More from the singularity is nearer
If you give some monkeys a slice of cucumber each, they are all pretty happy. Then you give one monkey a grape, and nobody is happy with their cucumber any more. They might even throw the slices back at the experimenter. He got a god damned grape this is bullshit I don’t want a cucumber anymore! Nobody was in absolute terms worse off, but that doesn’t prevent the monkeys from being upset. And this isn’t unique to monkeys, I see this same behavior on display when I hear about billionaires. It’s not about what I have, they got a grape. The tweet is here. What do you do about this? Of course, you can fire this women, but what percent of people in American society feel the same way? How much of this can you tolerate and still have a functioning society? What’s particularly absurd about the critique in the video is that it hasn’t been thought through very far. If that house and its friends stopped “ordering shit”, the company would stop making money and she wouldn’t have that job. There’s nothing preventing her from quitting today and getting the same outcome for herself. But of course, that isn’t what it’s about, because then somebody else would be delivering the packages. You see, that house got a grape. So how do we get through this? I’ll propose something, but it’s sort of horrible. Bring people to power based on this feeling. Let everyone indulge fully in their resentment. Kill the bourgeois. They got grapes, kill them all! Watch the situation not improve. Realize that this must be because there’s still counterrevolutionaries in the mix, still a few grapefuckers. Some billionaire is trying to hide his billions! Let the purge continue! And still, things are not improving. People are starving. The economy isn’t even tracked anymore. Things are bad. Millions are dead. The demoralization is complete. Starvation and real poverty are more powerful emotions than resentment. It was bad when people were getting grapes, but now there aren’t even cucumbers anymore. In the face of true poverty for all, the resentment fades. Society begins to heal. People are grateful to have food, they are grateful for what they have. Expectations are back in line with market value. You have another way to fix this? Cause this is what seems to happen in history, and it takes a generation. The demoralization is just beginning.
AMD is sending us the two MI300X boxes we asked for. They are in the mail. It took a bit, but AMD passed my cultural test. I now believe they aren’t going to shoot themselves in the foot on software, and if that’s true, there’s absolutely no reason they should be worth 1/16th of NVIDIA. CUDA isn’t really the moat people think it is, it was just an early ecosystem. tiny corp has a fully sovereign AMD stack, and soon we’ll port it to the MI300X. You won’t even have to use tinygrad proper, tinygrad has a torch frontend now. Either NVIDIA is super overvalued or AMD is undervalued. If the petaflop gets commoditized (tiny corp’s mission), the current situation doesn’t make any sense. The hardware is similar, AMD even got the double throughput Tensor Cores on RDNA4 (NVIDIA artificially halves this on their cards, soon they won’t be able to). I’m betting on AMD being undervalued, and that the demand for AI has barely started. With good software, the MI300X should outperform the H100. In for a quarter million. Long term. It can always dip short term, but check back in 5 years.
This is a map of primary trading partners, US vs China, and how it has evolved over the last 20 years. Think about it, and realize this probably reflects your experience. I know there was a similar panic about Japan in the 80s, but Japan by population has always been 3x smaller than the US, whereas China is 3x larger. In addition, we had and have military bases in Japan. This is not the same situation. The US, since I have been born, has been coasting. The main product made by the US is the dollar, and it used those manufactured dollars to outsource everything. Most jobs in the US are now basically fake. It’s basically an economy in which five people stick a pipe in the ground, but that pipe is the fed and the oil was the good will built up over 1870-1970. In 2008, with the bailouts, it was made clear that the US has no interest in reform. The next decade, in perhaps a spitting in your face move, the fed made the interest rate 0. Known as ZIRP, this had never been done before. This led to insane perversions. When I got into business, I didn’t understand that business in America was mostly a total scam. Sure, you might look at a single business, and be like, oh, that sounds reasonable, but then you zoom out and look at the entire system, and it doesn’t really make sense. It’s scams feeding other scams. Wanna each start a business, pass dollars back and forth over and over again, and drive both our revenues super high? Sure, we don’t produce anything, but we have companies with high revenues and we can raise money based on those revenues. We’ll both be rich! Let’s do it with a bunch of extra steps so people don’t catch on though. They’ll only see it reflected in the lack of movement of real macro metrics. You see, the US is a “developed” country, which means real growth is over? You do understand that guns and boats are made of steel, right? Oh, airplanes aren’t, they are made of aluminum. Oh…right, yea, it’s not just steel it is absolutely everything. The future is chips you say? All the good chips are made in the Republic of China you say? This 2021 article lays it out clearly, and it also explains why nothing I saw in Silicon Valley made any sense. I’m not going to go into the personal stories, but I just had an underlying assumption that the goal was growth and value production. It isn’t. It’s self licking ice cream cone scams, and any growth or value is incidental to that. It isn’t until you understand this that people’s behavior starts to make sense. America really is at a fork in the road. In one world, they abandon all hopes of being an empire, becoming a regional power with highly protectionist economics. This happened before, and it’s called Europe. I know it’s hard to believe now, but Europe used to be the seat of power for the whole world. The sun never set on the British empire. Now they put you in jail for memes. Protectionist America is a boring place and not somewhere I want to be. It kicks the can further down the road of poverty, basically embraces socialism, is stagnant, is stale, is a museum…etc, again there’s a contemporary example of this. When I said on Lex they were gonna nationalize NVIDIA, look at the AI Diffusion Framework, and notice how Trump hasn’t repealed it. It allows export of GPUs to only 18 countries. Nationalization with American characteristics. It tells the other 177 countries that they should plan on purchasing their AI infrastructure from China. The other path, which is the exciting path, is the attempt to maintain an empire. An empire has to compete on its merits. There’s two simple steps to restore American greatness: 1) Brain drain the world. Work visas for every person who can produce more than they consume. I’m talking doubling the US population, bringing in all the factory workers, farmers, miners, engineers, literally anyone who produces value. Can we raise the average IQ of America to be higher than China? 2) Back the dollar by gold (not socially constructed crypto), and bring major crackdowns to finance to tie it to real world value. Trading is not a job. Passive income is not a thing. Instead, go produce something real and exchange it for gold. The first will bring the value of “American” labor in line with its global market value. It is a particularly unique advantage of the US over China, the US has a potentially much larger pool of talent. Non ironically, diversity is our strength. Unfortunately, there’s a lot of resistance to American labor finding its market value. The second will prevent a lot of the scams. The reason the banking industry is so big is that it is close to the source of the made up dollars. If currency is gold backed, you could imagine something similar happening to the mining industry instead. However, the mining industry is real! It uses steel and aluminum to build physical things. And imagine when we start to mine space. That’s a way better reward function than scamming politicians out of fake dollars. Unfortunately, I doubt either will happen. They very much both can, but people haven’t been demoralized enough yet.
A lot of smooth brains on Hacker News about the last post. I’m sorry if you spent your whole life worshipping money, but hey, the Bible warned you about false idols, don’t shoot the messenger. “It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism” – Mark Fisher It’s actually very easy to imagine the end of capitalism. Imagine capitalism as a game of sharks, where eventually the biggest shark ends up gobbling up all the fish, and that one shark is the last player left standing with all the money. When one person (or company) has all the money, do you see how the money would be worthless? I’ll spell this out clearly. Money is a map, it is not a territory. Please understand what I mean by this before continuing to read. You can erase the mountains from the map, but you still have to climb over them in real life, and even worse, now you don’t have a map! “Everything around you that you call ‘life’ was made up by people who were no smarter than you” – Steve Jobs So, if money is the map, what territory is it attempting to capture? Presumably something having to do with value, but increasingly, as we are buying and selling baskets of derivatives of memecoins, nothing. A map that doesn’t accurately capture a territory is not a Schelling point. It’s not a useful map. And maps are only as good as their usefulness. Useless maps die out. Do you agree or disagree that money is supposed to be a map of value? If you disagree, that’s an ought and I can’t use logic to convince you otherwise, I can just call you a moron who refuses to burn paper $100 bills for warmth on a deserted island. Many capitalists I meet are as stupid as communists, trying to give a moral justification for their system. This is my money, I deserve it. I should be able to passively deploy my capital into the markets and live off the returns. “Moral victories are for minor league coaches.” – JAY-Z A economic system is only good in so much as it effectively deploys capital for real growth. If real economic growth is only 3 percent, any time you are earning beyond that, somebody else is losing. And yet somehow, today, you can put your money in money market accounts and earn a “risk-free” 5 percent…hmm something doesn’t make sense. Who is losing? You will eventually be unable to squeeze the productive people any further. The worst was an e-mail I got with someone who supposedly agreed with me. “Value creation (for all stakeholders) is at the core of the organization/ business model I am putting together…Anyway I wanted to let you know others out there who share your vision.” – anon email Fuck your stakeholders. Fuck your business model. You don’t understand me at all. Stop worrying so much about the distribution of the pie. Start thinking about how to make the pie bigger. With exponential (what 3 percent year over year is) growth, the latter outstrips the former by so much. The right distribution is simply: From each according to his ability, to each according to his ability to effectively deploy capital to achieve real economic growth. Communism is dumb cause it goes to the poor (who routinely demonstrate that they poorly deploy capital). Capitalism is dumb cause it goes to the rent-seekers (who frequently deploy capital to increase their moat). Acceleration is the way.
More in programming
We’ve read a lot of strategy at this point in the book. We can judge a strategy’s format, and its construction: both are useful things. However, format is a predictor of quality, not quality itself. The remaining question is, how should we assess whether a strategy is any good? Uber’s service migration strategy unlocked the entire organization to make rapid progress. It also led to a sprawling architecture problem down the line. Was it a great strategy or a terrible one? Folks can reasonably disagree, but it’s worthwhile developing our point of view why we should prefer one interpretation or the other. This chapter will focus on: The various ways that are frequently suggested for evaluating strategies, such as input-only evaluation, output-only evaluation, and so on A rubric for evaluating strategies, and why a useful rubric has to recognize that strategies have to be evaluated in phases rather than as a unified construct Why ending a strategy is often a sign of a good strategist, and sometimes the natural reaction to a new phase in a strategy, rather than a judgment on prior phases How missing context is an unpierceable veil for evaluating other companies' strategies with high-conviction, and why you’ll end up attempting to evaluate them anyway Why you can learn just as much from bad strategies as from good ones, even in circumstances where you are missing much of the underlying context Time to refine our judgment about strategy quality a bit. This is an exploratory, draft chapter for a book on engineering strategy that I’m brainstorming in #eng-strategy-book. As such, some of the links go to other draft chapters, both published drafts and very early, unpublished drafts. How are strategies graded? Before suggesting my own rubric, I want to explore how the industry appears to grade strategies in practice. That’s not because I particularly agree with them–I generally find each approach is missing an important nuance–understanding their flaws is a foundation to build on. Grading strategy on its outputs is by far the most prevalent approach I’ve found in industry. This is an appealing approach, because it does make sense that a strategy’s results are more important than anything else. However, this line of thinking can go awry. We saw massive companies like Google move to service architectures, and we copied them because if it worked for Google, it would likely work for us. As discussed in the monolith decomposition strategy, it did not work particularly well for most adopters. The challenge with grading outputs is that it doesn’t distinguish between “alpha”, how much better your results are because of your strategy, and “beta”, the expected outcome if you hadn’t used the strategy. For example, the acquisition of Index allowed Stripe to build a point-of-sale business line, but they were also on track to internally build that business. Looking only at outputs can’t distinguish whether it would have been better to build the business via acquisition or internally. But one of those paths must have been the better strategy. Similarly, there are also strategies that succeed, but do so at unreasonably high costs. Stripe’s API deprecation strategy is a good example of a strategy that was extremely well worth the cost for the company’s first decade, but eventually became too expensive to maintain as the evolving regulatory environment created more overhead. Fortunately, Stripe modified their strategy to allow some deprecations, but you can imagine an alternate scenario where they attempted to maintain their original strategy, which would have likely failed due to its accumulating costs. Confronting these problems with judging on outputs, it’s compelling to switch to the opposite lens and evaluate strategy purely on its inputs. In that approach, as long as the sum of the strategy’s parts make sense, it’s a good strategy, even if it didn’t accomplish its goals. This approach is very appealing, because it appears to focus purely on the strategy’s alpha. Unfortunately I find this view similarly deficient. For example, the strategy for adopting LLMs offers a cautious approach to adopting LLMs. If that company is outcompleted by competitors in the incorporation of LLMs, to the loss of significant revenue, I would argue that strategy isn’t a great one, even if it’s rooted in a proper diagnosis and effective policies. Doing good strategy requires reconciling the theoretical with the practical, so we can’t argue that inputs alone are enough to evaluate strategy work. If a strategy is conceptually sound, but struggling to make an impact, then its authors should continue to refine it. If its authors take a single pass and ignore subsequent information that it’s not working, then it’s a failed strategy, regardless of how thoughtful the first pass was. While I find these mechanisms to be incomplete, they’re still instructive. By incorporating bits of each of these observations, we’re surprisingly close to a rubric that avoids each of these particular downfalls. Rubric for strategy Balancing the strengths and flaws of the previous section’s ideas, the rubric I’ve found effective for evaluating strategy is: How quickly is the strategy refined? If a strategy starts out bad, but improves quickly, that’s a better strategy than a mostly right strategy that never evolves. Strategy thrives when its practitioners understand it is a living endeavour. How expensive is the strategy’s refinement for implementing and impacted teams? Just as culture eats strategy for breakfast, good policy loses to poor operational mechanisms every time. Especially early on, good strategy is validated cheaply. Expensive strategies are discarded before they can be validated, let alone improved. How well does the current iteration solve its diagnosis? Ultimately, strategy does have to address the diagnosis it starts from. Even if you’re learning quickly and at a low cost, at some point you do have to actually get to impact. Strategy must eventually be graded on its impact. With this rubric in hand, we can finally assess the Uber’s service migration strategy. It refined rapidly as we improved our tooling, minimized costs because we had to rely on voluntary adoption, and solved its diagnosis extremely well. So this was a great strategy, but how do we think about the fact that its diagnosis missed out on the consequences of a wide-spread service architecture on developer productivity? This brings me to the final component of the strategy quality rubric: the recognition that strategy exists across multiple phases. Each phase is defined by new information–whether or not this information is known by the strategy’s authors–that render the diagnosis incomplete. The Uber strategy can be thought of as existing across two phases: Phase 1 used service provisioning to address developer productivity challenges in the monolith. Phase 2 was engaging with consequences of a sprawling service architecture. All the good grades I gave the strategy are appropriate to the first phase. However, the second phase was ushered in by the negative impacts to developer productivity exposed by the initial rollout. The second phase’s grades on the rate of iteration, the cost, and the outcomes were reasonable, but a bit lower than first phase. In the subsequent years, the second phase was succeeded by a third phase that aimed to address the second’s challenges. Does stopping mean a strategy’s bad? Now that we have a rubric, we can use it to evaluate one of the important questions of strategy: does giving up on a strategy mean that the strategy is a bad one? The vocabulary of strategy phases helps us here, and I think it’s uncontroversial to say that a new phase’s evolution of your prior diagnosis might make it appropriate to abandon a strategy. For example, Digg owned our own servers in 2010, but would certainly not buy their own servers if they started ten years later. Circumstances change. Sometimes I also think that aborting a strategy in its first phase is a good sign. That’s generally true when the rate of learning is outpaced by the cost of learning. I recently sponsored a developer productivity strategy that had some impact, but less than we’d intended. We immortalized a few of the smaller pieces, and returned further exploration to a lower altitude strategy owned by the teams rather than the high altitude strategy that I owned as an executive. Essentially all strategies are competing with strategies at other altitudes, so I think giving up on strategies, especially high altitude strategies, is almost always a good idea. The unpierceable veil Working within our industry, we are often called upon to evaluate strategies from afar. As other companies rolled out LLMs in their products or microservices for their architectures, our companies pushed us on why we weren’t making these changes as well. The exploration step of strategy helps determine where a strategy might be useful for you, but even that doesn’t really help you evaluate whether the strategy or the strategists. There are simply too many dimensions of the rubric that you cannot evaluate when you’re far away. For example, how many phases occurred before the idea that became the external representation of the strategy came into existence? How much did those early stages cost to implement? Is the real mastery in the operational mechanisms that are never reported on? Did the external representation of the strategy ever happen at all, or is it the logical next phase that solves the reality of the internal implementation? With all that in mind, I find that it’s generally impossible to accurately evaluate strategies happening in other companies with much conviction. Even if you want to, the missing context is an impenetrable veil. That’s not to say that you shouldn’t try to evalute their strategies, that’s something that you’ll be forced to do in your own strategy work. Instead, it’s a reminder to keep a low confidence score in those appraisals: you’re guaranteed to be missing something. Learning despite quality issues Although I believe it’s quite valuable for us to judge the quality of strategies, I want to caution against going a step further and making the conclusion that you can’t learn from poor strategies. As long as you are aware of a strategy’s quality, I believe you can learn just as much from failed strategy as from great strategy. Part of this is because often even failed strategies have early phases that work extremely well. Another part is because strategies tend to fail for interesting reasons. I learned just as much from Stripe’s failed rollout of agile which struggled due to missing operational mechanisms. as I did from Calm’s successful transition to focus primarily on product engineering. Without a clear point of view on which of these worked, you’d be at risk of learning the wrong lessons, but with forewarning you don’t have run that risk. Once you’ve determined a strategy was unsuccessful, I find it particularly valuable to determine the strategy’s phases and understand which phase and where in the strategy steps things went wrong. Was it a lack of operational mechanisms? Was the policy itself a poor match for the diagnosis? Was the diagnosis willfully ignoring a truculent executive? Answering these questions will teach you more about strategy than only studying successful strategies, because you’ll develop an intuition for which parts truly matter. Summary Finishing this chapter, you now have a structured rubric for evaluating a strategy, moving beyond “good strategy” and “bad strategy” to a nuanced assessment. This assessment is not just useful for grading strategy, but makes it possible to specifically improve your strategy work. Maybe your approach is sound, but your operational mechanisms are too costly for the rate of learning they facilitate. Maybe you’ve treated strategy as a single iteration exercise, rather than recognizing that even excellent strategy goes stale over time. Keep those ideas in mind as we head into the final chapter on how you personally can get better at strategy work.
As I write this in March 2025, there is a lot of confusion about Signal messenger due to the recent news of people using Signal in government, and subsequent leaks. The short version is: there was no problem with Signal here. People were using it because they understood it to be secure, not the other … Continue reading Why You Should (Still) Use Signal As Much As Possible →
Often you’ll see a disorganized collection of ideas labeled as a “strategy.” Even when they’re dense with ideas, these can be hard to parse, and are a major reason why most engineers will claim their company doesn’t have a clear strategy even though my experience is that all companies follow some strategy, even if it’s undocumented. This chapter lays out a repeatable, structured approach to drafting strategy. It introduces each step of that approach, which are then detailed further in their respective chapters. Here we’ll cover: How these five steps fit together to facilitate creating strategy, especially by preventing practicioners from skipping steps that feel awkward or challenging. Step 1: Exploring the wider industry’s ideas and practices around the strategy you’re working on. Exploration is understanding what recent research might change your approach, and how the state of art has changed since you last tackled a similar problem. Step 2: Diagnosing the details of your problem. It’s hard to slow down to understand your problem clearly before attempting to solve it, but it’s even more difficult to solve anything well without a clear diagnosis. Step 3: Refinement is taking a raw, unproven set of ideas and testing them against reality. Three techniques are introduced to support this validation process: strategy testing, systems modeling, and Wardley mapping. Step 4: Policy makes the tradeoffs and decisions to solve your diagnosis. These can range from specifying how software is architected, to how pull requests are reviewed, to how headcount is allocated within an organization. Step 5: Operations are the concrete mechanisms that translate policy into an active force within your organization. These can be nudges that remind you about code changes without associated tests, or weekly meetings where you study progress on a migration. Whether these steps are sacred or are open to adaptation and experimentation, including when you personally should persevere in attempting steps that don’t feel effective. From this chapter’s launching point, you’ll have the high-level summaries of each step in strategy creation, and can decide where you want to read further. This is an exploratory, draft chapter for a book on engineering strategy that I’m brainstorming in #eng-strategy-book. As such, some of the links go to other draft chapters, both published drafts and very early, unpublished drafts. How the steps become strategy Creating effective strategy is not rote incantation of a formula. You can’t merely follow these steps to guarantee that you’ll create a great strategy. However, I’ve found over and over is that strategies fail more due to avoidable errors than from fundamentally unsound thinking. Busy people skip steps. Especially steps they dislike or have failed at before. These steps are the scaffolding to avoid those errors. By practicing routinely, you’ll build powerful habits and intuition around which approach is most appropriate for the current strategy you’re working on. They also help turn strategy into a community practice that you, your colleagues, and the wider engineering ecosystem can participate in together. Each step is an input that flows into the next step. Your exploration is the foundation of a solid diagnosis. Your diagnosis helps you search the infinite space of policy for what you need now. Operational mechanisms help you turn policy into an active force supporting your strategy rather than an abstract treatise. If you’re skeptical of the steps, you should certainly maintain your skepticism, but do give them a few tries before discarding them entirely. You may also appreciate the discussion in the chapter on bridging between theory and practice when doing strategy. Explore Exploration is the deliberate practice of searching through a strategy’s problem and solution spaces before allowing yourself to commit to a given approach. It’s understanding how other companies and teams have approached similar questions, and whether their approaches might also work well for you. It’s also learning why what brought you so much success at your former employer isn’t necessarily the best solution for your current organization. The Uber service migration strategy used exploration to understand the service ecosystem by reading industry literature: As a starting point, we find it valuable to read Large-scale cluster management at Google with Borg which informed some elements of the approach to Kubernetes, and Mesos: A Platform for Fine-Grained Resource Sharing in the Data Center which describes the Mesos/Aurora approach. It also used a Wardley map to explore the cloud compute ecosystem. For more detail, read the Exploration chapter. Diagnose Diagnosis is your attempt to correctly recognize the context that the strategy needs to solve before deciding on the policies to address that context. Starting from your exploration’s learnings, and your understanding of your current circumstances, building a diagnosis forces you to delay thinking about solutions until you fully understand your problem’s nuances. A diagnosis can be largely data driven, such as the navigating a Private Equity ownership transition strategy: Our Engineering headcount costs have grown by 15% YoY this year, and 18% YoY the prior year. Headcount grew 7% and 9% respectively, with the difference between headcount and headcount costs explained by salary band adjustments (4%), a focus on hiring senior roles (3%), and increased hiring in higher cost geographic regions (1%). It can also be less data driven, instead aiming to summarize a problem, such as the Index acquisition strategy’s summary of the known and unknown elements of the technical integration prior to the acquisition closing: We will need to rapidly integrate the acquired startup to meet this timeline. We only know a small number of details about what this will entail. We do know that point-of-sale devices directly operate on payment details (e.g. the point-of-sale device knows the credit card details of the card it reads). Our compliance obligations restrict such activity to our “tokenization environment”, a highly secured and isolated environment with direct access to payment details. This environment converts payment details into a unique token that other environments can utilize to operate against payment details without the compliance overhead of having direct access to the underlying payment details. The approach, and challenges, of developing a diagnosis are detailed in the Diagnosis chapter. Refine (Test, Map & Model) Strategy refinement is a toolkit of methods to identify which parts of your diagnosis are most important, and verify that your approach to solving the diagnosis actually works. This chapter delves into the details of using three methods in particular: strategy testing, systems modeling, and Wardley mapping. An example of a systems modeling diagram. These techniques are also demonstrated in the strategy case studies, such as the Wardley map of the LLM ecosystem, or the systems model of backfilling roles without downleveling them. For more detail, read the Refinement chapter. Why isn’t refinement earlier (or later)? A frequent point of disagreement is that refinement should occur before the diagnosis. Another is that mapping and modeling are two distinct steps, and mapping should occur before diagnosis, and modeling should occur after policy. A third is that refinement ought to be the final step of strategy, turning the steps into a looping cycle. These are all reasonable observations, so let me unpack my rationale for this structure. By far the biggest risk for most strategies is not that you model too early or map too late, but instead that you simply skip both steps entirely. My foremost concern is minimizing the required investment into mapping and modeling such that more folks do these steps at all. Refining after exploring and diagnosing allows you to concentrate your efforts on a smaller number of load-bearing areas. That said, it’s common to refine many places in your strategy creation. You’re just as likely to have three small refinement steps as one bigger one. Policy Policy is interpreting your diagnosis into a concrete plan. This plan also needs to work, which requires careful study of what’s worked within your company, and what new ideas you’ve discovered while exploring the current problem. Policies can range from providing directional guidance, such as the user data controls strategy’s guidance: Good security discussions don’t frame decisions as a compromise between security and usability. We will pursue multi-dimensional tradeoffs to simultaneously improve security and efficiency. Whenever we frame a discussion on trading off between security and utility, it’s a sign that we are having the wrong discussion, and that we should rethink our approach. We will prioritize mechanisms that can both automatically authorize and automatically document the rationale for accesses to customer data. The most obvious example of this is automatically granting access to a customer support agent for users who have an open support ticket assigned to that agent. (And removing that access when that ticket is reassigned or resolved.) To committing not to make a decision until later, as practiced in the Index acquisition strategy: Defer making a decision regarding the introduction of Java to a later date: the introduction of Java is incompatible with our existing engineering strategy, but at this point we’ve also been unable to align stakeholders on how to address this decision. Further, we see attempting to address this issue as a distraction from our timely goal of launching a joint product within six months. We will take up this discussion after launching the initial release. This chapter further goes into evaluating policies, overcoming ambiguous circumstances that make it difficult to decide on an approach, and developing novel policies. For full detail, read the Policy chapter. Operations Even the best policies have to be interpreted. There will be new circumstances their authors never imagined, and the policies may be in effect long after their authors have left the organization. Operational mechanisms are the concrete implementation of your policy. The simplest mechanisms are an explicit escalation path, as shown in Calm’s product engineering strategy: Exceptions are granted by the CTO, and must be in writing. The above policies are deliberately restrictive. Sometimes they may be wrong, and we will make exceptions to them. However, each exception should be deliberate and grounded in concrete problems we are aligned both on solving and how we solve them. If we all scatter towards our preferred solution, then we’ll create negative leverage for Calm rather than serving as the engine that advances our product. From that starting point, the mechanisms can get far more complex. This chapter works through evaluating mechanisms, composing an operational plan, and the most common sorts of operational mechanisms that I’ve seen across strategies. For more detail, read the Operations chapter. Is the structure sacrosanct? When someone’s struggling to write a strategy document, one of the first tools someone will often recommend is a strategy template. Templates are great: they reduce the ambiguity of an already broad project into something more tractable. If you’re wondering if you should use a template to craft strategy: sure, go ahead! However, I find that well-meaning, thoughtful templates often turn into lumbering, callous documents that serve no one well. The secret to good templates is that someone has to own it, and that person has to care about the template writer first and foremost, rather than the various constituencies that want to insert requirements into the strategy creation process. The security, compliance and cost of your plans matter a lot, but many organizations start to layer in more and more requirements into these sorts of documents until the idea of writing them becomes prohibitively painful. The best advice I can give someone attempting to write strategy, is that you should discard every element of strategy that gets in your way as long as you can explain what that element was intended to accomplish. For example, if you’re drafting a strategy and you don’t find any operational mechanisms that fit. That’s fine, discard that section. Ultimately, the structure is not sacrosanct, it’s the thinking behind the sections that really matter. This topic is explored in more detail in the chapter on Making engineering strategies more readable. Summary Now, you know the foundational steps to conducting strategy. From here, you can dive into the details with the strategy case studies like How should you adopt LLMs? or you can maintain a high altitude starting with how exploration creates the foundation for an effective strategy. Whichever you start with, I encourage yout o eventually work through both to get the full perspective.
Yesterday I gave a talk at Monki Gras 2025. This year, the theme is Sustaining Software Development Craft, and here’s the description from the conference website: The big question we want to explore is – how can we keep doing the work we do, when it sustains us, provides meaning and purpose, and sometimes pays the bills? We’re in a period of profound change, technically, politically, socially, economically, which has huge implications for us as practitioners, the makers and doers, but also for the culture at large. I did a talk about the first decade of my career, which I’ve spent working on projects that are designed to last. I’m pleased with my talk, and I got a lot of nice comments. Monki Gras is always a pleasure to attend and speak at – it’s such a lovely, friendly vibe, and the organisers James Governor and Jessica West do a great job of making it a nice day. When I left yesterday, I felt warm and fuzzy and appreciated. I also have a front-row photo of me speaking, courtesy of my dear friend Eriol Fox. Naturally, I chose my outfit to match my slides (and this blog post!). Key points How do you create something that lasts? You can’t predict the future, but there are patterns in what lasts People skills sustain a career more than technical skills Long-lasting systems cannot grow without bound; they need weeding Links/recommended reading Sibyl Schaefer presented a paper Energy, Digital Preservation, and the Climate at iPres 2024, which is about how digital preservation needs to change in anticipation of the climate crisis. This was a major inspiration for this talk. Simon Willison gave a talk Coping strategies for the serial project hoarder at DjangoCon US in 2022, which is another inspiration for me. I’m not as prolific as Simon, but I do see parallels between his approach and what I remember of Metaswitch. Most of the photos in the talk come from the Flickr Commons, a collection of historical photographs from over 100 international cultural heritage organisations. You can learn more about the Commons, browse the photos, and see who’s involved using the Commons Explorer https://commons.flickr.org/. (Which I helped to build!) Slides and notes Photo: dry stone wall building in South Wales. Taken by Wikimedia Commons user TR001, used under CC BY‑SA 3.0. [Make introductory remarks; name and pronouns; mention slides on my website] I’ve been a software developer for ten years, and I’ve spent my career working on projects that are designed to last – first telecoms and networking, now cultural heritage – so when I heard this year’s theme “sustaining craft”, I thought about creating things that last a long time. The key question I want to address in this talk is how do you create something that lasts? I want to share a few thoughts I’ve had from working on decade- and century-scale projects. Part of this is about how we sustain ourselves as software developers, as the individuals who create software, especially with the skill threat of AI and the shifting landscape of funding software. I also want to go broader, and talk about how we sustain the craft, the skill, the projects. Let’s go through my career, and see what we can learn. Photo: women working at a Bell System telephone switchboard. From the U.S. National Archives, no known copyright restrictions. My first software developer job was at a company called Metaswitch. Not a household name, they made telecoms equipment, and you’d probably have heard of their customers. They sold equipment to carriers like AT&T, Vodafone, and O2, who’d use that equipment to sell you telephone service. Telecoms infrastructure is designed to last a long time. I spent most of my time at Metaswitch working with BGP, a routing protocol designed on a pair of napkins in 1989. BGP is sometimes known as the "two-napkin protocol", because of the two napkins on which Kirk Lougheed and Yakov Rekhter wrote the original design. From the Computer History Museum. These are those napkins. This design is basically still the backbone of the Internet. A lot of the building blocks of the telephone network and the Internet are fundamentally the same today as when they were created. I was working in a codebase that had been actively developed for most of my life, and was expected to outlast me. This was my first job so I didn’t really appreciate it at the time, but Metaswitch did a lot of stuff designed to keep that codebase going, to sustain it into the future. Let’s talk about a few of them. Photo: a programmer testing electronic equipment. From the San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives, no known copyright restrictions. Metaswitch was very careful about adopting new technologies. Most of their code was written in C, a little C++, and Rust was being adopted very slowly. They didn’t add new technology quickly. Anything they add, they have to support for a long time – so they wanted to pick technologies that weren’t a flash in the pan. I learnt about something called “the Lindy effect” – this is the idea that any technology is about halfway through its expected life. An open-source library that’s been developed for decades? That’ll probably be around a while longer. A brand new JavaScript framework? That’s a riskier long-term bet. The Lindy effect is about how software that’s been around a long time has already proven its staying power. And talking of AI specifically – I’ve been waiting for things to settle. There’s so much churn and change in this space, if I’d learnt a tool six months ago, most of that would be obsolete today. I don’t hate AI, I love that people are trying all these new tools – but I’m tired and I learning new things is exhausting. I’m waiting for things to calm down before really diving deep on these tools. Metaswitch was very cautious about third-party code, and they didn’t have much of it. Again, anything they use will have to be supported for a long time – is that third-party code, that open-source project stick around? They preferred to take the short-term hit of writing their own code, but then having complete control over it. To give you some idea of how seriously they took this: every third-party dependency had to be reviewed and vetted by lawyers before it could be added to the codebase. Imagine doing that for a modern Node.js project! They had a lot of safety nets. Manual and automated testing, a dedicated QA team, lots of checks and reviews. These were large codebases which had to be reliable. Long-lived systems can’t afford to “move fast and break things”. This was a lot of extra work, but it meant more stability, less churn, and not much risk of outside influences breaking things. This isn’t the only way to build software – Metaswitch is at one extreme of a spectrum – but it did seem to work. I think this is a lesson for building software, but also in what we choose to learn as individuals. Focusing on software that’s likely to last means less churn in our careers. If you learn the fundamentals of the web today, that knowledge will still be useful in five years. If you learn the JavaScript framework du jour? Maybe less so. How do you know what’s going to last? That’s the key question! It’s difficult, but it’s not impossible. This is my first thought for you all: you can’t predict the future, but there are patterns in what lasts. I’ve given you some examples of coding practices that can help the longevity of a codebase, these are just a few. Maybe I have rose-tinted spectacles, but I’ve taken the lessons from Metaswitch and brought them into my current work, and I do like them. I’m careful about external dependencies, I write a lot of my own code, and I create lots of safety nets, and stuff doesn’t tend to churn so much. My code lasts because it isn’t constantly being broken by external forces. Photo: a child in nursery school cutting a plank of wood with a saw. From the Community Archives of Belleville and Hastings County, no known copyright restrictions. So that’s what the smart people were doing at Metaswitch. What was I doing? I joined Metaswitch when I was a young and twenty-something graduate, so I knew everything. I knew software development was easy, these old fuddy-duddies were making it all far too complicated, and I was gonna waltz in and show them how it was done. And obviously, that happened. (Please imagine me reading that paragraph in a very sarcastic voice.) I started doing the work, and it was a lot harder than I expected – who knew that software development was difficult? But I was coming from a background as a solo dev who’d only done hobby projects. I’d never worked in a team before. I didn’t know how to say that I was struggling, to ask for help. I kept making bold promises about what I could do, based on how quickly I thought I should be able to do the work – but I was making promises my skills couldn’t match. I kept missing self-imposed deadlines. You can do that once, but you can’t make it a habit. About six months before I left, my manager said to me “Alex, you have a reputation for being unreliable”. Photo: a boy with a pudding bowl haircut, photographed by Elinor Wiltshire, 1964. From the National Library of Ireland, no known copyright restrictions. He was right! I had such a history of making promises that I couldn’t keep, people stopped trusting me. I didn’t get to work on interesting features or the exciting projects, because nobody trusted me to deliver. That was part of why I left that job – I’d ploughed my reputation into the ground, and I needed to reset. Photo: the library stores at Wellcome Collection. Taken by Thomas SG Farnetti used under CC BY‑NC 4.0. I got that reset at Wellcome Collection, a London museum and library that some of you might know. I was working a lot with their collections, a lot of data and metadata. Wellcome Collection is building on long tradition of libraries and archives, which go back thousands of years. Long-term thinking is in their DNA. To give you one example: there’s stuff in the archive that won’t be made public until the turn of the century. Everybody who works there today will be long gone, but they assume that those records will exist in some shape or form form when that time comes, and they’re planning for those files to eventually be opened. This is century-scale thinking. Photo: Bob Hoover. From the San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives, no known copyright restrictions. When I started, I sat next to a guy called Chris. (I couldn’t find a good picture of him, but I feel like this photo captures his energy.) Chris was a senior archivist. He’d been at Wellcome Collection about twenty-five years, and there were very few people – if anyone – who knew more about the archive than he did. He absolutely knew his stuff, and he could have swaggered around like he owned the place. But he didn’t. Something I was struck by, from my very first day, was how curious and humble he was. A bit of a rarity, if you work in software. He was the experienced veteran of the organisation, but he cared about what other people had to say and wanted to learn from them. Twenty-five years in, and he still wanted to learn. He was a nice guy. He was a pleasure to work with, and I think that’s a big part of why he was able to stay in that job as long as he did. We were all quite disappointed when he left for another job! This is my second thought for you: people skills sustain a career more than technical ones. Being a pleasure to work with opens so many doors and opportunities than technical skill alone cannot. We could do another conference just on what those people skills are, but for now I just want to give you a few examples to think about. Photo: Lt.(jg.) Harriet Ida Pickens and Ens. Frances Wills, first Negro Waves to be commissioned in the US Navy. From the U.S. National Archives, no known copyright restrictions. Be a respectful and reliable teammate. You want to be seen as a safe pair of hands. Reliability isn’t about avoiding mistakes, it’s about managing expectations. If you’re consistently overpromising and underdelivering, people stop trusting you (which I learnt the hard way). If you want people to trust you, you have to keep your promises. Good teammates communicate early when things aren’t going to plan, they ask for help and offer it in return. Good teammates respect the work that went before. It’s tempting to dismiss it as “legacy”, but somebody worked hard on it, and it was the best they knew how to do – recognise that effort and skill, don’t dismiss it. Listen with curiosity and intent. My colleague Chris had decades of experience, but he never acted like he knew everything. He asked thoughtful questions and genuinely wanted to learn from everyone. So many of us aren’t really listening when we’re “listening” – we’re just waiting for the next silence, where we can interject with the next thing we’ve already thought of. We aren’t responding to what other people are saying. When we listen, we get to learn, and other people feel heard – and that makes collaboration much smoother and more enjoyable. Finally, and this is a big one: don’t give people unsolicited advice. We are very bad at this as an industry. We all have so many opinions and ideas, but sometimes, sharing isn’t caring. Feedback is only useful when somebody wants to hear it – otherwise, it feels like criticism, it feels like an attack. Saying “um, actually” when nobody asked for feedback isn’t helpful, it just puts people on the defensive. Asking whether somebody wants feedback, and what sort of feedback they want, will go a long way towards it being useful. So again: people skills sustain a career more than technical skills. There aren’t many truly solo careers in software development – we all have to work with other people – for many of us, that’s the joy of it! If you’re a nice person to work with, other people will want to work with you, to collaborate on projects, they’ll offer you opportunities, it opens doors. Your technical skills won’t sustain your career if you can’t work with other people. Photo: "The Keeper", an exhibition at the New Museum in New York. Taken by Daniel Doubrovkine, used under CC BY‑NC‑SA 4.0. When I went to Wellcome Collection, it was my first time getting up-close and personal with a library and archive, and I didn’t really know how they worked. If you’d asked me, I’d have guessed they just keep … everything? And it was gently explained to me that “No Alex, that’s hoarding.” “Your overflowing yarn stash does not count as an archive.” Big collecting institutions are actually super picky – they have guidelines about what sort of material they collect, what’s in scope, what isn’t, and they’ll aggressively reject anything that isn’t a good match. At Wellcome Collection, their remit was “the history of health and human experience”. You have medical papers? Definitely interesting! Your dad’s old pile of car magazines? Less so. Photo: a dumpster full of books that have been discarded. From brewbooks on Flickr, used under CC BY‑SA 2.0. Collecting institutions also engage in the practice of “weeding” or “deaccessioning”, which is removing material, pruning the collection. For example, in lending libraries, books will be removed from the shelves if they’ve become old, damaged, or unpopular. They may be donated, or sold, or just thrown away – but whatever happens, they’re gotten rid of. That space is reclaimed for other books. Getting rid of material is a fundamental part of professional collecting, because professionals know that storing something has an ongoing cost. They know they can’t keep everything. Photo: a box full of printed photos. From Miray Bostancı on Pexels, used under the Pexels license. This is something I think about in my current job as well. I currently work at the Flickr Foundation, where we’re thinking about how to keep Flickr’s pictures visible for 100 years. How do we preserve social media, how do we maintain our digital legacy? When we talk to people, one thing that comes up regularly is that almost everybody has too many photos. Modern smartphones have made it so easy to snap, snap, snap, and we end up with enormous libraries with thousands of images, but we can’t find the photos we care about. We can’t find the meaningful memories. We’re collecting too much stuff. Digital photos aren’t expensive to store, but we feel the cost in other ways – the cognitive load of having to deal with so many images, of having to sift through a disorganised collection. Photo: a wheelbarrow in a garden. From Hans Middendorp on Pexels, used under the Pexels license. I think there’s a lesson here for the software industry. What’s the cost of all the code that we’re keeping? We construct these enormous edifices of code, but when do we turn things off? When do we delete code? We’re more focused on new code, new ideas, new features. I’m personally quite concerned by how much generative AI has focused on writing more code, and not on dealing with the code we already have. Code is text, so it’s cheap to store, but it still has a cost – it’s more cognitive load, more maintenance, more room for bugs and vulnerabilities. We can keep all our software forever, but we shouldn’t. Photo: Open Garbage Dump on Highway 112, North of San Sebastian. Taken by John Vachon, 1973. From the U.S. National Archives no known copyright restrictions. I think this is going to become a bigger issue for us. We live in an era of abundance, where we can get more computing resources at the push of a button. But that can’t last forever. What happens when our current assumptions about endless compute no longer hold? The climate crisis – where’s all our electricity and hardware coming from? The economics of AI – who’s paying for all these GPU-intensive workloads? And politics – how many of us are dependent on cloud computing based in the US? How many of us feel as good about that as we did three months ago? Libraries are good at making a little go a long way, about eking out their resources, about deciding what’s a good use of resources and what’s waste. Often the people who are good with money are the people who don’t have much of it, and we have a lot of money. It’s easier to make decisions about what to prune and what to keep when things are going well – it’s harder to make decisions in an emergency. This is my third thought for you: long-lasting systems cannot grow without bound; they need weeding. It isn’t sustainable to grow forever, because eventually you get overwhelmed by the weight of everything that came before. We need to get better at writing software efficiently, at turning things off that we don’t need. It’s a skill we’ve neglected. We used to be really good at it – when computers were the size of the room, programmers could eke out every last bit of performance. We can’t do that any more, but it’s so important when building something to last, and I think it’s a skill we’ll have to re-learn soon. Photo: Val Weaver and Vera Askew running in a relay race, Brisbane, 1939. From the State Library of Queensland no known copyright restrictions. Weeding is a term that comes from the preservation world, so let’s stay there. When you talk to people who work in digital preservation, we often describe it as a relay race. There is no permanent digital media, there’s no digital parchment or stone tablets – everything we have today will be unreadable in a few decades. We’re constantly migrating from one format to another, trying to stay ahead of obsolete technology. Software is also a bit of a relay race – there is no “write it once and you’re done”. We’re constantly upgrading, editing, improving. And that can be frustrating, but it also means have regular opportunities to learn and improve. We have that chance to reflect, to do things better. Photo: Broken computer monitor found in the woods. By Jeff Myers on Flickr, used under CC BY‑NC 2.0. I think we do our best reflections when computers go bust. When something goes wrong, we spring into action – we do retrospectives, root cause analysis, we work out what went wrong and how to stop it happening again. This is a great way to build software that lasts, to make it more resilient. It’s a period of intense reflection – what went wrong, how do we stop it happening again? What I’ve noticed is that the best systems are doing this sort of reflection all the time – they aren’t waiting for something to go wrong. They know that prevention is better than cure, and they embody it. They give themselves regular time to reflect, to think about what’s working and what’s not – and when we do, great stuff can happen. Photo: Statue of Astrid Lindgren. By Tobias Barz on Flickr, used under CC BY‑ND 2.0. I want to give you one more example. As a sidebar to my day job, I’ve been writing a blog for thirteen years. It’s the longest job – asterisk – I’ve ever had. The indie web is still cool! A lot of what I write, especially when I was starting, was sharing bits of code. “Here’s something I wrote, here’s what it does, here’s how it works and why it’s cool.” Writing about my code has been an incredible learning experience. You might know have heard the saying “ask a developer to review 5 lines of code, she’ll find 5 issues, ask her to review 500 lines and she’ll say it looks good”. When I sit back and deeply read and explain short snippets of my code, I see how to do things better. I get better at programming. Writing this blog has single-handedly had the biggest impact on my skill as a programmer. Photo: Midnight sun in Advent Bay, Spitzbergen, Norway. From the Library of Congress, no known copyright restrictions. There are so many ways to reflect on our work, opportunities to look back and ask how we can do better – but we have to make the most of them. I think we are, in some ways, very lucky that our work isn’t set in stone, that we do keep doing the same thing, that we have the opportunity to do better. Writing this talk has been, in some sense, a reflection on the first decade of my career, and it’s made me think about what I want the next decade to look like. In this talk, I’ve tried to distill some of those things, tried to give you some of the ideas that I want to keep, that I think will help my career and my software to last. Be careful about what you create, what you keep, and how you interact with other people. That care, that process of reflection – that is what creates things that last. [If the formatting of this post looks odd in your feed reader, visit the original article]
I took an amazing trip to SE Asia last month, including Angkor Wat. I had a hard time finding good reading or other resources to learn from before I went, in part because Amazon is awash in AI garbage. Here’s some books and podcasts I found useful about the Khmer empire in general and Angkor in particular: Ancient Angkor by Michael Freeman and Claude Jacques. The closest thing to a coffee-table book to preview what you will see. The practical information is outdated but the pictures and descriptions are good. Empire Podcast #185: The God Kings of Angkor Wat by William Dalrymple and Anita Anand. An entertaining and fully detailed account of the Khmer empire. It’s basically an excerpt from Dalrymple’s new book The Golden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World. Fall of Civilizations Podcast #5: The Khmer Empire by Paul Cooper. Another history, not quite as magically well told as Dalrymple but full of good information. Angkor and the Khmer Civilization by Michael D. Coe. A highly recommended history of the Khmer region. Honestly I found this very dry and too detailed, but I did learn from it. Lonely Planet Pocket Guide: Siem Reap & the Temples of Angkor. We didn’t use this much but it seemed like a useful practical guide. OTOH it dates to 2018 so things have changed. My other advice for visiting Siem Reap and Angkor is: go. It is amazing. Plan for at least two full days of touristing there. Hire a private guide and driver if you can, it is absolutely worth it. (Email me for a recommendation.)