazilian real or Turkish lira, it is more prudent to do your calculations entirely in US dollars, and convert using the differential inflation rate: US dollar riskfree rate on July 1, 2025 = 3.97% ERP for Turkey on July 1, 2025 = 10.87% Expected return on average Turkish equity in US $ on July 1, 2025 = 3.97% + 10.87% = 14.84% Expected inflation rate in US dollars = 2.5%; Expected inflation rate in Turkish lira = 20% Expected return on average Turkish equity Turkish lira on July 1, 2025 = 1.1484 *(1.20/1.025) -1 = 34.45% Note that this process scales up the equity risk premium to a higher number for high-inflation currencies. Step 3: Estimate the equity risk premium or premiums that come into play based on operations    Many analysts use the equity risk premiums for a country when valuing companies that are incorporated in that country, but I think that is too narrow a perspective. In my view, the exposure to country risk comes from where a company operates, not where it is incorporated, opening the door for bringing in country risk from emerging markets into the cost of equity for multinationals that may be incorporated in mature markets. I use revenue weights, based on geography, for most companies, but I am open to using production weights, for natural resource companies, and even a mix of the two.  In corporate finance, where you need equity risk premiums to estimate costs of equity and capital in project assessment, the location of the project will determine which country’s equity risk premiums come into play. When Amazon decides to invest in a Brazilian online retail project, it is the equity risk premium for Brazil that should be incorporated, with the choice of currency for analysis determining the riskfree rate.  Step 4: Estimate project-specific or company-specific risk measures and costs     The riskfree rate and equity-risk premiums are market-wide numbers, driven by macro forces. To complete this process, you need two company-specific numbers: Not all companies or projects are average risk, for equity investors in them, and for companies that are riskier or safer than average, you need a measure of this relative risk. At the risk of provoking those who may be triggered by portfolio theory or the CAPM, the beta is one such measure, but as I have argued elsewhere, I am completely at home with alternative measures of relative equity risk. The cost of equity is calculated as follows:  Cost of equity = Riskfree rate + Beta × Equity Risk Premium The beta (relative risk measure) measures the risk of the business that the company/project is in, and for a diversified investor, captures only risk that cannot be diversified away. While we are often taught to use regressions against market indices to get these betas, using industry-average or bottom-up betas yields much better estimates for projects and companies. For the cost of debt, you need to estimate the default spread that the company will face. If the company has a bond rating, you can use this rating to estimate the default spread, and if it is not, you can use the company's financials to assess a synthetic rating. Cost of debt =Riskfree Rate + Default spread Harking back to the discussion of riskfree rates, a company in a country with sovereign default risk will often bear a double burden, carrying default spreads for both itself and the country. The currency choice made in step two will hold, with the riskfree rate in both the cost of equity and debt being the long-term default free rate in that currency (and not always the government bond rate). Step 5: Ensure that your cash flows are currency consistent      The currency choice made in step 2 determines not only the discount rates that you will be using but also the expected cash flows, with expected inflation driving both inputs. Thus, if you analyze a Turkish project in lira, where the expected inflation rate is 20%, you should expect to see costs of equity and capital that exceed 25%, but you should also see growth rates in the cash flows to be inflated the same expected inflation. If you assess the same project in Euros, where the expected inflation is 2%, you should expect to see much lower discount rates, high county risk notwithstanding, but the expected growth in cash flows will also be muted, because of the low inflation.     There is nothing in this process that is original or path-breaking, but it does yield a systematic and consistent process for estimating discount rates, the D in DCF. It works for me, because I am a pragmatist, with a valuation mission to complete, but you should feel free to adapt and modify it to meet your concerns.  YouTube Video Paper Country Risk Determinants: Determinants, Measures and Implications - The 2025 Edition Datasets Equity Risk Premiums, by country - July 2025 Country Risk Links EIU Democracy Index Global Peace Index (Exposure to Violence) Corruption Index International Property Rights Index Moody's Sovereign Ratings Political Risk Services (PRS) Country Risk Scores Spreadsheets Implied Equity Risk Premium for S&P 500 on July 1, 2025

a week ago 12 votes
Curate your own newspaper with RSS

Escape newsletter inbox chaos and algorithmic surveillance by building your own enshittification-proof newspaper from the writers you already read

a week ago 10 votes