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23

Glue and coprocessor architectures

from Vitalik Buterin's website [alt+shift+b] in technology

2nd Sep 2024

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mass destruction of weapons

There is a long history to chemical and biological warfare—one that, we at least hope, ended in 1993. The paucity of chemical and biological warfare today is a result of long-standing objections that culminated in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. It is striking that this formal end to most chemical weapons programs came within a year of the last US test of a nuclear weapon: similar sentiments, and a similar 1990s "end of history" context, motivated both. The similarity makes the differences more striking. Nuclear weapons are still part of the pop culture today, the quintessential "weapon of mass destruction" and a symbol of the destructive potential of modern warfare. But what of that term? Why "weapons of mass destruction?" The history of the phrase WMD is complex, and while it does predate nuclear weapons our modern use emerged in response to them. Still, it's a broader category. In today's language, WMD refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Some of its most prominent invocations, namely in the Iraq War, referred to chemical rather than nuclear warfare. Still, to most Americans, chemical weapons are out of sight and out of mind. There are a few reasons: chemical weapons have been more or less prohibited in warfare for over one hundred years, so we have little experience with or memory of them. In fact, today, in the United States, there are none. That was the modern chemical war: the safe management, recovery, and destruction of an enormous stockpile of chemical weapons. This effort spanned military reservations across the United States, dismantling and burning chemical and biological munitions as life went on as usual outside of the fence. Well, at least, "as usual" for the Cold War: one of the effects of the stockpile was to maintain a sort of localized Cold War climate in those towns that fell downwind of it. Today, with the discovery of a dangerously poorly managed stockpile of Lead Azide that will require an exceptionally risky emergency measure to destroy, we are all acutely aware of the direction that the wind blows. The upcoming plume of lead over Iowa is far from the first time that dangerous compounds have blown away from military custody. There have been dozens of such incidents, with varying degrees of intentionality and risk to the public. Many were, at the time, classified. Others were simply covered up. While not exactly the future we wanted, it is perhaps a sign of progress that the upcoming detonation has been announced at all. The public notifications seem, to me, to be the result of an attitude shift that happened at the tail end of the era of US chemical warfare. Windblown plume forecasting models, originally developed for the fallout of nuclear war, were reapplied to risk analysis of chemical weapon stockpiles. The news was bad, so bad that civilian towns were hardened against attack: not enemy attack, but an attack of bad luck, an accident upwind. But first, we should consider how we got there. There are accounts of chemical and biological warfare dating to antiquity, although as with most early history it can be hard to tell what was speculative and what was actually done. By the 18th century, there had certainly been multiple uses of poisons and noxious chemicals on the battlefield. Chemical weapons in particular took a revolutionary step forward with the development of a more formal science of chemistry, during the 19th century. Several important advancements in chemistry occurred in the pursuit of poisonous gases, and just about every other advance in chemistry was applied to them. Still, even in this early era, there was more of an appetite for the development of chemical weapons than for their actual use. A particularly memorable incident in this history comes from Lyon Playfair, the very same who popularized the "Playfair Cipher" that makes a standard appearance in cryptography classes. In his role as a key scientific official during the Crimean War of the mid-1850s, he proposed the use of shells that would disperse a very poisonous form of Cyanide. Objections to the plan came not from pacifist do-gooders but from the weapons-builders themselves, who considered the whole thing morally questionable. Playfair's words in response are almost haunting in consideration of what would follow, outcomes of which he was simultaneously prescient and shockingly short-sighted. War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to death. One of the reasons for the lackluster popularity of chemical weapons is that this notion of "easing the suffering" of the enemy, even if accepted as something other than madness, never really materialized. Particularly in the 1990s, the ethics of capital punishment in the United States came to be seen as sort of a technical problem. Maybe homicide by the state wasn't so bad if it was "painless," or "quick," or at least clinical in its appearance. The same idea pervaded chemical warfare in the 19th century, and in the 20th century it fell short in the same way that lethal injection has now. Objection to chemical weapons generally preceded their use. The Hague Convention of 1899 prohibited the form of chemical weapon that was then most obvious, the gas shell. That this prohibition applied specifically to artillery shells is significant: one of the complexities of chemical warfare is its interaction with domestic use. Like hollow-point bullets, tear gas, for example, is widely used in many nations' interiors—but it has been prohibited in warfare for many decades. This situation was already apparent with the first large-scale use of chemical weapons, at the onset of the First World War. Tear gas, a broad category of irritants that are not generally fatal but induce painful and disabling effects, was first developed in France. Parisian police struggled with organized criminal groups who would barricade themselves into buildings and successfully repel attempts at arrest. A commission was formed to investigate the matter in 1912, and it recommended the adoption of ethyl bromoacetate. Delivered to a barricaded position, it caused uncontrollable tearing, difficulty breathing, and considerable pain—enough to drive gangsters out of cover. That development in policing might have been controversial in its own right, but it was quickly overshadowed by the outbreak of the Great War. Tear gas was adapted to hand grenades, directed against the Germans at Alsace in 1914. In practice, this early chemical attack proved ineffective, but it opened Pandora's box. The Germans developed their own irritant shells, both sides justifying their use by leaning on the term "asphyxiating gas" in the Hague convention. Tear gases are unpleasant, but they are not asphyxiating as the term is defined. It was a slippery slope, though, and once the gears of war were in motion they would not be stopped. German chemists improved both the chemical agents and the means of delivery, such that during 1915 a drifting cloud of Chlorine gas was used to scatter French soldiers holding a defensive line. As it happened, the reticence of the Germans to march into their own poisonous cloud meant that they gained little advantage, but it proved the concept. Once again, the legality of the measure was questioned, but this time, the Germans emphasized the Hague convention's specific use of the word "shells"—no artillery shells having been involved in this particular weapon. Faced with this new threat, both sides developed countermeasures, and faced with those countermeasures, both developed new weapons. By the end of 1915 Phosgene was in wide use, and in 1917, the Germans introduced Mustard Gas. Mustard is a terrifying weapon, causing severe blistering of any exposed skin and extensive bleeding. Mustard Gas was extensively used by both sides, becoming part of routine infantry strategy, and along the way dooming tens of thousands of soldiers to a torturous ordeal in the overwhelmed military hospitals. Ironically, despite the extreme response it induced, Mustard Has was not particularly fatal. Many of its victims survived, disfigured after a long period of extreme suffering. These were the stories that came to be associated with chemical warfare. Far from Playfair's vision of "the least suffering," Mustard Gas became one of the war's main sources of it. Mustard-exposed soldiers convalescing in rows, their skin covered in blisters, their eyes sealed closed... these were the images that defined chemical warfare for decades to follow. While some use of chemical weapons continued after the First World War, Mustard Gas inspired a level of outrage that hung over the 1925 Geneva Conference. The Hague convention's prohibition on shells with asphyxiating gas was narrow enough that Mustard Gas arguably did not apply, so negotiators at Geneva agreed to stronger language. The Geneva Protocol, entering into force in 1928, broadly prohibited the use of chemical or biological agents in warfare between states. That could have been the end of the story. The Geneva Protocol was not perfectly observed, but it did prevent almost all use of such weapons. Despite significant technological advances made in Germany, including the development of several nerve agents during the 1930s, World War II elapsed with only limited use of chemical or biological weapons in combat. Most chemical attacks were by the Japanese, perhaps less affected by the experience of the First World War, and even then were directed mostly against other combatants in Asia. On the European front, only a handful of chemical attacks took place. Here, we arrive at the strangest contradiction in the history of chemical weapons: the near end of the use of chemical weapons, the Geneva Protocol, came before the peak of their development and manufacturing. Despite the limited chemical attacks during WWII, chemical weapons programs became larger than ever before. One reason was the Geneva Protocol's differentiation between combat use by state actors and other uses. To say that the Nazis made little use of chemical weapons, while correct in a certain technical sense, becomes absurd in the face of the Holocaust. Domestic use of chemical weapons only escalated, a dichotomy that still resonates today. This potential for domestic use or use against non-state adversaries (such as putting down revolutionary movements) justified a decision by most WWI combatants to continue development and manufacturing of chemical weapons. That created an ongoing possibility of their use, despite prohibition, which itself justified even more development. Consider the case of Australia, a nation that did not have a domestic chemical weapons program but still built massive stockpiles of imported chemical munitions during WWII. Why? For defense, of course: Australia was relatively close to Japan, the main chemical combatant, and felt the need to have a credible retaliation capability if Japan did decide to initiate all-out chemical war. This kind of reasoning, foreshadowing the doctrine that would demand nuclear weapons programs to the modern day, echoed around the world. Australia was importing those weapons principally from the US and UK, two countries that committed not to use chemical weapons, indeed never used them, and nevertheless operated major research centers and manufacturing plants throughout the war. The Germans clearly had a chemical inventory, which they so saliently demonstrated against their own population, and what if they decided to cast the treaty aside? Ought we to remain defenseless? The fear was not unfounded; Germany was known to have violated the Geneva Protocol on several occasions and some historians take the view that their use of chemical weapons was limited by technical issues rather than a policy decision. Churchill favored a chemical "first strike," although the suggestion didn't get much traction. In the US, as well, a notional retaliation capability was grounds for extensive R&D on rocket-delivered chemical warheads. Ironically, most of the US casualties to chemical weapons were self-inflicted. During the war the military manufactured stockpiles of Mustard Gas, Hydrogen Cyanide, and Cyanogen Chloride. These compounds were packaged into weapons and, in at least some cases, staged at the front in preparation for use. This program was a closely held secret and little is known of it even today. One major detail could not escape discovery: a German air raid on US Navy ships in Italy, in 1943, struck a ship carrying Mustard Gas. The resulting leakage at least contributed to the deaths of 69 people, and sickened hundreds. Already, perhaps the most dangerous thing about chemical weapons was possessing them. Chemical warfare programs only accelerated after WWII. The newly developed German nerve agents, including Sarin1, made it to the US as spoils of war. The research programs that formed around these new agents are some of the most infamous of the period, including exposure of thousands of soldiers to small doses of poisons to observe the effects, a program that continued at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland until the public became aware—and the program collapsed in scandal—in 1975. The involvement of LSD in these experiments often sees them lumped together with MKULTRA, but the vast majority of the research was on less exotic substances: VX, Sarin, Mustard Gas, Tear Gas. Edgewood was also the manufacturing center for Mustard and Phosgene. What Edgewood couldn't provide was storage; it didn't have room for the well-separated bunkers required for munitions. The Army built new installations for the stockpile: Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and Tooele Ordnance Depot in Utah. At each of these sites, hundreds of acres of earth-covered concrete sheds stored weapons at a distance that wouldn't set off their neighbors. In the very early years of the Cold War, the US Army weaponized a new chemical agent called BZ. BZ gained notoriety because of its psychological effects, which included hallucinations, and because of various accusations that it was covertly used by the US during the 1960s. These allegations don't generally hold up, but they illustrate the atmosphere of paranoia that chemical weapons created, and in response to which more chemical weapons were developed. BZ was produced at Swannanoa, North Carolina, and assembled into weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal, where binary (two parts that are mixed together) nerve agents were produced as well. Phosphate was manufactured at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and VX at Newport, Indiana. The Aberdeen Proving Ground handled Mustard gas manufacturing and filling. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal, though, just outside of Denver, was the center of the post-war program: Sarin, Mustard, and Sulfur Mustard were all produced and stored there. The Vietnam War proved a pivotal conflict for chemical warfare, as with so many other aspects of military history. Defoliants, such as Agent Orange, were not considered to be chemical weapons and saw heavy use in Vietnam. While targeted at plants, they were not safe for humans either, and played a major role in creating a generation of disabled veterans. In the meantime, the accidental dangers became more apparent: in 1968, an accident at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah released the nerve gas VX and killed thousands of sheep. The Army denied involvement, and then later admitted involvement but denied fault, a position it maintained into the '90s. Despite attempts to maintain secrecy, the Dugway sheep incident brought public attention to the chemical weapons program—which had maintained such a low profile that many didn't realize it existed. Press investigations after Dugway revealed further problems: disposal practices that had released large quantities of chemical agents into the ocean, handling accidents in overseas military installations, and of course numerous human experiments that fell far short of the ethical standards of the time. In short, the Dugway incident reminded the public, and Congress, that the US Army Chemical Corps existed. It had thousands of soldiers, dozens of facilities, and maintained an inventory of chemical weapons that spanned a national network of ammunition igloos. Ongoing manufacturing operations in the 1960s included BZ cluster bombs, VX shells, Hydrogen Cyanide, and others. Once the press latched on to the program, though, it was the beginning of the end. In 1969, President Nixon announced a "no first use" policy for chemical weapons and the complete prohibition of biological weapons—a stronger policy than has been adopted for nuclear weapons even to this day. As part of the 1969 declaration, Nixon also ended the biological weapons program entirely. I have not spoken as much of biological weapons here, as the scale of the US effort was always smaller than that for chemical agents, but I shouldn't understate it. A half dozen viral and bacterial infections, including Anthrax and Botulism, were weaponized in research laboratories. In part because of moral and practical concerns in the military, most of these were never manufactured at scale and delivery systems (such as artillery shells or warheads) were rarely developed to maturity. When Nixon ordered the program ended, its small scale made it relatively straightforward to destroy stockpiled material. Much of the laboratory-scale work was retained, anyway, for its value in researching defensive measures. Chemical weapons were a different matter entirely, because of the scale of the stockpiles. Continuing expansion of the chemical weapons program saw new stockpiles at Umatilla, Oregon; Pueblo, Colorado; Hawthorne, Nevada; Anniston, Alabama; and Blue Grass, Kentucky. At the peak, the United States disclosed an inventory of 31,100 metric tons of nerve agents and Mustard, stored across a dozen sites. Nearly half was concentrated in Tooele, Utah. Due to the old age of many chemical munitions, there had already been efforts to dispose of aged-out stockpiles in the 1960s. This program took the crude form of missions like "Operation CHASE," or "Cut Holes and Sink 'Em," in which Liberty ships full of munitions were towed off of the coast of Florida and scuttled. Only some carried chemical weapons, but well-founded concerns over the environmental impacts of such a chemical assault on the ocean led to legislation prohibiting this means of disposal in 1972. Other smaller-scale disposal efforts had taken forms like loading Phosphorus into barrels, rolling them into a lake, and then shooting at them until they sank, but besides the generally crude nature of this approach there were only so many lakes that could be so used. Congress had intervened in other ways, as well. Starting in 1970, the Office of the Surgeon General was tasked with reviewing the way that chemical weapons were handled and destroyed. This responsibility shifted around several agencies, ultimately involving the Centers for Disease Control, and brought a level of visibility into chemical weapons management that forced the Department of Defense to take a far more systematic and cautious approach to the remaining stockpile. During the 1970s, the Army's Chemical Corps took on a new focus: safe handling and disposal. The most concerning—and contentious—part of the stockpile was weapons that had been "forward staged" in Europe and Asia. These were intended to allow a fast retaliation to any chemical attack on Europe, but by this point they had become unpopular with host nations like Germany and Japan. This set up the first wave of chemical demilitarization: a months-long Army/Navy effort moved the chemical inventory from Okinawa, thousands of tons of munitions with nerve agents and Mustard Gas, to Johnston Atoll. While better known for its role in the nuclear weapons program, Johnston also served as a base for satellite programs (both intelligence collection and anti-satellite weapons) and a test site for biological and chemical weapons. Starting in 1971, storage and destruction of chemical weapons was made the installation's main purpose. In reaction to the safety incidents of the late '60s, legislation passed in the early 1970s that prohibited transfer of most chemical weapons from overseas to the United States. Instead, over the following decades, nearly all US chemical weapons that had been stored outside of North America were consolidated to Johnston Atoll. The inventory there in the 1990s included even German-made chemical shells that had been captured by the Allies and stored in Germany for study. In 1972, an Army command was formally established to manage the destruction of chemical weapons. The first priority was made the M34 cluster bomb. Designed in the 1950s, the M34 was the first Cold War-era chemical weapon and already considered obsolete. M34s were among the weapons destroyed by ocean disposal during Operation CHASE, but that method had since been prohibited. The Army had to find another way to handle more than 20,000 M34 bombs still stored by Denver, and because of the location of the weapons that method would have to actually neutralize the agents. For the Sarin-laden M34s, a hole was carefully drilled to drain the Sarin from each of the "bomblets" that made up the cluster munition. That Sarin liquid was then mixed with a neutralizing caustic chemical in a sealed reaction chamber. The resulting salt brine was dried, and the precipitated solids (no longer a nerve agent but still an environmental toxin) were buried in nearly 20,000 steel drums. In the meantime, Rocky Mountain Arsenal burned tens of thousands of tons of Mustard gas projectiles in an on-site incinerator, and began chemical neutralization of outdated VX munitions that had been relocated to the site for storage. These early disposal operations at Rocky Mountain Arsenal took place in part because of its proximity to a major city, and a political factor that had made it the top priority for site closure. That was also a liability: disposal operations added to existing environmental contamination, exacerbating a groundwater plume that killed nearby crops and creating a new set of toxic landfills. The weapons that were destroyed there in the '60s and '70s were the easy cases, intact weapons with chemical agents that had known neutralization techniques or were easily incinerated. The Army realized that many other chemical weapons, including older weapons that were already in poor condition and beginning to leak, would require a more complex approach with greater risk of exposure. To develop these techniques, the Chemical Corps established the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) at the Deseret Chemical Depot, a new purpose-built installation adjacent to the Tooele Army Depot on the south side of the Great Salt Lake. CAMDS became the primary R&D site for disposal, and pioneered techniques that included robotic remote handling, semi-automated processing lines, and high-temperature incineration with extensive filtration and chemical treatment of the exhaust. Over the lifespan of CAMDS, more than 91 tons of chemical agents were treated, but most operations at CAMDS served as pilots for larger-scale facilities at other installations. In 1981, an ambitious construction program started at Johnston Atoll: the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). Based on techniques in use at CAMDS and built over five years, JACADS then went through four years of testing and validation before the first full-scale chemical weapons disposal line started operation in 1990. Nerve gas shells were carefully unloaded from storage pallets and set up on a belt. That carried them through a sort of de-production line, where the shells were opened, drained, and washed. The explosives and chemicals they contained were burned in a high-temperature incinerator, while the metal casings of the shells and other components were treated in a high-temperature kiln to ensure they were safe to handle. Simultaneously, a set of "auxiliary" incinerators and kilns processed packaging materials and handling waste. Monitoring systems continuously sampled emissions for any escaping chemical weapons, and periodically such leaks were discovered. This period of chemical weapons history is an odd one, because the political tide had turned against chemical weapons but the Army's inertia continued in the direction of chemical warfare. As JACADS was under construction, the Army built a set of new manufacturing plants at Pine Bluff Arsenal. This would specifically produce binary chemical weapons, which use two separate agents that are relatively safe until they are mixed to produce a nerve agent. Binary weapons can be much safer to handle, since the mixing doesn't occur until an in-flight "arming" stage. They were also seen as an escalation in chemical warfare, especially in the context of the Cold War. As often happens with controversial weapons systems, the Army's work to productionize binary weapons was also their undoing. Controversy around the new weapon designs, and the facilities for manufacturing them, led to a renewal in negotiations with the Soviet Union for some type of chemical weapons treaty. Domestically, the issue made its way to Washington, where in 1986 legislation passed requiring that all non-binary (and thus less safe to handle) weapons be safely destroyed. Lack of congressional enthusiasm (resulting in limited funding), the intrinsic complexity of safely handling dangerous chemicals and explosives, and standard military acquisition problems meant that the new binary weapons programs were slow in coming. Despite the start of construction on several binary weapons plants in 1982, only one was operational by the 1990s, producing the M20 and M21 cartridges which produced Sarin upon mixing in an artillery shell. Barely after M20/M21 production started, ongoing talks with the Soviet Union led to an early agreement to end chemical weapons production—a somewhat informal memorandum, but one that kickstarted negotiations for a formal treaty, complete with timelines and verification requirements. In 1991, Congress ordered the destruction of all material related to the chemical weapons program. This included binary materials, as well as waste, experimental samples, and chemical weapons waste buried in landfills. The United States had, at that point, officially ended its chemical weapons program—a position that would be reinforced by the 1997 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a complete demilitarization treaty with nearly every nation of the world, and most critically key opponent Russia, as signatories. In a certain strategic sense, the US was no longer a "chemical power," the entire stockpile considered retired. In a practical sense, there were still thousands of tons of chemical agents, packaged into hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions, stored in concrete bunkers from Alabama to Oregon. Throughout the last decade of that century, every chemical weapon storage site became a disposal operation. Congressional restrictions and political realities meant that chemical weapons could not generally be transported between sites. During the 1980s, Sarin-carrying Mk 116 "Weteye" bombs stored at Rocky Mountain Arsenal were dismantled there until safety concerns forced a decision to discontinue demilitarization operations at the edge of a major city. The remaining stockpile at Denver was small, but still included almost a thousand Weteye bombs, particularly the "difficult cases" that had begun to leak. The decision was made to ship these bombs to Tooele for safer storage and disposal at the planned CAMDS. The move did happen, but not without inspiring one of the largest political battles of the chemical weapons era, a media circus that considerably frayed relations between the Army and the state of Utah. Congress followed up by restricting domestic transportation, and by the time disarmament was fully underway it was clear that it would all need to be done "as is, where is." I put a lot of time into writing this, and I hope that you enjoy reading it. If you can spare a few dollars, consider supporting me on ko-fi. You'll receive an occasional extra, subscribers-only post, and defray the costs of providing artisanal, hand-built world wide web directly from Albuquerque, New Mexico. The US Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity built the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (scaled up from CAMDS), Anniston CADF, Umatilla CADF, and Newport CADF. Failures of several pilot programs to develop a practical alternative to high-temperature incineration led to the construction of the Aberdeen and Pine Bluff CADFs shortly after. Manufacturing facilities were converted, sometimes hastily, to dismantling facilities. The Chemical Weapons Convention's verification scheme started a comprehensive audit of military stockpiles, with storage sites physically searched for chemical inventory. A dream that seems so remote for nuclear weapons had been achieved: it was now military policy, and a major military objective, to find and destroy every last chemical weapon. At the turn of the millennium, JACADS completed its mission, having incinerated nearly half a million weapons—6% of the total US stockpile—stored at Johnston Atoll. Disposal facilities were operating at nearly every stockpile site, almost exclusively by incineration, although some neutralization operations continued at smaller scale. While most of the chemical inventory took the form of large quantities of finished weapons at depots, there was also a sort of "miscellaneous" category. Smaller supplies of weapons that had been moved for testing or R&D, stored agents that were never assembled into weapons, laboratory samples and waste, and other "etcetera" cases made up the category of "non-stockpile" chemical materials. For example, the military had manufactured over a hundred thousand "chemical agent identification sets," sort of portable laboratories and field guides for soldiers that might encounter chemical weapons in the field. These contained small samples of several chemical weapons, and were stored at several sites. They met their end via the Rapid Response System, a three-semi-trailer portable agent disposal facility that could perform a range of neutralization processes at small scale. After qualification testing at Tooele, the Rapid Response System made a sort of nationwide tour of each facility. A particularly hard case were those weapons that had begun to leak, or where the explosives had become unstable. These were dangerous to handle or transport, even over short distances. In response, Sandia National Laboratories developed the Explosive Destruction System. The EDS was a single semi trailer, but one that traveled with about a dozen supporting trucks. It was typically set up under a tent with a negative pressure air filtration system and an airlock for entry. Chemical munitions were set up in a tray, and shaped explosive charges placed across the top. This nightmare casserole is then loaded into a huge steel chamber, where the explosives are detonated to both "open" the weapons and thermally neutralize some of the contents. The rest of the chemical agent is destroyed by neutralizing chemicals injected into the chamber post-detonation, and the steel vessel is heated and rotated to mix everything up and complete the operation. During the '90s and '00s, multiple EDS units were used to handle small inventories of "discovered" chemical weapons, leaking and damaged weapons, and non-stockpile materials. After the Chemical Weapons Convention, the EDS convoy included a "treaty trailer" where staff from the international treaty enforcement body Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) independently observed the work. Major storage sites required industrial-scale facilities. At Umatilla, 1,000 concrete bunkers held artillery shells, rockets, bombs, landmines, sprayers, and storage containers. These weapons contained nerve agents Sarin and VX, as well as Mustard Gas and blister agents. 1980s upgrades to the facility included better sealing the igloos, fitting them with drains that would contain water from the bunkers for sampling, and adding air filtration on the bunker vents. These reduced the risk from leaking weapons, but as the stockpile aged, leakage was a more and more serious problem. Starting in 1998 the Army carefully recorded each leak; prior to that year most went unnoticed. Environmental personnel interviewed former employees and found multiple stories of leaks, cracks, and other incidents. In at least one case, a leaking munition described by a former worker was found, still stored, right in the bunker where he said it had sprayed its contents across the wall. Contracted to Raytheon, construction of the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) began in 1997. The plant went in to operation in 2004. With 819 miles of wire, 25,000 cubic yards of concrete, and 2,655 tons of steel, the Army boasted that it was "among the most advanced industrial facilities in the world." Destroying the full inventory at Umatilla would take years. A risk-prioritized approach was used in which large-quantity nerve agent weapons were destroyed first, and the relatively less dangerous munitions (such as those with only Mustard Gas or those with very small quantities of nerve agent) were left for later. Operated by contractor URS, the UMCDF consisted of a Container Handling Building where airtight, double-walled steel containers that had been packed and sealed in the bunkers were inspected and transferred to conveyors. From that point, they moved into the Munitions Demilitarization Building where the containers were opened, munitions were disassembled and drained, and the chemical agents and components were delivered to various incinerators. While a few workers with extensive protective equipment performed the most complex disassembly tasks, most operations within the Demilitarization Building were performed by a system of conveyors, hoists, and robots under remote control. Different components went into different incinerators. Liquid from washing weapons and containers went to the Liquid Incinerators, where it was mixed with air and natural gas and fed into a two-stage vortex burner system operating between 2,500 and 2,700 degrees Fahrenheit (1,370-1,480 C). Explosives and propellants, usually contaminated by residual chemical agents, went to the Deactivation Furnace System. A 32 foot long rotating drum kiln treated the waste at a minimum of 1,100 degrees Fahrenheit (590 C) for 7-10 minutes, followed by a discharge conveyor that kept them nearly as hot for another 15 minutes. Most of the material burned during this process, leaving ash (packaged for disposal in a chemical landfill) and flue gas that passed through a final stage of incineration in an afterburner chamber. Just about everything else, mostly the metal casings and components of weapons, went to the Metal Parts Furnace (MPF). The MPF was a three-stage incinerator, with a system of belts and airlocks to move material through it in an almost continuous stream. The three stages held materials for various time periods (depending on the type of waste) at temperatures from 1,450 F to 1,800 F (790 C to 980 C), until the materials arrive in the out-feed airlock where they are cooled. The air blown in for cooling was sampled on the way out and tested to ensure that it was free of chemical agents. All gases from the MPF were processed by a multi-stage afterburner incinerator. The UMCDF required an array of support facilities, like the Pollution Abatement System that received the exhaust gases from all of the incinerators. This exhaust, clean of chemical agents but still bearing a variety of interesting and toxic chemicals, was cooled in a quench tower and then put through a series of chemical scrubbers and filters before a final incinerator stage for good measure. Liquid brines, collected from the scrubber towers and parts of the Demilitarization Building process, went to a treatment plant where the water was evaporated off (and the vapors scrubbed) to leave dry crystallized salts. These were packaged for disposal at a hazardous waste landfill. Laboratory, utility, and office buildings made up the rest of the complex. Congressional scrutiny of chemical weapons also led to the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. This legislation responded to accidents that had occurred at storage and demilitarization sites by requiring that the Army and FEMA take measures to protect nearby communities. The highest population concentration around a major depot, after the relatively early end of operations at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, was found in Oregon and Washington towns around Umatilla. In that region, FEMA funded the construction of a new emergency operations center, installation of sirens, and positive-pressure chemical filtration systems on schools. It was projected that residents of Umatilla would have to move into sealed shelter in less than an hour, were there to be an accident at the depot. A FEMA-funded computer modeling system, at the Emergency Operations Center, would project plume travel to inform evacuation and shelter decisions. The counties stockpiled protective suits and other equipment, and arranged military training on surviving chemical attack for firefighters. By 2000, residents of the area were provided with "tone alert" radios to sound an alarm in their home. Counties distributed "shelter in place kits," with tape and plastic sheeting, to offer residents something to do if the radios ever did sound. The East Oregonian described a county official saying that the kits wouldn't really seal a room, but "may buy more time for a family inside." Pressurization systems were made standard in new schools in the area, and added to the hospital and a nursing home in Umatilla. Working with the CDC, the State of Oregon trained medical personnel on chemical weapons response and distributed the nerve agent antidote Atropine to hospitals. FEMA funds were directed to school districts to buy more buses—a local transportation capability that could be conscripted for an evacuation. In 2008, the last nerve gas weapon, a VX land mine, passed through the plant. The last Mustard Gas weapon was processed in 2011, and evacuation sirens sounded their last Tuesday test. In 2013, the Army published a plan to remediate contamination at Umatilla, demolish the plant, and return the land to other use. Even this process was complex: many of the bunkers were contaminated and had to be carefully cleaned. Much of the demolition debris from the incinerator plant had to be handled as hazardous waste. Each and every bunker was swabbed for testing, soil samples were taken, buildings were knocked over and covered. At the building where workers changed into their protective equipment, septic leachate and dryer lint were collected as chemical waste. In 2023, the Army transferred the 9,511 acres that made up the installation to a coalition of local governments. Much of it will be used by the Oregon National Guard as a training site, other areas are slated to become industrial parks, and the tribal government of the Cayuse, Umatilla, and Walla Walla peoples will operate a large area as an environmental preserve—some of which will require an ongoing program of monitoring and institutional controls. The last chemical weapons in the US stockpile were located at Blue Grass Army Depot, where the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Disposal Facility processed the final Sarin-filled M55 rocket on July 7th, 2023—just ahead of the September 30th deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Measured from Congress's 1986 legislative mandate, the complete destruction of the US inventory of chemical and biological weapons took 37 years. Closure of the later disposal facilities is still ongoing, and the small-scale portable disposal systems will be retained for use on any chemical or biological weapons that might turn up in the future. An Assistant Secretary of Defense, Deborah Rosenblum, said that "this achievement demonstrates our credibility to the international community and has helped move the US government toward closing this particular chapter of US military history." There are few chapters of military history that ever close. The arc of the chemical weapons program, developed under wartime pressures but accelerated during the curious pressure of the Cold War, largely rejected by both the military and the public, and then wrapped up under international agreement at great expense... it is impossible not to compare it to that of the nuclear weapons program. Negotiations with the Soviet Union leading to a bilateral agreement, followed by an international convention, to completely disarm: the dream of generations of nuclear weapons protestors. It seems so far away, so impossible, for nuclear weapons that it's hard to remember that we've done it once before. So why can't we do it again? Well, the comparison isn't entirely fair. For one, the strategic significance of chemical weapons has never been on par with that of their nuclear peers. The story of World War I shows that chemical weapons are hard to use effectively outside of a few very specific situations, and that never really changed. They have a small area of effect, making them useful mostly to clear the way to advance, but they poison the land such that they can prevent that advance actually happening. Chemical disarmament was achieved, in good part, because the chemical weapons just weren't that important to begin with. One also wonders if the history of use is a factor: chemical weapons were widely used in the First World War, which both spread awareness of their horrific effects and made them more approachable, more understandable, as a part of combat. Nuclear weapons have seen such limited use that they remain more of a symbol than a real weapon, surrounded by such a mystique that their power seems both unlimited and unlikely to actually matter. During the 1899 Hague Convention, which banned the use of "shells containing asphyxiating gas," there was a sole vote against. That vote came from the United States, through its representative, Captain Alfred Mahan of the Navy. He explained his vote thus: The inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new weapons. We do consider ourselves to be a powerful culture. The development and manufacturing of chemical weapons was a massive program, involving tens of thousands of workers across the military and private industry. The dismantling of those same weapons happened on the same scale, and often faced even more formidable technical challenges. Perhaps our inventiveness could be less restricted in the destruction of weapons, as well. German researchers gave nerve agents names such as Sarin and Tabun, while the US and NATO used two-letter codes like GB and GA. In fact, these are the same: Sarin is GB and Tabun is GA. I find the acronyms difficult to remember, and the German names are generally the ones used in popular media, so I use the German names when applicable. The problem is that nerve agents developed within NATO countries, such as VX, have no such names. The result will unfortunately be a mix of both conventions.↩

22 hours ago • 1 votes
Ops needs friction

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a week ago • 2 votes
The Topology of Contemporary Politics

I’ve been getting back into the politics fandom this past month.

a week ago • 1 votes
So all software is free as in money now?

A few weeks ago I was up late in my kitchen. I've always been a bad sleeper, starting from when I was 10 and would spend whole nights reading books and watching the clock slowly wind it way to when I had to get up and go to

a week ago • 3 votes
The Pulse: Details of incident.io’s AI spend

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a week ago • 1 votes
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