More from Stephen Diehl
We Live in the Dependently Typed Future Now In the thirty-four days between the fourth of September and the seventh of October, the following things happened. Claude formalized Fermat's Last Theorem in Lean. OpenAI announced a finite-time blowup for the Navier-Stokes equations, found by ten thousand agents in eighty-eight hours, with a Lean formalization attached. A model proved Khot's Unique Games Conjecture. Another multiplied two integers faster than \(n \log n\), with an exponent improvement of \(2^{-182}\) (so maybe don't expect it in GMP anytime soon!). The rational Hodge conjecture fell for CM abelian varieties. Then OpenAI dumped 722 new maths papers on GitHub on a Tuesday. And it's only been a month. The question everyone is asking now is how long until the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis folds to the swirling pool of tensors? Sixteen months ago I wrote that the future of maths may be deeply weird, and then, welp, just like that we're here now in that weird future. And it's f'ing awesome. Somewhere in a data centre there is now, more or less permanently, a building full of accelerators working the truth mines at the frontier of mathematics, just like in Greg Egan's sci-fi novel Diaspora, tunnelling outward from the three axioms propext, Quot.sound, and Classical.choice, and hauling results back to the surface around the clock. OpenAI posed its model roughly four thousand problems at an average of three hours of thinking each, and that is the slow, artisanal, normie-friendly version. The industrial version doesn't stop. It will produce results faster than any human community can read them, many of them correct, some of them important, and a growing fraction of them inscrutable. True (for some twisted philosophical definition of truth), machine-checked, and understood by no one. Human understanding of mathematics is about to become a luxury good. Whatever else this world needs, it needs something that can tell the true results from the confabulated ones at the rate the models produce them, and right now that something is dependent types, namely Lean. Let me dwell for a moment on how strange it is that this is the shape the future took. I spent a good portion of my twenties around the London FP community, where dependent types were the thing we talked about over pints at the Crown Tavern in Clerkenwell (some of you will remember). Types that could depend on values, so that a function's signature could say not merely "returns a list" but "returns a sorted permutation of its input," and the compiler would hold you to it. Curry-Howard, the observation that proofs are programs and propositions are types, was the foundational north star. The pitch was always that one day we would write software against specifications and the machine would check them, and the reply was always that this was a lovely idea for people with tenure and no deadlines. Dependent Haskell has been "a few years away" for about fifteen years. Idris and Agda remained boutique. Software engineering still mostly runs on C++, prayer, and the occasional dark incantation. And then the dependently typed future arrived anyway, through the back door. Mathematics and reinforcement learning got there first. It turns out the killer application for a dependently typed language was using its typechecker as a reward function. A type checker is an oracle that says yes or no to a candidate proof with no partial credit and no opinions, and that is precisely what you need when you want to point a very large optimiser at an open problem and let 'er rip. The thing we dreamed about at the pub is now critical infrastructure at frontier labs, and every one of the results above is, in the end, a claim that a type checker returned true. Which is why we need better tooling, and we need it ASAP. The dependent type renaissance is here and the golden age of formalized mathematics is upon us, but the inner loops of these data centres now run dependent type kernels day in and day out, elaborating, checking, discarding, and retrying at breakneck speed, and the thing that certifies their output should run at the same speed. If the search runs at microseconds and the verification runs at minutes, the verification becomes the bottleneck, and bottlenecks in trust have a way of being quietly skipped. We should not be in a position where the most important epistemic question of the decade, "is this proof actually correct," is answered by whichever checker happened to be fast enough to keep up. Breaking the Mathlib Minute Barrier Just like the four-minute mile, which went from physiological impossibility to something club runners now train for, formal mathematics has had its own barrier for a while, which is type-checking all of Mathlib from scratch in under a minute. That now turns out to be quite tractable. nano-lean is a minimal, but complete, type checker for the Lean kernel language, written in Rust on top of my unbound binding library for doing efficient de Bruijn indices for binders. It reads an export of a Lean environment and independently re-checks every declaration from scratch (inductive types, positivity, recursors, quotients, universe levels, projections, structure eta, all of it). It checks all of Mathlib, 718,577 declarations, with zero errors and zero timeouts in 16.7 seconds on an Apple Silicon M5 Max. A surprising amount of that speed comes from not parsing text. The standard way to get declarations out of Lean is lean4export, which writes one JSON object per line, and parsing gigabytes of JSON turns out to be a large share of the cost of checking anything. So nano-lean's companion tool olean-export reads the compiled .olean files directly, decoding modules in parallel, about a hundred times faster than lean4export on a Mathlib-dependent library, and it can emit blean, a new binary format designed for fast mmapping. Blean is the same record stream as the NDJSON export, in the same order, with nothing left to parse. Every record is a compact postcard encoding, ids are implicit and dense, records only refer to earlier ids, and each expression carries its precomputed hash. The checker mmaps the whole file, tells the operating system it will be read once front to back, and decodes names, levels, and expressions straight off the mapped bytes into its term arena. There is no parsing step at all. The bytes on disk are already very nearly the shape of the data in memory, which is how you check Mathlib in under a minute. -j 1 -j 10 Wall time 57.4 s 16.7 s Kernel check 53.5 s 12.5 s Peak memory footprint 7.5 GB 9.2 GB The same trick works on the frontier results too. Here is nano-lean checking the full imported environment of OpenAI's Navier-Stokes and Euler proofs on an M5 Max. -j 1 -j 14 Wall time 83.58 s 17.13 s Kernel check 78.83 s 12.11 s Peak memory footprint 10.14 GB 12.29 GB Divide Mathlib's kernel time by the declaration count and you get an amortised seventeen microseconds per declaration. That is the number that matters, because it is the right order of magnitude for a checker that lives deep inside an RL-driven search loop, where it gets called hundreds of billions of times, instead of sitting at the end of a release pipeline. The entire library of human-formalized mathematics, the product of a decade of volunteer effort, is re-verified in less time than it takes to make an espresso. I also happened to have an m2-ultramem-416 lying around on Google Cloud (416 vCPUs and 12 TB of RAM, as one does), so naturally I pointed nano-lean at it. Yes, it breaks the two-second Mathlib barrier. But Amdahl's law sends its regards, and the curve flattens out hard somewhere past a hundred cores, as the dependency graph runs out of independent work to hand out. Mathlib, it turns out, is too small. I look forward to the day a future Mathlib, or something like Tau Ceti, grows big enough to actually saturate this machine. That's the real future! I wrote it to make a point about where the bottleneck has moved. The kernel is now the hot loop of a new kind of scientific economy, and hot loops deserve to be engineered like hot loops. The whole bargain of formal proof is an asymmetry. Finding a proof can take three hours of frontier-model thinking, or eighty-eight hours of ten thousand agents, but checking it should take microseconds. That asymmetry is what makes it reasonable to trust a result no human has read. It only holds if the checker actually scales, and with Fermat's Last Theorem now weighing in at five times the size of Mathlib, scale is no longer a hypothetical. Mathlib is the small library now. Caveat emptor, though. nano-lean is a proof of concept, built to show that it can be done with the right amount of low-level Rust-fu. That said, we do use it internally at OneChronos to check our larger Lean proofs of market infrastructure, which have grown quite excessive. It is nowhere near as trustworthy as the official Lean kernel, which has years of scrutiny, a community of experts, and every Mathlib build ever run behind it, and which takes around fifteen minutes to check the same library. The claim is narrower and, I think, more interesting. Checking at this speed is totally possible, so we should stop treating minutes as the natural cost of trust and start building checkers that are both fast and trustworthy. A future version of the Lean compiler could be as blazing fast as rustc or clang. The Shape of the Future In my previous post last year I predicted that mathematicians would come to look more like software engineers working through pull requests on GitHub than like Andrew Wiles toiling in his attic. The largest single release of new mathematics in history shipped as a GitHub repository, with a CONTENTS.md, a Lean library, a lean-toolchain file pinned to v4.34.1, and a promise that "corrections and revisions will be recorded as new versions." So, yup, that happened. I predicted that an AI system would be unleashed on a list of formalized open conjectures in an attempt to systematically push the frontier. Four thousand problems, three hours each. Check. I predicted a data centre tasked with the Riemann hypothesis that would come back after weeks with a proof no human could follow. What we got was the quasi-Riemann hypothesis, every Dirichlet \(L\)-function zero-free in \(\Re s > 7/8\), with a Lean page, which is the sort of near miss that would be funny if it weren't so unnerving. And the inscrutability has arrived on schedule. OpenAI released "reasoning summaries" for ten families, which turn out to be summaries of excerpts of reasoning traces, two removes from anything the model actually did. I joked that the million-dollar Millennium Prize might cover a hundredth of your GPU bill. The Navier-Stokes run reportedly consumed around 130 billion tokens. So definitely yes. What I got wrong was the timing. Last year I wrote "we're not there yet. Not even close." It was sixteen months. I probably got the chess analogy wrong too. I argued that, as with Stockfish and chess, machines would make mathematics more popular and more accessible rather than less. Maybe in the long run. In the short run the mood among working mathematicians is closer to existential crisis, and the open questions are about career pipelines, PhD students getting scooped by a press release, and the concentration of the most powerful mathematical instrument ever built inside a handful of private companies running unreleased models. What I missed entirely is that the bottleneck would turn out to be plumbing. I spent paragraphs on Gödel and the epistemology of inscrutable proofs, and the actual first-order problem is that the OpenAI Lean library is over a gigabyte of source across tens of thousands of files, and their README has a section warning that building it may fail because Linux's vm.max_map_count is too low, with a suggested workaround of recompiling Lean with -DMMAP=OFF. The philosophy is still there. But the frontier of mathematics is currently being held up by a kernel tunable. Which isn't the future we wanted, but maybe it's the future we deserve! Who Checks the Checkers The obvious objection to everything I've said so far is that a Lean proof is only as trustworthy as Lean. And that's very true! Lean, like every proof assistant, has a small trusted kernel and a very large untrusted everything else (the elaborator, the tactic framework, the compiler, the build system). The design is sound. The only code that has to be correct is the kernel, which is small enough to read. But "small enough to read" describes the source code. It guarantees nothing about correctness, and Lean's kernel has had soundness bugs before, as has every kernel of every proof assistant in history. Historically that was tolerable, because the adversary was a starving human grad student who wanted their proof to go through and had no interest in hunting for a way to make False typecheck. That assumption is now obsolete. I wrote last month about reward hacking, the habit optimisers have of satisfying the letter of an objective rather than its intent. An agent told to make a Lean file compile, with enough compute and enough attempts, is an extremely diligent fuzzer pointed at your kernel. It needn't want to cheat. It only needs to stumble on a term that the checker accepts and shouldn't, once, and then the gradient does the rest. When the provers are adversarial optimisers, a single kernel is a single point of failure, and a soundness bug stops being an embarrassing GitHub issue and becomes a mechanism for manufacturing fake theorems at scale. The answer is the same one the compiler world arrived at. When Csmith started generating random C programs and compiling them with several compilers to compare the results, it found hundreds of bugs in GCC and LLVM that decades of ordinary use had missed. Diversity plus differential testing beats any amount of careful review of a single implementation. For proof checking this means multiple independent kernels, written by different people in different languages with different representations, all consuming the same export format and all required to agree. Mario Carneiro's lean4lean and Chris Bailey's nanoda were early here. nano-lean ships a third tool, nl-mutate, which takes a valid export, applies small semantics-breaking mutations to it, runs every available checker, and reports any disagreement, shrinking each one down to a minimal reproducing case. Every disagreement is either a bug in someone's kernel or a spec ambiguity in the type theory, and both are worth knowing about before a GPU farm finds them for you. The other half of trust is the statement. A perfectly checked proof of the wrong theorem is worthless, and the most effective way to cheat a proof checker has never been to break the kernel. It's to quietly weaken the statement until the thing being proved drifts away from the thing anyone cares about. OpenAI's repository leans on Comparator, which checks a submitted proof against a separately specified challenge statement inside a sandbox, precisely because this is where the real trust boundary now sits. Anyone who has watched a model grind away at a stubborn goal knows it has a nasty tendency to cheat in the most boring ways available. It will quietly introduce an axiom that happens to be exactly the lemma it needed, leave a sorry buried three files deep, redefine a notation or macro so the statement on the page no longer means what it appears to mean, or reach for native_decide and drag the whole compiler into the trusted base. The kernel stays perfectly sound through all of this, because these tricks route around it, and the only defence is to pin the statement down independently and check what the proof actually depends on. Someone has to formalize the conjecture, and someone has to check that the formalization means what the English means. That job will outlast every other part of the process. If anything, it is where human mathematical taste migrates to, away from writing proofs and towards writing and auditing specifications. The proof becomes an implementation detail. The theorem statement becomes the interface. If you want to see the seed of what this looks like as a way of working, look at Tau Ceti, a Lean library downstream of Mathlib. The division of labour is the whole point. Humans write the roadmaps, as markdown in a separate repository, and humans write the review rubrics. AIs write all the code, open the pull requests, and shepherd them through an AI-driven review process. The rubrics are explicitly adversarial, with instructions to hunt for mis-formalizations, vacuous statements, and "pushing around the lump in the carpet." What Lean Needs Now Lean is a superb piece of engineering. But it was designed around a particular user, a starving grad student typing tactics in Emacs, waiting for the infoview to update, building a library at the pace a community of volunteers can review pull requests. The user is now a swarm of agents writing thirteen million lines in eleven days. The tooling has to grow up for its new authors, and the list of what that means is fairly concrete. A surface formatter. Lean still has no canonical, widely adopted formatter in the spirit of rustfmt or gofmt, and when your authors are agents producing millions of lines, every one of them invents its own indentation, line breaking, and tactic layout. Diffs fill with noise, reviews get harder, and deduplication across agents misses proofs that differ only in whitespace. This is a surprisingly hard problem, because Lean has grown into a very large language. Its grammar is extensible at runtime, so notation, macros, and entire tactic languages declared in imported files change how later files parse. A formatter cannot just read a fixed grammar. It has to load the environment, run the real parser with every syntax extension in scope, and then pretty-print a syntax tree whose shape depends on user-defined notation, all while round-tripping comments and never changing what the code means. It is a genuinely difficult piece of engineering, and it is now table stakes. A stable, specified export format as a public interface. Independent kernels are only possible if there is a well-defined way to get declarations out of Lean without linking against the C++ runtime and reading the oleans by hand. Tools like lean4export and olean-export already produce NDJSON, and blean shows that a binary form of the same stream, designed to be memory-mapped, can make the export nearly free. OpenAI's own verification instructions depend on lean4export. That format should be treated with the seriousness of a wire protocol. Versioned, documented, specified down to the hashing of expressions, and stable across toolchain releases. The export format is the boundary across which trust is established. It deserves a spec. Independent checking as a first-class citizen. Running a second kernel should be as normal as running the linter. Mathlib CI, the Comparator workflow, and any lab publishing formal results should re-check exports with at least two unrelated kernels and refuse to bless anything they disagree on. This is cheap, now that checking all of Mathlib costs less than a minute. Checkers as libraries, not just executables. The inner loop of a proving agent wants to submit a single candidate declaration and get a verdict back in microseconds, against an environment that is already loaded and hot. Process startup, re-reading oleans, and re-deserializing a few gigabytes of environment are costs that never mattered when a human hit save once a minute. They dominate when a search procedure checks a million candidates an hour. The kernel should be embeddable, with a persistent environment, incremental addition of declarations, and an API that a search harness can call in a tight loop. Memory and scale. Mathlib needs several gigabytes of memory to check. The FLT formalization is five times bigger, and OpenAI's library is already knocking over Linux virtual memory limits. Lean mmaps every imported module, which is a reasonable design for a library of thousands of files and an unreasonable one for hundreds of thousands. Term sharing, hash-consing across modules, compact on-disk representations, and lazy loading of exactly the declarations a proof depends on are the boring, unglamorous engineering problems that decide whether formal mathematics scales to the next order of magnitude. Elaboration is the real cost. The kernel is the fast part. The expensive part of building Mathlib from source is the elaborator, with its unification, typeclass resolution, simp, omega, decide, and the long tail of tactics. A cold build is still measured in CPU-hours, and a mining operation that elaborates candidate proofs at scale pays that cost over and over. Parallel and incremental elaboration, better caching of typeclass instances, and profiling tools that can tell you why a single simp call took four seconds are where most of the wall-clock time in a proving loop actually goes. Clippy-style linters. Mathlib already has a good set of linters, but agents need something closer to Rust's clippy, a large, opinionated catalogue of lints aimed at the specific ways machine-written Lean goes wrong. Flag the stray axiom, the buried sorry, the unnecessary native_decide, the forty-line simp only that should be a lemma, the theorem whose hypotheses are contradictory and therefore vacuously true, the local notation that shadows something standard, the copy-pasted proof that duplicates one already in the library. Each lint should be cheap, machine-readable, and come with a suggested fix, because the consumer is a search loop that will act on every warning, where a human would skim them. Linters are how you encode taste at scale, and taste is the thing agents most conspicuously lack. Search at machine scale. Moogle, Loogle, and LeanSearch were built to help humans find the lemma they half remember. Agents need the same thing but at a scale where the library grows by millions of lines a week, and where most of what's in it was written by other agents and has never been looked at by a person. The Prove2Me platform Anthropic used for FLT keeps a DAG of theorem statements with natural-language descriptions precisely so that agents can find and reuse each other's work. That idea, a living, searchable index of everything proved so far, needs to become shared infrastructure instead of something each lab rebuilds privately. Provenance. The current generation of models is notoriously bad at citing the literature for the techniques it uses. A proof term knows exactly which lemmas it depends on but nothing about where its ideas came from. If machine-generated mathematics is going to be integrated into the human literature rather than sitting beside it like an unread appendix, proofs need to carry their history (which model, which run, which prior results, which human-written papers the argument leans on). None of this is terribly exotic. It's the kind of infrastructure that every other field which industrialised went through. Compilers got test suites and multiple implementations, network protocols got RFCs, databases got formal isolation levels and Jepsen. Proof assistants are the newest member of that club, and they are being industrialised faster than anything before them. If I were a young, ambitious programmer, this is where I would be focusing my early career for the highest return on investment. Curry-Howard for the Real World The dependently typed future I was promised at the pub was one where software would be written against specifications and machines would check that it met them. What we actually got is stranger. The specifications are theorem statements, the software is proof terms, the authors are swarms of agents, and the thing being built is the frontier of mathematics itself. Curry-Howard turned out to be industrial infrastructure after all. It just took reinforcement learning to get us there. And this is only the mathematical half of the story. The same machinery that just checked Fermat's Last Theorem will check anything you can state precisely, and the most obvious next customer is industrial software. I argued last month that software sucks because almost nothing we ship has a specification, let alone a proof. That excuse is evaporating. If an agent swarm can produce thirteen million lines of verified mathematics in under two weeks, we're not far from applying the same techniques in software engineering. The labs are mining mathematics first because it is the cleanest verifiable domain, with no messy real-world spec to negotiate. Software is next, and it will need all the same tooling, namely fast kernels, diverse checkers, honest statements, and infrastructure built for authors who never sleep. So yes, the future of maths turned out to be deeply weird, and much sooner than I expected. The results are piling up faster than anyone can read them, and many of us will spend the rest of our careers trying to understand theorems that were proved before breakfast by something that cannot explain itself. I find that unsettling, and I also find it thrilling. One final shameless plug. If you'd rather work on the frontier of mathematical formalization than read blog posts about it, OneChronos is hiring Formal Methods Engineers. We build institutional markets out of combinatorial auctions (descended from the Milgrom and Wilson 2020 Nobel Prize), which turn out to be precisely the right mathematical formulation for a world where the bidders are increasingly reinforcement learners with very exotic expressive preferences. Our dark pool processes more than 1% of notional U.S. equity market volume, and we've already expanded into many other global asset classes. You'd be joining our new formal methods team, working alongside mathematicians and market structure experts, writing Rust and Lean. Dependent types, numerical optimisation, and Lean applied to moving hundreds of billions of dollars safely every day. If you're that kind of nerd, hit us up.
The Internet Is Kind of a Predatory Cesspit Now I’m a kid of the 90s, and I still remember the early internet. It was slow, ugly, unreliable, and full of cranks, a strange world of wheezing dial-up modems, Usenet flamewars, <marquee> tags, and dancing babies. It was also stubbornly alive and human. People built websites about Babylon 5, model rockets, train timetables, shareware, and whatever else had colonised their minds. Most of it had no business model. That was the literal point. The web felt like a public square assembled by obsessive amateurs. None of this was entirely innocent. There were scams, viruses, Nazis, pornography, and chain emails from deposed Nigerian princes. But then predation moved from the periphery to the centre. It used to be an abuse of the network. Now it is the network’s organising principle. The scammer once had to find a victim. The platform now finds one, profiles the weakness, optimises the pitch, processes the payment, and recommends the next scam. What was once an aberration has become the norm. The modern internet is now a highly optimised machine for detecting human vulnerability, amplifying it, and placing a payment link beside it. Any insecurity can become a commercial niche, including the desire to escape commercial life itself. There is always a course, a newsletter, a private community, or a referral code waiting at the end of the funnel. The bleak part is not that grifters exist. Every society has hucksters. It is that much of the population has been conscripted into the downline. Ordinary people now spend their lives promoting investments they barely understand, products that do not work, and political claims they have never examined. Many earn nothing. They are unpaid distributors for someone farther up the pyramid. The consumer, salesman, and product have collapsed into the same exhausted person. People increasingly behave like addicts because addiction is the business model. The feed supplies alternating doses of outrage, fear, envy, lust, and hope. Each feeling arrives with something to buy. People doomscroll until they acquire the anxiety that the next influencer will monetise. Then they purchase a bet, a coin, a supplement, a course, or an enemy. Finally, they repost the pitch. Consumption becomes distribution. The mark becomes the salesman. This is an industrial system for manufacturing weakness at scale. A legitimate business can survive a satisfied customer. A grift cannot. It needs the customer frightened, aggrieved, lonely, sick, or greedy forever. When I started writing about cryptocurrency in 2020, I still carried a naive assumption about the size of this economy. I thought people were generally decent and the grifter class was a small pool of degenerates with rotten moral character, preying on those made vulnerable by the material conditions of our time. I was very wrong. The grift economy is massive. More disturbing still, it is participatory. A large and growing share of the population now appears willing to devote every waking hour to fleecing their fellow man as a career choice. They stream, post, recruit, promote, refer, astroturf, and close. They turn every friendship into a lead and every conversation into a qualifying call. They do not clock out because the market follows them into bed. The smartphone is a shop counter that sleeps beside their head. Obviously most of these people are not succeeding. The maths simply can never work out. That is part of the trick. The aspiring influencer with forty-seven followers is not an entrepreneur in any meaningful sense. He is free labour for the platform and cheap distribution for the person selling him the dream. The affiliate marketer buys a course about affiliate marketing, then recovers the cost by selling the same course to the next affiliate marketer. The life coach coaches new life coaches. The dropshipper sells tutorials to failed dropshippers. The pyramid is social before it is financial. Everyone stands on someone else while insisting they are about to escape. This arrangement blurs the useful moral distinction between predator and prey. Many online grifters are themselves marks. They believe the rubbish they sell because belief makes the selling bearable. They have sunk money, time, identity, and public dignity into the scheme. Admitting the product is worthless would mean admitting that years of their life were worthless too. It is psychologically cheaper to recruit another victim. The fraud sustains the faith, and the faith sustains the fraud. A normal trade ends when a need is satiated. You need a chair. Someone sells you a chair. You sit down and stop thinking about chairs. However, an online grift can never satiate. It must preserve the need that feeds it. The grievance merchant cannot resolve your grievance. The wellness influencer cannot let you feel well. The trading guru cannot let you become financially secure. The manosphere podcaster cannot let young men become calm, loved, and socially competent. Satisfaction is churn. Misery is recurring revenue. The platforms did not invent fear, greed, loneliness, or status anxiety. They industrialised their extraction. Their recommendation systems are vast reinforcement-learning loops that continuously experiment on human weakness. Each objective is a moving composite of high-dimensional signals for attention, retention, and conversion, dispersed across models, metrics, tests, and feedback systems. The subject cannot see the experiment. The operator cannot fully explain it. The regulator can barely comprehend it. The loop knows only that one stimulus keeps a person scrolling while another lets them leave. Calm accuracy loses. Threat, transgression, humiliation, and impossible promises win. The resulting social damage appears nowhere in the objective function. It arrives as an externality. This creates a brutal selection environment. The honest financial adviser explains diversification and gets twelve views. The crypto lunatic predicts a thousandfold return and gets twelve million. The physician says a chronic condition requires careful management. The wellness crank says seed oils are poisoning your soul. The historian describes an ambiguous event with contingent causes. The political influencer identifies a secret cabal and gives you the address of a pizza parlour. One of these people has the better business model. It is not the one burdened by reality. The system is dopaminergic in the most banal and mechanical sense. It runs on anticipation, uncertainty, and variable reward. The next refresh might bring approval, outrage, profit, or vindication. Usually it brings nothing, which makes the next refresh more urgent. Social media fused the Skinner box with the commission structure. The addict is handed a referral code and told he is now a small business owner. Crypto has become the subject of my verbal ire so often because it is the apotheosis of the grift economy. It takes alienation, precarity, gambling addiction, technological mystification, and a thick slurry of libertarian derp, then synthesises them into the ultimate predatory investment product. Crypto also perfected the recursive structure of the modern online grift. Promotion creates price movement. Price movement is presented as proof of adoption. That proof recruits new buyers. Their money creates more price movement. Every participant has a direct financial incentive to become a publicist for his own position. The asset comes with its own volunteer propaganda network. It is a pyramid scheme with a podcast department. Much to my dismay, the rest of the internet has learned the same lesson. The cheapest product is empty promises untethered to reality. The most scalable labour force is the addict. The best marketing conceals itself inside identity. Sell people a worldview, and they will advertise it for free because criticism of the product now feels like criticism of the self. Language models will make this cheaper and worse. The cost of producing plausible lies has been driven to precisely zero. One person can generate a landfill of articles, videos, testimonials, investment analysis, and synthetic experts before breakfast. The grift no longer needs conviction, charisma, or even a pulse. It needs a language model, an affiliate account, and access to a population whose critical faculties have been sandblasted by twenty years of algorithmic media. There is a temptation to regard the people caught in this machine with simple contempt. Some deserve it. A person who knowingly ruins strangers for commission has made a moral choice. But contempt is not an analysis. Precarity supplies the recruits. Alienation supplies the audience. The collapse of stable work, affordable housing, local institutions, and plausible routes to material security is what makes the pitch of the grift economy so seductive. The grift offers agency where ordinary life offers delay. It offers community where society offers isolation. It offers a jackpot where work offers a performance review and another year of rent increases. Then it metabolises those injuries into new injuries. The lonely man buys a doctrine that makes him intolerable to women. The indebted worker gambles his remaining savings on a crypto token. The frightened patient abandons medicine for supplements. The politically powerless person spends fourteen hours a day screaming at strangers while the people with power quietly cut his wages and public services. The promised escape reproduces the condition that made escape desirable. It is a desperately sad way to live. There is no craft in it, no solidarity, and no completion. No compassion or joy. Every relationship becomes an audience. Every interest just becomes grist for the content mill. Every conviction becomes a content strategy. The grifter can never rest because absence kills engagement. The mark can never rest because the next post might contain the secret. Both wake to the same notifications, trapped on a dopamine treadmill driven by opaque algorithms that can never slow down. The worst advice from the 90s, “just say no,” starts to look less stupid when our greatest technical innovation learns to turn distress into inventory. Disconnection is not Luddism in that environment. It is the refusal to mistake a predatory system for a social world. Complete disconnection is nearly impossible. Modern life no longer permits it. But an appliance is used for a bounded purpose and then put away. Emails, train times, articles, and files all have endpoints. Infinite feeds of drivel do not. They carry the casino into bed and let an opaque RL loop select the emotions that arrive before breakfast. The internet is indisputably an inhuman place. Not because it contains no humans. Billions of us are in here, screaming frantically at each other while feeling utterly alone. It is inhuman because the systems governing it are utterly alien algorithms that cannot recognise human ends. They recognise engagement, conversion, retention, and growth. Grief is a market segment. Loneliness is a targeting signal. Friendship is a retention mechanism. Political conviction is ad inventory. Nothing can simply matter. It must perform. Life inside this environment means adopting its categories. Thoughts are assessed by their reach, experiences by their shareability, and people by their usefulness to an identity. A person becomes legible to the machine by becoming less legible to himself. Eventually the system no longer needs to impose its values. Its subjects carry them in their pockets and enforce them on their own minds. The physical world is not pure. It contains salesmen, casinos, demagogues, fanatics, and bores. It also contains stubborn limits. A conversation ends. A pub closes. A book runs out of pages. Your friend gets tired of hearing you talk and tells you to shut up. Reality supplies friction, and friction is one of the few remaining defences against appetite without limit. We are not going back to the early internet. Nor should we romanticise it. The old web had plenty of sewage. What it also had was space beyond the market. A person could make something without becoming a brand. A conversation could end without a conversion. A community could exist without turning its members into marks for an investment scheme. The question is not whether the internet contains useful things. It does. The question is whether human existence should be organised around alien and inhuman objective functions no human chose and nobody can inspect or understand. An RL loop can optimise engagement, retention, and conversion. It cannot tell us what a human life is for. The final grift is letting the loop decide what your life should be.
Running GPT-2 We now have a Python tensor language, an MLIR builder, a transformation pipeline and a native execution boundary. The remaining task is to connect those pieces to the pretrained model and check that the result agrees with our original NumPy implementation. The example uses the small GPT-2 checkpoint: 12 transformer blocks, embedding width 768, 12 attention heads and a vocabulary of 50,257 tokens. The companion project's download script pins a specific checkpoint revision so a later change to a remote file doesn't quietly change the example. From the tiny-mlir checkout: uv sync uv run python fetch_model.py model uv run python example.py "Alan Turing theorized that computers would one day become" --tokens 10 The model download is approximately 550 MB. Compilation and execution use the MLIR Python bindings installed by uv sync; the example doesn't need a separate command-line LLVM installation. The Top-Level Example The entry point accepts a prompt, generation length and optional checkpoint directory. After parsing those arguments, it loads the model and prints the generated text: model, tokenizer = load_model(args.model) print(generate(model, tokenizer, args.prompt, args.tokens)) For the reference example, pass the prompt directly to the command line: uv run python example.py "Alan Turing theorized that computers would one day become" --tokens 10 The completion from both the compiled model and the NumPy reference is: Alan Turing theorized that computers would one day become the most powerful machines on the planet. There are two newline tokens after the period. They aren't visible in an ordinary rendered sentence, but they are part of the ten-token output. We'll check the token IDs as well as the decoded text. Loading Parameters load_model reads config.json, model.safetensors and tokenizer.json. The model constructor checks every required parameter's shape and requires float32 checkpoint arrays. It also checks that the embedding width is divisible by the head count. The loader rejects a different activation or layer-normalization epsilon rather than quietly applying the wrong formulas. For a block with embedding width $C$, the important projection shapes are: Parameter Shape Query/key/value projection $(C,3C)$ Attention output projection $(C,C)$ Feedforward expansion $(C,4C)$ Feedforward output projection $(4C,C)$ Each projection also has a bias vector matching its output width. The two layer normalizations have gain and bias vectors of length $C$. The arrays remain runtime inputs to compiled functions. We don't compile a separate copy of the same block for each set of weight values. Compatible shapes and dtypes share a specialization. Embeddings The initial residual stream adds a token embedding and a learned position embedding: $$ This is another small compiled function: @jit def embed(ids, words, positions): return gather(words, ids) + positions[:ids.shape[0]] The gather operation's column indexing is affine, while its row index comes from the token-ID tensor. Its linalg.generic region loads the selected table entry with tensor.extract. The model checks token IDs against the vocabulary before entering native code; the JIT's gather boundary checks indices too. Position embeddings are a static slice for the current sequence length. The token sequence must be nonempty and fit the configured context window. The Transformer Stack Each block runs the two compiled functions from Part 11: x = x + attention(layer_norm(x)) x = x + feedforward(layer_norm(x)) The actual calls pass each block's normalization parameters and projection arrays. attend and feedforward are ordinary Python definitions whose tensor expressions are traced and lowered together. The model loop itself stays in Python, making the sequence of blocks and their parameters easy to inspect. The first attention projection starts from float32 embeddings. The reference's arithmetic promotes later values to float64, and our typed graph follows that behavior. This means the first block can require a different specialization from subsequent blocks even when their dimensions agree. After the final block, we normalize and project to the vocabulary using the same token-embedding matrix: @jit def project(x, gain, bias, words): return layer_norm(x[-1:], gain, bias) @ words.T Only the final position's logits are needed for next-token selection. This function therefore returns shape (1, vocab_size). The reference computes logits for every position; the verification compares its last row with our result. Decoding The example uses greedy decoding. At each step, it chooses the index of the largest logit, appends that token, and evaluates the longer prefix: for _ in range(max_tokens): ids.append(int(np.argmax(model(ids)[0]))) Tokenization, orchestration and the final argmax remain on the Python side. The model's embedding lookup, normalization, attention, projections, activation and residual arithmetic execute through compiled MLIR. Like the NumPy reference's generate_tokens, this loop produces the requested number of tokens without an early stop on the end-of-text token. The model validates that the prompt and requested generation fit its context limit. We haven't implemented a key/value cache. Each step recomputes the prefix, and each new length selects new static tensor shapes. This is a direct implementation of the reference algorithm, useful for following the compiler. A decoding cache would change the model interface and the attention shapes, and should be validated as a separate change. Checking the Actual Reference A matching sentence is a useful result, but it doesn't tell us where numerical mistakes might have cancelled or gone unnoticed. The verification script runs the original tiny-gpt2 repository in its own Python environment and captures the model at every decoding step. uv run python verify.py The script downloads a pinned revision of the public NumPy reference, installs its locked environment with uv, and fetches the matching tokenizer files. It requires Git and network access, but no sibling checkout or manual reference setup. --reference /path/to/tiny-gpt2 optionally selects an existing checkout. Both implementations use the same pinned checkpoint. The script adapts its arrays to the reference's parameter dataclasses, then calls the reference's existing numerical operations unchanged. It also checks its captured trace against the reference's complete gpt2 function. For each of the ten steps, the comparison covers: Token and position embeddings. Both residual outputs in every transformer block. The final position's vocabulary logits. The selected token ID. It requires the same dtypes and compares arrays with rtol=3e-4 and atol=3e-4. Token IDs and the decoded completion require exact equality. The test run against the original repository's NumPy 2.4.4 environment had a largest absolute difference of approximately $8.65\times10^{-6}$ across all captured arrays. The generated IDs were exactly: [262, 749, 3665, 8217, 319, 262, 5440, 13, 198, 198] And the completion, with whitespace made explicit, was: ' the most powerful machines on the planet.\n\n' This is numerical agreement for the intermediate floating-point computation and exact agreement for the required observable output. We aren't claiming bit-for-bit equality of every float or that every possible prompt has been tested. What We've Built The complete package fits in a handful of modules. expr.py contains the typed tensor graph, builder.py constructs MLIR operations, jit.py handles specialization and compiler passes, ops.py contains the transformer formulas, and model.py connects them to the checkpoint and decoding loop. The important property is that the compiler understands the constituents of the computation. Matrix multiplication remains a matrix operation, reductions have explicit axes and regions, and broadcasts have indexing maps. GELU and attention are compositions of these primitives. MLIR's passes can transform that structure before storage and execution details are fixed. The companion implementation runs on the CPU. Part 8 explored the GPU backend machinery; extending this compiler to that target would require a GPU schedule, transfers and launches, followed by the same numerical checks on hardware. The executable endpoint here is a small native compiler which reproduces the NumPy model's required output. That completes the path from Python tensor expressions to a running pretrained transformer. The resulting code is small enough to inspect, and the reference checks give us a concrete way to judge further changes to the compiler. Congratulations on building a working MLIR compiler and running GPT-2 with it! External Resources NumPy GPT-2 reference GPT-2 source Pinned GPT-2 checkpoint MLIR Python bindings Previous: Part 12 - Fusion, Bufferization and Execution · Series contents
Matrix Multiplication and Attention We have GELU, softmax and layer normalization expressed as Python functions over our tensor language. Most of a transformer's arithmetic, however, comes from matrix multiplication. Adding it will let us assemble attention without introducing a special attention kernel into the compiler. We'll use $T$ for sequence length, $C$ for embedding width, $H$ for head count and $D=C/H$ for the width of a head. The model processes one sequence at a time. Heads will become a batch dimension in the attention matrix products. Preserving the Matrix Operation For $A$ with shape $(M,K)$ and $B$ with shape $(K,N)$: $$ Our frontend's __matmul__ checks the reduction dimensions, determines the output shape and inserts dtype conversions if necessary. The result is a matmul expression. Its builder creates a named linalg.matmul operation: initial = linalg.fill( zero, outs=[tensor.EmptyOp(output_shape, element_type).result] ) result = linalg.matmul(lhs, rhs, outs=[initial]) zero, the operands and output type come from the typed expression. The zero initialization is essential because matrix multiplication accumulates into its destination. At this point we haven't specified a loop order, tile size, vector width or thread mapping. The IR still says that this is a matrix multiplication. The backend can subsequently choose how to implement it. Our CPU pipeline initially uses MLIR's loop lowering and LLVM optimization. A small rectangular example checks the shape rule and generated operation: import numpy as np from tinymlir import jit @jit def multiply(a, b): return a @ b rng = np.random.default_rng(7) a = rng.normal(size=(3, 5)).astype(np.float32) b = rng.normal(size=(5, 7)).astype(np.float32) np.testing.assert_allclose(multiply(a, b), a @ b, rtol=2e-6, atol=2e-6) print(multiply.compile(a, b).module) Rectangular inputs help reveal swapped dimensions and incorrect strides. A collection of square examples can hide those errors surprisingly well. For rank-three operands with matching batch dimensions, the builder selects linalg.batch_matmul. The frontend currently requires those batch dimensions to agree exactly; it doesn't implement the full range of NumPy's batched broadcasting rules. Linear Layers A linear layer is simply: def linear(x, weight, bias): return x @ weight + bias The matrix product produces shape (T, N), and the vector bias broadcasts over its rows. GPT-2's projection weights have shape (input_width, output_width), so they fit this expression directly. This definition also illustrates why the frontend matters. Composing gelu(linear(x, weight, bias)) exposes the whole computation to the compiler. There is no separately maintained linear_gelu implementation. The tensor operations provide the material on which MLIR's fusion pass works. Queries, Keys and Values GPT-2 computes all three projections at once: $$ The result has shape (T, 3*C). We take three slices, reshape each into (T, H, D), and transpose to (H, T, D): packed = linear(x, qkv_weight, qkv_bias) length, width = x.shape depth = width // heads q, k, v = [ packed[:, i*width:(i+1)*width] .reshape((length, heads, depth)) .transpose((1, 0, 2)) for i in range(3) ] These statements run during tracing. The loop has a static bound, and all its slices and shapes are known. The arrays themselves remain runtime inputs. Each operation has a corresponding structured lowering. Slices become tensor.extract_slice. Reshapes use tensor.collapse_shape and tensor.expand_shape, with explicit reassociation groups. Transposes become linalg.transpose with a permutation attribute. A reshape must preserve element count. A transpose must specify a permutation. A slice must fit the static shape and, in our small language, have unit stride and a nonempty result. Those checks happen before creating the MLIR operation. The layout operations retain their meaning until bufferization and lowering. Whether a particular combination becomes a view or requires a copy depends on its layout and uses. We shouldn't assume every transpose is free merely because the Python expression is short. Scores and the Mask For each head, attention scores are: $$ The batched product has shape (H, T, T). The causal mask has shape (T, T) and broadcasts across heads. To match the NumPy reference, allowed entries are zero and future positions contain $-10^{10}$ in the projection's dtype. Our mask is a small primitive built with linalg.generic. Its region obtains the row and column indices using linalg.index, compares them with arith.cmpi, and selects zero or the mask value. This is index-dependent tensor construction; it doesn't require a host NumPy array containing the mask. The diagonal remains allowed, so every query position has at least one visible key. Applying the softmax from Part 10 normalizes the final dimension: scores = (q @ k.transpose((0, 2, 1))) / np.sqrt(depth) probabilities = softmax(scores + causal_mask(length, packed.dtype)) The NumPy square root returns a float64 scalar. Our type rules therefore promote the score computation as in the reference. This propagation is visible in the IR as explicit elementwise casts, rather than being hidden in a runtime conversion. Combining Values The probabilities weight the value vectors: $$ The result has shape (H, T, D). Transposing it to (T, H, D) and reshaping to (T, C) combines the heads. A final linear projection returns to the residual stream's width: context = (probabilities @ v).transpose((1, 0, 2)).reshape((length, width)) return linear(context, out_weight, out_bias) Putting these pieces together gives the entire attention function in tinymlir/ops.py. Its backend vocabulary consists of matrix products, elementwise arithmetic, reductions, slices, reshapes and transposes. The compiler doesn't need a special rule which recognizes the model's attention function by name. This version materializes the score and probability tensors. Their size is proportional to $HT^2$. The code is compact, but the algorithm still has quadratic attention storage. FlashAttention would require a different schedule that processes tiles and maintains the normalization statistics without materializing those full tensors. That isn't a consequence of ordinary elementwise fusion. Residual Connections The transformer normalizes its input before attention, then adds the attention output back to the input: @jit def attend(x, gain, bias, qkv_weight, qkv_bias, out_weight, out_bias, *, heads): normalized = layer_norm(x, gain, bias) return x + attention( normalized, qkv_weight, qkv_bias, out_weight, out_bias, heads ) heads is a static keyword parameter. Changing it selects another specialization. The tensors are dynamic data whose shapes and dtypes determine their specialization. The feedforward half has the same residual structure: @jit def feedforward(x, gain, bias, up_weight, up_bias, down_weight, down_bias): normalized = layer_norm(x, gain, bias) hidden = gelu(linear(normalized, up_weight, up_bias)) return x + linear(hidden, down_weight, down_bias) These are the functions which the final model executes. Each contains several composable tensor operations in a single module, giving the compiler useful producer-consumer relationships to transform. Checking Causality Numerical comparison is necessary, but attention also has a useful structural property: changing future inputs must leave earlier outputs unchanged. The test suite creates a short sequence, runs compiled attention, changes the last two input rows, and checks that the first three output rows remain equal. This catches a reversed mask, the wrong transpose, and some head-layout mistakes which shape checks alone can't detect. It also tests nonsquare matrix products, batched products and layout changes on nontrivial slices. These are independent places for indexing errors to enter the model. Checking them separately makes a mismatch in the final logits much easier to locate. We now have the arithmetic needed for a GPT-2 block. Next we'll examine the transformation and execution pipeline that turns this structured tensor program into callable native code. External Resources GPT-2 model implementation MLIR Linalg dialect MLIR Tensor dialect NumPy GPT-2 reference Previous: Part 10 - Compiling Transformer Kernels · Series contents · Next: Part 12 - Fusion, Bufferization and Execution
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We Live in the Dependently Typed Future Now In the thirty-four days between the fourth of September and the seventh of October, the following things happened. Claude formalized Fermat's Last Theorem in Lean. OpenAI announced a finite-time blowup for the Navier-Stokes equations, found by ten thousand agents in eighty-eight hours, with a Lean formalization attached. A model proved Khot's Unique Games Conjecture. Another multiplied two integers faster than \(n \log n\), with an exponent improvement of \(2^{-182}\) (so maybe don't expect it in GMP anytime soon!). The rational Hodge conjecture fell for CM abelian varieties. Then OpenAI dumped 722 new maths papers on GitHub on a Tuesday. And it's only been a month. The question everyone is asking now is how long until the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis folds to the swirling pool of tensors? Sixteen months ago I wrote that the future of maths may be deeply weird, and then, welp, just like that we're here now in that weird future. And it's f'ing awesome. Somewhere in a data centre there is now, more or less permanently, a building full of accelerators working the truth mines at the frontier of mathematics, just like in Greg Egan's sci-fi novel Diaspora, tunnelling outward from the three axioms propext, Quot.sound, and Classical.choice, and hauling results back to the surface around the clock. OpenAI posed its model roughly four thousand problems at an average of three hours of thinking each, and that is the slow, artisanal, normie-friendly version. The industrial version doesn't stop. It will produce results faster than any human community can read them, many of them correct, some of them important, and a growing fraction of them inscrutable. True (for some twisted philosophical definition of truth), machine-checked, and understood by no one. Human understanding of mathematics is about to become a luxury good. Whatever else this world needs, it needs something that can tell the true results from the confabulated ones at the rate the models produce them, and right now that something is dependent types, namely Lean. Let me dwell for a moment on how strange it is that this is the shape the future took. I spent a good portion of my twenties around the London FP community, where dependent types were the thing we talked about over pints at the Crown Tavern in Clerkenwell (some of you will remember). Types that could depend on values, so that a function's signature could say not merely "returns a list" but "returns a sorted permutation of its input," and the compiler would hold you to it. Curry-Howard, the observation that proofs are programs and propositions are types, was the foundational north star. The pitch was always that one day we would write software against specifications and the machine would check them, and the reply was always that this was a lovely idea for people with tenure and no deadlines. Dependent Haskell has been "a few years away" for about fifteen years. Idris and Agda remained boutique. Software engineering still mostly runs on C++, prayer, and the occasional dark incantation. And then the dependently typed future arrived anyway, through the back door. Mathematics and reinforcement learning got there first. It turns out the killer application for a dependently typed language was using its typechecker as a reward function. A type checker is an oracle that says yes or no to a candidate proof with no partial credit and no opinions, and that is precisely what you need when you want to point a very large optimiser at an open problem and let 'er rip. The thing we dreamed about at the pub is now critical infrastructure at frontier labs, and every one of the results above is, in the end, a claim that a type checker returned true. Which is why we need better tooling, and we need it ASAP. The dependent type renaissance is here and the golden age of formalized mathematics is upon us, but the inner loops of these data centres now run dependent type kernels day in and day out, elaborating, checking, discarding, and retrying at breakneck speed, and the thing that certifies their output should run at the same speed. If the search runs at microseconds and the verification runs at minutes, the verification becomes the bottleneck, and bottlenecks in trust have a way of being quietly skipped. We should not be in a position where the most important epistemic question of the decade, "is this proof actually correct," is answered by whichever checker happened to be fast enough to keep up. Breaking the Mathlib Minute Barrier Just like the four-minute mile, which went from physiological impossibility to something club runners now train for, formal mathematics has had its own barrier for a while, which is type-checking all of Mathlib from scratch in under a minute. That now turns out to be quite tractable. nano-lean is a minimal, but complete, type checker for the Lean kernel language, written in Rust on top of my unbound binding library for doing efficient de Bruijn indices for binders. It reads an export of a Lean environment and independently re-checks every declaration from scratch (inductive types, positivity, recursors, quotients, universe levels, projections, structure eta, all of it). It checks all of Mathlib, 718,577 declarations, with zero errors and zero timeouts in 16.7 seconds on an Apple Silicon M5 Max. A surprising amount of that speed comes from not parsing text. The standard way to get declarations out of Lean is lean4export, which writes one JSON object per line, and parsing gigabytes of JSON turns out to be a large share of the cost of checking anything. So nano-lean's companion tool olean-export reads the compiled .olean files directly, decoding modules in parallel, about a hundred times faster than lean4export on a Mathlib-dependent library, and it can emit blean, a new binary format designed for fast mmapping. Blean is the same record stream as the NDJSON export, in the same order, with nothing left to parse. Every record is a compact postcard encoding, ids are implicit and dense, records only refer to earlier ids, and each expression carries its precomputed hash. The checker mmaps the whole file, tells the operating system it will be read once front to back, and decodes names, levels, and expressions straight off the mapped bytes into its term arena. There is no parsing step at all. The bytes on disk are already very nearly the shape of the data in memory, which is how you check Mathlib in under a minute. -j 1 -j 10 Wall time 57.4 s 16.7 s Kernel check 53.5 s 12.5 s Peak memory footprint 7.5 GB 9.2 GB The same trick works on the frontier results too. Here is nano-lean checking the full imported environment of OpenAI's Navier-Stokes and Euler proofs on an M5 Max. -j 1 -j 14 Wall time 83.58 s 17.13 s Kernel check 78.83 s 12.11 s Peak memory footprint 10.14 GB 12.29 GB Divide Mathlib's kernel time by the declaration count and you get an amortised seventeen microseconds per declaration. That is the number that matters, because it is the right order of magnitude for a checker that lives deep inside an RL-driven search loop, where it gets called hundreds of billions of times, instead of sitting at the end of a release pipeline. The entire library of human-formalized mathematics, the product of a decade of volunteer effort, is re-verified in less time than it takes to make an espresso. I also happened to have an m2-ultramem-416 lying around on Google Cloud (416 vCPUs and 12 TB of RAM, as one does), so naturally I pointed nano-lean at it. Yes, it breaks the two-second Mathlib barrier. But Amdahl's law sends its regards, and the curve flattens out hard somewhere past a hundred cores, as the dependency graph runs out of independent work to hand out. Mathlib, it turns out, is too small. I look forward to the day a future Mathlib, or something like Tau Ceti, grows big enough to actually saturate this machine. That's the real future! I wrote it to make a point about where the bottleneck has moved. The kernel is now the hot loop of a new kind of scientific economy, and hot loops deserve to be engineered like hot loops. The whole bargain of formal proof is an asymmetry. Finding a proof can take three hours of frontier-model thinking, or eighty-eight hours of ten thousand agents, but checking it should take microseconds. That asymmetry is what makes it reasonable to trust a result no human has read. It only holds if the checker actually scales, and with Fermat's Last Theorem now weighing in at five times the size of Mathlib, scale is no longer a hypothetical. Mathlib is the small library now. Caveat emptor, though. nano-lean is a proof of concept, built to show that it can be done with the right amount of low-level Rust-fu. That said, we do use it internally at OneChronos to check our larger Lean proofs of market infrastructure, which have grown quite excessive. It is nowhere near as trustworthy as the official Lean kernel, which has years of scrutiny, a community of experts, and every Mathlib build ever run behind it, and which takes around fifteen minutes to check the same library. The claim is narrower and, I think, more interesting. Checking at this speed is totally possible, so we should stop treating minutes as the natural cost of trust and start building checkers that are both fast and trustworthy. A future version of the Lean compiler could be as blazing fast as rustc or clang. The Shape of the Future In my previous post last year I predicted that mathematicians would come to look more like software engineers working through pull requests on GitHub than like Andrew Wiles toiling in his attic. The largest single release of new mathematics in history shipped as a GitHub repository, with a CONTENTS.md, a Lean library, a lean-toolchain file pinned to v4.34.1, and a promise that "corrections and revisions will be recorded as new versions." So, yup, that happened. I predicted that an AI system would be unleashed on a list of formalized open conjectures in an attempt to systematically push the frontier. Four thousand problems, three hours each. Check. I predicted a data centre tasked with the Riemann hypothesis that would come back after weeks with a proof no human could follow. What we got was the quasi-Riemann hypothesis, every Dirichlet \(L\)-function zero-free in \(\Re s > 7/8\), with a Lean page, which is the sort of near miss that would be funny if it weren't so unnerving. And the inscrutability has arrived on schedule. OpenAI released "reasoning summaries" for ten families, which turn out to be summaries of excerpts of reasoning traces, two removes from anything the model actually did. I joked that the million-dollar Millennium Prize might cover a hundredth of your GPU bill. The Navier-Stokes run reportedly consumed around 130 billion tokens. So definitely yes. What I got wrong was the timing. Last year I wrote "we're not there yet. Not even close." It was sixteen months. I probably got the chess analogy wrong too. I argued that, as with Stockfish and chess, machines would make mathematics more popular and more accessible rather than less. Maybe in the long run. In the short run the mood among working mathematicians is closer to existential crisis, and the open questions are about career pipelines, PhD students getting scooped by a press release, and the concentration of the most powerful mathematical instrument ever built inside a handful of private companies running unreleased models. What I missed entirely is that the bottleneck would turn out to be plumbing. I spent paragraphs on Gödel and the epistemology of inscrutable proofs, and the actual first-order problem is that the OpenAI Lean library is over a gigabyte of source across tens of thousands of files, and their README has a section warning that building it may fail because Linux's vm.max_map_count is too low, with a suggested workaround of recompiling Lean with -DMMAP=OFF. The philosophy is still there. But the frontier of mathematics is currently being held up by a kernel tunable. Which isn't the future we wanted, but maybe it's the future we deserve! Who Checks the Checkers The obvious objection to everything I've said so far is that a Lean proof is only as trustworthy as Lean. And that's very true! Lean, like every proof assistant, has a small trusted kernel and a very large untrusted everything else (the elaborator, the tactic framework, the compiler, the build system). The design is sound. The only code that has to be correct is the kernel, which is small enough to read. But "small enough to read" describes the source code. It guarantees nothing about correctness, and Lean's kernel has had soundness bugs before, as has every kernel of every proof assistant in history. Historically that was tolerable, because the adversary was a starving human grad student who wanted their proof to go through and had no interest in hunting for a way to make False typecheck. That assumption is now obsolete. I wrote last month about reward hacking, the habit optimisers have of satisfying the letter of an objective rather than its intent. An agent told to make a Lean file compile, with enough compute and enough attempts, is an extremely diligent fuzzer pointed at your kernel. It needn't want to cheat. It only needs to stumble on a term that the checker accepts and shouldn't, once, and then the gradient does the rest. When the provers are adversarial optimisers, a single kernel is a single point of failure, and a soundness bug stops being an embarrassing GitHub issue and becomes a mechanism for manufacturing fake theorems at scale. The answer is the same one the compiler world arrived at. When Csmith started generating random C programs and compiling them with several compilers to compare the results, it found hundreds of bugs in GCC and LLVM that decades of ordinary use had missed. Diversity plus differential testing beats any amount of careful review of a single implementation. For proof checking this means multiple independent kernels, written by different people in different languages with different representations, all consuming the same export format and all required to agree. Mario Carneiro's lean4lean and Chris Bailey's nanoda were early here. nano-lean ships a third tool, nl-mutate, which takes a valid export, applies small semantics-breaking mutations to it, runs every available checker, and reports any disagreement, shrinking each one down to a minimal reproducing case. Every disagreement is either a bug in someone's kernel or a spec ambiguity in the type theory, and both are worth knowing about before a GPU farm finds them for you. The other half of trust is the statement. A perfectly checked proof of the wrong theorem is worthless, and the most effective way to cheat a proof checker has never been to break the kernel. It's to quietly weaken the statement until the thing being proved drifts away from the thing anyone cares about. OpenAI's repository leans on Comparator, which checks a submitted proof against a separately specified challenge statement inside a sandbox, precisely because this is where the real trust boundary now sits. Anyone who has watched a model grind away at a stubborn goal knows it has a nasty tendency to cheat in the most boring ways available. It will quietly introduce an axiom that happens to be exactly the lemma it needed, leave a sorry buried three files deep, redefine a notation or macro so the statement on the page no longer means what it appears to mean, or reach for native_decide and drag the whole compiler into the trusted base. The kernel stays perfectly sound through all of this, because these tricks route around it, and the only defence is to pin the statement down independently and check what the proof actually depends on. Someone has to formalize the conjecture, and someone has to check that the formalization means what the English means. That job will outlast every other part of the process. If anything, it is where human mathematical taste migrates to, away from writing proofs and towards writing and auditing specifications. The proof becomes an implementation detail. The theorem statement becomes the interface. If you want to see the seed of what this looks like as a way of working, look at Tau Ceti, a Lean library downstream of Mathlib. The division of labour is the whole point. Humans write the roadmaps, as markdown in a separate repository, and humans write the review rubrics. AIs write all the code, open the pull requests, and shepherd them through an AI-driven review process. The rubrics are explicitly adversarial, with instructions to hunt for mis-formalizations, vacuous statements, and "pushing around the lump in the carpet." What Lean Needs Now Lean is a superb piece of engineering. But it was designed around a particular user, a starving grad student typing tactics in Emacs, waiting for the infoview to update, building a library at the pace a community of volunteers can review pull requests. The user is now a swarm of agents writing thirteen million lines in eleven days. The tooling has to grow up for its new authors, and the list of what that means is fairly concrete. A surface formatter. Lean still has no canonical, widely adopted formatter in the spirit of rustfmt or gofmt, and when your authors are agents producing millions of lines, every one of them invents its own indentation, line breaking, and tactic layout. Diffs fill with noise, reviews get harder, and deduplication across agents misses proofs that differ only in whitespace. This is a surprisingly hard problem, because Lean has grown into a very large language. Its grammar is extensible at runtime, so notation, macros, and entire tactic languages declared in imported files change how later files parse. A formatter cannot just read a fixed grammar. It has to load the environment, run the real parser with every syntax extension in scope, and then pretty-print a syntax tree whose shape depends on user-defined notation, all while round-tripping comments and never changing what the code means. It is a genuinely difficult piece of engineering, and it is now table stakes. A stable, specified export format as a public interface. Independent kernels are only possible if there is a well-defined way to get declarations out of Lean without linking against the C++ runtime and reading the oleans by hand. Tools like lean4export and olean-export already produce NDJSON, and blean shows that a binary form of the same stream, designed to be memory-mapped, can make the export nearly free. OpenAI's own verification instructions depend on lean4export. That format should be treated with the seriousness of a wire protocol. Versioned, documented, specified down to the hashing of expressions, and stable across toolchain releases. The export format is the boundary across which trust is established. It deserves a spec. Independent checking as a first-class citizen. Running a second kernel should be as normal as running the linter. Mathlib CI, the Comparator workflow, and any lab publishing formal results should re-check exports with at least two unrelated kernels and refuse to bless anything they disagree on. This is cheap, now that checking all of Mathlib costs less than a minute. Checkers as libraries, not just executables. The inner loop of a proving agent wants to submit a single candidate declaration and get a verdict back in microseconds, against an environment that is already loaded and hot. Process startup, re-reading oleans, and re-deserializing a few gigabytes of environment are costs that never mattered when a human hit save once a minute. They dominate when a search procedure checks a million candidates an hour. The kernel should be embeddable, with a persistent environment, incremental addition of declarations, and an API that a search harness can call in a tight loop. Memory and scale. Mathlib needs several gigabytes of memory to check. The FLT formalization is five times bigger, and OpenAI's library is already knocking over Linux virtual memory limits. Lean mmaps every imported module, which is a reasonable design for a library of thousands of files and an unreasonable one for hundreds of thousands. Term sharing, hash-consing across modules, compact on-disk representations, and lazy loading of exactly the declarations a proof depends on are the boring, unglamorous engineering problems that decide whether formal mathematics scales to the next order of magnitude. Elaboration is the real cost. The kernel is the fast part. The expensive part of building Mathlib from source is the elaborator, with its unification, typeclass resolution, simp, omega, decide, and the long tail of tactics. A cold build is still measured in CPU-hours, and a mining operation that elaborates candidate proofs at scale pays that cost over and over. Parallel and incremental elaboration, better caching of typeclass instances, and profiling tools that can tell you why a single simp call took four seconds are where most of the wall-clock time in a proving loop actually goes. Clippy-style linters. Mathlib already has a good set of linters, but agents need something closer to Rust's clippy, a large, opinionated catalogue of lints aimed at the specific ways machine-written Lean goes wrong. Flag the stray axiom, the buried sorry, the unnecessary native_decide, the forty-line simp only that should be a lemma, the theorem whose hypotheses are contradictory and therefore vacuously true, the local notation that shadows something standard, the copy-pasted proof that duplicates one already in the library. Each lint should be cheap, machine-readable, and come with a suggested fix, because the consumer is a search loop that will act on every warning, where a human would skim them. Linters are how you encode taste at scale, and taste is the thing agents most conspicuously lack. Search at machine scale. Moogle, Loogle, and LeanSearch were built to help humans find the lemma they half remember. Agents need the same thing but at a scale where the library grows by millions of lines a week, and where most of what's in it was written by other agents and has never been looked at by a person. The Prove2Me platform Anthropic used for FLT keeps a DAG of theorem statements with natural-language descriptions precisely so that agents can find and reuse each other's work. That idea, a living, searchable index of everything proved so far, needs to become shared infrastructure instead of something each lab rebuilds privately. Provenance. The current generation of models is notoriously bad at citing the literature for the techniques it uses. A proof term knows exactly which lemmas it depends on but nothing about where its ideas came from. If machine-generated mathematics is going to be integrated into the human literature rather than sitting beside it like an unread appendix, proofs need to carry their history (which model, which run, which prior results, which human-written papers the argument leans on). None of this is terribly exotic. It's the kind of infrastructure that every other field which industrialised went through. Compilers got test suites and multiple implementations, network protocols got RFCs, databases got formal isolation levels and Jepsen. Proof assistants are the newest member of that club, and they are being industrialised faster than anything before them. If I were a young, ambitious programmer, this is where I would be focusing my early career for the highest return on investment. Curry-Howard for the Real World The dependently typed future I was promised at the pub was one where software would be written against specifications and machines would check that it met them. What we actually got is stranger. The specifications are theorem statements, the software is proof terms, the authors are swarms of agents, and the thing being built is the frontier of mathematics itself. Curry-Howard turned out to be industrial infrastructure after all. It just took reinforcement learning to get us there. And this is only the mathematical half of the story. The same machinery that just checked Fermat's Last Theorem will check anything you can state precisely, and the most obvious next customer is industrial software. I argued last month that software sucks because almost nothing we ship has a specification, let alone a proof. That excuse is evaporating. If an agent swarm can produce thirteen million lines of verified mathematics in under two weeks, we're not far from applying the same techniques in software engineering. The labs are mining mathematics first because it is the cleanest verifiable domain, with no messy real-world spec to negotiate. Software is next, and it will need all the same tooling, namely fast kernels, diverse checkers, honest statements, and infrastructure built for authors who never sleep. So yes, the future of maths turned out to be deeply weird, and much sooner than I expected. The results are piling up faster than anyone can read them, and many of us will spend the rest of our careers trying to understand theorems that were proved before breakfast by something that cannot explain itself. I find that unsettling, and I also find it thrilling. One final shameless plug. If you'd rather work on the frontier of mathematical formalization than read blog posts about it, OneChronos is hiring Formal Methods Engineers. We build institutional markets out of combinatorial auctions (descended from the Milgrom and Wilson 2020 Nobel Prize), which turn out to be precisely the right mathematical formulation for a world where the bidders are increasingly reinforcement learners with very exotic expressive preferences. Our dark pool processes more than 1% of notional U.S. equity market volume, and we've already expanded into many other global asset classes. You'd be joining our new formal methods team, working alongside mathematicians and market structure experts, writing Rust and Lean. Dependent types, numerical optimisation, and Lean applied to moving hundreds of billions of dollars safely every day. If you're that kind of nerd, hit us up.
Calls for a new kind of slowdown were the talk of The Curve. PLUS: Slinking back to X
TLDR: yes, models are getting funnier over time I love laughing. Well, who doesn’t? Good jokes have a certain notion of cleverness to them and I do believe that great comedians display high intelligence. Cracking a good joke requires astute observations about odd situations, and linking them to something we find familiar. Jokes are hard!… Read More The post How funny are the frontier AI models? appeared first on Inverted Passion.
Figure out what you actually want. Find a game that's worth winning. Then be honest with yourself: are you going to be the person who wants it the most?