More from Jaz's Blog
I’ve recently started building a POC of a Redis RESP3 Wire Compatible Key/Value Database built on FoundationDB with @calabro.io and though it’s rather early, it’s already spawned a fun distributed systems problem that I thought would be interesting to share. Previously I’ve written about how I implemented a Graph DB via Roaring Bitmaps, representing relations as a bidirectional pair of sets. To support such use-cases in this new database, we’d like to represent sets of keys such that you can perform boolean operations on them (intersection, union, difference) relatively quickly even for very large sets (with millions of members). Supporting Larger Keys In the original Graph DB, we were representing user DID strings as uint32 UIDs to allow us to store millions of edge lists in very little space (e.g. the set of users who follow bsky.app) while being able to perform boolean operations between lists quickly (using Roaring Bitmaps’ parallel boolean operators). Since we were graphing follows, blocks, and other such User-to-User relationships, there was a practical maximum for the total number of user IDs in the low billions. We’ve continued exploring objects and relationships we’d like to represent as a Graph, and have realized that if we wanted to store e.g. the URIs of all posts a user has liked so we can intersect it with other users’ likes, we’re going to need a bigger keyspace! There are well over 15 Billion records in the AT Proto Ecosystem, each with a unique AT URI! Now our desired keyspace is much larger than can be represented by uint32 values and so we need to expand to uint64. Easy enough, let’s use the uint64 flavor of Roaring Bitmaps and simply intern URIs and User DIDs as uint64s, problem solved, right? Not quite… Interning Many Things at Once The AT Proto Firehose has hit historic peak traffic of over 1,500 evt/sec. We want to design a system that will handle many times more scale than we’ve ever seen in reality. This means designing for 10x or 100x would require us to be able to intern 15k to 150k new URIs per second into uint64 integers. Sounds easy enough, what’s the holdup? Well, in FoundationDB we’re able to use Transactions to do things like atomically increment a sequence safely when many other threads may be trying to do the same thing. This is simple enough to do in Go, we can just toss together a little helper function to acquire a new UID for our string: func (s *server) allocateNewUID(span trace.Span, tx fdb.Transaction) (uint64, error) { var newUID uint64 val, err := tx.Get(fdb.Key("last_uid")).Get() if err != nil { return 0, return fmt.Errorf("failed to get last UID: %w", err) } if len(val) == 0 { newUID = 1 // start from 1 } else { lastUID, err := strconv.ParseUint(string(val), 10, 64) if err != nil { return 0, return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse last UID: %w", err) } newUID = lastUID + 1 } tx.Set(fdb.Key("last_uid"), []byte(strconv.FormatUint(newUID, 10))) return newUID, nil } This function gets called from a fdb.Transaction which gets assigned a Transaction ID, then stages its changes, then tries to commit them. In FoundationDB, if your transaction is reading or modifying data written to by a different Transaction that finishes while you’re in-progress, your Transaction is thrown out and must be retried. For our UID assignment use-case, this is pretty problematic. We want to assign hundreds of thousands of new UIDs per second but if they’re all modifying the same key, concurrent transactions will constantly run into contention on the same data and will be forced to retry over and over again. This problem gets worse the more concurrent transactions you have trying to read from or write to the same key. Even if we stick to sequential access, if it takes ~5-10ms to assign a UID, we can only assign ~100-200 UIDs per second, nowhere near the throughput we need to support. How can we get past this problem and allow us to give strings unique uint64 UIDs in a high throughput and highly concurrent manner? Attempt #1: xxHash My first attempt to solve this problem was to try something that required no coordination and hash the string keys into uint64s using xxHash. xxHash is a non-cryptographic hash algorithm that supports incredibly high throughput (dozens of GB/sec) and can produce 64 bit unsigned integer hashes of strings trivially. Implementing this would look something like: Hash the incoming string key Lookup the uint64 UID to see if we’ve already assigned it to a string Reject the transaction if there’s a collision and give up Store the key in the UID map and the UID in the key map Use the UID for anything else we need While the uint64 keyspace is plenty large for our needs assuming we distribute evenly among the whole space, using a hashing algorithm with no coordination means there’s room for collisions and thus we’d need some additional logic (potentially by bucketing the keys somehow). Consulting the Birthday Problem we can see that a keyspace with 64 bit hashes has a >50% chance of containing a single collision when we have only ~5 billion keys in the set! That’s barely more keys than we can cram into a uint32 and definitely won’t suffice for the number of keys we expect to be storing! So, xxHash, while nice and coordination-free is probably not going to be the solution we need. What else can we do? Attempt #2: Billions of Sequences Incrementing one sequence is clearly not an option because we can only increment a single sequence ~100-200 times per second, but what if we instead had more than one sequence? Roaring Bitmaps managed to make highly efficient bitmap representations by breaking up a uint32 keyspace into a uint16-wide set of uint16-wide keyspaces. Can we do something similar here? Here’s an idea, what if we had just over 4 billion difference sequences and just picked one at random when we needed to assign a UID? Since we’re constructing our UIDs as a uint64, we can split the full UID into a pair of uint32s where the most-significant-bits are used to identify the sequence ID and the least-significant-bits are used to identify the value assigned to the UID within the sequence. So in our implementation, we get ~4.3 Billion sequence IDs that each have ~4.3 Billion incrementing values. As an example, if we were to randomly select Sequence ID 37 and then we increment that sequence to the value 5, we’d assemble the ID as 37<<32 + 5 which looks like 158,913,789,952 + 5 -> 158,913,789,957. Looking at the next Seuqence ID, we’d see 38 which, when left shifted by 32 gives us 163,208,757,248. You can see there’s a gap of ~4.3 billion values between the first UID assigned by each Sequence ID. Assuming we can increment a single sequence ~100 times per second with contention, we’re able to mint 430 Billion new UIDs per second without locking up (assuming the cluster can keep up). Storing ~4.3 billion sequences may be a bit expensive, but thankfully this strategy can scale up and down by picking a larger or smaller prefix size. If we only wanted to store say, ~16k sequences, we can pick a 14 bit prefix instead of a 32 bit prefix and then use a 50 bit sequence number. That spreads the load across 2^14 sequence IDs and significantly reduces storage requirements for Sequences. What does this look like in code? Well, it’s honestly not very complex! const uidSequencePrefix = "uid_sequence/" func (s *server) allocateNewUID(tx fdb.Transaction) (uint64, error) { // sequenceNum is the random uint32 sequence we are using for this allocation var sequenceNum uint32 var sequenceKey string // assignedUID is the uint32 within the sequence we will assign var assignedUID uint32 // Try up to 5 times to find a sequence that is not exhausted for range 5 { // Pick a random uint32 as the sequence we will be using for this UID sequenceNum = rand.Uint32() sequenceKey = fmt.Sprintf("%s%d", uidSequencePrefix, sequenceNum) val, err := tx.Get(fdb.Key(sequenceKey)).Get() if err != nil { return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get last UID: %w", err) } if len(val) == 0 { assignedUID = 1 // Start each sequence at 1 } else { lastUID, err := strconv.ParseUint(string(val), 10, 32) if err != nil { return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse last UID: %w", err) } // If we have exhausted this sequence, pick a new random sequence if lastUID >= 0xFFFFFFFF { continue } assignedUID = uint32(lastUID) + 1 } } // If we failed to find a sequence after 5 tries, return an error if assignedUID == 0 { return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to allocate new UID after 5 attempts") } // Assemble the 64-bit UID from the sequence ID and assigned UID newUID := (uint64(sequenceNum) << 32) | uint64(assignedUID) // Store the assigned UID back to the sequence key for the next allocation tx.Set(fdb.Key(sequenceKey), []byte(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(assignedUID), 10))) // Return the full 64-bit UID return newUID, nil } And there we go! We can now intern billions of strings per second with little to no contention in a distributed system while completely avoiding collisions and making full use of our keyspace! Conclusion Often times when designing distributed systems, patterns and strategies you see in seemingly unrelated libraries can inspire an elegant solution to the problem at hand. In the case of distributed, high-throughput string interning, horizontal scaling can be achieved by breaking up one large keyspace that requires strict coordination into billions of smaller keyspaces that can be randomly load-balanced across. Both patterns used in this technique are present elsewhere: Breaking up a large keyspace into a bunch of smaller keyspaces is present in Roaring Bitmaps (among other systems) Letting randomness and large numbers spread out resource contention is present in many load balancing systems This is one of my favorite parts of growing as an engineer: the more systems and strategies you familiarize yourself with, the more material you have to draw from when designing something new. Personal News A bit of personal news for y’all if you made it this far. Today is my last day as a member of the Bluesky team! The past 2+ years building out Bluesky’s Infrastructure and Platform team and scaling Bluesky from 100,000 -> 40,000,000 users have been the most intense and rewarding years of my life. I don’t have the words to express how much I’ve valued my time on the team and how much I care for the people I’ve worked with in what feels like a decade of real time. I’ve got some new adventures ahead and am excited to be embarking on a new journey within the next month (still building large-scale infrastructure, don’t worry). I plan to continue being involved in the AT Proto Community and to contribute to some cool projects other folks on the Bluesky team are working on from the FOSS space (like KVDB). To the team, I wish you all the best and will dearly miss getting to work with you all every day, but nothing lasts forever and I will always cherish the time I got to spend building an incredible platform with incredible people. If you’re interested in joining a world-class team doing important work, check out Bluesky’s open job listings here. There should be a new role opening up for a seasoned Go Engineer on the Platform team soon!
Often when designing systems, we aim for perfection in things like consistency of data, availability, latency, and more. The hardest part of system design is that it’s difficult (if not impossible) to design systems that have perfect consistency, perfect availability, incredibly low latency, and incredibly high throughput, all at the same time. Instead, when we approach system design, it’s best to treat each of these properties as points on different axes that we balance to find the “right fit” for the application we’re supporting. I recently made some major tradeoffs in the design of Bluesky’s Following Feed/Timeline to improve the performance of writes at the cost of consistency in a way that doesn’t negatively affect users but reduced P99s by over 96%. Timeline Fanout When you make a post on Bluesky, your post is indexed by our systems and persisted to a database where we can fetch it to hydrate and serve in API responses. Additionally, a reference to your post is “fanned out” to your followers so they can see it in their Timelines. This process involves looking up all of your followers, then inserting a new row into each of their Timeline tables in reverse chronological order with a reference to your post. When a user loads their Timeline, we fetch a page of post references and then hydrate the posts/actors concurrently to quickly build an API response and let them see the latest content from people they follow. The Timelines table is sharded by user. This means each user gets their own Timeline partition, randomly distributed among shards of our horizontally scalable database (ScyllaDB), replicated across multiple shards for high availability. Timelines are regularly trimmed when written to, keeping them near a target length and dropping older post references to conserve space. Hot Shards in Your Area Bluesky currently has around 32 Million Users and our Timelines database is broken into hundreds of shards. To support millions of partitions on such a small number of shards, each user’s Timeline partition is colocated with tens of thousands of other users’ Timelines. Under normal circumstances with all users behaving well, this doesn’t present a problem as the work of an individual Timeline is small enough that a shard can handle the work of tens of thousands of them without being heavily taxed. Unfortunately, with a large number of users, some of them will do abnormal things like… well… following hundreds of thousands of other users. Generally, this can be dealt with via policy and moderation to prevent abusive users from causing outsized load on systems, but these processes take time and can be imperfect. When a user follows hundreds of thousands of others, their Timeline becomes hyperactive with writes and trimming occurring at massively elevated rates. This load slows down the individual operations to the user’s Timeline, which is fine for the bad behaving user, but causes problems to the tens of thousands of other users sharing a shard with them. We typically call this situation a “Hot Shard”: where some resident of a shard has “hot” data that is being written to or read from at much higher rates than others. Since the data on the shard is only replicated a few times, we can’t effectively leverage the horizontal scale of our database to process all this additional work. Instead, the “Hot Shard” ends up spending so much time doing work for a single partition that operations to the colocated partitions slow down as well. Stacking Latencies Returning to our Fanout process, let’s consider the case of Fanout for a user followed by 2,000,000 other users. Under normal circumstances, writing to a single Timeline takes an average of ~600 microseconds. If we sequentially write to the Timelines of our user’s followers, we’ll be sitting around for 20 minutes at best to Fanout this post. If instead we concurrently Fanout to 1,000 Timelines at once, we can complete this Fanout job in ~1.2 seconds. That sounds great, except it oversimplifies an important property of systems: tail latencies. The average latency of a write is ~600 microseconds, but some writes take much less time and some take much more. In fact, the P99 latency of writes to the Timelines cluster can be as high as 15 milliseconds! What does this mean for our Fanout? Well, if we concurrently write to 1,000 Timelines at once, statistically we’ll see 10 writes as slow as or slower than 15 milliseconds. In the case of timelines, each “page” of followers is 10,000 users large and each “page” must be fanned out before we fetch the next page. This means that our slowest writes will hold up the fetching and Fanout of the next page. How does this affect our expected Fanout time? Each “page” will have ~100 writes as slow as or slower than the P99 latency. If we get unlucky, they could all stack up on a single routine and end up slowing down a single page of Fanout to 1.5 seconds. In the worst case, for our 2,000,000 Follower celebrity, their post Fanout could end up taking as long as 5 minutes! That’s not even considering P99.9 and P99.99 latencies which could end up being >1 second, which could leave us waiting tens of minutes for our Fanout job. Now imagine how bad this would be for a user with 20,000,000+ Followers! So, how do we fix the problem? By embracing imperfection, of course! Lossy Timelines Imagine a user who follows hundreds of thousands of others. Their Timeline is being written to hundreds of times a second, moving so fast it would be humanly impossible to keep up with the entirety of their Timeline even if it was their full-time job. For a given user, there’s a threshold beyond which it is unreasonable for them to be able to keep up with their Timeline. Beyond this point, they likely consume content through various other feeds and do not primarily use their Following Feed. Additionally, beyond this point, it is reasonable for us to not necessarily have a perfect chronology of everything posted by the many thousands of users they follow, but provide enough content that the Timeline always has something new. Note in this case I’m using the term “reasonable” to loosely convey that as a social media service, there must be a limit to the amount of work we are expected to do for a single user. What if we introduce a mechanism to reduce the correctness of a Timeline such that there is a limit to the amount of work a single Timeline can place on a DB shard. We can assert a reasonable limit for the number of follows a user should have to have a healthy and active Timeline, then increase the “lossiness” of their Timeline the further past that limit they go. A loss_factor can be defined as min(reasonable_limit/num_follows, 1) and can be used to probabilistically drop writes to a Timeline to prevent hot shards. Just before writing a page in Fanout, we can generate a random float between 0 and 1, then compare it to the loss_factor of each user in the page. If the user’s loss_factor is smaller than the generated float, we filter the user out of the page and don’t write to their Timeline. Now, users all have the same number of “follows worth” of Fanout. For example with a reasonable_limit of 2,000, a user who follows 4,000 others will have a loss_factor of 0.5 meaning half the writes to their Timeline will get dropped. For a user following 8,000 others, their loss factor of 0.25 will drop 75% of writes to their Timeline. Thus, each user has a effective ceiling on the amount of Fanout work done for their Timeline. By specifying the limits of reasonable user behavior and embracing imperfection for users who go beyond it, we can continue to provide service that meets the expectations of users without sacrificing scalability of the system. Aside on Caching We write to Timelines at a rate of more than one million times a second during the busy parts of the day. Looking up the number of follows of a given user before fanning out to them would require more than one million additional reads per second to our primary database cluster. This additional load would not be well received by our database and the additional cost wouldn’t be worth the payoff for faster Timeline Fanout. Instead, we implemented an approach that caches high-follow accounts in a Redis sorted set, then each instance of our Fanout service loads an updated version of the set into memory every 30 seconds. This allows us to perform lookups of follow counts for high-follow accounts millions of times per second per Fanount service instance. By caching values which don’t need to be perfect to function correctly in this case, we can once again embrace imperfection in the system to improve performance and scalability without compromising the function of the service. Results We implemented Lossy Timelines a few weeks ago on our production systems and saw a dramatic reduction in hot shards on the Timelines database clusters. In fact, there now appear to be no hot shards in the cluster at all, and the P99 of a page of Fanout work has been reduced by over 90%. Additionally, with the reduction in write P99s, the P99 duration for a full post Fanout has been reduced by over 96%. Jobs that used to take 5-10 minutes for large accounts now take <10 seconds. Knowing where it’s okay to be imperfect lets you trade consistency for other desirable aspects of your systems and scale ever higher. There are plenty of other places for improvement in our Timelines architecture, but this step was a big one towards improving throughput and scalability of Bluesky’s Timelines. If you’re interested in these sorts of problems and would like to help us build the core data services that power Bluesky, check out this job listing. If you’re interested in other open positions at Bluesky, you can find them here.
Bluesky recently saw a massive spike in activity in response to Brazil’s ban of Twitter. As a result, the AT Proto event firehose provided by Bluesky’s Relay at bsky.network has increased in volume by a huge amount. The average event rate during this surge increased by ~1,300%. Before this new surge in activity, the firehose would produce around 24 GB/day of traffic. After the surge, this volume jumped to over 232 GB/day! Keeping up with the full, verified firehose quickly became less practical on cheap cloud infrastructure with metered bandwidth. To help reduce the burden of operating bots, feed generators, labelers, and other non-verifying AT Proto services, I built Jetstream as an alternative, lightweight, filterable JSON firehose for AT Proto. How the Firehose Works The AT Proto firehose is a mechanism used to keep verified, fully synced copies of the repos of all users. Since repos are represented as Merkle Search Trees, each firehose event contains an update to the user’s MST which includes all the changed blocks (nodes in the path from the root to the modified leaf). The root of this path is signed by the repo owner, and a consumer can keep their copy of the repo’s MST up-to-date by applying the diff in the event. For a more in-depth explanation of how Merkle Trees are constructed, check out this explainer. Practically, this means that for every small JSON record added to a repo, we also send along some number of MST blocks (which are content-addressed hashes and thus very information-dense) that are mostly useful for consumers attempting to keep a fully synced, verified copy of the repo. You can think of this as the difference between cloning a git repo v.s. just grabbing the latest version of the files without the .git folder. In this case, the firehose effectively streams the diffs for the repository with commits, signatures, and metadata, which is inherently heavier than a point-in-time checkout of the repo. Because firehose events with repo updates are signed by the repo owner, they allow a consumer to process events from any operator without having to trust the messenger. This is the “Authenticated” part of the Authenticated Transfer (AT) Protocol and is crucial to the correct functioning of the network. That being said, of the hundreds of consumers of Bluesky’s production Relay, >90% of them are building feeds, bots, and other tools that don’t keep full copies of the entire network and don’t verify MST operations at all. For these consumers, all they actually process is the JSON records created, updated, and deleted in each event. If consumers already trust the provider to do validation on their end, they could get by with a much more lightweight data stream. How Jetstream Works Jetstream is a streaming service that consumes an AT Proto com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos stream and converts it into lightweight, friendly JSON. If you want to try it out yourself, you can connect to my public Jetstream instance and view all posts on Bluesky in realtime: $ websocat "wss://jetstream2.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe?wantedCollections=app.bsky.feed.post" Note: the above instance is operated by Bluesky PBC and is free to use, more instances are listed in the official repo Readme Jetstream converts the CBOR-encoded MST blocks produced by the AT Proto firehose and translates them into JSON objects that are easier to interface with using standard tooling available in programming languages. Since Repo MSTs only contain records in their leaf nodes, this means Jetstream can drop all of the blocks in an event except for those of the leaf nodes, typically leaving only one block per event. In reality, this means that Jetstream’s JSON firehose is nearly 1/10 the size of the full protocol firehose for the same events, but lacks the verifiability and signatures included in the protocol-level firehose. Jetstream events end up looking something like: { "did": "did:plc:eygmaihciaxprqvxpfvl6flk", "time_us": 1725911162329308, "type": "com", "commit": { "rev": "3l3qo2vutsw2b", "type": "c", "collection": "app.bsky.feed.like", "rkey": "3l3qo2vuowo2b", "record": { "$type": "app.bsky.feed.like", "createdAt": "2024-09-09T19:46:02.102Z", "subject": { "cid": "bafyreidc6sydkkbchcyg62v77wbhzvb2mvytlmsychqgwf2xojjtirmzj4", "uri": "at://did:plc:wa7b35aakoll7hugkrjtf3xf/app.bsky.feed.post/3l3pte3p2e325" } }, "cid": "bafyreidwaivazkwu67xztlmuobx35hs2lnfh3kolmgfmucldvhd3sgzcqi" } } Each event lets you know the DID of the repo it applies to, when it was seen by Jetstream (a time-based cursor), and up to one updated repo record as serialized JSON. Check out this 10 second CPU profile of Jetstream serving 200k evt/sec to a local consumer: By dropping the MST and verification overhead by consuming from relay we trust, we’ve reduced the size of a firehose of all events on the network from 232 GB/day to ~41GB/day, but we can do better. Jetstream and zstd I recently read a great engineering blog from Discord about their use of zstd to compress websocket traffic to/from their Gateway service and client applications. Since Jetstream emits marshalled JSON through the websocket for developer-friendliness, I figured it might be a neat idea to see if we could get further bandwidth reduction by employing zstd to compress events we send to consumers. zstd has two basic operating modes, “simple” mode and “streaming” mode. Streaming Compression At first glance, streaming mode seems like it’d be a great fit. We’ve got a websocket connection with a consumer and streaming mode allows the compression to get more efficient over the lifetime of the connection. I went and implemented a streaming compression version of Jetstream where a consumer can request compression when connecting and will get zstd compressed JSON sent as binary messages over the socket instead of plaintext. Unfortunately, this had a massive impact on Jetstream’s server-side CPU utilization. We were effectively compressing every message once per consumer as part of their streaming session. This was not a scalable approach to offering compression on Jetstream. Additionally, Jetstream stores a buffer of the past 24 hours (configurable) of events on disk in PebbleDB to allow consumers to replay events before getting transitioned into live-tailing mode. Jetstream stores serialized JSON in the DB, so playback is just shuffling the bytes into the websocket without having to round-trip the data into a Go struct. When we layer in streaming compression, playback becomes significantly more expensive because we have to compress outgoing events on-the-fly for a consumer that’s catching up. In real numbers, this increased CPU usage of Jetstream by 23% while lowering the throughput of playback from ~200k evt/sec to ~28k evt/sec for a single local consumer. When in streaming mode, we can’t leverage the bytes we compress for one consumer and reuse them for another consumer because zstd’s streaming context window may not be in sync between the two consumers. They haven’t received exactly the same data in the session so the clients on the other end don’t have their state machines in the same state. Since streaming mode’s primary advantage is giving us eventually better efficiency as the encoder learns about the data, what if we just taught the encoder about the data at the start and compress each message statelessly? Dictionary Mode zstd offers a mechanism for initializing an encoder/decoder with pre-optimized settings by providing a dictionary trained on a sample of the data you’ll be encoding/decoding. Using this dictionary, zstd essentially uses it’s smallest encoded representations for the most frequently seen patterns in the sample data. In our case, where we’re compressing serialized JSON with a common event shape and lots of common property names, training a dictionary on a large number of real events should allow us to represent the common elements among messages in the smallest number of bytes. For take two of Jetstream with zstd, let’s to use a single encoder for the whole service that utilizes a custom dictionary trained on 100,000 real events. We can use this encoder to compress every event as we see it, before persisting and emitting it to consumers. Now we end up with two copies of every event, one that’s just serialized JSON, and one that’s statelessly compressed to zstd using our dictionary. Any consumers that want compression can have a copy of the dictionary on their end to initialize a decoder, then when we broadcast the shared compressed event, all consumers can read it without any state or context issues. This requires the consumers and server to have a pre-shared dictionary, which is a major drawback of this implementation but good enough for our purposes. That leaves the problem of event playback for compression-enabled clients. An easy solution here is to just store the compressed events as well! Since we’re only sticking the JSON records into our PebbleDB, the actual size of the 24 hour playback window is <8GB with sstable compression. If we store a copy of the JSON serialized event and a copy of the zstd compressed event, this will, at most, double our storage requirements. Then during playback, if the consumer requests compression, we can just shuffle bytes out of the compressed version of the DB into their socket instead of having to move it through a zstd encoder. Savings Running with a custom dictionary, I was able to get the average Jetstream event down from 482 bytes to just 211 bytes (~0.44 compression ratio). Jetstream allows us to live tail all posts on Bluesky as they’re posted for as little as ~850 MB/day, and we could keep up with all events moving through the firehose during the Brazil Twitter Exodus weekend for 18GB/day (down from 232GB/day). With this scheme, Jetstream is required to compress each event only once before persisting it to disk and emitting it to connected consumers. The CPU impact of these changes is significant in proportion to Jetstream’s incredibly light load but it’s a flat cost we pay once no matter how many consumers we have. (CPU profile from a 30 second pprof sample with 12 consumers live-tailing Jetstream) Additionally, with Jetstream’s shared buffer broadcast architecture, we keep memory allocations incredibly low and the cost per consumer on CPU and RAM is trivial. In the allocation profile below, more than 80% of the allocations are used to consume the full protocol firehose. The total resident memory of Jetstream sits below 16MB, 25% of which is actually consumed by the new zstd dictionary. To bring it all home, here’s a screenshot from the dashboard of my public Jetstream instance serving 12 consumers all with various filters and compression settings, running on a $5/mo OVH VPS. At our new baseline firehose activity, a consumer of the protocol-level firehose would require downloading ~3.16TB/mo to keep up. A Jetstream consumer getting all created, updated, and deleted records without compression enabled would require downloading ~400GB/mo to keep up. A Jetstream consumer that only cares about posts and has zstd compression enabled can get by on as little as ~25.5GB/mo, <99% of the full weight firehose. Feel free to join the conversation about Jetstream and zstd on Bluesky.
More in AI
If you are helping build something that might kill everyone, maybe stop doing that.
Today's links Autodoxing: The road to hell is paved with badly thought-through tech policy. Hey look at this: Delights to delectate. Object permanence: Shakespeare programming language; DeCSS is "pure speech"; Blue Coat sold surveillance tools to Syrian secret police; "Extraordinary Catalog of Peculiar Inventions"; Cable prices rose at double the rate of inflation for 20 years; Supercuts; Antivax x Trump. Upcoming appearances: Kilkenny, Courtenay, Vancouver, Folkestone, Oxford, Sheffield, Virtual, Oxford, Montreal. Recent appearances: Where I've been. Latest books: You keep readin' em, I'll keep writin' 'em. Upcoming books: Like I said, I'll keep writin' 'em. Colophon: All the rest. Autodoxing (permalink) After 25 years of fighting for human rights amid the wreckage of bad tech policy, I'm here to tell you that the road to hell is paved with badly thought-through tech policy. The most galling thing about this wreckage is that it was both foreseeable and foreseen. Back when Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy was telling the world "Privacy is dead, get over it," digital rights advocates were saying, "Not only are digital tools pretty dang good at helping you protect your privacy, but a society-wide abolition of privacy sets us up for infinite harms long into the future": https://pluralistic.net/2025/10/31/losing-the-crypto-wars/#surveillance-monopolism It wasn't just business leaders who hated privacy, it was also our political classes. Bill Clinton tried to put a backdoor into every microchip (no, really): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip The NSA managed to enact a total prohibition on civilian access to working encryption, on the grounds that we're all safer if our spooks can spy on "bad guys" even if that means that every creep, petty crook, corporate or state-sponsored spy, and mafia can spy on us: https://pluralistic.net/2026/04/09/bernstein-2/#win-some-lose-some Even after that ban was overturned, governments encouraged the private sector to spy on us without limit, precaution or permission. Those private-sector troves of intimate, compromising data about every person alive constitute a warrantless, off-the-books surveillance system that cops, spies and government agencies can tap at will: https://pluralistic.net/2026/10/13/petards-r-us/#nobus To protect these surveillance capabilities, private firms and governments colluded to pass "anticircumvention" laws that make it illegal to reverse engineer our devices and apps to add privacy blockers to them, with the effect that every device we own and every app we use spies on us constantly: https://pluralistic.net/2024/03/12/market-failure/#car-wars At the same time, states either failed to pass new privacy laws (as in the USA, where federal consumer privacy law was last updated in 1988), or passed privacy laws that went unenforced (as in the EU, where "pretending to be Irish" allows US tech giants to flout EU privacy law): https://pluralistic.net/2023/05/15/finnegans-snooze/#dirty-old-town Our surveillance free-for-all world is objectively very bad. Over and over, companies and agencies who have been permitted to nonconsensually harvest and retain our data demonstrate that they are not capable of keeping that data safe, and no matter how badly they fuck up, nothing changes. It's been nearly a decade since Equifax doxed 148 million Americans and not only is the company still in business, they've been permitted to buy up and absorb more commercial surveillance firms. US regulators let Equifax buy Teletrack in 2021. Canadian regulators let them buy the Food Industry Credit Bureau in 2023. The same year, Brazilian regulators let Equifax buy Boa Vista Serviços. This all despite the fact that Equifax blamed its breach on shitty security practices after a string of mergers that led to it haphazardly combining databases from newly acquired surveillance companies. Data isn't the new oil. Data is the new oily rag: profitable only if you can warehouse it in vast quantities under unsafe conditions and have society pick up the bill for every conflagration: https://locusmag.com/feature/cory-doctorow-zucks-empire-of-oily-rags/ Equifax is a serial reoffender, but rather than getting the corporate death-penalty, they've been made to pay coins-down-the-back-of-the-sofa fines that amount to a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of the costs they imposed on society by amassing these vast, flaming storehouses of oily rags. Why wouldn't Equifax reoffend? Our policymakers keep demanding less privacy, not more, and their indifference to the consequences is (almost) comical. Take Malcolm Turnbull, the former Australian Prime Minister who uttered what remains, without a doubt, the single stupidest thing anyone anywhere has ever said about tech policy. Like many of his peers before, during, and since his reign, Turnbull had been trying to outlaw working encryption, insisting that every device have a Bill Clinton-esque back-door for the purpose of spying on "bad guys." When told that the laws of mathematics dictated that any measure that let Australia's cops spy on "bad guys" would also let bad guys spy on Australians, Turnbull replied, "The laws of mathematics are very commendable, but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia": https://www.newscientist.com/article/2140747-laws-of-mathematics-dont-apply-here-says-australian-pm/ We could laugh Turnbull off…if he was an outlier. But while Turnbull had the world's stupidest rejoinder to the scientifically irrefutable fact that banning encryption will let bad guys hack everything, he was hardly alone in wanting to ban encryption. Banning encryption is current policy in Canada: https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2026/10/08/canadas-bill-c-22-threatens-encryption-users-privacy-and-the-security-of-digital-economies/ It's also current policy in the UK: https://pluralistic.net/2023/03/05/theyre-still-trying-to-ban-cryptography/ And in the EU: https://fightchatcontrol.eu/ The difference between Malcolm Turnbull and, say, Canadian PM Mark Carney is that Turnbull was stupid enough to try to defend his ban on encryption, while Carney simply shakes his head at his critics' naivete and continues to press forward with his catastrophic proposal to welcome every cybercriminal in the world to hack every morsel of Canadian data. When it comes to bad privacy policy, our political classes aren't content to rest on their laurels: hardly a week goes by without news of a new way to encourage (or even require) the private sector to recklessly collect and retain our data, despite the dead certainty that this data will eventually end up breaching and getting plastered all over the internet. Take "age verification" laws. There's no such thing as "age verification" – there's just spying on everyone, all the time, creating (even more) records of all of our internet activities: https://pluralistic.net/2026/05/19/shes-dead-of-course/#consensus-hallucination Every promise of "privacy preserving" age verification is bullshit: https://pluralistic.net/2025/08/14/bellovin/#wont-someone-think-of-the-cryptographers If you think kids are experiencing internet harms today, just wait until we expose them to the harms of having even more of their data harvested, stored, breached, and weaponized against them: https://pluralistic.net/2026/06/23/destroy-the-village/#to-save-it If you want to protect kids from algorithmic manipulation and targeting by bad actors, what about banning spying on kids so no one can target them? https://made-not-found-by-danah-boyd.ghost.io/no-one-paid-me-to-disagree-with-jonathan-haidt-it-was-teenagers-who-taught-me-that-he-was-wrong/ Now, at this point, you might be thinking, "How can we know who the kids are so we know who not to spy on?" You can't. In order to not spy on kids, you'd just have to not spy on anyone: https://pluralistic.net/2023/04/09/how-to-make-a-child-safe-tiktok/ "Don't spy on anyone" is the kind of thing that has a reasonable chance of enhancing online privacy. But in the time-honored tradition of "we've tried nothing and we're all out of ideas," governments keep finding ways to make digital privacy worse, for example, by procuring Flock cameras for every lamp-post: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/high-crime-lmao-how-cops-are-treating-mass-surveillance-joke And then there's UK Labour: after the success of a pilot program for an incredibly effective and safe privacy-preserving way of analyzing the country's health records for research processes, they commissioned the Goldacre Report to evaluate the possibility of making this permanent: https://pluralistic.net/2024/03/08/the-fire-of-orodruin/#are-we-the-baddies After that report was completed and had a chance to be metabolized by policymakers, Labour acted upon it…by throwing it out and handing all of the country's health data to Palantir, a serial mishandler of data and violator of privacy: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/sep/30/legal-objections-palantir-nhs-platform-handling-data Here's the scariest thing about bad privacy policy: it has a long fuse. The harms of commercial and private-sector digital surveillance can occur years or even decades after the decision to permit it. There's a straight line from the post-9/11 decision to encourage public agencies to gather, merge and warehouse data on every person in America, and the ability of ICE ethnic cleansing squads to break down people's doors and drag them off to concentration camps; just as there's a straight line from the decision to do nothing about the breach of every Social Security Number and the later theft of all Social Security data by adolescent DOGE criminals: https://www.pcmag.com/news/is-your-ssn-in-the-national-public-data-breach-heres-how-to-find-out But despite how obvious these connections are, the fact that they're separated by a lot of time and space provides our policymakers with cover for making terrible decisions with foreseeably terrible outcomes. As a society, we lack object permanence, the ability to connect acts in the past with present-day phenomena. When the press reports on a "Black October" of catastrophic, AI-fueled data breaches and hack attacks, they don't mention a generation of policymakers' indifference and hostility to information security: https://pluralistic.net/2026/09/12/god-in-the-box/#llms-are-fake Policymakers benefit from politics' eternal now, in which disasters simply befall us, without any history or precedent or cause. Remember the One Big Beautiful Bill? Its architects designed it to wreak its worst harms after the midterms, with Medicaid work rules and food aid restrictions starting in December, and cuts to affordable housing and rural hospitals phasing in through the year: https://www.tumblr.com/mostlysignssomeportents/832146932089700352 Black October is going to give way to Black November, Black December, Black 2027, and the Black 2030s – a string of cybersecurity catastrophes that will befall us until policymakers decide that keeping us safe is more important than making it easy for them to attack their chosen "bad guys." Here's a preview of Black November: there's a new strain of the Volta infostealer malware that uses AI tools to dox you even as it hacks you: https://www.wired.com/story/kernel-panic-volta-autodoxer-ai-infostealer-malware/ How that works: your computer gets hacked and your data gets stolen, then it gets merged with breach data from Ticketmaster, Disney, AT&T and other companies that have recklessly compiled vast troves of data on all of us, stored it insecurely, and leaked it onto the internet where it will live forever. Volta's makers prompt their LLM "to act like an intelligence analyst and produce structured citation-backed assessment of the victim." This lets the criminals prioritize their victims based on the expected return from exploiting them. It augments this dossier by combing through your Gmail as well as your Doordash and Uber Eats profiles. This merged data makes it much easier for criminals to call you up or email you (or have a chatbot call you up or email you) and trick you into giving up even more data: https://pluralistic.net/2024/02/05/cyber-dunning-kruger/#swiss-cheese-security Volta seems especially interested in younger internet users, targeting "Discord, Telegram, Steam, and Roblox sessions." Of course, once our "age verification" services breach vast, eternally persistent, detailed troves of data on young internet users, this kind of AI-supercharged malware will be able to target kids with much greater fidelity and efficacy. AI capabilities have made infostealers much worse, but the reason for that new potency lies in how AI capabilities are supercharged by breach data that is the foreseeable and foreseen consequence of generations of hostility to privacy on the part of policymakers and corporations who responded to the incentives policymakers created. We are living in the age of oily rags. For decades we fucked around with letting the private sector warehouse our data and weaken our security so that public sector agencies could plunder our data and our computers at will. Now, we keep finding out that everything is on fire. It's going to take a long time to fix this, but we can do it. We can build more secure systems. We can make it much more of a legal ball-ache for companies to gather our data in the first place, and we can legalize and promote the creation of privacy blockers for browsers, phones, computers, cars, thermostats and smart speakers. We can enact corporate death-penalties for breaches to reflect the true societal cost of warehousing our data. We can ban Flock cameras and tear down the post-9/11 "fusion centers" that neatly package up our data for use by DOGE fascists and ICE thugs. We can ban our spy agencies from hoarding defects in widely used software, and instead require them to divulge these bugs so vendors can fix them: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS And before we do any of that, we can just stop making it worse by ending the campaigns to require companies to spy on us and deliberately introduce security defects into their products. Hey look at this (permalink) ICE wants its mask back, and hired a company to ask https://blog.flokinet.is/2026/10/29/ice-wants-its-mask-back-and-hired-a-company-to-ask/ Is There Life After AI? Cory Doctorow Thinks So. https://jacobin.com/2026/10/ai-bubble-labor-copyright-competition Online censorship is crushing indie webcomics https://xtramagazine.com/culture/online-censorship-indie-webcomics-284463 Fascists Thrive On Bad Economics https://economicpopulist.substack.com/p/fascists-thrive-on-bad-economics PrivacySafe Foundation Releases Free Security Tools to Combat Global Cyber Threats https://www.einpresswire.com/article/952907125/privacysafe-foundation-releases-free-security-tools-to-combat-global-cyber-threats Object permanence (permalink) #25yrsago NY Post blames pagans from Indianapolis for spam malware https://web.archive.org/web/20011103073038/http://www.nypost.com/news/regionalnews/33077.htm #25yrsago The Shakespeare Programming Language https://web.archive.org/web/20011207071324/http://shakespearelang.sourceforge.net/report/shakespeare/ #25yrsago Appeals court: DeCSS is "pure speech" https://web.archive.org/web/20011102003502/https://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48075,00.html #20yrsago Apple drops Trusted Computing https://web.archive.org/web/20070106150844/https://www.osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter10/tpm/ #20yrsago Microsoft threatens China pull-out over jailed bloggers http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6102180.stm #15yrsago Righthaven copyright troll’s victims send in US marshals to seize its assets https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/11/us-marshals-turned-loose-to-collect-6372080-from-righthaven/ #15yrsago Supercuts: rapid-cut videos that collect repetition https://web.archive.org/web/20111103190737/http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/11/supercut/ #15yrsago Study: why parents help their underage kids pretend to be 13 in order to use Internet sites https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3850/3075 #15yrsago Blue Coat “deep packet inspection” tools used by Syrian secret police and other repressive regimes https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges-syrian-government-use-its-products #15yrsago Extraordinary Catalog of Peculiar Inventions: awesomely dangerous pranks from the age of fraternal lodges https://memex.craphound.com/2011/11/01/extraordinary-catalog-of-peculiar-inventions-awesomely-dangerous-pranks-from-the-age-of-fraternal-lodges/ #10yrsago Cable prices have risen at more than double the rate of inflation for 20 years https://cordcutting.com/news/cable-prices-have-risen-faster-than-inflation-for-each-of-the-past-20-years/ #10yrsago Typical English village mystified by its cult status among Chinese tourists https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-oxfordshire-37820663 #10yrsago Nebraska’s billionaire governor couldn’t preserve the death penalty through the law, so now he’s buying a ballot initiative https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/ricketts-nebraska-death-penalty/ #10yrsago Anti-vaxx conspiracy leaders back Donald Trump, claim it’s mutual https://scienceblogs.com/insolence/2016/11/02/donald-trump-and-disgraced-antivaccine-scientist-andrew-wakefield-best-buds-forever #10yrsago New, fast-spreading IoT botnet hybridizes two less-effective strains to achieve quick dominance https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/11/new-iot-botnet-that-borrows-from-notorious-mirai-infects-3500-devices/ #1yrago There's one thing EVERY government can do to shrink Big Tech https://pluralistic.net/2025/11/01/redistribution-vs-predistribution/#elbows-up-eurostack Upcoming appearances (permalink) Kilkenny (Kilkenomics), Nov 6-8 https://kilkenomics.com/ Courtenay: Enshittification (Sid Williams Theatre Society), Nov 10 https://www.sidwilliamstheatre.com/events/cory-doctorow-talks-enshittification/ Vancouver: BC Policy Solutions Gala, Nov 12 https://bcpolicy.ca/gala/ Folkestone Writers Festival, Nov 16 https://www.creativefolkestone.org.uk/whats-on/cory-doctorow-the-internet-is-broken-now-what/ Oxford: Ministry of the Future, Nov 23 https://ministryforthefuture.co.uk/events.html Sheffield: Reverse Centaur at Juno Books, Nov 25 https://www.outsavvy.com/event/40274/cory-doctorow-in-conversation Virtual: Enshittification, AI, and the Future of Technology (UBC Master of Educational Technology), Nov 28 https://met.ubc.ca/2026/09/met-speaker-series-cory-doctorow-enshittification-ai-and-the-future-of-technology/ Oxford: Bennett Oxford Symposium on Open Code in Science, Dec 9 https://www.bennett.ox.ac.uk/events/2026-bennett-institute-symposium/ Montreal: World Science Fiction Convention, Sep 2-6 https://montreal2027.ca/en Recent appearances (permalink) Clint Eastwood (No Gods No Mayors) https://www.patreon.com/NoGodsNoMayors/posts/clint-eastwood-173008088 Life After AI (Brain Bar) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPPa43-n0vI Terms of Service with Clare Duffy (CNN) https://www.cnn.com/audio/podcasts/terms-of-service-with-clare-duffy/episodes/458ce968-af5d-11f0-b539-13ed2afe25f8 AI, Work, and Power (Software Engineering Daily) AI, Work, and Power https://softwareengineeringdaily.com/podcasts/cory-doctorow-on-ai-work-and-power/ AI, Corporate Power, and the Fight for Worker Control (Plutopia) https://plutopia.io/cory-doctorow-ai-corporate-power-and-the-fight-for-worker-control/ Latest books (permalink) "The Reverse-Centaur's Guide to AI," a short book about being a better AI critic, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, June 2026 https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374621568/thereversecentaursguidetolifeafterai/ "Canny Valley": A limited edition collection of the collages I create for Pluralistic, self-published, September 2025 https://pluralistic.net/2025/09/04/illustrious/#chairman-bruce "Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It," Farrar, Straus, Giroux, October 7 2025 https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374619329/enshittification/ "Picks and Shovels": a sequel to "Red Team Blues," about the heroic era of the PC, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), February 2025 (https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250865908/picksandshovels). "The Bezzle": a sequel to "Red Team Blues," about prison-tech and other grifts, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), February 2024 (thebezzle.org). "The Lost Cause:" a solarpunk novel of hope in the climate emergency, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), November 2023 (http://lost-cause.org). "The Internet Con": A nonfiction book about interoperability and Big Tech (Verso) September 2023 (http://seizethemeansofcomputation.org). Signed copies at Book Soup (https://www.booksoup.com/book/9781804291245). "Red Team Blues": "A grabby, compulsive thriller that will leave you knowing more about how the world works than you did before." Tor Books http://redteamblues.com. "Chokepoint Capitalism: How to Beat Big Tech, Tame Big Content, and Get Artists Paid, with Rebecca Giblin", on how to unrig the markets for creative labor, Beacon Press/Scribe 2022 https://chokepointcapitalism.com Upcoming books (permalink) "The Post-American Internet," a geopolitical sequel of sorts to Enshittification, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2027 "Unauthorized Bread": a middle-grades graphic novel adapted from my novella about refugees, toasters and DRM, FirstSecond, April 20, 2027 "Enshittification, Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It" (the graphic novel), Firstsecond, 2027 "The Memex Method," Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2027 Colophon (permalink) Today's top sources: Currently writing: “Once Is Enemy Action,” a science fiction novel about the origins of modern technofascism. Today's words: 574 (7730 total). "The Post-American Internet," a sequel to "Enshittification," about the better world the rest of us get to have now that Trump has torched America. Fourth draft completed. Submitted to editor. A Little Brother short story about DIY insulin PLANNING This work – excluding any serialized fiction – is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. That means you can use it any way you like, including commercially, provided that you attribute it to me, Cory Doctorow, and include a link to pluralistic.net. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Quotations and images are not included in this license; they are included either under a limitation or exception to copyright, or on the basis of a separate license. Please exercise caution. How to get Pluralistic: Blog (no ads, tracking, or data-collection): Pluralistic.net Newsletter (no ads, tracking, or data-collection): https://pluralistic.net/plura-list Mastodon (no ads, tracking, or data-collection): https://mamot.fr/@pluralistic Bluesky (no ads, possible tracking and data-collection): https://bsky.app/profile/doctorow.pluralistic.net Medium (no ads, paywalled): https://doctorow.medium.com/ Tumblr (mass-scale, unrestricted, third-party surveillance and advertising): https://mostlysignssomeportents.tumblr.com/tagged/pluralistic "When life gives you SARS, you make sarsaparilla" -Joey "Accordion Guy" DeVilla READ CAREFULLY: By reading this, you agree, on behalf of your employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. ISSN: 3066-764X
A recent scroll through social media got me thinking about trust. About half my feed was filled with AI slop that astute users would call out as being machine-generated, often to the embarrassment of the rube who unknowingly spread it and sometimes to the delight of the poster who shared it deliberately because they found it amusing or useful for sowing confusion. Remember the good old days of GPT-3 when we could ask the chatbot anything and it would almost instantly and very confidently spit back a plausible but false answer? That’s when the word “hallucination” as applied to AI answers entered the lexicon. Six years and several versions of a few different chatbots later, I still can’t trust the answers I get, even though Claude or Gemini often do useful work for me. That’s the thing about current AI: Trust but verify. And verify you must. Apply that maxim at scale to maintain the integrity of the scientific record and you get an idea of the challenge facing publishers of peer-reviewed scholarship. In “I Used AI to Fake a Scientific Paper,” freelance writer and doctor of applied mathematics Benjamin Skuse tells the story of the human gatekeepers trying to beat back the rising tide of AI slop by attempting to get his own AI-generated papers past IEEE’s defenses. “He basically hit ‘run experiment’ and ‘write paper.’ And then he didn’t do a damn thing to it.” —Eliza Strickland As features and AI beat editor Eliza Strickland told me, Skuse was surprised at just how effortless it was to generate a paper that was more or less plausible and more or less science. For one of his experiments, “he basically hit ‘run experiment’ and ‘write paper,’” she said. “And then he didn’t do a damn thing to it. He just launched it into the maw of the publishing engine.” Skuse discovered that the combination of IEEE’s human-review processes and research-integrity checker programs are currently keeping pace in what amounts to a cat-and-mouse game against people using free tools. But the more advanced LLMs are no longer making the same dumb mistakes the free versions do. That leaves publishers locked in an arms race between increasingly plausible slop and the systems aimed at detecting it. Scholarly publishers aren’t the only ones trying to hold the line against slop. So is that global depository of human-generated knowledge, Wikipedia. For this month’s Five Questions, Strickland interviewed Ellia Lebleu, a founding member of WikiProject AI Cleanup, a volunteer effort to detect and delete AI-generated material from the platform. Lebleu’s team is confronting the same problem as commercial publishers, but with fewer people and fewer tools. “Wikipedia is known as a repository of human-generated information, and they want to hold on to that,” says Strickland. “Who knows how long they’ll be able to do that.” If we can’t collectively assume that the scientific record is trustworthy or that basic facts about the world are accurate, then our understanding of what is real unspools into uncertainty. Perhaps that delights quantum scientists and the grifters who thrive in an information environment where there is no shared reality. But that uncertainty ultimately undermines trust in the institutions that exist to curate the corpus of human knowledge and to promote the advancement of science and technology for the benefit of humanity. Or maybe in a world where AI is doing the science and writing the papers, it won’t matter whether or not humans trust the outputs. As Strickland put it, “Doesn’t it just feel crazy that we’ll have AI writing for other AIs at some point? We’ll just get left out of the loop.”
Video reading by Tim Foley: