Poems read aloud, beautifully The post “A Blessing” by James Wright appeared first on The American Scholar.

“One of the offices of poetry: to use shapely speech to express the radicals of existence in all their ambiguity.”  “Shapely speech” is nicely put. Guys I knew, when being polite, might describe a girl as “shapely.” You know what that means. It means pleasing. What about “the radicals of existence”? I don’t know what that means. “Radicals” intended etymologically, meaning “roots”? As in chemistry or politics? All of the above? A similar “office” applies to prose as well, though “office” sounds a little high-falutin’.     “To answer idiosyncratically, privately, to a public world given over to falsehood, fake facts, scuzzy rumor, casual murderousness, comedic denials, manic impromptu wind-tunnel ideologies. To answer palsied language with vital language, plasticity, gaiety of invention and fabulation, against opportunistic mendacity.”   The ethics of writing. As John Berryman puts it in his biography of Stephen Crane: “Crane was a writer and nothing else: a man alone in a room with the English language, trying to get human feelings right.” An honest writer comes equipped with a bullshit detector that he applies first to himself, then others. Lies enter language through politics, fashion, self-aggrandizement and any effort to seek approval. The hardest part of writing is keeping it vital while remaining faithful to the truth.     “If poetry can’t, or chooses not to, reveal what it feels like to live as a sentient being in a perilous enchanted world, then maybe it can (and deserves to) die. Or that mission will be replaced by a spectacular dumb show loaded with content, whipped up drama, and ‘language.’ It will be a polymer mold of what once was primary material. What can replace the completeness and immediacy of feeling that the sounds of words whip up or lay down?”   W.S. Di Piero might be describing prose or poetry assembled by artificial intelligence. What I’ve read or seen of it, even when it’s a competent copy of a human creation, feels hollow, dead inside. Something is missing, something vital and as personal as DNA or the individual human sensibility. Something “sentient,” to use Di Piero’s word. Algorithms write like backward children eager to please teacher.   [The quoted passages, a single continuous entry, is drawn from Di Piero’s Mickey Rourke and the Bluebird of Happiness: A Poet’s Notebooks (Carnegie Mellon University Press, 2017).]

What the world looked like to George Orwell during his final days The post Visions From Jura appeared first on The American Scholar.

On submission and resistance to AI-generated literature   To great writers, finished works weigh lighter than those fragments on which they work throughout their lives. For only the more feeble and distracted take an inimitable pleasure in conclusions, feeling themselves thereby given back to life. For the genius each caesura, and the heavy blows of fate, fall like gentle sleep itself into his workshop labour. About it he draws a charmed circle of fragments.                                               – Walter Benjamin 1                      Many years ago I used this paragraph as the epigram to something of identical length – perhaps a short story or prose poem – as an alibi for its brevity and as a dig at the use of epigrams, a device as I saw it for co-opting the incontrovertibility of the one to win credence for the other. It was weightless until it dropped into memory when I read a similar point made by one of Benjamin's keenest readers in an intellectual memoir prompted by the objects in his workplace: The studio is the image of potentiality–of the writer's potentiality to write, of the painter's or sculptor's potentiality to paint or sculpt. Attempting to describe one's own studio thus means attempting to describe the modes of and forms of one's own potentiality–a task that is, at least on first glance, impossible. How can one have a potentiality? One cannot have a potentiality, one can only inhabit it.2 One can sense the weight of potential in the open notebooks on show, a place the reader inhabits examining the details. Potentiality is a subject embedded in Agamben's thinking and extends beyond practicalities, but what struck me in the photograph is that there is no computer in sight, not even a typewriter. Agamben makes no explicit mention of his working methold, but it's there to see. The clutter is a neat copy of the working mind as it seeks a completed work. The working method is also something I noticed on the cover of a very different but equally absorbing intellectual memoir whose cover has a cropped version of this photograph accompanying an interview. Peter Brown says his books are written by hand. And recently I heard that Peter Handke is the only author Suhrkamp allows to submit work handwritten in pencil. He wants to move slowly, allowing sentences to come from a great distance. His collection of notebooks pictured below provokes an overwhelming sense of potential.  The pleasure of writing by hand in notebooks is not in what one writes but in its opening onto possibility, the potential to become something complete. I write one sentence and a world opens. This is not possible on a computer because everything one types can be deleted in a moment (and usually is), whereas one is driven forward by the pen and potential is maintained despite striking out a typed or handwritten sentence; even an eraser leaves the ghost of a pencilled word. On completion, however, the world closes. As readers we know of Agamben, Brown and Handke only because of completion, and yet the presence of books like the self-portrait and Handke's The Weight of the World suggests Benjamin is right about the unique experience of potential, especially in light of these authors' prolific output, as if so many books are attempts not to add to the pile but to move in the opposite direction, towards potential. Writing longhand may be a resistance to completion and conclusions, very much against the grain of cultural demand. Image from The Goalie's Anxiety   Technology now at hand enables completion without the need to work through potential. Much anxiety has been expressed about the threat of the new generation of large language models (LLMs) to destroy livelihoods in the short term and to erase the social role of literature in the long. One professional writer says "We're screwed. Writing is over. That's it. It's time to pack away your quill, your biro, and your shiny iPad: the computers will soon be here to do it better." Meanwhile, the Society of Authors has staged a protest about copyright infringement and the Guardian has run a discussion of an AI-generated story by various professional authors in which worries about the lack of a human connection are expressed.  On a more philosophical level, it raises questions about the role of the writer in the writing process. The learning-theory guru Donald Clark reckons these are due only because we are "trapped in the late 18th [Century] Romantic view of authorship, the unique, divinely-inspired, creative spark of the individual". This has led to the Society of Authors appropriating the mystique of authorship to make it a respectable profession like carpet weaving or quantity surveying, while their public statements read like a corporate drone has written them.3 LLMs are really only the logical terminus of genre fiction that dominates book culture, the last thing the Society would march against.4 The scholar of digital literature Hannes Bajohr confirms AI is the genre author's secret sharer because it is designed to produce "normalization": Their output is convincing precisely when they are supposed to spit out what is expected, what is ordinary, what is statistically probable...And just as there are assistive marketing AIs for expectable marketing prose, there are now also assistive literature AIs for more or less expectable literature....Genre literature is virtually defined by the recurrence of certain elements, making it particularly suitable for AI generation. Like AI, genre writing minimises the creative workload for the author – each sentence an epigram – and allows easy digestion by the reader. This is has always been the ideal for the "feeble and distracted" to give themselves back to life without ever leaving it. Bajohr tells of the popular German writer Daniel Kehlmann's attempt to generated a story using a language model AI, which failed according to Kehlmann because it did not "seem good enough to be published as an artistic work rather than merely as the product of an experiment on an artistic level". "But" Bajohr asks "what does 'good enough' mean? Measured against what aesthetics?" When Kehlmann speaks of 'experiment', he seems not to have experimental literature in mind, but rather the scientific meaning of the word: a controlled observation whose outcome supports, weakens, or refines a hypothesis. But it does so...only within the framework of an existing paradigm – new paradigms are precisely not what scientific experiments establish. Experimental literature, on the other hand – at least according to its avant-garde self-image – does not want mere refinement, but ideally questions the paradigm of literature itself. Clark focuses on a "robot artist" that is at the forefront of challenging the paradigm of "the human-centric view of creativity as a uniquely human trait" in which: vast pools of media representing the sum total of all history, all cultural output from our species, has been captured and used to train huge multimodal models that allow our species to create a new future. With new forms of AI, we are borrowing to create the new. It is a new beginning, a fresh start using technology that we have never seen before in the history of our species, something that seems strange but oddly familiar, thrilling but terrifying. Examples are provided of "historical dawns that hinted at this future" such as the Library of Alexandria, "open to all containing the known world's knowledge" and latterly Wikipedia. The difference, he says is that AI is "much more profoundly communal". The examples remind us that AI is only the latest form of technology without which cultural production communal or otherwise would not be possible. Similar concerns were not expressed when a quill on papyrus became a fountain pen on mass-produced paper, or when a pen became a typewriter. Everything was positive moving forward. But of course there was concern following the invention of printing press and the subsequent availability of translations of the Bible into the vernacular, and this example immediately exposes the deeper issue lurking in the concern for AI-generated art. It is the ghost haunting Clark's assumption that art equals encyclopaedic knowledge, containing creativity within the boundaries of humanism. This is continued in his claim that we have entered a new era of artistic production defined by Nicolas Bourriaud as postproduction in which "art and cultural activity now interprets, reproduces, re-exhibits or utilises works made by others or from already available cultural products". If this seems familiar it's because it is the standard practice of postmodernism, with all the insoucient optimism that goes with it, and Clark does acknowledge that postmodernism shares with postproduction "themes of challenging originality and embracing plurality". The difference here is that this "moves us beyond simple curation, collages and mashups into genuinely new forms of production and expression". It cannot be pinned down to one word and we should "let the idea [of AI's 'outputs'] flutter and fly free from the prison of language".  Such optimism about new technology and the arts is nothing new: In the last twenty years neither matter nor space nor time has been what it was from time immemorial. We must expect innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art. This part of Paul Valéry's essay The Conquest of Ubiquity from 1928 was used by Walter Benjamin as the epigram to his famous essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction in which he sees such technological innovations as enabling a change in human perception, in this case the inexhaustible repetition of previously immutable works of art presented in limited arenas are injected with time and change, removing the aura surrounding them and brushing aside "outmoded concepts, such as ... eternal value and mystery", thereby empowering a perceptual and political revolution. What may be less familiar is the continuity of all three thinkers with the art production of a much earlier era. "The artistic representation of sacred subjects was a science governed by fixed laws which could not be broken at the dictates of individual imagination" writes Êmile Mâle in the book subtitled Religious Art in France of the Thirteenth Century. Every artist had to learn the rules of representation. He must know that the circular nimbus placed vertically behind the head serves to express sanctity, while the nimbus impressed with a cross is the sign of divinity which he will always use in portraying any of the three Persons of the Trinity. He will learn that the aureole (i.e. light which emanates from the whole figure and surrounds the body as a nimbus) expresses eternal bliss, and belongs to the three Persons of the Trinity, to the Virgin, and to the souls of the Blessed. He must know that representations of God the Father, God the Son, the angels and the apostles should have the feet bare, while there would be real impropriety in representing the Virgin and the saints with bare feet. In such matters a mistake would have ranked almost as heresy. Other accepted symbols enabled the mediaeval artist to express the invisible, to represent that which would otherwise be beyond the domain of art.5  If this programme reads like the precise opposite of secular freedom and the unpredictable products of AI, that's because it is, but it is also determined by tradition and normalisation (in which anything goes becomes a programming command). Both bring forth the old and proclaim the new, appropriating an aura even in the act of discharging it; "nothing was left solely to inspiration", as Mâle says of Dante's Commedia. AI's rampant productivity also mimics capitalism's hothouse demand for new markets, 'growth' and human submission. From expressing the invisible via religious art to escaping the prison of language via AI, there is continuity in utopian claims, for the promise of deliverance whether heavenly or humanist. The continuity is consolidated in Meyer Schapiro's revisionary account of church art in the eleventh and twelfth centuries when he says began "a new sphere of artistic creation without religious content" anticipating modern art because it was "imbued with values of spontaneity, individual fantasy, delight in color and movement, and the expression of feeling". We can't help but regard medieval art as entirely symbolic and devotional, and Schapiro cites commentators who have sought to attach religious symbolism to the most mundane features. He explains this with Hegel's comment that "in an age of piety one does not have to be religious in order to create a truly religious work of art, whereas today the most deeply pious artist is incapable of producing it."  This suggest that the basis of artistic production and what we are drawn toward is the "truly religious", however sublimated.6 This may be confirmed by the vast archives of scholarly material on the arts and popular culture communities devoted to billion-dollar movie franchises. Anxiety about the meaning and worth of art in the here and now is embodied in modern review culture. The reception of Daniel Kehlmann's bestselling novel Die Vermessung der Welt when published in translation as Measuring the World is a good example. One reviewer sought the incontrovertibility of paradigm-shifting European modernism to win credence for the crowd-pleasing entertainment by announcing without evidence that Kehlmann was "already being compared to Nabokov and Proust"; a claim that became its own evidence. Unable to recognise what it seeks, the visual arts has developed an aura as an investment commodity for the super-rich,7 and as sentimental ornamentation for the rest, while novels are evaluated by entirely extra-literary criteria: the public profile of an author, the number of sales, whether they have won a literary prize, and sometimes even by the number of pages. AI, however, may provoke a turn away from such inanities. ***   For a long time I thought writing was a job of work. I'm now convinced that it's an inner event, a 'non-work' that you accomplish, above all, by emptying yourself out, and allowing what's already self-evident to percolate through.                Marguerite Duras 8 When Benjamin predicted the overcoming of auratic art, he defined the aura as "the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be", and if distance has now become taboo in contemporary literature, it is with the advent of LLMs literature that the unique phenomenon is drawn back into the foreground. Invariably, distance is presented as the "inaccessible" and experienced entirely on the reader's side and is used as a critical barb directed at the "self-indulgent" author but, as Duras' remark suggests, it is also experienced by the author (at least by those who disavow the agency of the name).  It's a curious thing, this intimate experience of distance and our need for the guarantee of a human presence in the background. Like road signs and adverts, genre fiction provides an a priori guarantee and must be why supernatural horror and stories of gruesome crime provides comfort to so many, much as the story of Christ's torture and death on the cross brings comfort to Christians. In 2004, I was drawn to write about the promotional phrases on two posters on a bus shelter, not to seek the identity of copywriters but because of their automated effacement, the empty space onto which the words open and how difficult it is to speak about. There is someone speaking and yet nobody is speaking; assuredly, this is speech, but speech that does not think about what it is saying, always says the same thing, and is incapable of choosing its audience or responding to their questions.  This is not one of the Guardian's guests responding to the soulless anonymity of an AI-generated story but Socrates talking about the phenomenon of writing, paraphrased here by Maurice Blanchot.9 Socrates proposes that language of this sort should be avoided in favour of a living speaker one can interrogate. He recognises its similarity to "the pure speech that gives expression to the sacred", such as at the oracle of Delphi. In this regard, somewhat mysteriously...writing, as an object, appears to have an essential proximity with sacred language, whose strangeness it imparts to the literary work, while also inheriting from it its boundlessness, risk, and incalculable force beyond all guarantee. Like sacred language, what is written comes from no recognizable source, is without author or origin, and thereby always refers back to something more original than itself. What is strange about literature? What risks does it take? In what way is it close to the sacred? These are the questions dilating the void beneath contemporary art and literature. They cannot receive answers because we have no means to formulate a response. To ask them invites weary contempt. For Heidegger, this is because literature has gone peak-Socrates to become a functional technology reducing the world and its inhabitants to a resource to be exploited. Strangeness, risk and the sacred have become marketing phrases. He traces the retreat of the sacred in the poetry of Hölderlin. In his time the "default of God" was distance – "the age [was] determined by God's keeping himself afar" – whereas now the default is absence and the "radiance of divinity is extinguished in world-history". The ground upon which humanity stood is no longer ground but an abyss: "The age is desolate not only because God is dead but also because mortals scarcely know or are capable even of their own mortality." Poetry offers a mode of truth-revelation more originary to commonsense correspondence between word and thing. Heidegger separates the hammer from the hand. For him, poetry is a means of building new ground, but in order to so "it is necessary that there are those who reach into the abyss", who seek to be capable of their own mortality, and in doing so enable others to experience and endure the loss and absence of the sacred, to recognise the disenchantment of the world: "How could there ever be for God a residence fit for God unless the radiance of divinity had already begun to appear in all that is?" 10 Heidegger was not alone in recognising symptoms in poetry. A few decades earlier Mallarmé claimed that literature was "undergoing an exquisite and fundamental crisis" as free verse flooded over classical forms following the instability of runaway industrial growth, and soon after Benjamin showed how even the everyday wisdom passed on in storytelling had succumbed to the novel in which "no event comes to us without already being shot through with explanations".11 Nowadays poetry is difficult to identify as anything other than prose in an affectation of format, a prejudicial identification for sure but one made possible because of the dominance of functional prose. This would explain why it has a minor presence in literary culture, not refuted by the growth of boilerplate expressionism on social media. Readability has become unreadable. If the novel then functions only as information by other means – events shot through with explanation – and has in the process neutralised the potential for the unveiling of poetic language in Heidegger's sense, thereby creating conditions for literature identical to those summarised by Hegel for religious art, we might wonder if literature is even possible in our time. Duras' conviction that writing a novel is non-work is not far from LLMs that can produce a complete work without indeed any work. Both disrupt our notion of creativity and both open onto distance. The similarity may help us to understand why in all its richness and variety of contemporary art and literature, and in its excited amplification in criticism, it nevertheless appears very much after the Lord Mayor's Show, forced and straining for glory; "pyrotechnics against a night sky of nothingness", as EM Cioran put it.12    Duras was not alone in the manner of her discovery. As Holly Langstaff recounts in her outstanding book how Blanchot at first agreed with Heidegger that poetic language was a vehicle of truth grounding human existence, but through his own experience as a literary critic in the day and as a novelist at night, his mind was changed. If the critic's task is to evaluate a literary work and to communicate this to the reading public it "requires there to be something particular about the work that sets it apart from the everyday". A paradox arises in the demand to bring to light that which is bound to the dark, but it is inevitable that the critic and the everyday reader will seek to utilise the experience of the night and to communicate it in some way, to itself if not also to others, and indeed Blanchot argued that this is also necessary to the work. Yet what sets the reading experience apart and why it maintains almost mystical prestige in an otherwise non-literary culture is that the essence of literature is perpetually removed from such utility. Critics invariably point to specific details to shine a light on a novel's dark, such as its ingenious plotting, its psychological insights, its geographical and chronological span, the knowledge we absorb of other people and cultures, its relation to similar books or an account of the author's career thus far, or simply how good, bad or indifferent it makes them feel. But the light merely illuminates itself. In reading, and for the writer too, as Duras says, something escapes rational translation. This should not be news to any keen reader because it is the fundamental experience of reading a novel, the longue durée of curling up with a good book. Blanchot calls it La Part de feu, the fire's share, as in the swathe of a forest sacrificed by a firebreak so the rest can survive. This is the determinate sentence of literature. However, there is what Langstaff calls slippage between the two modes of language that Heidegger saw as a great danger as it "results in the forgetting of Being which is characteristic of modernity" leading to everything, including literature, becoming a resource to be exploited. This is related to Blanchot's criticism of word-by-word and line-by-line paraphrasing of poetry but praise for the critic who respects the fire "while maintaining his reader in a state of pure ignorance".13 How familiar this is to the reader of the broadsheet book reviews! Literature haunts us because it is a confrontation with the "unsayable emptiness" of the fire, what Blanchot refers to elsewhere as "the outside", "the neuter" or, from Heidegger's es gibt, "the there is". He sees literary writing as a suspension of the empirical world, its negation, an inhuman interruption of human control and understanding. While this may be seen as nihilistic, and certainly not humanist, Blanchot sees it instead as an affirmation of the unknowable, which can be creative as well as destructive, "a radical nihilism which", Langstaff says, "is no longer nihilism in the sense of nostalgia for values, but an embrace of the impossible".14 In the final part below, I'll turn to the writing of the impossible.   ***   How many efforts are required in order not to write—in order that, writing, I not write, in spite of everything.                   – Blanchot 15   In the first part of this inadvertent series, I responded to Alice Oswald's "manifesto of likeness" in which the Oxford Professor of Poetry calls for rhapsodic poetry to stitch the profusion of the empirical world together against lyric poetry, exemplified by a poem generated by chatGPT, because it not does not emerge from a "situated self" and "is not about things which are". In doing so, she says, it exposes us to "a mighty contagious absence". While Oswald's criticism presents a powerful case and appears to be humanism's definitive resistance to the advent of AI-generated poetry and prose, it does so by addressing a technology whose essence is and always has been precisely this absence; the absence of things which are, or the presence of that which is situated elsewhere, or indeed nowhere. Absence draws us to to books; an absence we sense in the world and turn to books in the hope to fathom and resolve, an absence, however, we meet again in the infinity of prose, at once mocking and soothing our finitude, an absence we go on to explore and reinscribe in writing. Absence is contagious. Happy talk of novels opening "another world" is a symptom of this meeting; another world in which nothing dies, in which nothing can die.16  A confounding dualism is inherent to literature: it is nothing and is nothing without it. So behind our literary evaluations and debates is our relation to this nothing, this space of absence.  In an exceptional essay,17 Lars Iyer traces the origins of the relation back to ancient Palestine and the messianic hope offered by an apocalypse in which the coming messiah will end the dualism between God and the world. Despite the horrors associated with apocalypse – whose etymology can be traced to "an unveiling or revelation" – the faithful "can look forward to the coming vindication of the persecuted, to the divine redemption that brings an end to suffering and death". Hope lies in apocalypse. We can see the residue of this in the aura given to the book, the decapitalised version is its modest disguise of the divine Word, and the hope we invest in its promise of a revelation, however vulgar or diminished. "But what happens", Iyer asks, "when the putative messiah actually arrives and fails?" What happens when Christ dies upon the cross leaving the world order unchanged? And so we might ask, what happens when the book fails not only to resolve absence but augments it? Iyer cites Jacob Taubes' argument that St. Paul dealt with the crisis of a failed apocalypse by turning it inward. From now on it would take place in the individual soul, which for Taubes meant opening: an inward messianic realm of freedom, of faith, which not only suspends the Mosaic law, the legal framework of the Roman Empire but also the Hellenistic metaphysics of law, which is to say, [the] general sense of worldly order and structure. Paul rejects all earthly, lawful, orderly authority in the name of faith.18  The freedom offered in the literary, reliant on our suspension of disbelief, has its DNA in Paul's rejection of worldly authority. The supposedly opposed genres of Realism and Fantasy can be seen as the culmination of our bad faith in what opens for us. What opens in Paul's theology is "very close to what [Taubes] calls called Gnosticism". For Paul, like the Gnostics, the cosmos is ruled by demonic powers; Satan is the prince of this world. For Paul, like the Gnostics, the aim is to achieve a kind of gnosis, or knowledge, that allows you to hold yourself back from full participation in the world, which remains ruled by the wicked 'powers and principalities'. For Paul, like the Gnostics, very little can be said about God. As Taubes writes: The negative statements about God—unrecognizable, unnameable, unrepeatable, incomprehensible, without form, without bounds, and even nonexistent—all orchestrate the . .. Gnostic proposition that God is essentially contrary to the world. This suggests that Paul's faith is a relation to an empty transcendence, lacking determinate content and contesting at every turn the works that support the order of the world. God is what Hans Jonas called the 'nothing of the world', understood as the antithesis of worldly power.19 We go to books to understand and cope with the world, and of course to escape its demons for a while, and in doing experience a cover version of messianic promise which is, however, only ever an empty transcendence. Literature becomes the nothing of the world. No wonder modern readers have an almost identical relationship with religious faith as they do with books; a short walk from gush to disgust. 20   Novels generated by LLMs, however bad judged as works of art, reveal the essence of literature. This is the fear: every book is revealed as an excess of nothing.21  This would explain why fragments haunt great writers, as they maintain a relationship with that which is in excess of the world without falling into generic form and as such disrupts the use of literature as an everyday resource. They cannot make use of them. The writer in the centre of a charmed circle is only ever a writer in potential, the book only ever a book in potential. While this presents a roadblock, it may be key to resisting AI-generated and genre literature, which are, it has to be restated, identical; they cannot be told apart. Literature may be possible only by maintaining its potential within the work. But what does this mean in practice? Giorgio Agamben's essay On Potentiality discusses the aporia raised by Aristotle of why the senses cannot themselves be sensed in the absence of external objects. Aristotle's answer is that sensibility is not actual but only potential, which raises the question of what it means to have a faculty like sight. We tend to see our faculties as modes of power, and Agamben links this to "that part of humanity that has grown and developed its potency to the point of imposing its power over the whole planet". But Agamben interprets having a faculty as having a privation and potentiality is "the mode of existence of this privation". We would not be able to see light were it not for darkness, and darkness "is in some way the color of potentiality". To be potential means: to be one's own lack, to be in relation to one's own incapacity. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can be because they are in relation to their own nonBeing. In potentiality, sensation is in relation to anesthesia, knowledge to ignorance, vision to darkness.22 Presence is in relation to absence. Applied to literature, and Agamben says Aristotle draws his examples from "the domain of arts and knowledge", we are returned to Blanchot's writing set apart from the day and Heidegger's poets reaching into the abyss for a relation of finitude to the infinite. Our faculty to write is considered much like the power of that has imposed itself over the planet. So if we are to resist AI-generated prose and its threat to human creativity, we must first recognise that its apparent inhumanity is and always has been part of us and part of writing. This is why it is indistinguishable from genre fiction. Agamben ends by asking how we might consider the actuality of the potentiality to not-be. "The actuality of the potentiality to play the piano is the performance of a piece for the piano; but what is the actuality of the potentiality to not-play?". Aristotle answers: if a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it as such. This does not mean that it disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality. What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such. This may be how to question the paradigm of literature, to move in the opposite direction, towards potential.     Notes 1 From One-Way Street (not sure of translator). Click on the back button to return.  2 Translated by Kevin Attell.  3 The author Matthew Teller resigned from the SOA following its "outlandishly opaque statement" on an Israeli raid on a bookshop in Jerusalem.    4 According to the Verso Books blog, "Romance novels are said to account for nearly 40% of all book sales in the last decade".  5 Translated by Dora Nussey.  6 In the Talk Gnosis podcast, Jonathan Stewart claims "we have this deep yearning for the divine":  "Even if you're not a spiritual person…consciousness is almost structured in a way where we want to have the divine. Doesn't mean that there is a god, but to be a happy, adjusted society and an adjusted individual, you have to acknowledge this and work with it in a healthy way.  You don't have to be religious, you can get it through good art. Because people aren't aware of this religious drive within us...we assume we live in the most secular society in human history [but] we live in the most religious society that has ever existed in human history. We act in religious ways without really knowing it, with no way to funnel it, no way to integrate it into our lives. The rationalist is missing all this." 7 We see this in action on the BBC's Fake or Fortune series, and Clark claims value for the robot artist's products because they sell for six-figure sums. 8 From Suspended Passion translated by Chris Turner. 9 In the Oxford Literary Review, Volume 22, Number 1, translated by Leslie Hill. 10 From 'Why poets?' in Off the Beaten Track translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes.  11 I used Benjamin's essay The Storyteller in The last novel, a discussion of JM Coetzee's The Death of Jesus. 12 In A Short History of Decay, translated by Richard Howard.  13 From 'The Myth of Mallarmé' in The Work of Fire, translated by Charlotte Mandell. 14 Blanchot's atheism is discussed by Stefanos Geroulanos in An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought.  15 From The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock. 16 The Morning Star in Knausgaard's novel of the same name is a symbol of the book and an allegory of this meeting, at least as I argue in my review.  17 The Opposite Direction: Taubes, Bernhard and the Gnostic Imaginary was a paper given to the European Graduate School in 2023. 18 I wrote about a biography of Taubes in A modern heretic.  19 Iyer's paper cites my blogpost The withdrawal of the novel in which I write about Willem Styfhals' book on Gnosticism and postwar German philosophy. 20 Larkin's poem A Study in Reading Habits is a prime example of the latter. 21 In my post A measure of forever, I wrote about how a combination of plainness and excess renewed my interest in novels. 22 In Potentialities, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen.

“Above the town of Frankfort, on the top of the steep bluff of the Kentucky River, is a burial-place where lie the bones of many heroes, sons the Commonwealth has lovingly gathered in one fold. It is a beautiful site for this simple Valhalla, with its wide outlook over the noble vale it crowns, to my eyes wondrously enriched by the sense of a people’s care for the fame of its illustrious dead.”  Each Memorial Day we walked to my grade school to watch the parade. Standing at the curb we waited for the marching bands, the dignitaries, pretty girls riding in convertibles, the veterans of three or four wars. The city handed out American flags on sticks and we waved them as the brass-heavy bands played “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.” We followed the parade for half a mile to the Parma Heights Cemetery where my mother is buried. Prayers, solemn speeches, the firing of bolt-action rifles in a three-gun salute. I was a dim kid and understood nothing I was seeing. Americans have always gathered to honor their war dead, even today.   The passage above is taken from The Autobiography of Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (1909). If Shaler (1841-1906) is remembered at all it is as a geologist and paleontologist. When the Civil War started, Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (1841-1906) was a student of the great Swiss-born zoologist Louis Agassiz in the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. A year away from graduating, Shaler resolved to continue his studies while preparing for war. He joined the university’s drill club, studied infantry tactics, read Jomini’s Traité de grande tactique and each weekend visited Fort Independence in Boston Harbor to learn about artillery.   After graduating summa cum laude in 1862, Shaler returned to his native Kentucky, where he was commissioned to raise the Fifth Kentucky Battery on the Union side, despite coming from a slave-owning family. He detested the Republican Party and many of his Kentucky friends had already joined the Confederate cause, but Shaler believed in the Union, which he called “a most useful convenience for uniting like states for protection and interchange.”   Shaler served for two years until illness forced his resignation. For almost forty years he taught at Harvard, and late in life wrote the poems collected in From Old Fields: Poems of the Civil War. Shaler’s wife published the book posthumously. In 2004, R.L. Barth edited and introduced The Selected Civil War Poems of Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (Scienter Press). Bob is a poet, publisher, Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, and fellow Kentuckian. In his introduction he writes:   “Shaler was a Civil War combat veteran; he thought long and hard about combat, war, and soldiering; although a poetic amateur, he had certain poetic skills, chief among them narrative power, an ability to write fluid blank verse, and an eye for telling details, sharply perceived and rendered.”   Barth says Shaler’s best poems are “shrewdly observed and profoundly moving.” As the volume’s final selection, Bob includes “The Burial Place,” a poem that echoes the passage at the top taken from Shaler’s Autobiography. It begins:   “A hill-top that looked far above the throng Of brother hills, and into widening vales Wherein the brooks slip onward to the sea. A place for castle in old war-torn lands When might was master: here, the silent hold Where sleep the dead in earth that looks to sky For the brave trust in all that dwelleth there.”   Visiting the cemetery are an old man and a boy, “in ancient quest / Of place for one more grave . . .” The Civil War and its dead are alluded to obliquely:   “’T is not yet two-score years, yet ’t is as far As Trojan legend to the youth who hears How o’er this earth of peace tramped demon war, Treading its hills and vales with feet that scorched Their goodly life out; how of all that dwelt Out to the rim of sight, peace stayed alone With those who abided here in God’s strong arms, Unheeding Satan’s deeds.”   Shaler concludes his poem with a line as final as an epitaph: “’T is but the graves that stay.” As a coda, here is Bob’s “Meditations After Battle,” collected in Deeply Dug In (University of New Mexico Press, 2003). The first part is preceded by half of a Virgilian tag from Book I, line 462, of the Aeneid: “sunt lacrimae rerum . . .”:   “And all around, the dead! So many dead! So many ways to die it hurt the heart To look and feel sun burning overhead. We stacked the bodies on scorched grass, apart.”   Before the second part of the poem is the rest of Virgil’s line: “et mentem mortalia tangunt”:   “Death was the context and the only fact. Amidst the stench, I almost could believe There was a world of light where, if souls lacked Broken bodies awhile, they would retrieve Them, mended; where no one need longer grieve.”   The complete line from the Aeneid can be translated “There are tears for things and mortal things touch the mind.”