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Stablecoins, a new type of financial institution, are unique in two ways. First, they use decentralized databases like Ethereum and Tron to run their platforms. Secondly, and more important for the purposes of this article, they grant access to almost anyone, no questions asked. I'm going to illustrate this openness by showing how Garantex, a sanctioned Russian exchange that laundered ransomware and darknet payments, has enjoyed almost continual access to financial services offered by stablecoin platforms like Tether and USDC throughout its six year existence, despite a well-known reputation as a bad actor. Last month, law enforcement seizures combined with an indictment and arrest of Garantex's operators appear to have finally severed Garantex's stablecoin connection... or not. Evidence shows that Garantex simply rebranded and slipped right back onto stablecoin platforms. Stablecoins' no-vetting model is a stark departure from the finance industry's default due diligence model, adhered to by banks (such as Wells Fargo) and fintechs (such as PayPal). We all know the drill—provide two pieces of ID to open a payments account. Requirements for businesses will probably be more onerous. Anyone on a sanctions list will be left at the door. Banks and fintechs must identify who they let on their platforms because the law requires it. By contrast, to access the Tether or USDC platforms, the two leading U.S. dollar stablecoins, no ID is required. Anyone can start using stablecoin payments services without having to pass through a due diligence process. Sanctioned customers won't get kicked off, as Garantex's long-uninterrupted access shows. Regulators seem to tolerate this arrangement—so far, no stablecoin operators have faced penalties for money laundering or sanctions evasion. A quick history of the Tether-Garantex nexus Garantex became notorious early on for its role in laundering ransomware payments. Russian ransomware gangs hacked Western firms, extorted them for bitcoin ransoms, and cashed out at Moscow-based exchanges like Garantex. Garantex also became a popular venue for laundering darknet-related proceeds, particularly Hydra, once the largest darknet market. Reports allege that the exchange's shareholders have Kremlin links and that terror groups Hezbollah and Quds Force have used it. Founded in 2019, Garantex was connected to Tether's platform by August 2020. We know this because an archived version of Garantex's website from that month show trading and payment services being offered using Tether's token, USDT. Archived Garantex.org trading page from March 2024 with USDT-to-ruble, Dai-ruble, and USDC-ruble markets [link] This connection to Tether allowed Garantex's customers to transfer their Tether balances to Garantex's Tether wallet, in the same way that a shopper might use their U.S. dollar account at PayPal to make payments to a business with a PayPal account. This allowed Garantex's users to trade U.S. dollars (in the form of Tether) on its platform for bitcoins or ether, two volatile cryptocurrencies, and vice versa. The Tether linkage also meant that Garantex could offer a market for trading ruble-USD. By April 2022, Garantex's bad behaviour had caught up to it: the exchange was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). U.S. individual and entities were now prohibited from doing business with Garantex. Out of fear of being penalized, most non-Russian financial institutions would have quickly severed ties with it. Yet Tether, based in the British Virgin Islands at the time, permitted its relationship with Garantex to continue without interruption. Archived copies of Garantex's trading page from mid-2022 and 2023 show that Tether-denominated services were still being offered. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2023 that around 80% of the exchange’s trading involved Tether, despite sanctions being in place. The net amounts were not small. According to Bloomberg, an alleged $20 billion worth of Tether had been transacted via Garantex post-sanctions. A 2024 Wall Street Journal report revealed that sanctions-evading middlemen used Tether to "break up the connection" between buyers like Kalashnikov and sellers in Hong Kong, with Garantex serving as their venue for acquiring Tether balances. Finally, analysis from Elliptic, a blockchain analytics firm, alleges that Garantex offered USDT trading services to North Korean hacking group Lazarus in June 2023. This transaction flow is illustrated below: The Garantex/Tether nexus in 2023: Elliptic alleges that North Korean hackers stole ether from Atomic Wallet, converted it to Tether using a decentralized exchange 1inch, and then sent Tether to Garantex to trade for bitcoin. (Click to enlarge.) Source: Twitter, Elliptic Tether's excuse for not off-boarding sanctioned entities such as Garantex? A supposed lack of government clarity. When Tornado Cash was sanctioned in 2022, for instance, the company said that it would "hold firm" and not comply because the U.S. Treasury had "not indicated" whether stablecoin issuers were required to ban sanctioned entities from using what Tether refers to as "secondary market addresses." Translating, Tether was saying that if bad actors wanted to use Tether's platform to transact with other Tether users (i.e. in the "secondary market"), it would let them do so. Tether's only obligation, the company believed, was to stop sanctioned users from asking Tether itself to directly cash them out of the platform into U.S. dollars (i.e. the "primary market"). This is quite the statement. Imagine if PayPal allowed everyone—including sanctioned actors—to open an account without ID and send funds freely within its system, only intervening when bad actors asked PayPal to cash them out into regular dollars. That was Tether's stance. Or if Wells Fargo let sanctioned actors make payments with other Wells Fargo customers, but only stopped them from withdrawing at ATM. Banks and fintechs can't get away with such a bare bones compliance strategy; they must do due diligence on all their users. But Tether seemed to believe that a different set of rules applied to it. In December 2023, Tether reversed course. It would now initiate a new "voluntary" policy of freezing out all OFAC-listed actors using its platform, not just "primary market" sanctioned users seeking direct cash-outs. This brought Tether into what it described as "alignment" with the U.S. Treasury. Soon after, Tether froze three wallets linked by OFAC in 2022 to Garantex. However, this action was largely symbolic. By the time Tether froze those wallets, Garantex had already abandoned them and opened new ones, thus allowing the exchange to maintain access to Tether's platform. Tether's no-vetting model permitted this pivot. Archived versions of Garantex's trading page show that it continued offering Tether services throughout 2024 and early 2025. The U.S. Department of Justice recently confirmed Garantex's tactic of replacing wallets in its March 2025 indictment of the exchange's operators. It alleges that Garantex frequently cycled through new Tether wallet addresses—sometimes on a daily basis—to evade detection by U.S.-based crypto exchanges like Coinbase and Kraken, which are legally required to block customer payments made to sanctioned entities. That the relationship between Tether and Garantex continued even after Tether's supposed 180 degree turn to "align" itself with the U.S. government is backed up by several reports from blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis. The first, published in August 2024, found that a large purchaser of Russian drones used Garantex to process more than $100 million in Tether transactions. The second describes how Russian disinformation campaigners received $200,000 worth of Tether balances in 2023 and 2024, much of it directly from Garantex. In a March 2024 podcast, Chainalysis executives allege that "a majority" of activity on Garantex continued to be in stablecoins. After years of regular access to Tether's stablecoin platform, a rupture finally occurred earlier this month when Tether froze $23 million worth of Garantex's USDT balances at the request of law enforcement authorities. The move came in conjunction with a seizure by law enforcement of Garantex's website and servers. Garantex's website was seized in March 2025 by a collection of law enforcement agencies. In a press release, Tether claimed that its actions against Garantex illustrated its ability to "track transactions and freeze USDt." But if Tether was so good at tracking its users, why did it connect a sanctioned party like Garantex in the first place, and continue to service it for over four years? Something doesn't add up. Not just Tether: other stablecoins offered Garantex access, too Tether doesn't appear to have been the only stablecoin platform to provide Garantex with access to its platform. MakerDAO (recently rebranded as Sky) and Circle Internet may have done so, too. Circle, based in Boston, manages the second-largest stablecoin, USDC. When OFAC put Garantex on its sanctions list in April 2022, Circle was quick to freeze one of the designated addresses. It did no hold any USDC balances. However, like Tether, Circle's no-vetting policy means that it doesn't do due diligence on users (sanctioned or not) who open new wallets, hold USDC in those wallets, and use them to make payments within the USDC system. Circle only checks the ID of users who ask it to cash them out. Thus, it would have been a cinch for Garantex to dodge Circle's initial freeze: just open up a new access point to the USDC platform. Which is exactly what appears to have happened. On March 30, 2022, Garantex used its Twitter/X account to announce that it was offering USDC-denominated services. Beginning at some point in the first half of 2022, close to the time that the U.S. Treasury's sanctions were announced, Garantex began to list USDC on its trading page (see screenshot at top). The exchange's trading page continued to advertise USDC-denominated financial services through 2023, 2024, and 2025 until its website was seized last month. Tether, Circle's competitor, proceeded to freeze $23 million worth of USDT on behalf of law enforcement authorities, as already outlined. However, respected blockchain sleuth ZachXBT says that Circle did not itself interdict Garantex's access to the USDC payments platform, alleging that "a few Garantex addresses" holding USDC had not been blacklisted. MakerDAO is a geography-free financial institution that maintains and governs the Dai stablecoin, pegged to the U.S. dollar. Archived screenshots show that Garantex added Dai to its trading list by September 2020, not long after the exchange had enabled Tether connectivity. According to blockchain analytics firm Elliptic, Russian ransomware group Conti has used Garantex to get Dai-denominated financial services. Garantex is able to access the Dai platform because MakerDAO uses the same no-vetting model as Tether. In fact, MakerDAO takes an even more hands-off approach than the other stablecoin platforms: it didn't seize any of the original 2022 addresses emphasized by OFAC. That's because Dai was designed without freezing functionality. Not vetting users is lucrative Providing financial services to a sanctioned Garantex would have been profitable for Tether and competing stablecoin platforms managed by Circle and MakerDAO. All stablecoins hold assets—typically treasury bills and other short term assets—to "back" the U.S. dollar tokens they have issued. They get to keep all the interest these assets generate for themselves rather than paying it to customers like Garantex. If we assume an average interest rate of 5% and that Garantex maintained a consistent $23 million in Tether balances over the 34 months from April 2022 (when it was sanctioned) to March 2025 (when it was finally frozen out), Tether could have earned approximately $3.2 million in interest courtesy of its relationship. Not only does their no-vetting model mean that stablecoin platforms get to earn ongoing income from bad actors like Garantex, this model also seems... not illegal? Stablecoin legal teams have signed off on the setup, both those in the U.S. and overseas. Government licensing bodies like the New York Department of Financial Services don't seem to care that licensed stablecoins don't ask for ID, or at least they turn a blind eye. (Perhaps these government agencies are simply unaware?) Nor has the U.S. Department of Justice indicted a single stablecoin platform for money laundering, sanctions violations, or failing to have a compliance program, despite it being eleven years now since Tether's no-vetting model first appeared. The model seem to have legal chops. Or not? Banks and fintechs are no doubt looking on jealously at the no-vetting model. Had either PayPal or Wells Fargo allowed Garantex to get access to their payments services, the punishment would have been a large fine or even criminal charges. Sanctions violations are a strict liability offence, meaning that U.S. financial institutions can be held liable even if they only accidentally engage in sanctioned transactions. But more than a decade without punishment suggests stablecoins may be exempt. This hands-off approach benefits stablecoins not only on the revenue side (i.e they can earn ongoing revenues from sanctioned actors). It also reduces their costs: they can hire far fewer sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance staff than an equivalent bank or fintech platform. Tether earned $13 billion in last year with just 100 or so employees. That's more profits than Citigroup, the U.S.'s fourth largest bank with 229,000 employees, a gap due in no small part to Tether's no-vetting access model. The coming financial migration? Zooming out from Garantex's stablecoin experience, what is the bigger picture? I suspect that a great financial migration is likely upon us. Financial institutions can now seemingly provide services to the Garantex's of the world as long as the deliver them on a new type of substrate: decentralized databases. If so, banks and fintechs will very quickly shift their existing services over from centralized databases to decentralized ones in order to take advantage of their superior revenue opportunities and drastically lower compliance costs. This impending shift isn't from an inferior technology to a superior one, but from an older rule-bound technology to a rule-free one. PayPal recently launching its own stablecoin is evidence that this migration is afoot. The argument many stablecoins advocates make to justify the replacement of full due diligence with a no-vetting access model is one based on financial inclusion. Consumers and legal businesses in places such as Turkey or Latin America, which suffer from high inflation, may want to hold digital dollars but don't necessarily have access to U.S. dollar accounts provided by local banks, perhaps because they don't qualify or lack trust in the domestic banking system. An open access model without vetting solves their problem. What about the American voting public? Do they agree with this migration? The last few decades have been characterized by a policy whereby the government requires financial institutions to screen out dangerous actors like Garantex in order to protect the public. Forced to the fringes of the financial system, criminals encounter extra operating dangers and costs. The effort to sneak back in serves as an additional choke point to catch them. To boot, the additional complexity created by bank due diligence serves to dissuade many would-be criminals from engaging in crime. Is the public ready to let the Garantexes back in by default? I'm not so sure it is. Tether is available at Grinex, a Garantex reboot. [link] Garantex's stablecoin story didn't end with last month's seizures and indictment. According to blockchain analytics firm Global Ledger, the exchange has been renamed Grinex and continues to operate. Tether services are already available on this new look-alike exchange, as the screenshot above reveals. Global Ledger says that $29.6 million worth of Tether have already been moved to Grinex as of March 14, 2025. This is the reality of an open-access, no-vetting financial system: bad actors slip in, eventually get cut off, and re-enter minutes later—an endless game of whack-a-mole that seems, for now at least, to be tolerated. It will only get larger as more financial institutions, eager to cut costs, gravitate to it.
We're all busy doing our best to boycott U.S. products. I can't buy Special K cereal anymore, because it's made in the U.S. by Kellogg's. But I'm still buying Shreddies, which is made in Niagara Falls, Ontario. Even that's a grey area, since Shreddies is owned by Post, a big American company. Should I be boycotting it? Probably. However, the disturbing thing is that I'm paying for my carefully-curated basket of Canadian groceries with my MasterCard. If we really want to avoid U.S. products, we can't just vet the things we are buying. We also need to be careful about how we are doing our buying. Our Canadian credit cards are basically made-in-U.S. goods. They rely on the U.S-based Visa or MasterCard networks for processing. Each credit card transaction you make generates a few cents in revenue for these two American mega-corporations. It doesn't sound like much, but when multiplied by millions of Canadians using their cards every day, it adds up. Vigilant Canadians shouldn't be using them. Canadians who want to boycott American card networks have two options. Go back to paying with cash, which is 100% Canadian. Or transact with your debit card. Debit card transactions are routed via the made-in-Canada Interac debit network.* We're lucky to have a domestic debit card option. Our European friends are in a worse position, since many European countries (Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria) are entirely reliant on MasterCard and Visa for both debit and credit card transactions. Unfortunately, going back to debit cards means doing without all of the consumer protection that credit cards offer in an online environment. Worse, you're giving up your credit card rewards or cash back. If you don't pay with your 2% cash back credit card, for instance, and use your debit card instead, which doesn't offer a reward, you're effectively losing out on $2 for every $100 you spend. This should illustrate to you, I hope, the golden shackles imposed on us by our U.S.-based credit cards. It's fairly easy to replace your American-grown tomatoes with Mexican ones or your U.S.-made car with a Japanese car. But networks, which tend towards monopolization, are not so easy to bypass. Which gets us into the meatier issue of national sovereignty. The difficulty we all face boycotting the MasterCard and Visa networks reveals how Canada has let itself become over-reliant on these critical pieces of U.S financial infrastructure. My fear is that our neighbour's political leadership is only going to fall further into authoritarianism and belligerence, eventually making a play to slowly annex Canada—not by invasion, but by "Canshluss". If so, this will involve using our dependencies on U.S. systems, including the card networks, to extract concessions from us. "Canada, if you don't do x for me," says Trump in 2026, "we're TURNING OFF all your credit cards!" In anticipation, we need to remove this particular financial dependency, quick. We're already safe when it comes to debit cards; we've got Interac. But we need the same independence for our credit cards. More specifically, we need to pursue an end-goal in which all Canadian credit cards are "co-badged". That means our credit cards would be able to use both the Visa/Mastercard card networks and Interac (or, if Interac can't be repurposed for credit cards, some other yet-to-be-built domestic credit card network). With co-badging, if your credit card payment can't be executed by Visa because of a Trump freeze order, at least the Canadian network will still process it. This is how the French card system works. While much of Europe suffers from a massive dependency on MasterCard and Visa, France is unique in having built a 100% French card solution. The local Carte Bancaire (CB) network can process both French debit card transactions, like Interac can, but goes one step further by also handling French credit card purchases. Before paying for their groceries with a card, French card holders get to choose which network to use, the local one or the international one. THIS IS WHAT CANADA NEEDS: This French credit card, issued by Credite Agricole, is co-badged with the domestic Carte Bancaire (CB) network and the international MasterCard network. When incidents occur on one route (CB, for instance), traffic is automatically routed to the back-up route, MasterCard, and vice versa. I think that a Canadian solution to the Trump problem would look something like this French CB card. The incoming Carney government should move to co-sponsor a CB-style domestic credit card network along with the big banks (perhaps a simple upgrade to Interac will do?). All Canadian financial institutions that issue credit cards would be required to co-badge them so that Canadians can connect to this new network as well as Visa or MasterCard. Even if annexation never actually occurs, at least we've got a more robust card system in place to deal with outages arising from hacking or natural disasters. Along with France, we can take inspiration from India, which introduced their Visa/MasterCard alternative, Rupay, in 2012. Thirteen years later, RuPay is now a genuine competitor with the American card networks. I can't believe I'm saying this, but we can also use Russia as a model, which was entirely dependent on Visa and MasterCard for card payments until it deployed its Mir card network in 2016—in the nick of time before Visa and MasterCard cut ties in 2022. Europe will have to push harder, too. The EU has been trying to rid itself of its Visa and MasterCard addiction for over a decade now, without much luck. Its first attempt, the Euro Alliance of Payment Schemes, was abandoned in 2013. (In fact, one of the reasons the European Central Bank is exploring its own digital currency is to provide an alternative to the American card networks.) As Canada builds out its own domestic credit card workaround, we can learn from the European mistakes. The U.S. is no longer a clear friend. Boycotting U.S. products is one thing. But if we truly want to reduce the external threat, we need to build our own card infrastructure—before it's too late. * In-person debit payments are processed by the Interac network. However, online debit card transactions default to the Visa or MasterCard networks. While Interac does allow for online purchases, many retailers don't offer the option, and when they do, the checkout process requires the user to log into their online banking, which is more of a hassle than using a card.
In what seems to be an effort to extort Canada for additional benefits, Donald Trump complained yesterday on social media that CANADA DOESN'T EVEN ALLOW U.S. BANKS TO OPEN OR DO BUSINESS THERE. And so according to Trump, Canada doubly deserves to be disciplined with tariffs. Well, if it's true that U.S banks aren't allowed to do business in Canada, then why in god's name is one of the U.S.'s largest banks doing business in downtown Toronto? Citigroup Place, 123 Front St. West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada Citi has been operating in Canada since 1919 and currently has 1,700 Canadian employees. According to OSFI, Canada's bank regulator, the bank earned C$35 million in Canada in the first three quarters of 2024 and has C$5.49 billion in Canadian assets as of September 30, 2024. In short, Trump was either lying, misinformed, crazy, or some combination of those three. Canada allows foreign banks to enter our banking industry by requiring them to set up a domestic subsidiary and applying for a Schedule II banking charter. Schedule II banks can operate in all of the same lines of business as mainstay Canadian banks (i.e. Schedule I banks) like Royal Bank or Bank of Montreal. There are 16 Schedule II banks in Canada, three of which are American. (In addition to Citi, the other two are Amex Bank and JP Morgan.) Some folks on social media tried to reinterpret Trump's complaint: "But JP, what Trump really meant to say is that Canada doesn't allow U.S. banks to serve retail customers." As proof they cited the fact that if you walk into a Citi office in Canada, Citi won't allow you to open a personal chequing account. The reason that Citi won't give you a personal chequing account isn't because the rules prevent them from doing so. Rather, Citi (along with Amex and JP Morgan) have chosen not to enter the Canadian retail banking market, preferring to focus instead on other types of Canadian banking, like commercial and investment banking. If Citi, for instance, wanted to set up a retail branch network, it could. In fact, Citi once had a small five-branch retail banking network in Vancouver and Toronto, offering personal chequing and savings account, term deposits, loans, mortgages, mutual funds and RRSPs. But it sold out in 1999 to Canada Trust, which was ultimately bought by TD Bank. Other foreign banks have also set up Schedule II banks with a retail presence, only to sell out to domestic banks. HSBC Canada, owned by its British parent, became Canada's seventh largest bank—one that was notably successful in offering mortgages to retail customers—but was recently offloaded by its parent to Royal Bank, a Schedule I bank. ING Canada, owned by Dutch-based ING Bank, created one of Canada's most popular discount retail banks, ING Direct, but sold it to Scotia Bank in 2012, which rechristened the discount bank Tangerine Bank. The lone Schedule II foreign bank I'm aware of that still serves retail customers is ICICI Bank, which is owned by its Indian parent. Why are U.S. and foreign banks reticent to compete in Canada's retail banking market? Contrary to perceptions that Canadian banking is slow and lazy, it's actually quite difficult to make much headway in Canada. The Big-5 banks, plus National Bank, which counts as half a big bank, have built strong retail branch networks that span the entire country. They compete rigorously for consumer deposits, offering higher interest rates than U.S. banks offer to Americans, suggesting a more cut-throat market than south of the border. In short, U.S. banks don't have the cojones to cross the border and compete head-to-head against Canada's more competitive behemoths. Citi already tried. It gave up. By contrast, the U.S. is an easier market for a foreign bank to enter because its banking industry is more fragmented. And many Canadian banks have entered, with TD Bank and Bank of Montreal occupying 10th and 13th spot respectively on the list of largest U.S. banks. This fragmentation is the residue of the U.S.'s refusal (until recently) to allow banks to set up branches across state lines. By contrast, Canada has always had fairly permissive rules about establishing cross-country banking networks. The irony here is that Trump's complaints about lack of openness best apply to the U.S., historically the culprit when it comes to tamping down the spread of banking. Canadian banks' U.S. and international exposure has increased over time. A recent Bank of Canada study finds that our banks now have more foreign liabilities (i.e. deposits) than domestic liabilities. (See chart below). More precisely, 57% of all Canadian banks' liabilities are now foreign. As for our banks' asset mix, foreign assets are poised to surpass domestic assets in the next year or two, if trends continue. Rising Canadian bank exposure to the rest of the world. Source: Bank of Canada The reason for this outward migration is clear. Canada's saturated retail banking market offers few opportunities for growth, but other parts of the world are less saturated, and so these jurisdictions offer Canadian banks ideal avenues for acquisitions and growth. This gives us an additional vantage point for viewing Trump's absurd comments about Canadian banking. He may not be saying that Canada's banking system is closed, but that the U.S. banking system is now effectively shut off to additional acquisitions by Canadian banks, as part of some sort of America First banking policy. This implicit threat of a foreign banking blockade may explain, in part, why the price of Canadian bank stocks fell so much more than the broader Canadian market yesterday. Their avenues for growth may have just narrowed.
On Twitter/X, I recently suggested that the network effects of the stablecoin market are massive. Tether, which has four times more wallets than all other stablecoins, is locked-in as the stablecoin lingua franca, just like English has been locked-in as the global language of business. In case you've missed the trend, stablecoins are fiat money (primarily U.S. dollars) that are issued on a new type of database called a blockchain. The total value of stablecoins in circulation has grown from $0 to over $200 billion in a decade, with Tether dominating at $138 billion. When I said at the outset that the stablecoin market is governed by network effects, what I meant is that a positive feedback loop exists whereby the value that a network (i.e. languages or stablecoins) provides to users increases as more users join the network. Once a given stablecoin has entered into this virtuous loop, other issuers cannot join in, and will have troubles competing. It's a winner take all market that Tether and its stablecoin USDt (and perhaps smaller competitor USDC, issued by Circle) have already won. Larry White, a monetary economist who I've mentioned a few times on my blog, asked me why I think network effects are present in the stablecoin market. We don’t see network effects with other U.S. dollar payment media like checkable deposits, Larry points out (and I agree), so it's not clear why we should see this with stablecoins. Here's my logic. Stablecoins aren't fungible, bank deposits are The key is that while U.S. dollar stablecoins—Tether's USDt, Circle's USDC, PayPal USD, etc—are pegged to the dollar, and thus seem to be alike, they are not actually completely alike. That is, they are not fungible with each other. Fungibility is one of my favorite words, and I write about it quite often on this blog. It means that members of a population are interchangeable, or perfectly replaceable with each other. All grams of pure raw gold are interchangeable. Not all grams of pizza are alike—pizza is non-fungible. U.S. dollar bank deposits (say Well Fargo dollars and Chase dollars) are fungible with each other. Rather than being independent, they are fused together as homogeneous and singular U.S. dollars. A Chase dollar is just as good as a Wells Fargo dollar for the purposes of making payments. That's not the case with stablecoins, which are like pizza. Or better yet, in the same way that Chinese yuan and UAE dirham are pegged to the dollar but remain independent currencies, each U.S. dollar stablecoin is pegged to the dollar but functions as its own distinct non-fungible currency. For the purposes of making payments, one stablecoin is not as good as another one, just like how dirham balances aren't perfect replacements for yuan. The reason behind this difference is that U.S. banks cooperate with each other by accepting competitor's money at par on behalf of their customers. For instance, I can take a Wells Fargo check to my Chase branch and Chase will accept it 1:1 even though it represents a competing bank's dollar. Or I can send an ACH payment directly from Wells Fargo to Chase, and Chase will accept that Wells Fargo dollar at par and convert it into a Chase dollar for me. The effect of this reciprocal acceptance is that all U.S. banking dollars are tightly knit together, or interchangeable. A fungible standard has been created. I can't perform these same actions with stablecoins. I can't send 100 USDC to Tether to be converted into 100 USDt, nor send 100 USDt to Circle, which issues USDC, to be converted into 100 USDC. Stablecoins issuers are loners. They've chosen to avoid banding together to weave a unified U.S dollar stablecoin standard. This lack of standardization explains some weird things in the stablecoin market, like why there are so many markets to trade USDt for USDC (see below). Notice that the clearing price in these stablecoin-to-stablecoin markets is never an even $1, but always some inconvenient price like 0.991 or 1.018. Some of the multiple markets for trading USDt for USDC, all at varying prices Source: Coingecko There is no equivalent trading market for Chase-to-Wells Fargo balances or TD-to-Bank of America dollars. These banks' dollars are perfectly compatible and don't require such markets. The advantages of a single dollar standard Harmonization is useful. Anyone can walk into a McDonald's and purchase a Big Mac for $5.69 with whatever brand of bank dollar they want. Money held at small banks is just as useful as money at massive ones: the Bank of Little Rock may only have five branches, but its dollars are accepted at McDonald's all across the world, on par with those of Chase, America's largest bank. McDonald doesn't accept stablecoins, but if it did, it would have to offer multiple prices for a Big Mac: i.e. 5.73 USDt and 5.68 USDC. Each stablecoin serving as its own particular unit of account is inconvenient, both for McDonald's and its customers. PayPal USD probably wouldn't even be accepted at McDonald's: it's too small. The lack of standardized stablecoin market becomes even more awkward in asset markets. If you want to buy $1 million bitcoins on, say, Binance, there's a whole array of different U.S. dollar stablecoin markets available, including bitcoin-to-USDt, bitcoin-to-USDC, and bitcoin-to-FDUSD. (FDUSD refers to First Digital USD, a medium sized stablecoin.) The table above shows the prices of bitcoin and ether on Binance, the world's largest crypto exchanges. Notice that liquidity in both Binance's bitcoin and ether trading market is compartmentalized into different stablecoins rather than being fused into a single homogeneous US dollar-to-bitcoin market. Source: Coingecko You can forget about easily buying bitcoins with PayPal USD stablecoins. No crypto exchange offers that trading pair; PayPal USD is too small to be worth the hassle. This has the effect of fragmenting the liquidity of the stablecoin market into different buckets. Instead of stablecoins-in-general having a certain level of marketability, each individual stablecoin has its own distinct liquidity profile in asset markets. In contrast, the liquidity that a Wells Fargo dollar, a Bank of Little Rock, or a Chase dollar provides to their owner in the context of asset markets has been unified into a collective whole. If you want to buy shares of Blackrock's iShares Bitcoin ETF, there isn't a separate market for Wells Fargo-to-bitcoin or Chase-to-bitcoin. As for Bank of Little Rock dollars, they are just as fit for bitcoin purchases as its much largest competitors. A winner-takes-all market Now we can understand why network effects dominate the stablecoin market. If you want to start using stablecoins to trade crypto or buy stuff, you will always be arm-twisted by market logic into choosing the largest most liquid stablecoin. And your decision to go with the largest one makes that stablecoin a little more liquid, thus solidifying its pole position. Selecting a smaller stablecoin like PayPal USD makes little sense. McDonald's will never accept it, and there are many crypto assets that you won't be able to buy with it. Even when certain PayPal USD trading pairs are available, the bid-ask spreads will be wide, imposing much larger costs on you than if you simply went with a larger stablecoin. Thus network effects, working in reverse, repel uptake of PayPal USD. The unsafe stablecoin is the largest Tether remains the largest stablecoin, despite being one of the most unsafe stablecoins. (USDC does not get top marks for safety, either.) Network effects explain this. Stablecoin rating agency Bluechip awards Tether a D rating, noting that it is "less transparent and has inferior reserves... USDT is not a safe stablecoin". Under normal conditions (i.e. those not characterized by network effects) the safest stablecoins would have long-since displaced Tether from its leading spot. But in stablecoin markets, the safest stablecoins—Gemini USD, PayPal USD, and USDP, all rated A or A- by Bluechip—remain insignificant players. The virtuous circle in which Tether is locked dominates all other factors. These are the best-ranked fiat stablecoins according to Bluechip. But they are also tiny, with market capitalization below $1 billion. There appears to be no point trying to be a safe stablecoin, since the network effects arising from liquidity completely dominate any safety concerns that users might have. Eyeing Tether's profits, new competitors are entering the stablecoin market. But this is a game they probably shouldn't bother playing. PayPal arrived last year with PayPal USD, but to date it remains mostly irrelevant, despite huge growth in the overall stablecoin market over the same period. Ripple and Revolut are also slated to bring out their own products. They're also destined to mediocrity, because they're too late to make the jump into the virtuous loop that Tether and (to a lesser extent) Circle occupy. (There is one caveat. Should one of the two leaders eventually be shutdown for money laundering offenses or sanctions evasion, one of these also-rans could be vaulted into their spot.) Might the stablecoin sector eventually migrate over to the unified fungible standard that characterizes banking deposits? No, that's probably not going to happen. For a fusion to occur, Tether and runner-up Circle, which issues USDC, would have to start accepting their competitors' stablecoins at par. But they won't go down this path, since that would kill off the network effect that gives them their unrivaled dominance over the rest of the pack. No, it's in the interests of the leaders for chaotic non-fungibility to continue. Alas, this lack of standardization may limit the stablecoin sector's broader potential to serve as a cohesive global payment alternative to the better-organized banking standard. Sometimes a bit of cooperation trumps competition.
The next chapter in the Tornado Cash saga just dropped. Last week a court ruled last that Tornado Cash, a bot that can be used for obfuscating crypto, is safe from being sanctioned. I first wrote about Tornado Cash in 2021, before its legal troubles began, warning of the risks ahead. I've been tracking Tornado's legal saga since then. (See here | here | here ). The saga serves as a bellwether for how financial services hosted on blockchains are to be sliced and diced under existing laws, in particular the crucial anti-money laundering statutes and sanctions laws. More generally it foreshadows how autonomous techno-beings, many of which don't yet exist, are to be treated by the law. In the newest chapter of the saga, a court ruled that America's sanctions authority, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), does not have the authority to sanction a certain type of smart contract, or string of autonomous code, that undergirds Tornado Cash: its so-called immutable contracts. Recall that in August 2022, OFAC sanctioned Tornado Cash, which accepts traceable crypto from users and returns it in untraceable format. Tornado had been used by the sanctioned North Korean hacker group Lazarus to obfuscate its financial tracks. OFAC listed Tornado Cash's website tornado.cash along with 53 Ethereum addresses. The sanctions were relatively effective. Americans could no longer use the bot without risking fines or imprisonment. Those who had funds deposited in Tornado had to ask OFAC for special permission to withdraw them. In the months after the sanctions were announced, usage of the privacy bot plunged and the amount of crypto deposited fell by over half. After two different sets of plaintiffs challenged OFAC's actions in court, the appeals court in one of the cases returned a verdict last week. An immutable smart contract is "unownable, uncontrollable, and unchangeable—even by its creators," and therefore it doesn't qualify as property. Because OFAC's sanctioning power is limited to that which is property, it follows that OFAC cannot sanction immutable smart contracts. This not-property ruling only applies to twenty immutable Tornado Cash contracts that were on OFAC's sanctions list. Tornado's mutable contracts, those that can be controlled and changed, remain property—and thus can stay on the list of sanctioned contracts. Unless OFAC wins on appeal, it will presumably have to unsanction those twenty immutable contracts. Now, it's possible that as long as the remaining sanctioned mutable contracts are crucial to the functioning of the Tornado Cash bot, the revised sanctions blacklist will still have an effect. And if OFAC adds other key mutable Tornado Cash smart contracts to its list (say like the contracts allowing governance, which for some reason were not originally sanctioned), American users will continue to steer clear of Tornado Cash, the bot's anonymizing capacities remaining lower than otherwise, thus diminishing its ability to serve North Korean interests. But if not, what can OFAC do? Sanction users, not code I've already done a bit of digging on this question. In response to the sanctions, I wrote an article in late 2022 entitled: How to stop illegal activity on Tornado Cash (without using sanctions) The gist was to explore alternative tools for countering illicit activity on Tornado rather than the blunt tool of sanctioning its actual smart contracts. What I suggested was to apply pressure to the users of the smart contracts. "Rather than punishing code, penalize the people who use the code." The logic goes like this. Any user who deposits crypto to Tornado Cash, even someone with clean crypto, is providing North Korea with prohibited financial services, the Tornado bot being the means by which the two sides are connecting as counterparties. Whether intentional or not, a user's deposits broaden the anonymity set of Tornado Cash, or its ability to obfuscate larger amounts of illicit funds sourced from sanctioned counterparties like Lazarus. Think of it as sanctioned North Korean users passing on sanctions taint to all other Tornado Cash users by virtue of everyone interacting via the same bot, Tornado Cash. This taint spreads to those who deposited their crypto (clean or dirty) to Tornado at the same time as Lazarus and/or those who have continued to deposit to it in light of the known fact that the North Korean group regularly deposits stolen funds to the platform. OFAC issues a public alert stating that any foreigner can and will be sanctioned if their funds interact with North Korean funds on Tornado Cash. In response, some foreign users will risk being designated and continue to engage with Tornado. Many will not. As for U.S. users, OFAC can threaten them with potential civil monetary penalties if they aid North Korea using Tornado as their a tool. A $10,000 fine for interacting with sanctioned North Korean actors via the Tornado Cash bot will probably discourage most usage. Another core set of Tornado Cash users who OFAC has legal leverage over are the relayers—real life individuals who provide an extra layer of privacy to Tornado Cash users. (I explain here why relayers are necessary for full privacy). OFAC can threaten foreign relayers with sanctions and U.S.-based relayers with civil monetary penalties. Pressuring these various groups of users won't stop Tornado Cash code from functioning, but it will certainly constrain the activity it facilitates, and thus make it harder for North Korea to anonymize its funds. And it is consistent with the court's not-property ruling because users, not contracts, are being targeted. I'm not saying that OFAC will follow this playbook, or that it should, but it certainly is an option. There is another route, though, and that is to go to Congress and ask for the ability to put sanctions on immutable entities. More broadly, Tornado Cash may just be the first in an emerging population of unownable and uncontrollable techno-beings—bots, machines, drones, androids, AI agents, automatons, and golems—that operate independently of human control, many of which will end up doing very dangerous things. Society may want the legal ability to protect its members from these immutable contraptions, including by sanctioning them. For instance, imagine the following scenario... A Russian AI-guided assassin bot If a Russian assassin is regularly poisoning people (including U.S. citizens) for criticizing Putin, OFAC can sanction that assassin, thus preventing any American entity from dealing with him and blocking all of his accounts, his car, and his interests in various companies. That might not stop the assassin, but it'll make his job more difficult. In doing so, OFAC is simply fulfilling its mandate to use its sanctioning powers to protect Americans. Say the assassin creates an artificial intelligence and imbues it with all of his assassin's lore, providing it with an artificial body and then throwing away the keys, rendering the robot immutable. The court's recent not-property ruling suggests that while OFAC can ably defend Americans from the flesh and blood assassin, it cannot protect them from the assassin's immutable killing robot—even though the robot performs the precise same killing function as the living assassin using the exact same techniques. This is obviously an incongruity, one that seems like it should be fixed. Or is there a specific reason why we should provide legal safe harbor to all unownable and uncontrollable techno-beings? Feel free to explain in the comments. In any case, OFAC's efforts to apply its national security mandate to Tornado Cash are probably not over. Let's see how it responds. Some sort of resolution is important because we are still in the early stages of being inundated with self-guided autonomous agents.
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I am a dabbler, by nature, moving on from topic to topic, but this year, I have spent more time than usual on AI, but that is because it seems to be part of almost every business or economy related story. I tried to value SpaceX ahead of and after the filing of the prospectus for its initial public offering before moving on to the question of whether it and OpenAI and Anthropic should be part of the S&P 500 index. I started my analysis of how AI would affect the rest of us, from doomsday to do-nothing scenarios, largely in response to Citrini and Citadel reports on the topic. in August 2026, I took my first big picture look at AI as a business, which I titled its bar mitzvah moment, with a look at its potential market, business economics and moats. That look was a prelude to the initial public offerings in the works (then) for Anthropic and OpenAI, and I provided a simple way to reverse engineer how much investors would need in revenues from these companies to justify their sky-high pricing. In early October, I looked at how the massive investments in AI are playing out in the aggregate earnings, cashflows and invested capital at US companies, and why it is contributing to holding the market intact, in the face of rising rates. Just last week, I argued that both Anthropic and OpenAI would be priced, rather than valued, for their initial public offerings, using what I called buzzy metrics (like annualized run rates) and promised that I would try to value the company, when it filed its prospectus. On October 26, Anthropic filed its prospectus, and at the risk of being called hopelessly wrong by both bulls and bears, I will try to value the company, using what I see as its most likely pathway, while also leaving the door open for you to disagree with me, and pick your own pathways to valuing the company. The Prospectus Before I delve into the details of the S-1 filed by Anthropic, it is worth noting that at 416 pages, it is long and filled with distractions, as has become the case with almost every initial public offering in the last two decades. (I chronicled this trend in my post on the disclosure dilemma, arguing that while filings have become longer, they have become less informative). The Anthropic IPO has useful information that both bulls and bears will spin to justify their priors, and in the section below, I look at key disclosures, broken down by valuation input into revenue growth, profitability, risk and reinvestment categories, from both an optimist (glass half full) and pessimist (glass half empty) perspective: Revenue Growth and Composition: The good news in the revenue story is that the company has grown exponentially over the last year, with revenues in the first two quarters of this year about fourteen times as high as the revenues in the first two quarters of the last year, but the sobering news is that revenue growth slowed down in the third quarter of 2026, as OpenAI increased market share, compute capacity acted as a constraint and some enterprises moved to cheaper open source models. The good news on customer composition is that the number of enterprises that spend more than $1 million a year on Claude increased to 1900, from less than a hundred a year ago, but the bad news is that the company still has concentrated revenues, with its top five customers accounting for 25% of revenues. Operating and Net Profitability: In bad news, Anthropic reported an operating loss, corrected for non-cash and one-time charges, of over $ 8 billion, for the first six months of the year. The actual loss reported was $80 billion, but $72 billion represented a non-cash charge, expensing the conversion option of the convertible bond. The good news, though, is that not only are the trend lines working in their favor, with the company claiming that it had an operating profit in the most recent quarter. The company is also delivering its revenues more efficiently over time, with all of its expenses decreasing as a percent of revenues across the quarters, with compute costs, its biggest cost,, decreasing from more than 250% of revenues to 48% of revenues, on a quarterly basis. Reinvestment for growth: AI agents are computing power hogs, and AI companies invest immense amounts in compute power. The financial statements in Anthropic's prospectus actually do not show this investment at the moment, with neither the cap ex in the statement of cash flow nor the debt (and invested capital) in the balance sheet showing substantial investment in compute power. Before you accuse Anthropic of hiding the truth (or worse), the company is open about its future compute power commitments, reporting hundreds of billions in compute commitments in future years. The good news is that Anthropic is now catching up with OpenAI, which had the lead on compute power, but the bad news is that this catching up has not been cheap, in terms of cost commitments in future years. It i s also worth noting that compute power will need to be renewed and reinvested in, and while chip costs (a key component) may come down, data centers, facing opposition from communities, may become more expensive. Operating and Regulatory risk: Anthropic's argument is that its customers, once they adopt Claude models within their enterprises, will find that they become so integral to operations that they will not abandon them (making revenues sticky and the business less risky). That has not been fully tested yet, and it is entirely possible that spending on AI agents is cyclical and that companies will pull back in bad times. On the financing front, committing to hundreds of billons in compute, purchase and lease commitments exposes the firm to default risk (with a bond rating of BB+), but in response the company will argue that its access to new capital, as a publicly traded large market-cap company, will make this risk recede. In addition, its cash balance, already at $114 billion, and likely to be bulked up with another $100 billion from the IPO offering, will give them more than enough cash to cover commitments in the next few years. Source for AI risks: https://airisk.mit.edu If I were to summarize the information that I obtained in the prospectus that is relevant to valuing the company, I would come up with the following (and neither Anthropic bulls nor bears will be happy with me): The company's revenues are growing quickly, and for at least of the subset of users that are its core customers, it is delivering on its promise. That said, the revenue growth rate is clearly coming down, as scale, competition and compute power constraints all work against the company, and the fact that Anthropic is so interconnected in both operating and financing practices with other big players in the AI game (the circularity that is often noted by critics) does lead to the potential for double counting and opacity. The expenses for Anthropic, across categories, are growing slower than revenues and that is helping reduce operating losses and putting the company on a glide path to not just profitability, but significant profitability. That said, notwithstanding one quarter's reported profits, the company is not quite there yet, and will require significant revenue growth to keep ahead of the expenses (from the compute power commitments) that will hit the income statement in future periods. The immense compute power commitments at Anthropic have not only allowed the company to lock in what it needs to deliver growth but are also largely responsible for the high gross profit margins reported by the company, because they have moved company's biggest expense from the variable to the fixed operating cost column. That has come at a cost, since this not only increases the company's operating leverage, but also will result in further commitments down the road, as compute power needs to be replenished and grown. Anthropic has built a buffer against risk in the form of a very large cash balance, which will be augmented after the IPO, and it is is possible that Anthropic's customers will become reliant on its products, making its revenue stickier. However, it is exposed to risk on three dimensions - in operations, from high operating leverage, in financing, because of its contractual content cost commitments and on survival, since it is dependent on growth to meet its obligations. Over the next few days, don't be surprised to see people make cases for and against Anthropic using their spin of the data in the prospectus. Neither side will be convinced, or convincing, and will emerge with their priors about Anthropic intact and reinforced. I think that too much time and effort is being spent on going through this prospectus, as if it contains the answers to every question you may have on AI, when, in truth, it is a snapshot of a young company that is evolving. This prospectus, at least in my view, is analogous to reviewing a report card for a kindergartner (a precocious and talented one perhaps, but still a kindergartner) and trying to determine how much, if any, to set into that child's college fund. My one piece of advice, no matter which side of the optimist/pessimist divide you may fall on, is that you do not get sucked into conspiracy stories revolving around AI company cabals (where the hyper-scalers, chip maker and LLMs are all working at creating a mirage of AI success to fool investors) or accounting fraud. I agree that self interest is driving many of the actions that you observe in this space and that accountants sometimes use the discretion in accounting rules to make the numbers look more favorable for companies than they really are, but those are common problems across all companies, not just AI and Anthropic, and falling into the conspiracy rabbit holes effectively blocks you from even considering alternative explanations. The Anthropic Valuation - Story and Numbers The prospectus, with all of its disclosures, is still a document rooted in the past, and the value of a business lies in your expectations for the future. In this section, I am planning to leave the safety of the historical disclosures and embark on forecasting the future, knowing fully well that I am going to be wrong, and perhaps even massively wrong, in my attempts. At each step of the story, I will offer you a chance to disagree with my take, and provide your own, with the resulting change in inputs. I know that you are busy, but if you can humor me and play alone, we may both benefit from this exercise. 1. The Scaling Up Story The value of Anthropic, and any of the other AI product and service companies that will come later, ultimately rests on how big you believe the AI products and services market will become, and what portion of that market you company will inhabit. I started on this discussion a couple of months ago in my assessment of AI as a business, and argued that the total market for AI products and services will depend on four assessments - whether AI is a productivity tool for employees or employee replacement, with the latter creating a larger market for its products and services. whether that employee displacement will be primarily at the top end (top quintile) of the wage scale or across the board, with the latter pushing up the total market. whether AI's impact will be concentrated in a few industry groups or across many or most industries, with the market expanding as AI's reach expands whether the AI disruption will be primarily in the United States and a few other geographies or global, with a global reach leading to a bigger market. I used the picture below to illustrate the range of total market outcomes: I believe that AI will have the power to disrupt some industries, and that its most powerful (and highest priced) models will displace white collar (and highly paid) employees, yielding an end market size of $5 trillion or greater for its products. In my view, and that is based on a very early reading of the AI business today, Anthropic is aiming for the premium portion of the market and looks like a leader in that portion of the market. The one emerging add on is Anthropic's ambition (made explicit in the prospectus) to be a competitor in a subset of the businesses that its agents are disrupting, with the pharmaceutical business emerging as a potential play. In effect, Anthropic Pharma, or whatever they choose to call it, will then use its agents to do drug research and testing, displacing the companies that currently provide this service, and reap at least a portion of the revenues from the drugs they develop. With that story in place, I believe that it is plausible that Anthropic's revenues could approach a trillion dollars in a decade. For perspective, there is only no company in the world with more than a trillion in revenues today, with Amazon and Walmart sitting at around $700-$750 billion (albeit in current dollars and time). Clearly, these are my views, and yours may be very different. If you are willing to play along, I would like you to make your own assessment and make your choice below: My choice is shaded black, and as you make your choice, pay more attention to the target revenues that you believe Anthropic will have in 2036 than to the compounded annual growth rate between years 2 and 5, which is just an input to get to your target revenues. 2. The Profitability Story There is clearly movement towards profitability in the prospectus, but where will the profit margins end up after Anthropic has gone through its growth pains? To estimate where margins will converge, it may help to start with the recognition that the AI product and service market, once established, is likely to have a mass market segment where AI agents and models, many of which may be open-sourced and less powerful, will compete for customers primarily on pricing, and a premium segment, where frontier models, many of which will remain closed models, powered by client data, dominate. The operating margins for the former are more likely to resemble those of business services (roughly 10%), whereas the operating margins for the latter will converge on the operating margins of enterprise software (close to 40% for the top quartile), with compute power and R&D becoming the reinvestment needed to deliver these products. Anthropic is targeting the premium market, as reflected not only in its current revenue breakdown, with almost 80% from enterprises paying based on usage, but also in its focus on using its newly acquired compute power to build next generation models rather than service current clients. I will assume an end-mix of 75% of revenues from premium products, and 25% from the mass market, giving me an unadjusted pre-tax operating margin of 32.5%; that would put them at the ninth decile of US companies in 2026. Here again, you may find room for disagreement, either on the market mix (mass market versus premium), the margins for each market segment or business economics, as companies scale up. You can make your choice below: Again, my estimate of the target margin is highlighted in black, but with plenty of room for a different choice. 3. The Reinvestment Story The reinvestment assumptions you make for Anthropic will revolve around understanding compute power, in terms of both how it is created as well as how much frontier models will need that power, as they become more powerful and scale up. For the moment, Anthropic, with its compute commitments in excess of $600 billion and greater, has sent signals that it views compute power as a necessity to power its growth ambitions as well as to maintain an edge over competitors (current and prospective). The nature of compute power, and especially with the chips that represent a large percentage of costs, is that investments will age quickly and will need replacement. This is an indication that if Anthropic's growth ambitions come to fruition, there will be more reinvestment needed in future years, to both replenish and grow compute power. It is true that technology may make chips cheaper, but that may be more than offset by new models demanding proportionately more power, and if you add in the real estate and power needs of data centers, there is room for diverge on how much additional investment will be needed in future years. I do believe that the compute power crunch will stay in place for the near term, but will ease over time, and that belief translates into my assumption that Anthropic will need to invest about $1 for every $3 in additional revenues, going forward. That would be in line with what technology companies are generating as revenues per dollar of invested capital today, but with the leap in revenues that Anthropic is forecasting, it will translate into large dollar reinvestments each year. As with revenue growth and profitability, I will leave the door open for disagreement, and you can make your choice below: While I have highlighted my base case assumption in black, note that lower sales to capital ratios will make the business more capital-intensive, and increase the cash drain from reinvestment. 4. The Risk Story As you start listing out the risks that you will be exposed to as an Anthropic investor, you may be overwhelmed both by the number of risks as well as their diversity. To gain some control in this process, I will divide the risks into three groups: a. Operating risk: The AI business is still evolving, and while Anthropic's growth and customer stickiness so far are noteworthy, the business will face challenges as it grows, and lives through market and economic turmoil. Thus, for Anthropic's customers spending on AI as a productivity tool, we do not know whether they will cut back their spending, and if so how much, in bad times, and for those who plan to replace employees with AI agents, whether the pace and extent of usage will change with the economy. The number that is designed to convey this risk into the valuation is the cost of capital, and for Anthropic, assuming that it carries the risk of large technology companies with an added burden of the compute commitments, I will estimate a cost of capital of 9.74%. Again, for perspective, note that the median cost of capital for US firms in September 2026 was 9.16% and that the third quartile for US firms is 9.88%. If you disagree, here are your choices: My advice, and feel free to ignore it, is that you should not spend too much time finessing the cost of capital, since of the many assumptions that drive this valuation, it is among the least critical. While I highlight my base case cost of capital, remember that when investing in a publicly traded company, what you would like to use as a cost of capital has to be constrained by what the market is offering. b. Financing risk: The main talking point for many Anthropic bears is the compute commitment that runs into hundreds of billions, creating fixed costs that will be a drag on profitability, especially if revenue growth falls short of expectations, as well as the risk of distress. While bondholders are right to be trepidatious and will point to the current bond rating of BB+ for the company as backing for their concerns, there are two reasons why failure risk will be suppressed. The first is that the company has the cash balance to sustain itself through the near terms and meet its contractual obligations. The second is that, as a high-profile trillion-dollar plus publicly traded company, it will have access to capital. I do believe, though, that if revenues grow at anemic rates, both these benefits will dissipate, as cash gets burned through and the market cap collapses, and I will estimate a probability of failure of 10% for the company, with a loss of half its value if that happen. If you want to disagree, go into the input sheet worksheet of the spreadsheet, and if you scroll down to cells B52 and B53, you can put in your own views: c. Regulatory risk: With AI companies, the question with regulatory risk is not whether it will show up, but when it does, what form it will take. Anthropic and OpenAI have both invited the government to restrict how this business will grow, and while the cynical rationale for these pleas is that it may keep out competition (especially from China), the regulations and restrictions are coming. As with the large social media companies, the effect of these regulations will not be a cessation of business but an increase in operating expenses and loweer profit margins. I estimate that the regulatory effects are likely to be mild, at least on a relative basis, and that it will shave my initial operating margin estimate of 32.5%, for Anthropic, down to 27.5% (a reduction of 5%). You can make your own call on the regulatory effects on margins below: You may disagree with me both on the likelihood of regulation and its effects, and while my base case is highlighted in black, you can diverge in your choice. The Valuation With my storyline and inputs for Anthropic in place, I valued the firm, and you can check out the spreadsheet at this link. Rather than drown you in cash flow line items, I will present my Anthropic valuation, with a trillion in revenues by 2036, a target operating margin of 27.5% (with the target margin of 32.5% adjusted for regulatory drag), reinvestment that delivers three dollars of revenues for every dollar of capital invested over time and a cost of capital of 9.74%: Download spreadsheet With my upbeat story for Anthropic, I estimate a value for the equity of $1.475 trillion, at the lower end of the offer pricing range ($1.5 to $2 trillion). Note that my debt for the company is close to half a billion and includes my estimate of the present value of their compute commitments, and that my cash balance includes an estimated $100 billion in proceeds from the offering. If you are bullish, you will undoubtedly find ways to tweak my numbers, and find that a slightly higher operating margin and a lower cost of capital or a longer growth period, will get you to whatever number you want. If you are bearish, you will do a similar exercise in reverse, lowering growth and raising discount rates, to capture your priors. It was precisely to avoid this gaming that I tried to get you to make your own choices on revenue growth, margins, reinvestment and risk along the way, and if you had the time and patience to play along, here is what the range of outcomes would look like. The worst-case Anthropic story, where its target revenues limp (at least relative to expectations) to $200 billion in 2036, margins converge on the mass market (10%), compute power stays scarce and costly (sales to capital of one), cost of capital rises to the third quartile for US companies (9.88%) and the regulatory effect on margins is drastic yields worthless equity, In fact, the value of equity is -$373 billion, and the company will not survive as a going concern. The best-case Anthropic story, where target revenues surge to $1.5 trillion in 2036, margins converge on the premium market (40%), compute power becomes cheap (sales to capital of four), cost of capital falls to the first quartile for US companies (7.79%) and the regulatory effect on margins is non-existent yields a value of $4.04 trillion for equity. While I believe that the best case and worse case scenarios are both possible, but unlikely, you can assess your own story for the company, with the resulting value, applying what I call the 3P test: Is it possible? Is it plausible? Is it probable? Investing is a personal decision, and whether you choose to buy Anthropic, sell it short or sit on the sidelines, you should base it on your own assessment. Corporate Governance and Lock-up Provisions With publicly traded companies, corporate governance obviously matters, but in the last few decades, that recognition unfortunately has led us away from a sensible rationale of why it matters. In fact, much of academic research on corporate governance as well as practitioner measures of it have become focused on the minutia and details of governance, with number of board members, length of their tenure and board composition (insiders vs outsiders) all vying for front place. The truth is that corporate governance scores, which claim to measure how strong or weak governance at a company is, have been gamed by companies, making them poor indicators of shareholder power. So, what exactly is corporate governance? In my view, it is a measure of the power that shareholder (in public) and outside investors (in private businesses) have to change the way businesses are run, if they disagree with the way they are run by incumbent. It is therefore true that this power will be greater at companies where boards are more willing to push back against CEOs and activist investors are involved, and will diminish when you change the rules of engagement to make it more difficult for shareholders to push for change. I have long argued that the institutional investors who sat on their hands, when Google decided to break a precedent, at least in US markets, at its initial public offering by issuing shares with different voting rights. Their success has opened the door for a host of tech companies that have used the same structure to protect founder power at companies and effectively reduced the power that shareholders at these companies have to push for change to selling their shares and moving on. With Anthropic, these concerns about entrenching founders at companies is magnified by two choices that the company has made: Voting rights: This company has decided to exhaust the alphabet in terms of share classes, with five classes of shares, with different voting rights. Note that the class A shares come with standard voting rights, but the voting structure, with a benefit trust picking the board and the founders controlling 50.1% of voting, no matter how many more shares may be issued in the futur, effectively emasculates public investors. Public benefit corporation: The company has structured itself as a public benefit corporation, and in its prospectus, it states that "we may make decisions that we believe appropriately balance the pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose, but that negatively impact the short-, medium-, or long-term performance of our business or the market price". Given the worries that people have about AI being a force for destruction, a concern that Dario Amodei has actively cultivated, this protection against shareholder power may seem to be a good thing, but we need to be open eyed about what this structure does. It does not protect society from AI's evils, but puts power in the hands of the few (the founders and members of the benefit trust that they pic) at the top of Anthropic, hoping that they use that power well. If you, as an investor, have had bad experiences with top management at companies using corporate responsibility and ESG as cover for self-serving activity and hypocrisy, the Anthropic structure is that structure on steroids. As an investor who holds shares in other companies that have dual classes, with different voting rights, including Alphabet and Meta, I will not draw a line in the sand and assert that I will not invest in companies that have "fixed" the voting process in favor of founders. That said, I think Anthropic has managed to put those companies to shame with its combination of a benefit corporation structure (which gives the company the legal license to do pretty much whatever it wants with your money) and a voting share design that is so deviously self-serving that it would put Kim Jong Un to shame. In its nineteen IPO rounds, Anthropic has already accumulated an investor base that includes some of the biggest names in venture capital, as well as other companies in the AI game. I know that for some looking at the Anthropic IPO, there is the concern that these investors will cash out at the expense of public market investors, and that concern will probably be magnified by the fact that the company will, unlike in many other IPOs, allow some investors to cash out at the offering, with more shares being unlocked over time as the company trades. On the first trading day, insiders (but not founders and certain major figures) will be permitted to sell up to 10% of their shares. The remaining shares will be unlocked in tranches, across the first 180 days of trading, and founders and key named figures will be allowed to trade after 365 days. To be honest, I think that too much is made of share unlocking, perhaps because it gives investors and journalists something to talk about before unlock dates. With companies like Anthropic, where you have large institutional investors in the game, and plenty of liquidity, the effects of these unlocks is likely to be muted. My view, though, also reflects a belief that the smart money (which presumably includes all of those selling at the unlock) is not that smart and that their selling has far less informational value than you might believe. As you look at both the corporate governance and lock-up provisions that Anthropic has put into its prospectus, it seems to me that they are daring institutional investors to make a choice of speaking up against these provisions (by not partaking in the IPO) or staying passive, and have already calculated that they will do the latter. Trading the IPO I would draw your attention to my last post on Anthropic, where I argued that the company will be priced, and that almost everyone who trades the stock right after the offering will be pricing, not valuing the stock. That is not meant as a slight, but as a reality check for investors, and especially those investors who seem to believe that the market owes them a payoff, just because they care about fundamentals. Markets owe nothing to any of their participants, and as an investor, I have to not only recognize that reality, but act accordingly. Consequently, I will keep an open mind and wait for Anthropic to be priced for its IPO, and if it is priced well above my estimate of $1.48 trillion, I will sit out the frenzy. To the question of why I would not sell short, if it is priced well above my value, my response is that while I have faith in my valuation, albeit with a range around my estimate, I have no reason to believe that the market will or should agree with me, and even if it has made an error, correct within my time horizon. Once Anthropic starts trading, its story will continue to evolve and change, and given AI's presence in the economy and markets, I can guarantee you that it will be a roller coaster. It is possible that we have underestimated the possible payoff from AI, and that Anthropic continues to rise in market cap, but it is just as possible that major parts of the storyline, from revenue growth to margins to risk, will come under stress, leading the market to reassess what it thinks Anthropic should be priced at. Obviously, those stresses will also cause my estimate of the value to change, but it is not just a possibility but almost a guarantee that there will be a day that Anthropic will be undervalued, and it may be sooner than you think. I valued Facebook at the time of its IPO in June 2012, and while I found it over valued then, at a stock price of $36, it became a bargain just three months later, when the price hit $18, making me a buyer of the stock. The structure of Anthropic, with the public benefit facade and the voting rights abuse, will require a much larger discount on my value estimate, but the market may accommodate that requirement as well. YouTube Video Anthropic Prospectus Prospectus (S1) filing on October 26, 2026 Anthropic Valuation My Anthropic IPO valuation (and you can make it yours) Blog Posts on AI in 2026 To a Trillion Dollars and Beyond: A SpaceX Odyssey! Revisiting SpaceX: A post-Prospectus valuation OpenAI, Anthropic and SpaceX: The S&P 500 Inclusion Question and Investment Consequences AI Scenarios: From Doomsday to Do-nothing! AI's Bar Mitzvah: From hope & hype to business questions! Stock Prices, Earnings and Cashflows: The AI Effect! From Eyeballs to ARR: Buzzy Pricing Metrics and the Anthropic Pricing
The ultimate truth is revealing the truth of the situation and our feelings about it are a relief, and the starting point to moving forward in a positive direction. This is the first in a series of posts around the theme of Truth Be Told, a theme that demands some interpretative explication / context. There is a spectrum of ways to tell the truth. There's the angry rant ("I'm mad as hell and I'm not gonna take this any more!"), the tearful confession, the accusatory diatribe ("you can't take the truth!"), the dispassionate accounting of facts and evidence, and many variations that combine the human emotions these express. My series is built around a special form of Truth Be Told, the kind only a true friend can tell us. It's human nature to hide truths that hurt, and it's human nature to lie to ourselves to maintain a front that all is well and whatever's crumbling can be shored up by our belief that everything is still as it's always been. The acquaintance responds to our doubts and fears with superficial encouragement: you'll get through this, it's just a rough patch, every relationship / enterprise goes through these low spots, you just need a weekend off to regain your perspective, and so on--well meant but not the truth. Only a true friend will risk telling us the truth, knowing it will be painful and that we will likely respond poorly, defensively at best and lashing out attacking the friend at the worst. The true friend accepts the responsibility reluctantly, torn between the desire not to hurt us and the knowledge that the only way out of our misery is to finally face the truth, mourn what is no longer what it once was and accept the truth of what we feel beneath what we've been telling ourselves to keep going. A true friend is not passing judgement, they speak the truth with sympathy for our plight, sympathy for the suffering of living a lie, however attractive the lie may be, fully aware of the pain we're experiencing as the gulf between what we tell ourselves and what we truly feel widens to the breaking point. The truth is the most personal, consequential truths are often painful because accepting them means the end of something we wanted and cherished, the end of an era and the acceptance of an uncertain, perilous future. I use the examples of relationships and enterprises, because these are life's most demanding commitments. To end a relationship or close an enterprise is difficult on multiple levels, and the true friend knows this from their own experiences. The path of least resistance is to maintain the facade of a happy marriage and successful enterprise, even as living a lie eats away at us. It's often a shock that someone else sees through the facade and discerns the truth within us. The true friend must make a difficult calculus, as truth be told risks the friendship for a highly uncertain gain. The true friend is aware that sometimes we're not ready to confront the truth, and the precipice has to crumble beneath our feet before we're ready to accept the truths behind the facade. Or we're finally at a point where hearing the truth from a trusted friend who has our best interests at heart unleashes a great relief, for the truth is not just pain, it's also relief. A true friend is more likely to expose the truth by asking us questions rather than making statements. Our answers to questions such as "when was the last time you had an honest heart-to-heart with your partner?" reveal the truth we've avoided. I anticipate angering many readers in this series, because deeply held mythologies will be bulldozed. In a very real way, the facades we cling to to maintain relationships and enterprises are personal mythologies, and their collapse generally spawns an emotional tornado. The ultimate truth is revealing the truth of the situation and our feelings about it are a relief, and the starting point to moving forward in a positive direction. To share a series around Truth Be Told makes me feel like the guy in a bedraggled white robe on the street corner, murmuring about redemption while passersby cross the street to avoid me. So be it. I'm just asking questions, and the truth is revealed by your answers and your emotional reactions. New collection of five intriguing stories: Jumble Bin Stories (Kindle $6, print $12) read samples for free (PDF) My book Investing In Revolution is available ($18 for the paperback, $24 for the hardcover and $8.95 for the ebook edition). Introduction (free) Subscribe to my Substack for free NOTE: Contributions/subscriptions are acknowledged in the order received. Your name and email remain confidential and will not be given to any other individual, company or agency. Thank you, Darth L. ($70), for your marvelously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Djanyja ($70), for your monstrously generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Amarnakar ($25), for your massively generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Thank you, Eugene K. ($20), for your most generous subscription to this site -- I am greatly honored by your support and readership. Go to my main site at www.oftwominds.com/blog.html for the full posts and archives.
Last month saw “La rentree” – the return to the real world, after an enjoyable summer. Very much so for me, as it happens – but with plenty of enjoyment still to be found. I’ve taken in Frida Kahlo at the Tate Modern, a spot of luxury in the south of France, a City ritual… Continue reading September ’26: Income rush →
In a post at the end of August 2026, I talked about interest rates in 2026 and marveled at the capacity of equities to keep rising in the face of rising rates. I argued that the resilience of stocks during the year could be traced to higher-than-expected earnings being reported by companies in 2026, and a concurrent increase in expected earnings in 2027 and 2028. Now that September 2026 is one for the record books, it is time to take stock and dig a little deeper, especially since the month brought about one of the largest increase in treasury yield rates in recent memory, and stock prices still held their own. In particular, I want to examine the earnings at US companies, in the aggregate and by sector, trying to trace out where the earnings increase is coming from, and how that increased earnings is playing out on corporate balance sheets and cash flows. Stock Prices and Rates In my earlier post on interest rates, I had looked at treasury rates by day through the end of August, and I will begin this section by updating that chart to include a tumultuous September: I had described the rise in rates between January and August as gradual, but the rise in rates in September was anything but, as the ten-year rate rose from 4.75% at the start of the month to 5.29% at the end. In fact, to put the 54 basis point rise in the ten-year rate in context, take a look at the distribution of monthly rate changes in the ten-year treasury in the chart below: The September rise in rates would put in the top ten percent of 770 monthly rate changes that we have seen between 1962 and 2026. In the face of the mark up in rates, stocks held their own in September, at least in the aggregate, and you can see that in the chart below, where I look at aggregate market values, by month, and by sector: = The market added $2.5 trillion in market capitalization across all stocks in September 2026, but almost $1.5 trillion of that came from technology As you look across the entire year, broken down by quarters, here is what you see in the aggregate market caps: Only companies listed at the start of 2026 included I excluded firms that were not listed at the start of 2026 from the list since including them will give a misleading sense of returns to investors; adding SpaceX, for instance, which was listed in June 2026, will increase the value of communication service companies by more than $2 trillion, but it was listed at roughly that value. There are many who have pointed to the fact that US equities, while up for the year, have seen divergence in performance, and you can see that phenomenon play out in two statistics. The first is that three sectors - technology, energy and materials have carried the market, with technology being the biggest contributor to market gains. The second is that the percent of companies within each sector that are up for the year is about 50% across the market, and in the third quarter, about 65% of all listed stocks saw dropping stock prices. It is often difficult to make sense of what is moving stock prices because there are so many factors from growth to interest rates to cash payout that are pulling in different directions. It is to counter this confusion that I have resorted to estimating an implied equity risk premium, where I estimate the internal rate of return you can earn by buying equities, given how they are priced, and their expected earnings growth and cash flows, as well as interest rates. That calculation, which I have done at the start of each month since September 2008, yields an expected return of 8.99% for equities and an equity risk premium of 3.70% (3.92%) over the ten-year treasury rate (dollar riskfree rate) of 5.29% (5.07%) at the start of October 2026: Download spreadsheet Note that this estimation is model-agnostic and is an internal rate of return for investing in stocks, given expectations of the cash flows from investing in equities. If you are a market timer, and I am not one, you could use this implied equity risk premium as a barometer of market priciness, with a lower number indicating overpricing and a higher number indicating underpricing. Download spreadsheet The jump in US treasury rates in September 2026 has had an effect, with the equity risk premium dropping below 4% for the first time this year. In fact, even as the ten-year treasury rate has climbed this year from 4.18% to 5.29%, the expected return on stocks has also gone up from 8.41% at the start of 2026 to 8.99% on September 30, 2026. The AI Cap Ex Boom: Accounting and Corporate Finance Consequences The focus on stock prices and interest rates can sometimes distract us from paying attention to corporate investing, financing and cash return policies that drive value. It should not surprise you, given the times we live in, that AI is at the heart of the business story that is driving corporate behavior, and in the process, providing the fodder for market resistance to higher rates. I will begin with an assessment of how the trillions of dollars in AI cap ex will show up in financial statements: As you can see, the AI cap ex story is a complicated one, if you are looking at market aggregates, because the market includes both the companies that are spending the money building the AI architecture, which includes data centers and other infrastructure, as well as the companies that are supplying the ingredients for that infrastructure. The builders of the architecture are the hyperscalers (Meta, Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft et al.), and the money they spend on cap ex will cause lower earnings, at least until the cap ex starts paying off, in the form of amortization of the AI cap ex, as well as a hit to their free cash flows, which are after cap ex. The money spent on AI cap ex though becomes revenues to the chip makers (Nvidia and TSMC leading the way), network equipment manufacturers (Broadcom, Micron and Marvel, to name just three), power plant builders (Constellation Energy et al.) and even real estate developers focused on data centers (Equinix, Digital Realty), and ultimately net profits (with net margins driving the bottom line). It is true that there are gray zones here, with some AI builders also benefiting from being suppliers (Amazon is spending money on AI cap ex but is also benefiting from the usage of its cloud space for data storage, and Nvidia, while selling the chips that go into the architecture, is also investing directly or indirectly into data centers). As we trace through the aggregated effects of the AI cap ex boom on accounting statements, there are two caveats that need to be stated up front. The first is that the data that is accessible to the public, and which I will be using, will be data from publicly traded companies. To the extent that some of AI's big players (builders and suppliers) are private, I will be missing the revenues, earnings, cash flows and invested capital at these large private players (which include at least two companies in Anthropic and OpenAI that are expected to command trillion dollar plus market caps. The second is that some of the AI cap ex is taking the form of joint ventures and off-balance sheet entities, and the accounting for these (especially on the debt side) may not fully reflect the consequences for firms. As a result, the numbers you see in the public company financials will understate the full effect across all businesses. With those caveats in place, the business story for US equities starts with massive capital expenditures in AI, with trillions being invested into data centers and AI architecture. It is true that this cap ex is top heavy, with the top ten hyper-scalers accounting for more than $2 trillion of the AI cap ex, but in the table below, I look at the aggregate cap ex reported in corporate financial statements at all publicly traded companies in the United States: Even with the caveats about understatement, but you can still see that cap ex in the second quarter of 2026, which is our last completed quarter of reported financials, was up $133.4 billion from the cap ex in the second quarter of 2025, an increase of almost 36%. Again, the surge in cap ex is concentrated, with technology, communication services and consumer discretionary all registering growth of more than 50% in the quarter-to-quarter comparison. Accounting incorporates capital expenditures into the balance sheet as assets, and reflects how this cap ex is funded (debt or equity) by increasing the book values of the funding used in the investment. A surge in cap ex, such as the one that we have seen in 2026, will show up as higher book values for equity, debt and invested capital, and we capture this effect, by sector, in the table below: Across all US stocks, the book equity has increased almost 13%, between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, and total debt is up almost 8%. In dollar terms, the book equity at US companies increased by $1.8 trillion between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, and book debt by $1.9 trillion, over the same period. Technology, being the most active player in AI cap ex, has seen much bigger increases in both numbers, with book equity rising almost 30% and total debt up about 18.8%. From an earnings perspective, the focus on cap ex and book values may seem misplaced, since the former can only decrease cash flows and the latter impacts accounting returns. In 2026, though, the increased capital expenditures on AI are affecting earnings for a simple reason. The money spent on cap ex by a company building AI architecture will become revenues (and earnings) for other companies that supply the building blocks for the architecture. There is a reason why Nvidia has been the biggest beneficiary from the AI cap ex boom so far, since its chips, marked up massively, power the data centers, and there others, from electrical equipment makers to power companies to real estate developers who have also reaped the benefits. It is true that there should be increased amortization expenses at the AI builders, but the longer amortization schedules being used by many of them is reducing the current hit to earnings at these companies. The earnings effect of the AI story can be seen in the table below, where I look at aggregate net income at US companies, broken down by sector: Note that in both the first and second quarters of 2026, US companies have seen earnings surge over the corresponding quarters in 2025, with aggregate earnings increasing from $511 billion to $692 billion (translating into an earnings growth rate of 35%, quarter-to-quarter) in the first quarter of 2026 and from $576 billion to $904 billion (translating into an earnings growth rate of 57%, quarter-to-quarter) in the second quarter of 2026. As with stock prices, the earnings benefits are not broad-based, with more than half of all companies in the market reporting declines in net income, and there are wide differences in earnings growth across sectors. Technology, financials and communication services have seen the biggest increases in earnings, and health care, utilities and real estate have lagged. A cap-ex driven surge in aggregate earnings comes with an asterisk, since the higher earnings across firms will be partially or even fully offset by capital expenditures across firms, leading to free cashflows to firms often growing at much lower rates than earnings. Since these free cash flows are what fund dividend payments and stock buybacks, I looked at cash returned to shareholders in both forms in 2026: In the aggregate, dividends in the last twelve months are up about $43.3 billion (about 5%) from dividends in the 2025 calendar year, and stock buybacks are up about $106.7 billion (about 9%). In fact, if you net out stock issuances, which spiked in the second quarter of 2026, from buybacks, net buybacks have grown bout 7% between the last calendar year and now. Those numbers represent reasonable step ups from the last year's numbers, but they clearly have not kept up with the earnings growth in 2026. One way to see the disconnect that is occurring between earnings and cash flows is to look at the cash returned as a percent of earnings for the S&P 500 companies over time: For much of the last two decades, US companies have returned 80% or more, and sometimes more than 100% of their earnings, to shareholders in dividends and buybacks. Starting in about 2024, you can see a divergence with earnings rising much faster than cash returns, and in the last twelve months leading into 2026, the companies in the S&P 500 returned 63% of their earnings to shareholders, a low not seen since 2004. Many of those who were criticizing US companies for buying back too much stock and not investing enough back into businesses are now finding fault with those same companies scaling back buybacks and investing more into AI cap ex, leading to the conclusion that these critics will find fault no matter what companies do. The AI Business Resolution: Accounting and Market Consequences It is true that the massive investments in AI cap ex are being driven by expectations that AI as a business will enjoy not only a large market, but one that where the winners can sustain huge profits for the long term. As I noted in my post on AI as a business, this is a plausible path, but there are vast disagreements on whether this is the expected one, given uncertainties about all three layers of the business story - the size of the total addressable market, the unit economics/operating margins of companies in the business and the moats and competitive advantages that will allow for sustainability in profits. So, what will the accounting and market consequences be, if the AI pathway diverges from expectations? In the table below, I trace out the accounting and market consequences of the AI business working better than expected at delivering growth and profits, as well as if i does much worse than expected: In the best case scenarios for AI, the companies that have invested in AI, at least collectively, will be able to deliver not just earnings growth from the cap ex, but enough incremental earnings to generate returns on the AI cap ex that exceed their cost of capital for those investments. Their lenders will be made whole, with interest and principal payments, and the AI builders will see their cashflows become more positive, but the companies, while successful, will emerge as very different businesses than when they entered the space, more capital intensive than they used to be. In the worst case scenarios for AI, there will be both accounting and market carnage, as accountants write off large portions of the AI cap ex, because of its failure to deliver promised profits, and while cash flows may recover, markets will correct the pricing of these companies to reflect a lack of trust in management. For companies that were excessively dependent on debt for their AI cap ex, there will be defaults and increased distress, with lenders feeling the pain as well. There are also intermediate scenarios, ranging from AI being a moderate success, where the companies investing AI may be able to extract some earnings from their investment, but not enough to cover the cost of capital, to a moderate failure, where some companies may be able to justify their investments and most will not. Given that AI business surprises will have both market and accounting consequences, I will hazard a guess that the market will lead in this process and accounting will follow. In short, if AI is working better (worse) than expected, you should see stock prices at AI-centered businesses rise (fall) before you see accountants respond. Put simply, in the event that AI does not deliver on its promise, waiting to act until accountants write off AI cap ex to sell your AI company implies that you waited too long. An Investor Perspective: Taking Stock and Taking Action In my post on AI as a business, I zeroed in on the debate between AI optimists, pointing to huge (albeit unspecified) markets for AI products and services, and AI skeptics, drawing attention to the outsized capital expenditures. While that debate plays out, financial markets and businesses cannot afford to wait for resolution, and are acting now, with companies making investments in cap ex and markets building in their expectations of what that will mean for future earnings into stock prices. That has made not just the market but also the economy a giant bet on AI, with success vindicating the companies and investors who have bet on it, and failure manifesting in massive write offs at companies (feeding into losses) and stock price markdowns. As investors, there are four choices that you can make, and unfortunately, none of these choices give you the luxury of sitting out the AI debate: Go all in on the AI story winning (and doing it soon): The first betis that AI is an unstoppable force, destined to change the way we live and work, with AI businesses reaping the benefits of the disruption. It is a plausible story, albeit one that raises significant questions about the economic and social costs of disruption, with disagreements about the speed and extent of the disruption. It was the story that Leo Aschenbrenner built Situational Awareness around, and while excessive leverage, driven by hubris and over-conviction, brought him down, it is possible that you could mimic his strategy, of buying the AI disruptors and/or selling the AI disrupted, albeit with far less leverage, and win in the long term. Go with the market consensus: In an age where we worship at the altar of crowd wisdom in almost everything we do, you could examine what the market is pricing in, as its AI story, and go along. At the moment, at least, the market seems to be building in the expectation that AI will be a major disruption that will give rise to large and valuable businesses and it is picking its winners among the AI architecture companies (with Nvidia the biggest so far) and among the LLMs (SpaceX in the public markets and OpenAI and Anthropic in the private markets). For better or worse, you may have already chosen this path implicitly, if your pension funds and savings are invested passively, getting partial exposure to this story with an S&P 500 fund, and more complete exposure if you buy a total market fund for US equities. Be an AI skeptic: There are many reasons to be skeptical about the AI story, and for some, that skepticism may lead to the belief that AI will not make it as a viable business, or at least one large enough to sustain the pricing and investment you are seeing for it. While that belief may not be strong enough to lead you to act on it, you can steer your new investing away from the AI space, investing in businesses that are least likely to be altered by AI (food processing and leisure) and in geographies where AI is less likely to be a threat, such as the EU (perhaps because of regulation) and parts of Asia (because AI is too expensive to replace human labor in many buainwaawa). Crash out on the AI story: If your belief that AI will fail hardens into a conviction that failure is imminent, you can try to actively cash in on your story. You should, at the minimum, reduce your exposure to equities, especially in the US, by selling your holdings and putting that money into cash,. If you are more risk taking, you can sell short on the companies that have seen their pricing surge on the AI story and perhaps buy the companies that AI was meant to disrupt, flipping Leo Aschenbrenner's story. This has not been a winning strategy for many of the traders and investors who have tried it out for the last two years, and it is worth remembering the adage hat markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent I am personally going with the "market consensus' choice for the bulk of my portfolio, since I do hold five of the Mag Seven (all except Tesla and Nvidia) and four of my holdings in this group (Amazon, Alphabet, Meta and Microsoft) are heavy investors in AI cap ex, but the new money added to my portfolio in the last year or two has gone mostly into cash (short term treasuries, yielding 4%) for much of the last year, leaving my portfolios more cash-laden than usual. I have left money on the table undoubtedly by doing so, but it has helped me sleep better at night, and my advice to you is that you find a pathway in the AI jungle that helps you pass the sleep test as well. There is one final piece of this puzzle that bears watching, and that is a portion of your portfolio that does not show up (yet) in your holdings. The income you will earn in your occupation, over the rest of your working life, is human capital, and to the extent that you believe that AI disruption is coming for your profession, it behooves you to direct your financial capital away from the businesses most exposed to AI disruption to balance your portfolio. I am old enough not to care much about this component, since I have fewer working years left, but if you are much younger than me, this could change your investment game. YouTube Video Blog Posts on AI AI's Bar Mitzvah Moment: From Hope and Hype to Business Questions! Spreadsheets Implied Equity Risk Premium on September 30, 2026
A look at how Four Seasons founder Isadore Sharp learnt to handle recessions in one of the most cyclical industries known to man.